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GLOSSARY
The biographies are of the main individuals who appear in this study, and are by no 
means exhaustive. They are based on the following works: Kokushi Daijiten Henshü 
Iinkai hen, Kokushi daijiten (various volumes). (Tokyo: Yoshikawa köbunkan, 1979- 
1993); Arthur W. Hummel (ed), Eminent Chinese o f the C h’ing Period (vol. I, II). 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1944, 1945); Ssu-YU Teng and 
John King Fairbank, China ’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982; Paul Bailey, ‘Introduction’ 
in Ma Jianzhong, Strengthen the Country and Enrich the People: The Reform Writings 
o f Ma Jianzhong (1845-1900) (Durham East Asia Series, no. 2) (Paul Bailey, trans.). 
(Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998); Yen-P’ing Hao, ‘Chan Kuan-ying: The 
Comprador as Reformer’, Journal o f Asian Studies (vol. 29, no. 1, November 1969, pp. 
15-22) and Nakamura Masanori, Ishii Kanji, Kasuga Yutaka (eds) Nihon kindai shisö 
taikei (vol. 8). keizei kösö. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1988)
Chinese names
Cai E Cai E (1882-1916) was a disciple of Liang Qichao. He led the
Yunnan Army and rebelled against Yuan Shikai, the then president of 
the Republic of China, 1916, contributing to the latter’s downfall.
Dong Xun Dong (1807-1892) was an official from Jiangsu. He first served in the
Board of Revenue. He was appointed to the zongli yamen in 1861, 
where he served until 1880. He was experienced in negotiations with 
European diplomats, and strongly called for Chinese diplomats to be 
posted overseas. Dong was also an acquaintance of W. A. P. Martin, 
and wrote the preface to his translation of Wheaton’s Elements o f  
International Law, the Wanguo gongfa.
Feng Guifen Feng Guifen (1809-1874) was a scholar from Suzhou. He was
director of local academies in Shanghai and Suzhou, but also served 
as assistant to both Lin Zexu and Li Hongzhang. His celebrated work, 
the Jiaobinlu kangyi, was compiled in 1861 and published
posthumously. It was presented to the Guangxu emperor in 1893, 
when concerted efforts were been taken to strengthen the country.
Guo Songtao
He Ruzhang 
Kang Youwei
Li Hongzhang
Ma Jianzhong
Guo (1818-1891) was a scholar, official and diplomat from Hunan. 
He opposed aggressive anti-foreign behaviour, which was extremely 
rare for his time. He worked as a local administrator, administering 
the salt monopoly. In 1863, he was appointed as acting governor of 
Guangdong. He was appointed as Chinese Minister to Britain in 
1876.
He (1838-1891) served as China’s Minister to Japan.
Kang (1858-1927) was a Confucian scholar and reformist. His 
memorials came to the attention of the Guangxu emperor in 1898, 
which culminated in the ‘Hundred Days of Reform’ which began on 
June that year. The reforms were crushed by the empress dowager 
Cixi, and Kang was forced to go into exile. Although he eventually 
returned to China after the collapse of the Qing, he never wielded the 
political significance that he had during the brief period of reforms of 
1898.
Li (1823-1901) was one of most influential officials and Chinese 
diplomats of his time. His climb to the highest levels of official dome 
came in the backdrop of his role in organising local militia to fight 
and Taiping Rebellion. Thereafter, he served as acting governor of 
Jiangsu. He became governor-general of Hunan and Hubei. He was 
charged with a number of political duties, including those of governor 
general of Zhili, a position he held on for 25 years. Li also had 
considerable experience of diplomatic negotiations with the European 
powers, and his power was such that many matters of foreign affairs 
would (in addition to the zongli yamen) come to his attention because 
foreign dignitaries often visit his headquarters in Tianjin for his 
consent or advise. Li is also famous for being a leading reformist 
official, and sponsored many initiatives that aimed to make China 
‘rich and strong’.
Ma (1845-1900) was from Jiangsu province. His family was 
Catholic, and Ma studied at a French Catholic school. He served as a
Prince Gong
Shen Baozhen
Wang Tao
diplomatic attache accompanying students sent overseas from the 
Fuzhou Naval Dockyard. While in France, Ma studied international 
law, commercial law, and political systems. He served as Li 
Hongzhang’s personal staff from 1880. He assisted in the drawing up 
of the U.S.-Korea treaty of 1882, and helped consolidate Sino-Korean 
ties. Ma Jianzhong was also assistant manager of the China 
Merchants Steam Navigation Company from 1884 to 1891.
Prince Gong (1833-1898) was a Manchu prince with the name of 
Yixin. He was the younger brother of the Xianfeng emperor. 
Although he was initially unfavourably disposed towards the 
European powers, military defeat and increased interaction with their 
diplomats gradually brought about a change in his attitude. He was 
instrumental in the establishment of the zongli yamen in 1860. Prince 
Gong also served as co-regent to the Tongzhi emperor from 1861. 
Prince Gong was probably at the height of powers around this time, 
holding additional offices in the zongli yamen and Grand Council. 
However, his growing power brought about the suspicion of the 
empress dowager, who demoted him from time to time curb his 
powers and ambitions. He gradually faded from the scene, returning 
briefly to participate (albeit ineffectively) in the Sino-Japanese 
negotiations which led to the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895.
Shen (1820-1879) was an official from Fujian. Famed for his strict, 
incorruptible personality, he is best known as Imperial Commissioner 
and Director General of the Fuzhou Naval Dockyard, which had 
originally been established by Zuo Zongtang. He served this post 
until 1874, and during this time the shipyard produced fifteen vessels 
and trained students in English, French, and other technical studies. 
Shen also played a part in implementing a number of institutional 
reforms in Taiwan following the Japanese invasion of the island in 
1873.
Wang Tao (1828-1897) was one of the earliest Chinese journalists. 
He worked in Shanghai for the missionary press in the 1840s. He 
briefly flirted with the Taiping rebels, which landed him in trouble
vii
Wei Yuan
Wenxiang
Woren
with the Qing authorities after the rebellion was crushed. He spent his 
time as a refugee in the British consulate in Shanghai, and eventually 
escaped to Hong Kong. There, he spent his time assisting Briton 
James Legge in translating Chinese classics into English. Wang 
travelled to Britain in 1867, and returned to Hong Kong in 1870. 
Back in Hong Kong, Wang established his own publishing house. By 
translating passages from foreign periodicals, he published an account 
of the Franco-Prussian War, which was reprinted by the Japanese 
army in 1878. He established a newspaper, the Xunhuan ribao. He 
wrote and published widely on contemporary and foreign affairs. He 
eventually returned to Shanghai in 1884, where he continued to write 
articles for newspapers. Wang’s writings are wide-ranging, including 
fiction, European technology, and the history of Western political 
institutions.
Wei Yuan (1794-1856) was a historian and geographer from Hunan. 
He served as a magistrate in Jiangsu, and was also an adviser to the 
governor there. He is noted for several volumes of work, among them 
the Shengwuji, an account o f the Qing military campaigns, and the 
Haiguo tuzhi, which first appeared in 1844 and was hugely influential 
in both China and Japan.
Wenxiang (1818-1876) was a Manchu official. He served as an 
official in various capacities before taking up a post in the zongli 
yamen, which he had helped establish with Prince Gong. He also 
served in the Board of War and Board of Civil office. In 1871 he 
became Associate Grand Secretary, and Grand Secretary the following 
year. His honest character earned him the respect of the European 
diplomats, and he was one of the more reformist officials of his time. 
He also helped establish the Tongwenguan, the school for Western 
languages and studies.
Woren (7-1871) was a Mongol official. He was appointed imperial 
tutor in 1855. In 1862 he was appointed as president of the Board of 
Works and Grand Secretary. He was a powerful official and seen as 
an expert on Song Neo-Confucianism. He was one of the leading
viii
Xu Jiyu
Xue Fucheng
Yuan Shikai
Zeng Guo fan
Zhang Zhidong
officials who opposed Prince Gong and Wenxiang’s institutional 
reforms.
Xu (1795-1873) was an official and geographer from Shanxi. He 
served various posts including governor of Guangxi and Fujian. At 
Fujian he had the opportunity to come into contact with European 
nationals, and he tried to foster mutual confidence between them. 
This made him popular with the European powers, but not among his 
own people. His most famous work, the Yinghuan zhilile was first 
published in 1850.
Xue (1838-1894) was an official from Jiangsu. He came to Zeng 
Guofan’s attention during the pacification of the Nian Rebellion, and 
served as a secretary to Zeng’s staff. In 1875, he joined Li 
Hongzhang’s staff. He was instrumental in providing Li Hongzhang 
with advice to send troops to Korea following the 1882 mutiny. Xue 
was appointed Minister to Britain, France, Italy and Belgium in 1889, 
and stayed in Europe for four years.
Yuan (1859-1916) was a military leader and official of the Qing. He 
served as the Chinese Resident of Korea between until 1894. He later 
became the president of the Republic of China in 1912.
Zeng Guofan (1811-1872) was bom in Hunan. Noted for his 
morality, he was in charge of pacifying the Taiping Rebellion and 
some of the Nian Rebellion. He was one of the Qing’s top officials of 
his time, and played a significant role in China’s dealing with the 
Western powers, and displayed a great interest in Western military 
technology. He also established an arsenal in Jiangxi and Shanghai. 
He was also a patron of Li Hongzhang.
Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909) was born in Zhili province (present day 
Hebei). He was a high-ranking official who enjoyed appointments to 
the posts of tutor to the Imperial Academy, governor-general of 
Liangguang, Huguang and Liangjiang. He also became a Grand 
Councillor (Junji dachen). He was noted for his honest and vigorous 
leadership. Zhang often supported strong, military measures against 
the European powers, particularly during the Sino-Russian dispute
Zheng Guanying
Zuo Zongtang
during 1879-1880, and the Sino-French conflict over Vietnam, but 
neither was he a xenophobic ‘diehard’. He was a strong advocate of 
‘self-strengthening’ and learning superior techniques from the West 
and established military schools and arsenals, as well as sending 
students to Japan for study. Zhang later also proposed the 
establishment of a school system based on Japanese models. His most 
famous work, the Quanxue bian was written in the backdrop of Kang 
Youwei’s sweeping reforms, and called for moderate change based on 
Confucian learning and Chinese institutions.
Zheng (1842-1923) was a comprador who served as director of Li 
Hongzhang’s Shanghai Cotton Cloth mill and China Merchants Steam 
Navigation Company, as well as foreign enterprises operating in 
China. Bom in Guangdong province, he received a classical 
education as a child. After failing to get an official post, he moved to 
Shanghai and worked as a merchant. He studied English, and his 
sustained contact with foreigners in the Treaty Ports profoundly 
influenced him, and led to the emergence of his reformist ideas.
Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885) was bom in Hunan. An able and 
incorruptible official, his career was often associated with military 
campaigns. He took part in battles against the Taiping rebels, the 
Nian rebels, and the Muslim uprising. He served as governor-general 
of Fujian and Zhejiang from 1862, and was then appointed governor- 
general of Shaanxi and Gansu in 1866. During his tenure as 
governor-general, he did much to assist the rehabilitation of areas 
devastated by rebellions, encouraging agriculture and establishing 
local industry. He maintained a high level of interest in Western 
technology, particularly weapons. He was an able administrator and 
was instmmental in setting up modem Western factories and arsenals, 
such as the famous Fuzhou Naval Dockyard and a gunpowder factory 
in Lanzhou, Gansu.
Japanese names
Abe Masahiro
Aizawa Seishisai
Dazai Shundai
Eto Shinpei
Fukuzawa Yukichi
Abe (1819-1857) was the röjü when Perry arrived in Japan in 
1853. He was instrumental in the signing of the Treaty of 
Peace and Amity in 1854. He introduced Western arms and 
culture through the establishment of a naval school (Kaigun 
denshüjo) and a school of Western learning (the Yögakusho). 
Aizawa Seishisai (1782-1863) was a samurai and Confucian 
scholar of the Mito fiefdom. He eventually became the head 
of the Ködökan, the Mito fiefdom’s school in 1840. He 
interviewed British sailors in 1824. His influential work, 
Shimon was written the next year. It was originally intended 
for the Mito lord but was later disseminated widely and 
influenced many samurai opposed to the signing of the 
unequal treaties with the West.
(1680-1747). Tokugawa Confucian. His political thought was 
based on strong discipline and pragmatism.
Etö (1834-1874) was a politician of the late-Tokugawa and 
Meiji periods. In the Meiji government he played a role in 
centralising the new government’s power, while also calling 
for a British and American-style of division of the judiciary, 
executive and legislative. He served in the ministry of 
education and ministry of justice. He clashed with Inoue 
Kaoru and Yamagata Aritomo during his tenure as justice 
minister. He left the government following the debate over 
sending troops to Korea, and later took part in a samurai 
rebellion. He was executed for this in 1874.
Fukuzawa (1834-1901) was one of the leading intellectuals of 
the Meiji period. His educational background was in 
Confucian and Dutch studies, but he began studying English. 
In 1860, he sailed to the United States. He published 
numerous works, among them Seiyö jijö (1868), which 
introduced its Japanese audience to Western institutions and 
thought. He was influenced by de Tocqueville, Spencer,
Hanabusa Yoshimoto
Hirosawa Saneomi
Hotta Masayoshi
Ii Naosuke
Iwakura Tomomi
Inoue Kaoru
Buckle, and Guizot. In 1882, he founded a newspaper, the 
Jiji shinpö.
Hanabusa (1842-1917) was a Meiji diplomat. He received a 
Confucian education as a child. In 1867 he travelled to 
France, Britain and the United States. He joined the foreign 
ministry in 1869. He served as Minister to Korea and Russia. 
In 1887, he worked in agricultural and commercial policy, and 
also served as imperial adviser in 1889.
Hirosawa Saneomi (1833-1871) was a samurai from the 
Chöshü fiefdom. He was involved in the anti-foreign 
movements, and was in charge of the peace talks with the 
European powers following their bombardment of the fiefdom 
in 1866. He held important appointments in the dajökan 
government, including that of Imperial Councillor (Sangi). 
He was assassinated in 1871.
Hotta Masayoshi (1810-1864) was the röjü at the time of the 
signing of the 1858 Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between 
the United States and Japan.
Ii (1815-1860) became tairö in 1858 and was instmmental in 
the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between 
the United States and Japan the same year. He was 
assassinated two year later.
Iwakura Tomomi (1825-1883) was one of the key officials of 
the early Meiji government. He served as vice president of 
the dajökan government, and was also foreign minister for a 
brief period in 1871. From 1871-73 he sewed as ambassador 
to Japan’s fact-finding mission to the West. Suspicious of 
popular political participation, he played a part in introducing 
the Prussian-styled Meiji Constitution.
Inoue (1835-1915) was from the Chöshü fiefdom. He took 
part in the 1862 burning of the British legation. He travelled 
to Britain the next year, and became a supporter o f opening up
xii
Inoue Kakugoro
Inoue Kowashi
Ito Hirobumi
Kabayama Sukenori
to the West. Under the Meiji government, he served in the 
fields of finance, agriculture, and home and foreign policy, 
and pushed forward with Japan’s ‘Europeanisation’ policies. 
He attempted to reform the unequal treaties under Ito 
Hirobumi’s cabinet, but had to resign following criticisms of 
excessive concessions to the European powers. He 
maintained his political influence through serving as elder 
statesman.
Inoue Kakugoro (1860-1938) was a politician and 
businessman of the Meiji to early Shöwa period. He studied 
with Fukuzawa Yukichi, and helped establish a newspaper in 
Korea (the Kanjö junpo). He became a member of the House 
of Representatives in 1889, and also served as executive on 
several enterprises.
Inoue Kowashi (1843-1895) was a politician and bureaucrat 
of the early Meiji period. He is most famous for his 
contributions in drafting the Meiji Constitution and Rescript 
on Education. He travelled to Europe in 1872. He assisted 
the Meiji leaders in various capacities, and also became 
minister of education in 1893.
Ito (1841-1909) was one of the most powerful politicians of 
the Meiji period. He took part in the anti-foreign 
demonstrations, participating in the burning of the British 
legation in 1862. In 1863 he travelled to Britain with Inoue 
Kaoru. In 1871, he travelled to Europe and the United States 
again with the Iwakura Mission. He served in the dajökan 
government in various capacities, and played key role in 
promoting Japan’s modernisation. He travelled to Europe 
again 1882 to study constitutionalism, and became Japan’s 
first prime minister in 1885. In 1905, he became the first 
governor general of Korea, and was assassinated in 1909. 
Kabayama (1837-1922) was a politician and army officer of 
the Meiji and Taishö periods. He served in the army and
xiii
Kato Hiroyuki
Kido Takayoshi
Kume Kunitake
Kudo Heisuke
accompanied the 1873 Soejima mission to China, taking part 
in the negotiations over the murder of the Ryükyü islanders in 
Taiwan. He participated in the Taiwan expedition the 
following year. He later served the navy, and commanded the 
naval battles in the Sino-Japanese war. He became the first 
governor general of Taiwan, and played a key role in the 
pacification of the island.
(1836-1916) Political scientist o f the Meiji period. A pioneer 
of German studies. He served the Meiji government in 
various capacities, and was a member of the House of Lords. 
In his earlier works, he had advocated the need for 
establishing a constitutional government, but when the calls 
for mass political participation grew, he criticised the 
movement as premature. In his later years, he turned his 
attention to criticising Christianity and the protection of the 
national interest.
Kido Takayoshi (1833-1877) was a samurai from the Chöshü 
fiefdom. He was one of the leading Meiji statesmen of the 
time, holding the office of Imperial Councillor from 1869- 
1874 and 1875-1876. He was a member of the Iwakura 
mission. Although he had previously called for the invasion 
of Korea to divert samurai dissent, he opposed such plans in 
1873, calling for the need to resolve domestic issues before 
venturing on overseas expeditions. He advocated the 
adoption of a constitutional government.
Kume (1839-1931) was a historian. He came from a samurai 
family, and was the secretary for the Iwakura mission. He 
taught Japanese history, geography and Chinese history at 
Tokyo Imperial University.
Kudo (1734-1800) was a doctor who served the Sendai 
fiefdom. He befriended the leading scholars of Dutch studies 
and learnt of foreign affairs. He wrote o f the necessity to 
prepare for a Russian advance into Ezo (present day
xiv
Hokkaido), and called for the development of the island. His 
ideas were presented to the then röjü Tanuma Okitsugu in 
1783.
Kuroda Kiyotaka
Kuroda Narihiro (also 
known as Kuroda 
Nagahiro)
Maeda Mas ana
Matsuda Michiyuki
Matsudaira Yoshinaga
Matsukata Masayoshi
Kuroda (1840-1900) was a Meiji politician from the Satsuma 
fiefdom. He took part in the anti-Tokugawa military 
campaigns, and in the Meiji government he was primarily 
responsible for the development of Hokkaido. In 1876 he was 
appointed minister plenipotentiary for the negotiations of the 
Kanghwa Treaty. As a leading member of the Satsuma 
faction, his influence was considerable: in 1887 he was 
minister of agriculture and commerce and became prime 
minister the following year. He later became minister for 
communications and head of the Privy Council.
Kuroda (1811-1887) was bom to a daimyö family. He had 
strong interests in Dutch studies, and was one of the few to 
actively advocate the opening of Japan following the arrival 
of Perry.
Maeda (1850-1921) was a bureaucrat and advocate of 
industrial affairs. He studied in France from 1868-1877. He 
is noted for persuading Ökubo Toshimichi that Japan should 
be represented in the Paris Exhibition. He served in various 
capacities in the ministries of finance and agriculture and 
commerce. He resigned from the government in 1890, and 
travelled Japan encouraging local industrialisation.
Matsuda (1839-1882) was a bureaucrat. He worked primarily 
in home affairs. In 1879, he became the governor of Tokyo. 
(1828-1890) A daimyö, he was noted for his enlightened rule 
in his fiefdom. Although he originally called for anti-foreign 
movements, he began advocating the opening up of Japan in 
1857. He became assistant to the shogun Tokugawa Iemochi. 
In the Meiji government, he briefly served as home and 
finance minister from 1869-1870.
Matsukata (1835-1924) was a politician of the Meiji and
Mineta Fuko
Mutsu Munemitsu
Mori Arinori
Taishö (1912-1926) period. He was from the Satsuma 
fiefdom. He served in the home ministry and later entered the 
ministry of finance. He was a noted specialist on fiscal 
affairs, and a strong promoter o f industry. In 1881 he became 
finance minister, and successfully curbed the rampant 
inflation. He was also instrumental in establishing the central 
bank. In 1885, he became finance minister of the Itö cabinet, 
a post he continued to hold for more than six years under 
different cabinets. He continued to wield influence as elder 
statesman, particularly in economic and fiscal affairs.
Mineta (1817-1883) was a samurai and later became an 
educator in the Meiji period. He studied Dutch studies, and 
advocated protecting Japan’s northern borders prior to Perry’s 
arrival. He wrote on the Opium War and European invasions, 
but was imprisoned by the Tokugawa shogunate. Although 
he served the shogunate in the final years of its rule, he spent 
most of his time educating.
Mutsu (1844-1897) was a Meiji politician and foreign 
minister of the second Itö cabinet. He served as governor of 
Kanagawa prefecture and as an official in the ministry of 
finance. He took part in a plot to overthrow the Meiji 
government in 1877, and was imprisoned. After his release, 
he studied in Austria and Britain from 1884. Upon his return 
to Japan, he served as Minister to the United states in from 
1881, and played a key role in Japan’s signing of its first 
equal treaty with Mexico. Later, he served as Minister of 
Agriculture and member of the House of Representatives. In 
1892, he became foreign minister and was in charge of 
Japan’s negotiations with China following the Sino-Japanese 
war.
Mori (1847-1889) was from the Satsuma fiefdom. In 1865, 
he studied at University College, University of London. He 
also visited Russia. He was profoundly influenced by
Motoda Eifu
Nishi Amane
Ogiwara Ryötarö
Okakura Tenshin
Ogyü Sorai 
Ökubo Toshimichi
Christianity. Upon his return to Japan, he served the Meiji 
government in various capacities. In 1869, he was posted to 
the United States, and later served as Minister to China and 
Britain. During his time as Japanese Minister to Britain, he 
befriended Herbert Spencer. Returning to Japan in 1884, he 
served in the ministry of education, and contributed to 
establishing a modem education system in Japan. He was 
known as an advocate o f ‘Westernisation’.
(1818-1891) Also known as Motoda Nagazane, Motoda was a 
Confucian scholar and a close aide of the Meiji emperor. He 
campaigned for direct imperial rule. He campaigned for the 
introduction of national ethics in education. He also had 
interests in the revision of unequal treaties, and opposed Inoue 
Kaoru and Okuma Shigenobu’s attempts revise them.
Nishi (1829-1897) was an academic and bureaucrat of the 
Meiji government. Although he began with a Confucian 
education, he studied Dutch and English, and began studying 
Western philosophy, politics and economics. He from 1863- 
1865, he studied in the Netherlands with Simon Vissering, 
and published his lectures as Bankoku köhö. Member of the 
influential liberal intellectual group, the Meirokusha. He also 
served in the ministry of war.
Ogiwara (1843-1916) was of rich peasant background from 
present day Gunma prefecture. He helped establish one of 
Japan’s leading sericulture cooperatives, the Usuisha.
Okakura (1862-1913) was an intellectual and art critic of the 
Meiji period. He played a role in promoting oriental art, as 
well as holding posts at the Tokyo School of Fine Arts.
Ogyü (1666-1728) was a Confucian scholar 
Ökubo (1830-1878) was a samurai from the Satsuma fiefdom. 
He played a key part in ousting the Tokugawa shogunate. He 
was instrumental in the abolition of the fiefdoms, and served 
as minister of finance and home minister. He was a promoter
xvii
Okuma Shigenobu
Saigo Takamori
Saigo Tsugumichi
of industry, and was strongly influenced by German 
Chancellor Bismarck. In 1874, he took part in the 
negotiations with the Qing over Japan’s sending of troops to 
Taiwan. Often seen as a cold-minded autocrat, he was 
nevertheless one of the earliest Meiji leaders to utilise 
bureaucratic government institutions for political decision­
making.
Ökuma (1838-1922) was a politician of the Meiji and Taishö 
periods. He studied English with Guido Verbeck. He was 
experienced in negotiations with foreign diplomats, and took 
part in negotiations to revise the unequal treaties. He 
advocated the establishment of parliamentary and cabinet 
systems, but clashed with other Meiji leaders and was ousted 
from the government in 1881. He founded a political party, 
the Rikken kaishintö the following year. He became foreign 
minister in 1888, and held the position again in 1896. In 1898 
he became prime minister and held the position again in 1914. 
Saigö (1827-1877) was a leading figure of the Meiji 
Restoration. In the Meiji government, he was instrumental in 
abolishing the fiefdoms, and while the Iwakura mission 
remained overseas, he helped in the implementation of 
compulsory education, conscription, and the new land tax 
system. He resigned following the 1873 controversy over 
sending troops to Korea, and historians remain divided over 
whether Saigö was attempting to avoid war or initiate 
hostilities with Korea to divert samurai dissent. He took part 
in the samurai rebellion of 1877 and committed suicide.
Saigö Tsugumichi (1843-1902) was Takamori’s younger 
brother. He took part in anti-foreign activities, and 
participated in the battles against the British when the latter 
bombarded Kagoshima in retaliation for the Satsuma 
fiefdom’s attacks on foreign ships. He also travelled to 
Europe in 1869 and 1870. Under the Meiji government, he
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Sakuma Shozan
Soejima Taneomi
Takashima Shuhan
served in the Ministry of War. He was instrumental in 
sending troops to Taiwan in 1874. In the wake of the failed 
coup of 1884 in Korea, he travelled to China in 1885 with Itö 
Hirobumi and participated in the negotiations with Li 
Hongzhang. He served as home, army, agriculture and 
commerce minister, but served longest as navy minister.
Sanjö (1837-1891) was a politician of the Meiji period. A 
court noble, he originally opposed Japan’s opening to the 
European powers. He became the prime minister of the 
dajökan government in 1868, and held the position until 
1886.
Sakuma (1811-1864) was a Confucian scholar and samurai. 
Upon hearing of China’s defeat in the Opium War, he 
advocated the necessity to strengthen Japan’s maritime 
defence. He studied the Western cannon and taught the 
subject. His students included Katö Hiroyuki. In 1862, he 
argued that resisting the Western powers was futile, and Japan 
needed to open her borders to the European powers and 
engage in trade. He criticised traditional views of Europeans 
as ‘barbarians’, claiming that such prejudices hindered 
Japan’s learning from the West.
Soejima (1828-1905) was a bureaucrat and politician. He 
studied English and the American constitution under Verbeck. 
In 1872 he became foreign minister, and was ambassador to 
China in 1873, where he discussed the Ryükyü and Taiwan 
issues and the ratification of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 
Peace and Amity. Following the controversy over sending 
troops to Korea, he resigned the Meiji government in 1873. 
He later served as home minister and member of the Privy 
Council.
Takashima (1798-1866) was a military scientist of the late 
Tokugawa period. He was bom in Nagasaki, and leamt about 
Western cannon from the Dutch. He advocated the adoption
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Terashima Munenori
Torii Yozo
Tsuda Shin’ichiro
Wakayama Norikazu
of Western military methods upon hearing of China’s defeat 
in the Opium War, and contributed to the modernisation of 
Tokugawa forces.
Takezoe (1842-1917) was a Meiji diplomat and scholar of 
Chinese studies. He accompanied Mori Arinori to China in 
1875. In 1878, he worked in the ministry of finance. From 
1880 he became the Japanese consul in Tianjin, and 
negotiated with Li Hongzhang over the Ryükyü issue. In 
1882, he became Japanese Minister to Korea, but was relieved 
of his post in 1885. He later taught at Tokyo Imperial 
University.
Terashima Munenori (1833-1893) was from the Satsuma 
fiefdom. He studied rangaku, or Western studies, and 
travelled to Britain in 1865. He was able to converse in 
English, German and French, and was at the forefront of Meiji 
diplomacy. He played an important part in the newly 
established Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Terashima was 
Japan’s Minister to Britain in 1873. In 1882, he was Minister 
to the United States. Terashima also contributed to Japan’s 
attempts to revise the unequal treaties, and also accepted posts 
in the Privy Council.
Torii (1769-1873) was a high-ranking bureaucrat of the late 
Tokugawa period. He is known for his opposition to scholars 
of Dutch studies, whom he persecuted. He was instrumental 
in imprisoning Takashima Shühan, whose Western military 
science he opposed.
Tsuda (1829-1903) was a scholar o f Western studies and later 
became a bureaucrat of the Meiji government. Studied in the 
Netherlands under Simon Vissering in 1862. Translated his 
lectures as Taisei kokuhöron. He assisted in the signing of the 
Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Amity. He also became a 
member of the House of Representatives and House of Lords. 
Wakayama (1840-1891) was an economist. He accompanied
Yamagata Aritomo
Yanagiwara Sakimitsu
the 1871 Iwakura mission to the West, and remained there to 
study fiscal policy. Upon his return to Japan, he served in 
various capacities as a bureaucrat with the Meiji government. 
He introduced many Western works on economics, 
agriculture and law, and is particularly noted for advocating a 
protectionist trade policy.
Yamagata (1838-1922) was one of the highest-ranking Meiji 
oligarchs, with particular influence in military affairs. He was 
bom as a son of a lower-ranking samurai family. He 
participated in anti-foreign activities and battled the American 
and French troops. He was an active member of anti- 
Tokugawa militia, and after the Meiji Restoration became 
responsible for military affairs. He travelled to Europe in 
1869, and was profoundly influenced by Western civilisation. 
Yamagata was responsible for the introduction of 
conscription, and also Japan’s military build-up. He was 
participated in the drafting of the Rescript to Soldiers and 
Sailors and Rescript on Education. In the dajökan 
government, he was Army Minister (1873) and Councillor 
(1874). He became Prime Minister in 1889 and 1898. He 
continued to wield influence even after his official retirement 
well into the 1920s.
Yanagiwara (1850-1894) was from a noble family in Kyoto. 
He joined the Foreign Ministry in 1869. He participated in 
negotiations over the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and 
Amity (concluded 1870) with China from 1870-1872, and 
also accompanied the Soejima Taneomi mission to China in 
1873. In 1874, he assisted Ökubo Toshimichi in the 
negotiations with China in the aftermath of the Taiwan 
Expedition. He also served as Minister to Russia, as well as 
other government administrations, where he played a role in 
establishing legislation which governed the imperial 
household.
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Yokoi Shonan
Korean names
Kim Ok-kyun
Pak Yong-hyo
Ö Yun-jung
Yokoi Shönan (1809-1869) was a low-ranking samurai and 
Confucian scholar from Kumamoto. Hi acted as an adviser to 
the Echizen fiefdom lord, Matsudaira Yoshinaga, and also 
served as a councillor in the Meiji government. His ideas of 
reform were influential among anti-Tokugawa activists.
(1851-1894) A reformist Korean official. He formed a 
reformist political faction in the early 1870s. He advocated 
full independence and the repudiation of Sino-Korean 
tributary relations and reforms based on the Meiji restoration 
model. He had contacts with Inoue Kaoru and Fukuzawa 
Yukichi. After the abortive coup to rid the Korean court of 
conservatives and the Min faction, he escaped again to Japan. 
He was assassinated soon afterwards.
Pak (1861-1939) was a reformist politician from Korea. He 
formed the reformist faction with Kim Ok-kyun and others. 
He visited Japan in 1882, and established contacts with 
Fukuzawa Yukichi. In 1883, he began political reforms, but 
his efforts were thwarted by the Min faction. After the failed 
coup of 1884, he escaped to Japan. He served as a cabinet 
minister in the Korean government shortly after the Sino- 
Japanese war, but was accused of plotting against the royal 
family, and became an exile in Japan again. From 1932-1939, 
he was a member of the Japanese House of Lords. 
(1848-1896): a pro-Japanese Korean politician. He toured 
Japan as a member of the ‘gentleman’s tour’ group in 1881. 
On his way back to Korea, he met Li Hongzhang and 
advocated opening Korea to the European powers upon his 
return. He played a role in the signing o f the U.S.-Korean 
Treaty of Friendship and the Sino-Korean trade agreement in 
1882.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis advances the debate on the entry of China and Japan into European 
International Society. Conventional accounts by the English School have
conceptualised membership of the Society primarily in terms of adherence to the 
‘standard of civilisation’ and the adoption of the Society’s institutions, particularly 
international law and diplomatic institutions, both of which are seen as developed to 
facilitate orderly, cooperative relations among states.
This thesis argues that these accounts are inadequate; by extrapolating from 
European international relations, the English School concentrate of the cooperative, 
progressive aspects of the Society. They fail to adequately theorise the relations 
between European and non-European entities, and down play the fact that there existed a 
more intolerant, coercive side of the Society that aimed to ‘civilise’ ‘barbarous’ entities. 
They ignore that the identity of a ‘civilised’ member entailed the capacity and political 
will to introduce the trappings o f ‘civilisation’ to ‘barbarous’ communities.
The thesis contributes to the theoretical debates of the English School by arguing 
that China and Japan were socialised into a Janus-faced International Society. This 
interpretation provides a rich, more nuanced account of Chinese and Japanese 
engagements with the Society by bringing out both its progressive and regressive 
features into sharper focus. Utilising primary Chinese and Japanese sources, it 
demonstrates that the Chinese and Japanese elites were aware of the dualities of the 
Society. It goes on to examine how both states’ elites interacted with both faces of the 
Society, and how this affected their socialisation.
The thesis also makes an empirical contribution by forwarding an international 
social explanation of early Meiji imperialism. It argues that Japan’s socialisation into 
European International Society involved the adoption of an identity of a ‘civilised’ 
power that would introduce the trappings of ‘civilisation’ to its ‘backward neighbours’. 
To this end, Japan’s imperialist ventures in the 1870-1890s also took on the role of 
demonstrating Japan’s ‘civilised’ identity and facilitating its acceptance as a legitimate 
member o f ‘civilised’ International Society.
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INTRODUCTION
In the pre-war era there was a period of conflict between Japan and China, but that 
was only a short period. Japan and China have a history of friendship and 
exchange covering 2,000 years. (Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro)
Japan and China are neighbouring countries divided by only a narrow stretch of 
water. We have a long history of friendship and exchange going back more than 
2,000 years. There was an unfortunate period between us in the past, but good 
neighborliness and friendship are the mainstream. (Chinese President Hu Jintao)1
Such were the seemingly friendly words exchanged between Japanese Prime Minister 
Koizumi Jun’ichiro and Chinese President Hu Jintao at the Sino-Japanese summit in St. 
Petersburg in 2003. In recent years, however, relations between the two great powers 
have not been as good as the diplomatic niceties between Hu and Koizumi may suggest: 
disputes over issues such as the interpretation of history2 or the ownership of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands3 have all led to a period of cool relations between the two great 
powers of Northeast Asia in recent years. Both states seem to be unable to overcome 
their mutual distrust and antipathy, leading one commentator to argue that ‘China’s 
relations with Japan over the past several decades have been cyclical, with periods of 
relative cordiality interspersed with episodes of contention.’4
‘Cyclical’ though contemporary Sino-Japanese relations may be, what is 
interesting is that relations between the two states appear remarkably stable until the end 
of the nineteenth century. While we should not interpret Sino-Japanese relations in this 
period as uniquely benign, military conflict between the two states was certainly not a 
normal occurrence. There were clashes in 668 when China crushed a coalition of 
Japanese and Korean forces and helped instate the Silla (§rfi) dynasty; 1274 and 1281, 
when the Yuan (tu) emperor Khubilai Khaan sent his fleet to conquer Japan; and finally 
in 1592-1598, when the Japanese (under the rule of Toyotomi Hideyoshi
1 Both quotes from Koizumi and Hu are taken from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan website,
‘Japan-China Summit Meeting in St. Petersburg (Overview)’,
(http://www.mofa.go.ip/pohcv/economv/sunmiit/2003/china.html), consulted on 29th November 2004
2 For detailed studies on this issue, see Tanaka Akihiko ‘ “Kyökasho mondai” o meguru Chügoku no 
seisaku kettei’ in Okabe Tatsumi (ed) Chügoku gaikö -  seisaku kettei no közö. (Tokyo: Nihon 
kokusai mondai kenkyüjo, 1983); Hidenori Ijiri, ‘Sino-Japanese Controversy Since the 1972 
Diplomatic Normalisation’ in Christopher Howe (ed), China and Japan: History, Trends and 
Prospects. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Caroline Rose, Interpreting History in Sino- 
Japanese Relations: a case study in political decision-making. (London: Routledge, 1998)
3 An excellent study on this issue is provided by Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, 
‘Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism’, International Security (vol. 23, no. 3, 1998-1999, pp. 
114-146)
4 June Teufel Dreyer, ‘Sino-Japanese Relations’, Journal of Contemporary China (vol. 10, no. 28, 
2001, pp. 373-385), p. 373
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invaded Korea. From the late-nineteenth century onwards, however, a change took 
place. Japan and China clashed over their interests in Korea in 1894-1895; in the 
twentieth century, Japan invaded China in 1914, followed by an invasion on an even 
larger scale in 1931, which only ended when the World War II was brought to an end in 
1945 after both sides (particularly the Chinese) had suffered horrific losses of human 
life.
The late-nineteenth century thus appears to be an important turning point in Sino- 
Japanese relations, and indeed continues to weigh heavily on the minds of both the 
Japanese and Chinese.5 Statesmen from the two sides regularly make references to the 
‘history of friendship and exchange covering 2,000 years’, and it is this ‘juxtaposition of 
a two thousand-year, predominantly peaceful relationship on the one hand, and a fifty- 
year relationship of acrimony on the other, [which] appears to have set the tone of 
postwar Sino-Japanese relations.’6 These statements are based on the assumption that 
Sino-Japanese relations were of a peaceful nature for a remarkable period of time, and 
became conflictual from 1895 onwards. This acrimonious relationship only came to an 
end fifty years later in 1945, when Japan was defeated by the Allies.
Why, then, did this turning point take place in the late-nineteenth century? 
Historians of Japan, attempting to explain Japanese aggression during this period, have 
attributed the changes in China and Japan’s bilateral relations to Japan’s 
‘modernisation’, or more accurately, its entry and socialisation into the European- 
dominated international order. Christopher Howe, for instance, notes that following its 
encounter with the European order, ‘Japan first came to terms with a Western political 
and economic order that it was powerless to resist but then, having done this,
5 This can be seen by the fact that the teaching of Japan’s imperialist history is an extremely divisive 
issue which generates heated discussions in Japanese domestic society. It is often argued by 
‘historical revisionists’ that the teaching of Japan’s negative past results in a lack of patriotic 
sentiment among its populace. A typical view of this is expounded in the Atarashii kyökasho o 
tsukurukai (Japanese Society for Textbook Reform)’s webpage at 
(http://www.tsukurukai.com/02 about us/01 opinion.html), consulted on 29th November 2004. For a 
critical discussion of these views, see Eguchi Keiichi, ‘Nihon no shinryakuto nihonjin no sensö kan’, 
Iwanami bukkuretto (no. 365, 1995) and Lee Sun Ae, ‘Sengo sedai no sensö sekinin ron’, Iwanami 
bukkuretto (no. 467, 1998). Another divisive issue is Japanese cabinet ministers’ visits to the 
Yasukuni shrine, where Japan’s war dead (including those of class-A war criminals) are enshrined. 
For its part, the Chinese government has often used the history of Japanese aggression to whip up 
patriotic fervour within China to bolster its legitimacy. While the extent to which the Chinese 
leadership is actually ‘detached’ from their own perceptions of Japan (in that they can ‘rationally’ 
manipulate historical experiences to serve their self-interests) is debatable, its behaviour does serve to 
remind us that historical perceptions do matter: after all, a receptive audience is required for these 
anti-Japanese campaigns to be effective. For a study in the use of history in Sino-Japanese relations, 
see Tanaka Akihiko ‘ “Kyökasho mondai” o meguru Chügoku no seisaku kettei’and Rose, 
Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations.
6 Rose, Interpreting History) in Sino-Japanese Relations, p. 17
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subordinated China by the same Western methods. ’ 7 Similarly, in his authoritative study 
of Japanese colonialism in Korea, Peter Duus also states:
The adoption of an expansionist policy was intimately linked to the timing of 
Japan’s decision to modernize. The Japanese chose to tread the path toward 
‘civilization’ and ‘enlightenment’ at precisely the moment in history when the 
nation-states of Western Europe were in the midst of frenzied territorial expansion 
across the globe...The global reach of Western imperialism could not help but 
influence both the character of Meiji modernization and the thrust of Meiji foreign 
policy. It provided the context in which the Meiji leaders acted and a model for 
them to follow.8
But these arguments raise further questions. Duus’ claim that the Western powers 
provided a ‘model’ for Japan to follow suggests that something was ‘learned’. But what 
exactly was learned from the European international order and its members to cause the 
hostilities that would overshadow such a long period of ‘friendship and exchange’? It is 
also worth considering the Chinese case as well; as the European-dominated 
international order had also expanded to China before Japan, it is equally plausible that 
the Chinese were subjected to similar forces that caused Japan to emulate the European 
powers. Did the Chinese also ‘learn’ similar lessons from the Japanese? If so, did this 
also contribute to the deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations? If not, why?
International factors and the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations
The existing literature on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations, however, does not 
offer us many clues. One obvious reason is that most of these studies take the post- 
World War II period as a starting point; while the importance of the nineteenth century 
is acknowledged to a certain extent, the ‘historical’ animosity between the two states is a 
given, and is neither problematised or historicised.9 Elistorical studies have, as discussed 
above, provided us with some explanations, but they remain somewhat vague. In order 
to locate what international factors accounted for Japan’s ‘learning’ of expansionism 
and how this contributed to the destabilisation of Sino-Japanese relations, we need a 
nuanced account of the European dominated international order and its social structures
7 Christopher Howe, ‘Introduction: The Changing Political Economy of Sino-Japanese Relations: A 
Long Term View’ in Howe (ed) China and Japan: History, Trends and Prospects., p. 6
s Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995), pp. 2-3. See also Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner 
History of American-East Asian Relations. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), pp. 65-66.
9 Teufel Dreyer, ‘Sino-Japanese Relations’; Jian Yang, ‘Sino-Japanese Relations: Implications for 
Southeast Asia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia (vol. 25, no. 2, August 2003, pp. 306-327); Allen S. 
Whiting, China Eyes Japan. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Thomas J. Christensen, 
‘China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia’, International Security (vol. 
23, no. 4, Spring 1999, pp. 49-89)
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to assist us in understanding what Japan and China learnt, and how this contributed to 
war between the two countries in the late-nineteenth century.
It is at this point that the literature of International Relations becomes relevant to 
our questions. It is of course a truism to suggest that international factors alone cannot 
explain a state’s political behaviour; with reference to the study of Chinese foreign 
policy, James N. Rosenau reminds us that ‘the most important task involves a readiness 
to acknowledge that no single perspective has cornered the truth on China, that several 
theoretical perspectives are available for sorting out its enormous complexities’ . 10 
However, given the fact that numerous historical studies suggest that international 
factors -  in this specific case, the European international order and its expansion -  did 
indeed play a part in the rise of conflict between China and Japan in the late-nineteenth 
century, * 11 it seems worthwhile to proceed with our analysis from ‘the premise that the 
foreign policy behavior of states is shaped in varying degrees by extemal/systemic 
factors’ . 12 We begin by examining realism, which has long been the dominant 
theoretical perspective in International Relations, and has traditionally had an interest in 
explaining international conflict.
Realist perspectives
Realism has often been divided into two broad strands, classical realism and neorealism. 
Neorealism assumes that the anarchic structure of international relations produces an 
insecure world in which states are constantly fearful for their survival. In a classic 
statement of this claim, Kenneth N. Waltz argues that under anarchy
[n]o appeal can be made to a higher entity clothed with the authority and equipped 
with the ability to act on its own initiative. Under such conditions the possibility 
that force will be used by one or another of the parties looms always as a threat in 
the background.13
10 James N. Rosenau, ‘China in a Bifurcated World: Competing Theoretical Perspectives’ in Thomas W. 
Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 1994), p. 527
11 In addition to the works of Howe and Duus cited above, see Akira Iriye, ‘Imperialism in East Asia’ in 
James B. Crowley (ed), Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, 1970), especially pp. 133-137, and Marius B. Jansen, ‘Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji 
Perspectives’, in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895- 
1945. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 64
12 Samuel S. Kim, ‘Chinese Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice’ in Samuel S. Kim (ed), China and 
the World: Chinese foreign policy faces the new millennium. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p. 17
13 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics. (Boston, Massachusetts: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 
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This structure shapes a state’s interest. As the potential threat of an attack by 
another state constantly looms, a state is assumed to be primarily interested in its 
survival, and rationally pursues this self-interest. ‘Learning’ (or ‘socialisation’) also 
takes place in this context. The anarchic international structure and the perpetual 
insecurities it produces means that most states will adopt any efficacious means to 
maximise their power and ensure their survival. Failure to do so will risk their demise. 
Neorealists argue that as a consequence we see that states all display similar qualities 
and are Tike units’. This homogeneity occurs because weak states that did not Team’ 
the best means to survive have already been weeded out through an almost Darwinian 
selection of the ‘the fittest’ . 14
There are two problems with this argument. The first problem stems from 
neorealism’s ahistorical assumption of a constantly competitive, anarchical international 
realm, which ‘presents the whole of international history as a static, monolithic entity 
that operates according to a constant and timeless logic, such that stmctural change 
becomes entirely obscured. ’ 15 The presupposition of a static international environment 
makes it difficult to account for historical changes within it, and this is one reason which 
makes neorealism unsuitable for this study. The Sino-Japanese clash of the late- 
nineteenth century could potentially be explained as a result of a ‘security dilemma’, 
where Japan’s attempts to protect itself from the European powers through 
‘Europeanisation’ and the adoption of European weaponry inadvertently threatened the 
Chinese, who saw these ‘defensively motivated measures...as offensive threats’ because 
of the insecurities generated by anarchy. 16 This is precisely the argument Thomas J. 
Christensen forwards as one of the key factors that causes instabilities in East Asia 
today. The application of the Realist security dilemma argument, however, is 
problematic in that the argument again (necessarily) relies on the assumption of the 
international milieu as an anarchic one of constant suspicion and conflict. However, the 
international environment is clearly not necessarily coloured by suspicion and fear: after 
all, the United States is hardly going to perceive a danger from a British arms build-up; 
it will only feel threatened if it believes its relations with Britain to be inherently
14 ibid, pp. 127-128
15 John M. Hobson, ‘What’s at stake in “bringing historical sociology back into international relations? 
Transcending “chronofetishism” and “tempocentrism” in international relations’ in Stephen Hobden 
and John M. Hobson (eds), Historical Sociology o f International Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 10
16 Christensen, ‘China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia’, p. 50. For a 
discussion on the security dilemma, also see Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security 
Dilemma’, World Politics (vol. 30, no. 2, January 1978, pp. 167-214), pp. 169-170
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coercive and insecure. This argument also downplays the significance of the long 
period of stable relations between China and Japan. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that 
distrust between China and Japan was not a constant feature, but really began to matter 
after the late-nineteenth century; a point Christensen himself notes when he states that 
China’s ‘natural aversion to Japan’ actually originates in the early-twentieth century. 17
It thus seems somewhat simplistic to assume that the international environment 
China and Japan inhabited prior to and after the expansion of the European international 
order was the same, and produced similar outcomes in state behaviour. While it is 
possible that an anarchical international structure produces a competitive, insecure 
international environment, this cannot be assumed a priori. Anarchy amongst friends 
need not necessarily be a competitive one, and similarly the nature of the international 
realm depends very much on the intersubjective meanings actors attach to them. 18
The second shortcoming for neorealism is that its theory for learning is too thin. 
While neorealists allow for some Teaming’, they still assume that states are rational 
actors that aim to maximise their utility. Anarchy reinforces interest in survival, and 
states are thus are assumed to ‘have acquired “selfish” identities’ which are interested in 
attaining survival, and this is characterised by self-help behaviour. 19 Here, actors 
already know what they want; Teaming’ here merely changes the means by which they 
obtain them. 20 Actors’ interests and identities are in this sense fixed. Because of the 
ahistorical quality neorealists attach to anarchy, state identities and interests are 
presupposed to be static and do not allow for the possibility for them to change.
If, however, we adopt Alexander Wendt’s definition of identities as ‘certain ideas 
about who one is in a given situation’ , 21 Duus’ aforementioned statement that Japan 
modelled itself on the West clearly indicates that its identity had been transformed (from 
traditional Japanese state to Europeanised Japanese state) after its encounter with the
17 Christensen, ‘China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia’, p. 52
18 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics’ 
International Organisation (vol. 46, no. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425), pp. 396-397. Interestingly, 
this point has been explored by Stephen M. Walt in his ‘balance of threat’ theory, which takes 
account of how perceptions affect balancing behaviour, rather than just the distribution of material 
capabilities. However, Walt does not problematise the Realist assumption of an anarchic and 
competitive international environment, and his insights into threat perception sit somewhat 
uncomfortably with his theoretical orientations. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins o f Alliances. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987)
19 Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics’, International 
Organization (vol. 46, no. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 391-425), p. 402
20 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996), p. 11; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), pp. 326-327
21 Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics, p. 170
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European-dominated international order. Why, for instance, did Japan behave like a 
‘civilised’ member of the European-dominated international order in its relations with 
its Asian neighbours, despite the relative lack of social pressures to do so? Similarly, if 
a state’s identity changes, so will its interests, 22 and this posits the distinct possibility 
that Japan’s interests changed following its ‘learning’ from the European states, and this 
contributed to increased tensions and eventually war with China. Because it assumes 
that states’ interests and identities are constant, however, neorealism does not allow for 
us to empirically examine this possibility, and this is another reason why it is of limited 
utility for this study.
It is worth noting in this context that Classical Realism has a much more nuanced 
answer to these questions. Hans J. Morgenthau’s brand of Classical Realism posits that 
the domineering nature of humankind and anarchy produce a competitive international 
realm, 23 where states each pursue ‘interest defined in terms of power’ . 24 Unlike 
neorealism, Morgenthau is sensitive to the fact that both ‘interest’ and ‘power’ will 
differ depending on the particular social context a state finds itself in, and may not be 
contingent on anarchy and human nature alone.25 He states that ‘the kind of interest 
determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political 
and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated.. .The same observations 
apply to the concept of power. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by 
the political and cultural environment. ’ 26 Morgenthau’s Classical Realism thus shows a 
high degree of sensitivity to historical and social contingencies, and his arguments 
deserve to be taken seriously. However, there are certain unresolvable tensions in 
Morgenthau’s work, which in part seem to reflect a commitment to ‘the possibility of 
developing a rational theory that reflects.. .objective laws. ’ 27 The result is a series of 
statements that point to a somewhat universal, ahistorical description of a competitive,
22 The connection between identity and interest can be demonstrated from real life examples: for 
instance, if I identify myself as a member of academia, I will have strong incentives to have an article 
published by a top-tier journal if I wish to acquire prestige; if I identify myself as a young urban 
professional, however, I may be more interested in buying an expensive house in Chelsea and driving 
a German luxury car to demonstrate my ‘success’ and acquire the prestige of my peers.
23 For a discussion of the nature of humankind, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 34-36
24 ibid, p. 5
25 John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), p. 47
26 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 9
27 ibid, p. 4. For this point, I am indebted to John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations, p. 
47
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coercive international realm. 28 While his argument that social factors can shape an 
actor’s interests should be taken into account, the inherent contradictions within his 
theory cannot be resolved here, and this renders Morgenthau’s Classical Realism 
unsuitable for this study. While we cannot discount the possibility that the international 
environment of the late-nineteenth century was a competitive one, this should be 
problematised and open to empirical investigation, rather than assumed.
Theoretical framework of the study: the English School and constructivist approaches
The discussions above demonstrate that realist theoretical perspectives are not suited to 
explaining the process of learning that China and (particularly) Japan appear to have 
experienced following their encounter and incorporation into the European-dominated 
international order. Any theoretical explanation of this case needs to account for the 
possibility that actors’ identities and interests can be shaped by social pressures, rather 
than assuming a priori a rational actor with fixed interests. What is needed for this 
study is thus a more sociologically-informed theoretical approach that can adequately 
capture the complexities of the socialisation process. Here, we discuss two such 
theories, the English School and constructivist approaches, which seem to offer us a 
promising starting point.
The English School approach is organised around the concept of an ‘international 
system’ 29 and of a ‘society of states’. It has taken its critique of the Realist depiction of 
international politics as its starting point. In particular, the English School approach has 
argued that the depiction of international politics as a competitive and lawless realm 
does not seem to fit reality, as demonstrated by the existence of evidence that states do 
follow some rules and procedures, rather than engage in behaviour stemming from pure 
self-interest. English School scholars have also elucidated the existence of shared
28 For example, Morgenthau states: ‘All history shows that nations active in international politics are 
continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of 
war’ or ‘the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience.’ 
See Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 40, 34 respectively. Emphasis added. A similar tension 
can be said to exist within recent ‘Neoclassical’ Realism. See Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism 
and Theories of Foreign Policy’ World Politics (vol. 51, no. 1, 1998, pp. 144-172); Jeffrey W. Legro 
and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’, International Security (vol. 24, no. 2, Fall 
1999, pp. 5-55)
29 An international system is deemed to exist when ‘two or more states have sufficient contact between 
them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave -  at least in 
some measure -  as parts of a whole.’ Note, however, that an international system does not assume the 
existence of common goals among the states in the system. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A 
Study o f Order in World Politics. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p. 9
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norms which they argue offers the most compelling evidence for the existence of an 
International Society. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson defined such a Society as follows:
By an international society we mean a group of states (or, more generally, a group 
of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the 
sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the 
others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and 
institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest 
in maintaining these arrangements.30
As evidence of the existence of a Society, Martin Wight forwards the following 
argument:
International society...is manifest in the diplomatic system; in the conscious 
maintenance of the balance of power to preserve the independence of the member- 
communities; in the regular operations of international law, whose binding force is 
accepted over a wide though politically unimportant range of subjects; in 
economic, social and technical interdependence and the functional international 
institutions established latterly to regulate it. All these presuppose an international 
social consciousness, a world-wide community-sentiment.31
These arguments point to a number of important assumptions for the English 
School. First, as argued above, the very concept of ‘society’ indicates that international 
politics is an inherently social arena consisting of members who share common norms 
and goals. 32 Second, ‘membership’ points to the strong possibility that members of the 
Society are required to undergo some sort of ‘socialisation or contractual process’ , 33 and 
social expectations exert powerful influences on states’ behaviour. As an International 
Society entails states ‘formfing] a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to 
be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another’ , 34 states must be 
judged against these rules in order to be accepted as legitimate members of this 
Society.35 To attain this legitimacy, a state must satisfy ‘the collective judgment of
30 Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, ‘Introduction’ in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds), The 
Expansion of International Society. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 1
11 Martin Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’ in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 96-97. Also see R. J. Vincent, ‘Hedley Bull and Order in International 
Politics’, Millennium (vol. 17, no. 1, 1988, pp. 195-213), p. 205
32 Although not associated with the English School, Thomas Franck also notes: ‘the international 
community more closely resembles a membership club with house rules....Membership is reinforced 
by valid governance, shared experience, reciprocal gestures or deference and recognition, common 
rituals, mature common expectations and the successful pursuit of shared goals.’ See Thomas M. 
Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’, American Journal o f International Law (vol. 82, 
no. 4, October 1988, pp. 705-759), p. 711
33 Yongjin Zhang, China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond. (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1998), p. 4
34 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 13
35 See Ian Clark, ‘Legitimacy in a Global Order’, Review o f International Studies (Special Issue, 2003, 
pp. 75-95), p. 84-85. From a sociological point of view, Theodore E. Long and Jeffrey K. Hadden 
argue that a member has ‘(1) to be competent and compliant with the cultural rules of the group and
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international society about rightful membership of the family of nations’ . 36 Indeed, 
‘mutual recognition’ is crucial. Societies cannot exist without mutually recognised 
members, and the society of states is no exception.
The English School’s interpretivist approach enables us to examine Chinese and 
Japanese engagements with the European international order and the subsequent 
evolution of their relations within a more nuanced, sociologically-informed analytical 
framework. For its utility in studying this phenomenon, this study adopts the English 
School approach as its central theoretical framework. In addition to the value of its 
interpretive approach, English School scholars are, as Richard Little argues, ‘interested 
in world history because it can help us differentiate international systems/societies and, 
in doing so, provide the basis for a comparative framework that can help to reveal what 
is distinctive about contemporary international relations. ’ 37 The English School 
approach’s idea of an ‘International Society’ opens up the possibility that ‘international 
units within an empire or an anarchic arena can be constrained by a common ideology or 
set of beliefs about appropriate norms and rules of behaviour’ . 38 It allows us to compare 
different historical international orders and their normative structures. 39 It also 
historicises the process by which the current dominant international order (International 
Society) expanded across the globe. For these reasons, the adoption of the approach 
gives us a theoretical template for a systematic analysis of the process of interaction 
between the East Asian international order and the European International Society in the 
late-nineteenth century.
(2) to occupy a specific position within the group and carry out its responsibilities and functions.’ 
See Theodore E. Long and Jeffrey K. Hadden, ‘A Reconception of Socialization’, Sociological 
Theory (vol. 3, no. 1, Spring 1985, pp. 39-49), p. 42
36 Martin Wight, Systems o f States. (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 153.
37 Richard Little, ‘The English School and World History’ in Alex J. Bellamy (ed) International Society 
and its Critics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 63. See also Stephen Hobden, ‘Historical 
sociology: back to the future of international relations?’ in Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson 
(eds), Historical Sociology o f International Relations. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), pp. 51-53
38 Bary Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study o f  
International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 12. It would also be worth noting 
that this particular strength of the English School approach is augmented by its long-standing interest 
in history. See Hedley Bull, ‘International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach’, World 
Politics (vol. 18, no. 3, April 1966, pp. 361-377) and Andrew Hurrell, ‘Keeping history, law and 
political philosophy firmly within the English School’, Review o f International Studies (vol. 27. no. 3, 
2001, pp. 489-494).
39 Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History o f the English School. (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press, 1998), pp. 124-129; Hobden, ‘Historical sociology: back to the future of 
international relations?’, pp. 52-53. Examples of such works include Adam Watson, The Evolution o f  
International Society: A comparative historical analysis. (London: Routledge, 1992); and Buzan and 
Little, International Systems in World Histoiy.
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Most importantly, however, the approach’s sensitivity to socialisation processes is 
heuristically powerful: the very notion of society implies that in order to obtain 
membership (something which arguably most sovereign states have, to a certain extent, 
done in the present day), states must be recognised as adhering to the rules of the society 
and fulfilling their social obligations to be deemed ‘legitimate’ members by their peers. 
Hedley Bull certainly alludes to this when he points out that this global expansion of 
European International Society has come about through its acceptance by the non- 
European states. In entering the society, ‘they themselves have sought the rights of 
membership of it, and the protection of its rules, both vis-ä-vis the dominant European 
powers and in relation to one another. ’ 40 While the cases of China and Japan highlight 
the need to problematise what aspects of the Society which China and/or Japan 
‘accepted’ or internalised, the approach’s sociologically-informed analytical framework 
remains useful.
This approach can be augmented by adopting some of the theoretical findings 
from constructivism. 41 Simply put, we can distinguish three core constructivist 
theoretical claims. First, the importance of ideational factors in shaping international 
political behaviour; second, that ‘[a]gent interests are derived from identity-
4,J Hedley Bull, ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’ in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson 
(eds), The Expansion o f International Society. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 124. Although 
not working within the English School approach, G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan have 
also suggested the concept of hegemonic socialisation which is much more sensitive to the concept of 
socialisation. Here, socialisation occurs when the hegemonic power utilises a variety of material and 
normative incentives to socialise secondary states into internalising ‘the hegemon’s norms and move 
to adopt new state policies which are compatible with those of the hegemon and which produce 
cooperative outcomes.’ (G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, ‘Socialization and Hegemonic 
Power’, International Organization (vol. 44, no. 3, Summer 1990, pp. 283-315), p. 290.) However, 
their conceptualisation of socialisation is somewhat narrow, due to its structuralist/functionalist bias, 
as will become clearer below.
41 This means that I am closer agreement with Dunne’s assertion that the English School is characterised 
by an interpretivist approach. It should also be noted that Richard Little has argued that the English 
School is characterised by methodological pluralism, with positivism, interpretivism and critical 
theory employed to study (respectively) international systems, International Society, and world 
society. Setting aside the difficulty in determining when precisely an ‘International System’ becomes 
an ‘International Society’, I do so as I am unsure of employing positivist methodology -  defined here 
as ‘any method that opens up the possibility of analysing the recurrent and repetitious patterns that 
occur in International Relations’ (Little, ‘The English School’s Contribution to the Study if 
International Relations’, p. 404) -  to studying international history. I conceive history to be neither 
repetitive nor cyclical, and each epoch needs to be historicised in its specific social, cultural and 
temporal context. I am concerned that a ‘positivist’ approach could potentially lead to an ahistorical 
interpretation of world history. See Timothy Dunne, ‘The Social Construction of International 
Society’, European Journal o f International Relations (vol. 1, no. 3, 1995, pp. 367-389) and Richard 
Little, ‘The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations’, European Journal 
o f International Relations (vol. 6, no. 3, 2000, pp. 395-422). Cf. Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The 
Constructivist Challenge after September 11’ in Alex J. Bellamy (ed) International Society and its 
Critics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 87
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construction, which is constituted in the course of social interaction’ , 42 and finally ‘that 
agents and structures are mutually constituted. ’ 43 Constructivists share many 
commonalities with the English School approach, ‘particularly interests in the cultural 
bases of state identity, the rule-governed nature of international society, and the variable 
forms of life under anarchy’ .44 The similarities between the two approaches’ have led 
Timothy Dunne to argue that the English School was a pioneering form of 
constructivism. 45 In the specific context of this thesis, the constructivist approach is 
attractive for its theoretical rigour. Although the English School has forwarded a 
valuable analytical framework for understanding international politics, their theoretical 
assumptions have often been under-specified. The utilisation of constructivist 
theoretical insights results in a much clearer analytical framework for analysis.
This study integrates the constructivist insight that identity shapes interests and 
action. While English School scholars have noted that states form a society on the basis 
of ‘universal’ ‘goals of social life’ (to ensure the protection of life, property, and 
guarantee adherence to agreements) , 46 the fact that states need to become a ‘member of 
International Society’ indicates that a state’s interests and actions will be accordingly 
shaped by this ‘identity’. Most English School studies, however, tend to see the norms 
of the Society in ‘regulative’ terms (such as adherence to international law), and have 
not explored how these rules shape and define state interests and action in sufficient 
depth. The adoption of this particular constructivist assumption allows us to fully 
explore the deeper constitutive rules and norms -  the ‘social consciousness’ -  of 
International Society that shapes its members’ behaviour.
42 John M. Hobson, ‘What’s at stake in “bringing historical sociology back into international relations?’, 
p. 24, also see Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International 
Theory and Constructivism’, European Journal o f International Relations (vol. 4, no. 3, 1998, pp. 
259-294), p. 267
43 Price and Reus-Smit, ‘Dangerous Liaisons?’, p. 267
44 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Imagining society: constructivism and the English School’, British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations (vol. 4, no. 3, October 2002, pp. 487-509), p. 489
45 Dunne, ‘The Social Construction of International Society’, p. 372. Dunne identifies the English 
School approach with a particular strand of constructivism forwarded by Alexander Wendt, who 
forwards a state-centric, structural argument. There are, however, different strands of constructivism 
that do not necessarily adopt a state-centric focus. Such works include Margaret E. Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998) and Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and 
Grand Strategy in Chinese History. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995). A 
critique of English School scholars’ views of constructivism is provided by Reus-Smit, ‘Imagining 
society’. See also Price and Reus-Smit, ‘Dangerous Liaisons?’, for an overview of different strands 
of constructivist approaches.
46 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 4-6
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This study also adopts constructivist insights drawn from ‘logics of 
appropriateness’ , 47 where actors’ actions are conditioned by what they believe to be 
‘socially appropriate’. Furthermore, in order to demonstrate their conformity with social 
norms, ‘they justify their behaviour by appealing to established codes of social conduct 
in the “linguistic court of appeal” . ’ 48 The existence of social norms in international 
politics has often been ‘proven’ through analysing how actors behave, and whether this 
corresponds to these norms: this is the approach adopted by Wight in the 
aforementioned passage above. This approach, however, has difficulty in demonstrating 
the existence of social norms when they are broken. But a violation of a norm does not 
necessarily mean the absence of a norm, 49 and an action-centred approach may give us a 
somewhat impoverished account of international social life. By adopting a 
constructivist of focus on actors’ speech patterns and arguments, we are able to provide 
an empirically rich and more nuanced accounts of China and Japan’s socialisation into 
European International Society. 50
Interpretivist explanations of China and Japan ’s entry into the European order
Flow then, have these interpretivist theories accounted for China and Japan’s 
incorporation, into the European-dominated international order?
English School scholars have argued that International Society -  which can trace 
its origins to seventeenth century Europe -  has expanded across the globe to the extent
47 The ‘logic of appropriateness’ is defined as a situation when ‘[a]ction stems from a conception of 
necessity, rather than preference. Within a logic of appropriateness, a sane person is one who is “in 
touch with identity” in the sense of maintaining consistency between behavior and a conception of 
self in a social role.’ See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The 
Organizational Basis o f Politics. (New York: The Free Press, 1989), p. 161
48 John M. Hobson, ‘What’s at stake in “bringing historical sociology back into international relations?’ 
This approach is also derived from ‘communicative action theory’ forwarded by Jürgen Habermas. 
Also see Paul Kowert and Jeffery Legro, ‘Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise’, 
in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed), The Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 485; Reus-Smit, ‘Imagining society’, pp. 493-494; 
and Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’, International 
Organization (vol. 54, no. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 1-39)
49 For instance, the fact that fraud is ubiquitous does not mean that fraudulent behaviour is condoned in 
society.
50 We must note, however, that the insights provided by the ‘logic of appropriateness’ argument have 
been criticised as overtly structural, thus undermining constructivism’s claim that agents and 
structures are mutually constitutive. Ole Jacob Sending argues that the ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
assumes ‘a homogenous political community, characterized by a set of shared interpretations and 
conceptions of the common good’ which ‘substantially reduces the degree to which the process of 
interpretation can enable individuals to interpret things differently.’ His argument serve as a powerful 
reminder to maintain a balance between structural and agent-centric analysis, and will be incorporated 
into this study to the extent possible. Ole Jacob Sending, ‘Constitution, Choice and Change: 
Problems with the “Logic of Appropriateness” and its Use in Constructivist Theory’, European 
Journal o f  International Relations (vol. 8, no. 4, 2002, pp. 443-470), p. 451
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that it can now be called a ‘universal international society’ in the sense that there exist 
shared rules and norms which states adhere to. The expansion of International Society 
into East Asia have been considered from this perspective.51 Evidence of the expansion, 
they claim, can be found in the adoption of the key institutions of international law and 
diplomacy throughout the world. Further evidence is provided by the fact that the 
sovereign state system, which emerged from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), has also 
come to be accepted as the sole legitimate form of statehood.52
English School scholars have approached the specific cases of China and Japan’s 
entry into European International Society primarily through examining both states’ 
adoption of two particular institutions, international law and European-styled diplomatic 
institutions, both of which developed alongside and can be attributed as unique to the 
Society. Another ‘hallmark’ of China and Japan’s entry (or socialisation) into the 
Society is their adoption of the ‘standard of civilisation’, which has been studied by 
Gerrit Gong.53 The ‘standard’ is broader in scope than the introduction of international 
law and Western diplomatic institutions, and subsequently Gong’s analyses go further 
than China and Japan’s adoption of international law and Western-styled diplomacy. 
The ‘standard’ not only required that ‘civilised’ states adopt international law, but also 
(among others) demanded the protection of foreigners’ property and the implementation 
of a legal code capable of delivering justice.
This ‘standard’ constituted the social criteria that had to be fulfilled to gain 
legitimate membership of the Society as a ‘civilised’ entity. Hence, Gong examines 
both states’ domestic reforms aimed at satisfying this ‘standard’ and entering the Society 
as a legitimate member. China and Japan’s attempts to conform to this ‘standard’ 
reflect both states’ desires to assume ‘civilised’ status on the Society’s terms, as well as 
the existence of social pressures that shaped China and Japan’s interests and identities. 
It strongly suggests the existence of a process of socialisation where actors attempt to
51 The key works on this particular topic include Gerrit W. Gong, ‘China’s Entry into International 
Society’ and Hidemi Suganami, ‘Japan’s Entry into International Society’, both in Bull and Watson 
(eds), The Expansion o f International Society, Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard o f ‘Civilization’ in 
International Society. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Yongjin Zhang ‘China’s Entry into 
International Society: Beyond the Standard of “Civilisation”’ Review o f International Studies (vol. 
17, no. 1, 1991, pp. 3-16). Other studies of state socialisation into International Society -  with 
specific reference to revolutionary states -  are undertaken by David Armstrong, Revolution and 
World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) and 
Yongjin Zhang, China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond. (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press, 1998).
52 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 40
53 The most important work on this aspect of the expansion of European International Society is Gong, 
The Standard o f ‘Civilization ’ in International Society.
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shape a new member to conform to the norms of the social group, and is also compatible 
with the English School’s fundamental assumption that state interests and identities are 
socially constructed.
Further examinations of English School works with reference to the Sino-Japanese 
case, however, quickly leads to some intellectual frustrations. In particular, these 
accounts downplay the intertwined nature between the expansion of European 
International Society and imperialism. The European powers at the end of the 
nineteenth century were industrial and military powers with colonies, and there is 
evidence that China and Japan attempted, to different degrees, to emulate these aspects 
as well. However, existing accounts by the English School do not offer us satisfactory 
explanations. To be fair, the English School scholars are certainly not unaware of the 
intertwined nature of imperialism and the expansion of the Society, but their references 
to it are somewhat perfunctory and weak. With reference to Japan’s coercive diplomatic 
conduct towards its Asian neighbours following its encounter with the Society, Hidemi 
Suganami states:
Meiji Japan’s intercourse with these countries closely resembled that between the 
Western Powers and the Tokugawa authorities in both form and substance: in 
form, it was based on treaty obligations; in substance, it was an exercise in power 
politics.. .this.. .stage of Japan’s foreign relations is one in which she began to 
apply what she had leamt from the West in her external affairs.54
In similar fashion to arguments forwarded by some historians, Suganami’s 
statement again opens up the possibility that it may be more appropriate to hypothesise 
that China and/or Japan were in fact socialised into a new social environment in which 
their interests and identities were framed in a particular way in that it precipitated a 
military clash between the two states. However, Suganami does not develop his 
argument any further. As it stands, we are again left with no clear idea of what exactly 
Japan had Teamt’ from European International Society to make them behave in a 
coercive manner towards China and Korea.
Gong provides another account. He notes that the Japanese used international law 
to further its imperialistic ambitions in East Asia. ‘Recognizing an advantage in 
employing international law in Korea’, he writes, ‘Japan modelled the “unequal treaty” 
it imposed on Korea after the “unequal treaties” the West had imposed on Japan. ’ 55 This
54 Suganami, ‘Japan’s Entry into International Society’, p. 192 
5' Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation ’ in International Society, p. 183
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raises the question of why Japan decided to impose ‘unequal treaties’ which it appears 
to have ‘learnt’ from the West, and to this, Gong states:
...one senses that Japan followed the other treaty powers in exacting concessions 
from China and Korea simply for selfish purposes. On the other hand, Japan 
seems to have felt that part of its mission was to lead the rest of Asia in becoming 
strong enough through reform and modernization to hold off the predatory Western 
powers.56
Gong’s answers do not go far enough either. This is particularly the case with 
regard to historical contingencies and problematising Japan’s ‘interests’. Why do 
Japanese ‘selfish’ interests in forcing its Asian neighbours to sign unequal treaties 
appear after its encounter with the Western international order? Where did these 
interests come from? Why did the Japanese pursue these interests in a particular form 
of imitating the Western states?
Aims of the study
This study aims to advance our understanding of the expansion of European 
International Society into East Asia through the case studies of the socialisation of 
China and Japan. Building on existing works by English School scholars, it asks 
questions about the international social dynamics of the late-nineteenth century, as well 
as China and Japan’s interactions with them. This study will pay particular attention to 
the nature of European International Society in the context of the late-nineteenth 
century, and Chinese and Japanese perceptions of this Society. Specifically, the study 
seeks to investigate the following questions.
1. What was the relationship between European International Society and 
imperialism in the late-nineteenth century?
2. How did this shape the relations between the Society and China and Japan?
3. Did the engagement between European International Society and China and 
Japan involve a process of socialisation that produces a fundamental shift in 
both states’ identities and interests? If such transformations did take place, 
how did they affect subsequent domestic and foreign policies? How
56 Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation ’ in International Society, p. 184
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significant were these socialisation processes in accounting for the military 
conflict between China and Japan in the late-nineteenth century?
4. Finally, what are the implications of these findings for the English School 
approach?
Central arguments and contributions
In order to give a better account for the complex socialisation process of China and 
Japan, this study compares both states’ perceptions of and engagement with European 
International Society in a systematic manner. If European International Society and/or 
its expansion is be conceptualised as the extension of a form of social structure, there 
needs to be a more detailed examination of different actors and the ways in which they 
made choices within a given set of structures. The comparative case study approach 
adopted in this study will serve to highlight the differences between China and Japan’s 
engagement with the Society, and thus attempt to provide a richer account of their 
socialisation.
The thesis contends that nineteenth-century European International Society was a 
Janus-faced one which was characterised by starkly contrasting normative foundations. 
One face governed the relations between ‘civilised’ states, and aimed to promote order 
and coexistence among them.57 ‘Civilised’ members were generally (and theoretically) 
accorded the protection of international law, diplomacy, and the institution of the 
balance of power, and their sovereign prerogatives were by and large respected.
The other face represented a much less tolerant, coercive side of the Society. It 
governed the Society’s relations with ‘uncivilised’ entities, and was charged with the 
task of promoting and propagating the trappings of ‘civilisation’ towards ‘barbarous’ 
polities. A very different mode of interaction applied in this relationship. The 
sovereign rights of ‘uncivilised’ peoples and their political communities were not 
recognised. Rather than protect their sovereignty, international law and diplomacy in 
fact played a crucial role in justifying European ‘civilising’ missions. Furthermore, a 
great power possessed the prerogative to lead the way in enlightening ‘uncivilised’ 
entities. They were given the paternalistic mandate to guide the ‘uncivilised’ polities 
and peoples towards ‘civilisation’ -  by force if necessary -  until the latter were deemed
57 Needless to say, these are theoretical ‘ideal types’: the existence of historical events that do not fit this 
conceptualisation should be readily acknowledged.
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to have become ‘civilised’ enough and capable of self-rule. Naturally, the European 
powers did not usually bother to ask the ‘uncivilised’ peoples for their permission to do 
this; they encountered much resistance, which they put down with force. Furthermore, it 
was the ‘civilised’ members of the Society that decided the level of a polity’s 
‘civilisation’ on the basis of a state’s capacity to fulfil an alien ‘standard of civilisation’. 
Their decisions of what and who was ‘civilised’ was a subjective one, and demanded 
civilisational homogeneity. From today’s perspective, the ‘civilising’ face of the Society 
was undoubtedly an imperialistic one.
This thesis forwards the central argument that China and Japan were socialised 
into this Janus-faced European International Society, and that this process involved a 
complex engagement with the Society’s two different faces. It make two claims: first, it 
argues that conventional English School accounts have mistakenly conceptualised China 
and Japan as encountering and engaging with a Society through a single mode of action 
that aimed for order and coexistence, thus downplaying the darker face of the Society. 
Second, conventional English School accounts of the expansion of European 
International Society into East Asia are inadequate because they do not sufficiently 
explore the effects that the Society’s ‘civilising’ mode of interaction had on China and 
Japan. I also suggest that in order to provide a more comprehensive account of 
socialisation, it is necessary to study the process of Chinese and Japanese interactions 
with the Society, rather than simply focus on the outcomes (such as the adoption of 
international law).
By focussing on the agents that were on the ‘receiving end’ of European 
International Society’s dual modes of interaction, this thesis serves to highlight the 
darker face of the Society and bring its effects into sharper focus. In the context of this 
thesis, Japan’s attempts to reproduce the social structures of European International 
Society actually resulted in imperialistic ventures and increased hostility in Northeast 
Asia. This does not necessarily mean that we need only focus exclusively on 
imperialism and its relations with the Society. This has been carried out elsewhere, 58 
and an exclusive focus on the darker sides alone (while well worth further exploration) 
does not necessarily give us the full picture of China and Japan’s engagement with the
58 Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), c.f. Sanjay Seth, ‘A “Postcolonial World”?’ in Greg 
Fry and Jacinta O’Hagan (eds), Contending Images o f World Politics. (Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, 2000), pp. 218-220
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Society. Rather, what we are in need of is a more nuanced account of the darker and 
lighter faces of the Society, which coexisted side by side.
This thesis’ emphasis on Chinese and Japanese experiences of engaging with a 
dualistic European International Society will give us a better account of how the agents 
interpreted the dualisms in the Society, and thus fill an empirical gap that will provide 
us with a more complete picture of the interaction between the Society and the 
Northeast Asian regional order in the late-nineteenth century. Drawing on primary 
sources of the late-nineteenth century, this thesis highlights a serious weakness in 
conventional conceptualisations of International Society. Existing works have 
suggested that China and (particularly) Japan envisaged a Society that aimed for equality 
and order; the discovery of discrepancies led the Japanese to conclude that the 
international environment was an anarchic one where power mattered. I argue that this 
interpretation is overly simplistic: the fact is that Chinese and Japanese elites were much 
more aware of the dualities inherent in European International Society than they have 
previously been given credit for. While they certainly understood that the mode of 
interaction that governed ‘civilised’ states did not apply to them, they were also aware 
that some form of societal relations that aimed for order did exist between the European 
powers, and that these states all seemed to share a common identity.
I further contend that the recognition amongst Chinese and Japanese elites that the 
international environment was not simply that of anarchy and power but of 
differentiated modes of interaction, had in fact opened up two possible paths that China 
and Japan could follow in adapting to European International Society: one was to build 
up military power and ward off the ‘civilising’ forces of the Society. Another possibility 
was to join the ‘family of nations’ by attaining the same ‘civilised’ identity as the 
European powers, and thus be subjected to the more cooperative mode of interaction. 
China chose the former path, while Japan chose the latter. Both states’ attempts to 
become ‘rich and powerful’ thus acquired different meanings, and the study highlights 
this by interpreting these series of reforms as a process of socialisation into European 
International Society. Unlike China, Japan’s attempts to become ‘rich and strong’ also 
acquired the additional purpose of demonstrating its acquisition of the trappings of 
modernity and attainment of ‘civilised’ status.
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The thesis also makes an empirical contribution by providing an international 
explanation for Japanese imperialism in the late-nineteenth century.59 It is not intended 
to be a definitive study of Japanese imperialism. Neither does it suggest a monocausal 
explanation for Japanese imperialism. My interest is primarily in the ideational shifts 
which took place in Japan and (to a lesser extent) China during this period, and in how 
these were a contributing factor to the lead up to war in 1894-1895, within the broader 
context of the international social dynamics of the time.
It should be noted here that while Japanese imperialism has been studied from 
many different angles,60 there have been relatively few studies which have explicitly and 
systematically examined early Meiji Japanese imperialism and its connection with 
European International Society.61 Some reasons for this neglect can be forwarded. First, 
many studies begin their analysis from 1895, when Japan acquired its first colony, 
Taiwan, from China in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war. The second is the strong 
influence of historical studies conducted by Western scholars that implicitly adopt 
modernisation theory to explain Japan’s engagement with the European-dominated 
international order. These studies were formulated, in part, in the context of the Cold 
War, when there was a perceived need to counter the influence of Marxist studies of 
Japanese history by portraying pre-World War 11 Japanese society and Japanese 
modernisation efforts in a more positive light. The result is, however, an excessively 
affirmative depiction of the imperialist ‘European powers’ which Japan modelled itself 
on. Japan’s imperialism and its connection with European imperialism is thus 
downplayed; Japan’s imperialism is instead either reduced to a product of ‘strategic 
interests’ or treated as an aberration of modernisation whose roots could be traced back 
to Japanese society. The result of this, in the words of John Dower, is that
59 This means that the thesis does not offer any explanations for Japanese imperialism in the 1930s and 
1940s. Japanese imperialism was dynamic, and it is impossible to ignore how Japanese thinking on 
European International Society and imperialism evolved during this time, and analyse Meiji 
imperialism and Shöwa imperialism in the same light.
60 For non-Marxist approaches, see Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea 1868-1910: A Study 
o f Realism and Idealism in International Relations. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1960); W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Ramon 
Myers and Mark Peattie (eds), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984); Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration o f Korea, 
1895-1910. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). A classic Marxist account has been 
provided by Inoue Kiyoshi, Nihon teikokushugi no keisei. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001)
61 Some notable exceptions include Robert Eskildsen, ‘Meiji nana nen taiwan shuppei no 
shokuminchiteki sokumen’ in Meiji ishinshi gakkai (eds) Meiji ishin to ajia. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa 
köbunkan, 2001). Another classic study by Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea 1868-1910, 
explores the ‘idealist’ Japanese drives to reform Korea, but their connections with the international 
social context remain, at best, implicit.
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...many recent interpretations of Japanese external behavior...turns attention away 
from the similarity of this behavior to that of countries which (1) lacked Japan’s 
peculiar cultural heritage, (2) were early and ‘gradual’ modernizers, and (3) 
presumedly did attain a higher level of bureaucratic rationalization, bourgeois 
democracy and ‘individualism’ than Japan.6:
This thesis argues that Japan’s attempts to attain the identity of a ‘civilised’ 
member of European International Society entailed reconfiguring its bilateral relations 
with its Asian neighbours and embarking on imperialistic missions. In order to be 
recognised as a ‘civilised’ member of the Society, Japan needed to eradicate the vestiges 
of the East Asian international order: it thus forcibly absorbed the Ryükyü Kingdom, 
which had been a tributary state to both China and Japan, causing considerable alarm in 
China.
Demonstration of ‘civilised’ identity also entailed showing the capacity and 
political will to pacify and introduce the trappings of ‘civilisation’ into ‘barbarous’ 
entities. I contend that Japan’s decision to be judged by the normative standards of 
European International Society entailed accepting the Society’s hierarchical 
differentiation between ‘civilised’ and ‘barbarous’ entities. Consequently, China and 
Korea, both of which had yet to become members of the Society, were labelled as 
‘uncivilised’. Japan sent troops to Taiwan to punish its ‘savage’ aborigines to escape its 
‘semi-civilised’ status. The Japanese elites not only began pushing for domestic 
political reforms in Korea, but also sought to reconfigure Korea’s international relations 
along European International Society’s lines by encouraging the Koreans to repudiate 
their tributary relations with China. Japan’s actions resulted in deepening tensions with 
the China, and this eventually culminated in war between the two countries over their 
interests in Korea in 1894. By interpreting China and Japan’s entry into the European- 
dominated international order as a process of socialisation into a Janus-faced European 
International Society, this thesis provides a theoretically-informed, nuanced 
international explanation for the (increased) hostilities between China and Japan, which 
culminated in the Sino-Japanese war in 1894. I highlight and demonstrate that the 
coercive side of European International Society manifested itself in Japan’s imperialistic 
external behaviour, and thus challenge conventional English School accounts which 
implicitly see International Society as a ‘progressive’ force for the promotion of order in 
an anarchic realm.
62 John W. Dower, ‘E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History’ in Dower, John W. (ed) Origins o f 
the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings o f E. H. Norman. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 
p. 83
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Structure of the study
The period under examination in this study starts from the 1860s and ends in 1895. In 
the chapter exploring Chinese and Japanese perceptions of European International 
Society, earlier encounters with the Society before 1860 will be included to account for 
any continuities or changes. It is, of course, possible to extend the time period of our 
enquiry to later periods, as a socialisation process does not suddenly end at a certain 
point in time. However, the year 1895 is a useful point in which to conclude our 
enquiry. As the chapters below will attempt to demonstrate, while this war was at one 
level a result of Sino-Japanese rivalry, it was also a clash of two competing international 
orders. By 1894, Japan was strongly committed to becoming and gaining recognition as 
a ‘civilised’ member of European International Society, while the Chinese continued to 
operate within the East Asian international order. Japan’s attempts to demonstrate its 
new identity as a ‘civilised’ member in the Society entailed attempts to dismantle the 
vestiges of the Tribute System. This caused alarm in China, which had yet to seek full 
membership of the Society. Japan’s actions were seen as a fundamental challenge to 
China, and resulted in increased tensions over Korea.
The resulting war was an important milestone for the expansion of European 
International Society. It not only ended in the defeat of China; the 1895 Treaty of 
Shimonoseki also put an end to China’s last remaining tributary relations with Korea, 
signalling the final collapse of the tribute system. After this, China had few options but 
to engage more fully with European International Society. The Sino-Japanese war 
marked the final collapse of the East Asian international order and the ultimate triumph 
of European International Society.
The study will proceed as follows. Chapter 1 will give a more detailed account of 
the study’s theoretical assumptions and framework. It provides a critical discussion of 
the existing conceptualisation of International Society and its expansion, and reviews 
previous English School works on the socialisation of China and Japan. Following from 
this, the chapter suggests that European International Society in the late-nineteenth 
century was in fact a dualistic one. Here, the differences in the constitutive norms and 
institutions of the Society which governed Western and non-Westem states will be 
elucidated. Following from this, the chapter provides a brief survey of the study of 
socialisation processes and forwards an alternative analytical framework for 
understanding the socialisation of China and Japan into the Society.
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Chapter 2 seeks to explore the East Asian international order before the expansion 
of European International Society. In similar fashion to the preceding chapter, the 
constitutive norms and institutions of this international order will be examined, and 
Sino-Japanese relations will be briefly examined in this context.
Chapter 3 will examine both Chinese and Japanese perceptions of European 
International Society. This chapter, in a sense, is an account of the ‘social structures’ as 
seen by the elites of the two states.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the socialisation process, and shift the emphasis more 
on the ‘agents’. Here, changes in both states’ domestic and international policies will be 
examined. The two chapters are divided according to the continuum of socialisation 
forwarded in chapter 1, although it must be acknowledged that this is primarily for 
analytical purposes, and in reality the two processes overlapped.
Chapter 4 concerns the domestic reforms undertaken by states following their 
encounter with European International Society. It will give a detailed account of how 
the elites of both states redefined their state interests and identities. This chapter 
represents the earlier stage of socialisation into European International Society. The 
domestic reforms undertaken in both states were initially based on both Chinese and 
Japanese interactions with the Society’s coercive face, as well as their observations that 
its members were military powers. As a result, both Chinese and Japanese elites 
embarked on a programme of making their respective countries ‘rich and strong’. 
However, as their interaction with the Society increased, we begin to see divergences in 
both states’ behaviour. China attempted to ‘self-strengthen’ without joining the Society 
and remained largely within the stage of socialisation labelled in the study as ‘strategic 
learning’. Meanwhile Japan chose to become a ‘civilised’ member of the Society, and 
moved into a deeper stage of socialisation which is termed ‘emulative learning’.
Chapter 5 will explore how these processes led to changes within the East Asian 
international order. Japan’s deeper level of socialisation into European International 
Society meant that it not only had to reinvent its state: it also had to restructure its 
diplomatic relations with its Asian neighbours on the lines of ‘civilised’ European 
International Society. China for its part had not reached a deeper level of socialisation 
at this stage, and viewed Japan’s actions as a challenge to its international order. The 
consequence was increasing Sino-Japanese rivalry and eventually war. The study 
concludes by summarising its central arguments and discusses their implications for the 
English School approach.
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Finally, a number of qualifications are needed. The adoption of the English 
School theoretical approach means that the concept and existence of an (European) 
International Society is assumed. It should, however, be noted that in the case of Japan, 
which was socialised into the Society before China, the term ‘international society 
(kokusai shakai) did not appear until after the Versailles Treaty of 1919, amid 
considerable scepticism. In spite of this, we do see evidence of Japan’s socialisation 
into the norms of European International Society in the nineteenth century. Japan 
accepted the institutions of international law and the European diplomatic system to 
govern its foreign relations. It also adopted the sovereign state system, thereby 
Teject[ing] the traditional East Asian concept of hierarchical relations among states and 
peoples’.63 The social structures of European International Society certainly had 
discernible effects on China and Japan’s foreign policy behaviour, although to different 
degrees. Although European International Society was not an ontological being until the 
twentieth century, it can be assumed within the scope of this study that both China and 
Japan did encounter a European International Society by the late-nineteenth century, and 
had been subjected to its ‘pressures’ of socialisation.
By European International Society, I also include the United States, and this 
definition also applies for the term ‘European powers’, unless specified otherwise. It 
may be objected that the United States, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine of 
1823, did not fully participate in European politics at this time and cannot be considered 
to have been a member of European International Society. While accepting the 
controversial position of the United States in the Society, this study regards the United 
States as a member of the Society and is thus in agreement with Adam Watson’s 
assertion that while maintaining a somewhat separate identity,
the American states were in much the same position as the lesser European 
powers. Both groups played minor but real parts in the elaboration of the society’s 
rules, institutions, and codes of conduct. The United States also played an active 
part in the expansion of “European” or “Western” dominance....The originally 
anti-imperial United States acquired dependent territories of its own in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, and the European powers co-opted it as a quasi-equal 
partner in formulating agreed policies towards Eastern Asia.64
63 Key-Hiuk Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese 
Empire, 1860-1882. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 156 
04 Adam Watson, ‘European International Society and Its Expansion’ in Bull and Watson (eds), The 
Expansion o f International Society, p. 28
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Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Its first aim is to explore the relationship 
between imperialism and European International Society, and in particular its 
relationship with European imperialism. As noted above, standard studies of the 
expansion of the Society have often described this process ‘as a success story of states 
in which a society of initially European states expanded “across the rest of the globe” to 
eventually become the “global international society of today.”’ 1 Accordingly, the 
socialisation of China and Japan is described primarily in terms of both states adopting 
international law and European-style diplomacy and fulfilling the ‘standard of 
civilisation’ to be eventually accorded full membership status.
However, a cursory survey of the literature of Chinese and Japanese history 
indicates that there was more to China and Japan’s socialisation than these works 
suggest. Both China and Japan were coerced into European International Society as a 
result of European powers’ ‘gunboat diplomacy’. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
Japan’s subsequent imperialism in the late-nineteenth century was partly, if not fully, a 
result of its ‘learning’ process that followed its engagement with the Society.
This chapter argues that conventional studies cannot provide us with a satisfactory 
explanation of this process because of their downplaying of the intertwined nature of 
European imperialism and the expansion of European International Society. They do 
not sufficiently acknowledge the fact that European imperialism was at its height when 
the Society expanded to East Asia, and to date they have not adequately considered the 
possibility that both states may have been exposed to the darker aspects of the Society. 
This chapter seeks to address this lacuna by exploring the relationship between 
European International Society and imperialism. It begins by reviewing conventional 
works which study the entry of China and Japan into European International Society. 
An examination of the Society in the context of the late-nineteenth century follows, and 
a dualistic mode of interaction within the Society is identified.
The second aim of the chapter is to build on these findings and forward a more 
flexible analytical framework that can account for the multifaceted process of China and 
Japan’s socialisation. To this end, previous conceptualisations of non-European states’
1 Paul Keal, ‘An “International Society”?’ in Greg Fry and Jacinta O’Hagan (eds), Contending Images 
o f World Politics. (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 64
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entry into European International Society are critically examined. It is argued that the 
English School scholars’ normative commitments resulted in empirically impoverished 
accounts of this complex process. I then forward an alternative framework that is 
characterised by two points. First, it takes the role imperialism played in China and 
Japan’s engagement seriously. Second, rather than an outcome-based conceptualisation, 
this framework emphasises a more process-based account for socialisation. It is argued 
that this framework generates a more agent-centred depiction of this complex 
phenomenon, and goes beyond the ‘thin’ accounts of non-European states’ socialisation 
that have characterised conventional studies by English School scholars.
China and Japan’s socialisation into International Society: review of previous 
works
One of the most important works that have examined the topic of China and Japan’s 
socialisation into European International Society is The Expansion of International 
Society, edited by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson. In this study, the expansion of 
European International Society and the incorporation of non-European states are 
depicted in a somewhat linear fashion, sharing a broad resemblance with the 
structural/functionalist conceptualisation of socialisation.2
It is claimed the expansion of European International Society took place primarily 
between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, usually in the wake of imperialist 
expansion by the European powers. Supported by overwhelming military strength, the 
Western powers were able to impose their codes of diplomatic conduct and standards of 
viable statehood on the non-Westem states. This normative ‘code of conduct’ was 
known as the ‘standard of civilisation’. According to Gerrit W. Gong’s classic study, a 
‘civilised state’ was expected to protect the life, rights and property of foreign nationals; 
possess an ‘organized political bureaucracy with some efficiency in running the state
2 Curiously, the structuralist/functionalist approach has also been adopted by Kenneth N. Waltz, who 
states that the anarchical structures and the resultant competitive behaviour within the international 
system compel states to become similar units: ‘Socialization and competition are two aspects of a 
process by which the variety of behaviors and of outcomes is reduced.’ Failure to do so would result 
in the possibility of the ‘deviant’ state to be ‘punished’, mainly in the form of elimination from the 
international system. See Waltz, Theory o f International Politics, p. 77. There are some problems 
with Waltz’s conceptualisation of ‘socialization’, however: the socialisation process as conceived by 
the English School approach implicitly assumes that member states of the society serve as role 
models or dispensers of sanctions. Socialisation takes place as a result of member and non-member 
interaction, and is inherently social. However, Waltz’s version of ‘socialization’ is through the 
interaction between actors and material pressures, and, as Alexander Wendt correctly argues, 
‘[cjalling the production of behavioral conformity “socialization” says little if the structure that actors 
are being socialized to has no “social” content.’ A simple example can illustrate this point: I may eat 
at least one meal every day: but this is due to my feeling hungry (material pressures), and not because 
I have been ‘socialised’ into eating a meal every day. See Wendt, Social Theory o f International 
Politics, p. 101
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machinery, and with some capacity to organize for self-defence’; adhere to international 
law; provide channels for diplomacy; and conform ‘to the accepted norms and practices 
of the “civilized” international society’ . 3 In addition to protecting the lives and 
properties of Western nationals overseas, the ‘standard of civilisation’, it is argued, was 
a ‘response to the philosophical problem of determining which countries deserved legal 
recognition and legal personality in international law’ and ‘provided a doctrinal 
rationale for limiting recognition in international law to candidate countries’ . 4 In order 
to qualify for the protection of the norms and institutions of European International 
Society, non-European states were required to pass the test laid down by the ‘standard 
of civilisation’ and thus be judged as ‘civilised’ by its member states. 5
Empirical case studies which examine China and Japan’s entry into the Society 
focus primarily on the processes by which these states fulfilled the ‘standard of 
civilisation’ by accepting the institutions of international law and European style 
diplomacy and reconfiguring their domestic political organisational structures along 
Western lines. Such processes were inextricably linked to the modernisation of non- 
European states, and as a consequence functionalist undertones also permeate English 
School scholars’ accounts of the acceptance of European International Society across 
the world. Barry Buzan, for instance, has forwarded the argument that the expansion of 
International Society can take place as a result of a functional necessity to introduce a 
degree of order in increasingly complex interactions among states. 6 With regard to the
3 Gong, The Standard o f ‘Civilization ’ in International Society., pp. 14-15
4 ibid., p. 24
5 This aspect of the ‘standard of civilisation’ playing a crucial part in defining what it means to be a 
‘legitimate’ actor in international politics can be seen today: some authors have suggested that 
universal human rights constitutes the new ‘standard of civilisation’ in international politics today. 
See Jack Donnelly, ‘Human rights: a new standard of civilization?’, International Affairs (vol. 74, no. 
1, 1998, pp. 1-24). It is also interesting to note that any ‘standard of civilisation’ continues to carry 
with it considerable historical baggage: while not necessarily dissenting to human rights, there are 
some views that are suspicious of (and indeed question) this new ‘standard’, which is sometimes seen 
as an imposition of an alien normative standard and -  understandably, to my mind -  smacks of the 
cultural imperialism which took place in the nineteenth century. For a thoughtful treatment of these 
views, see Peter Van Ness, ‘Introduction’, Chandra Muzaffar ‘From human rights to human dignity’, 
and Nikhil Aziz, ‘The human rights debate in an era of globalization: hegemony of discourse’, all in 
Peter Van Ness (ed), Debating Human Rights: Critical essays from the United States and Asia. 
(London: Routledge, 1999)
0 See Barry Buzan, ‘From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and 
Regime Theory Meet the English School’, International Organization (vol. 47, no. 3, Summer 1993, 
pp. 327-352). Although not working within the English School approach, Ikenberry and Kupchan 
have also suggested the concept of hegemonic socialisation. Note, however, that while Ikenberry and 
Kupchan do cautiously posit the possibility that socialisation can happen through ‘normative 
persuasion’, their bias is towards materialist explanations. Socialisation, in their view, is extremely 
difficult to achieve in the absence of some form of coercion. Similarly, socialisation is greatly 
facilitated when domestic actors of the secondary states accept the norms forwarded by the hegemon 
to further their own myopic interests. However, such views, while highly plausible, do run into 
difficulties when faced with empirical anomalies -  while acknowledging the role or non-state actors, 
Audie Klotz, for instance, has convincingly demonstrated the global internalisation of the anti-
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adoption of Western political institutions by non-European states that took place in the 
wake of this expansion, Adam Watson also adopts a functionalist explanation:
...the nineteenth century is notable for the creation throughout Asia, Africa, and 
Oceania of Europeanized or Westernized elites. The Europeans and the Americans 
offered the instruction, and usually met with an enthusiastic response...The 
mastery of Western governmental practice and military technology enabled these 
elites to run a modem state...* 7
This linear approach is visible in the specific case studies which examine China 
and Japan’s entry into European International Society. The most important works 
examining Japan’s introduction to the Society are Hidemi Suganami’s contribution in 
The Expansion of International Society and Gerrit Gong’s case study of Japan in The 
Standard o f ‘Civilization ’ in International Society.8 Here, the metamorphosis of Japan 
after its entry into the Society is examined almost exclusively in terms of domestic 
modernisation, the adoption of European diplomatic practices and international law, and 
Japan’s participation in international conferences. Gong and Yongjin Zhang adopt a 
similar approach in their studies of China’s entry into European International Society.9 
Their accounts of non-European states’ entry into European International Society again 
concentrate on the process of China’s modernisation, particularly the adoption of 
modem diplomacy, international law and the political structures of Western states. 
Zhang does move away from an exclusive focus on non-European states’ fulfilling of 
the ‘standard of civilisation’, and differs with Gong on the dates at which China could 
be considered to have entered the Society, claiming that China’s entry took place in the 
late 1920s, rather than the 1940s. He argues that Gong places undue attention on 
China’s efforts to fulfil the ‘standard or ~'_ M!sation’ and consequently ignores the 
‘democratization of the post-war international system’ which took place after World 
War I. The dissemination of Wilsonian collective security (as embodied in the 
establishment of the League of Nations) ‘accentuated the need to involve all the states in 
an enduring peace’, 10 thus facilitating China’s entry into International Society. 
However, Zhang, in similar fashion to Suganami and Gong, is in broad agreement that
Apartheid norm, even though this norm was initially articulated by Third World states, rather than the
hegemonic powers. See Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid.
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995)
7 Adam Watson, ‘European International Society and its Expansion’, p. 31
8 Suganami, ‘Japan’s Entry into International Society’ and Gong, The Standard o f ‘Civilization’ in 
International Society.
9 See Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization' in International Society, ‘China’s Entry into International 
Society’ in Bull and Watson (eds), The Expansion o f International Society, and Yongjin Zhang, 
‘China’s Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of “Civilisation”’
!0 Zhang, ‘China’s Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of “Civilisation”’, p. 15
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efforts at modernisation played an important part in facilitating China’s recognition as a 
‘civilized’ state and attaining full membership of the Society.
Shortcomings o f previous works
While such accounts certainly do illuminate certain aspects of the expansion of 
European International Society, they are not without their problems. One is of an 
empirical nature: this Society is often conceptualised as one which recognises ‘the 
existence of different political systems and cultures in the world, and attempts to 
facilitate their peaceful coexistence with one another by promoting toleration. It tries to 
achieve this goal through the normative principle of the reciprocal recognition of 
sovereignty’ . 11 This approach seems to reflect closely Bull’s assertion that members of 
International Society should consider themselves to be bound by a commitment to 
maintaining the ‘structure of coexistence and co-operation. ’ 12 However, this account 
downplays the role imperialism -  and violence -  played in the expansion of European 
International Society, and thus does not always stand up to historical realities. 13 If we 
take European imperialistic expansion into account, it is somewhat problematic to 
assume that the norms of ‘toleration and coexistence’ played a crucial role with 
European states’ relations vis-ä-vis the non-European states, particularly in the 
nineteenth century.
Second, because English School scholars have not adequately investigated the 
Society’s relations between non-European ‘outsiders’ who were not subjected to the 
norms of coexistence, conventional studies undertaken by English School scholars 
result in implicitly assuming is that there exists an International Society with a single set 
of norms which applies equally to all its members, and that non-European states were 
socialised into this. This depiction of the expansion of European International Society 
assumes that the normative structure of European International Society, with its goals of 
promoting order and coexistence, was transmitted to the non-European states, and this is
11 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 12. Furthermore, these cooperative norms are argued to 
stem from European civilisation.
12 Hedley Bull, ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’ in Bull and Watson (eds), The 
Expansion o f International Society, p. 120
13 See Hidemi Suganami, ‘British Institutionalists, or the English School, 20 Years on’, International 
Relations (vol. 17, no. 3, 2003, pp. 253-271) and Paul Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness o f International Society. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), for a sensitive treatment of this matter. Note, however, that Keal is 
primarily concerned with the plight of indigenous peoples who were deprived of their human rights 
in the course of the expansion of International Society, and is highly critical of the statist bias of the 
English School approach.
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reinforced by ‘their firm confidence in western civilization’ which is seen as almost 
uniquely concerned with promoting international order. 14
This is not to imply that English School scholars were unaware of the connection 
between power politics and European International Society. Seän Molloy, for instance, 
argues that Martin Wight was sensitive to the ‘paradoxical situation of a Grotian 
international structure based upon the institution of diplomacy and alliances operating a 
realist logic based upon the principle of competition in international anarchy’. Hence 
Wight saw ‘international anarchy and the struggle for power as the foundation of 
international society’ . 15 With regard to the expansion of European International Society, 
Hedley Bull was keenly aware of the connection between imperialism and the 
expansion of the Society, stating that the trading relations between the European and 
non-European states prior to the age of imperialism failed to facilitate the entry of the 
latter into the European society of states. It was only at the age of imperialism when the 
expansion of European International Society finally came about. 16
However, these particular aspects of International Society discussed above 
curiously seem to drop out in the English School approach’s portrayal of the expansion 
of European International Society and relations between Western states and China and 
Japan. Even when the existence of imperialism is acknowledged, how this may have 
affected the latter’s socialisation remains underexplored, as our previous survey of 
studies of Japan’s entry into the Society has demonstrated. The analyses thus often give 
a somewhat teleological impression. The ‘achievements of the West’ (including the 
institutions of International Society) and the English School’s implicit confidence in 
them ‘supply a universal yardstick by which to assess the degree of development of 
other societies’ within English School accounts, 17 and this results in depicting the 
expansion of the Society as a global spread of ‘progressive’ elements of International
14 See Suganami, ‘British Institutionalists, or the English School, 20 Years on’, p. 264. This point is 
most eloquently put forward by Martin Wight, who stated with regard to the ‘Grotian’ tradition 
which promotes order within the states system: ‘[t]he cultivation of this middle ground [between 
realism and idealism/revolutionism], and the discovery of political morality, seem peculiarly related 
to Western values’. See Wight, ‘Western Values in International Relations’, p. 128
15 Sean Molloy, ‘The Realist Logic of International Society’, Cooperation and Conflict (vol. 38, no. 2, 
2003, pp. 83-99), p. 91. I do not agree, however, with Molloy’s assertion that the balance o f power 
as conceptualised by Wight is necessarily a product of the logic o f anarchy: in ‘Western Values in 
International Relations’, Martin Wight refers to the balance o f power as something more ‘conscious’ 
which serves ‘to preserve the independence of the member-communities’. Here the balance o f power 
is seen as rather as a social product which enjoys some legitimacy within international society as a 
guiding norm. It is not necessarily a fortuitous product o f anarchy. Wight, ‘Western Values in 
International Relations’, p. 96. Emphasis added.
16 See Bull, ‘The Emergence o f a Universal International Society’, p. 118
1 Hidemi Suganami, ‘British Institutionalists, or the English School, 20 Years on’, International 
Relations (vol. 17, no. 3, 2003, pp. 253-271), p. 265
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Society (particularly international law and European-style diplomacy) that promote 
order and coexistence. 18
The consequences are an unresolved tension between the approach’s sensitivity to 
historical realities and the assumed ‘aspects of the universalization of the West’s 
identity...[which exercises] a progressive influence over the broader history of 
mankind. ’ 19 Hedley Bull’s conceptualisation of the expansion of European International 
Society has been described succinctly by Jacinta O’Hagan: ‘Universalist overtones 
surface in Bull’s discussion of international society. While there is no strong thread of 
progressive history in Bull’s work...he does imply that development and progress have 
been linked to the expansion of the European system. ’ 20
There appears to be two main reasons for this rather lopsided depiction of the 
expansion of European International Society. First, based on an empirical observation 
that the institutions of the Society had spread across the world, the British Committee 
concentrated on exploring ‘whether a common culture was a necessary condition for the 
existence of a states system’ . 21 This may account for the fact that English School 
scholars devoted most of their intellectual efforts to explaining how the Society’s 
institutions came to be accepted by ‘alien’ polities and led to the emergence of a
18 William A. Callahan provides a telling example with reference to China. Whereas foreign 
intervention (such as the imposition of unequal treaties, treaty ports and the sacking of the 
Yuanmingyuan Summer Palace in 1860 following the Qing’s failure to adhere to the Treaty of 
Tianjin) in China is seen as national humiliation, this is treated by Adam Watson as ‘the most 
impressive overseas achievement of the international Concert: a sustained and developing collective 
action on behalf of international society as a whole.’ See William A. Callahan, ‘Nationalizing 
International Theory: The Emergence of the English School and IR Theory with Chinese 
Characteristics’ (Paper presented at International Studies Association annual conference, Portland 
Oregon, February 2003), pp. 11-12. Watson’s quote cited here can be found in Watson, ‘European 
International Society and its Expansion’, p. 31
19 Jacinta O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 126. Also see Suganami, ‘British Institutionalists, or the English 
School, 20 Years on’
20 O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West in International Relations, p. 129. O’Hagan also contends that 
Wight did not share Bull’s somewhat teleological vision, rather seeing international politics as 
repetitious. However, he did ‘admit limited possibilities for change, as is demonstrated by his faith in 
the existence of international society as a set of institutions and norms which can help to modify 
international conflict.’ See p. 129 There are similar tenets visible in Buzan and Little. While they 
do accept the existence of a core and periphery in international society, they seem to argue that 
International Society is moving towards increased ‘progressive’ homogeneity, claiming that ‘the core 
of international society creates pressures (coercive and persuasive) on the periphery to follow the 
core’s path towards a deeper and wider understanding of what “like unit” means.’ (Barry Buzan and 
Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International 
Relations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 338) For evidence of this, they cite the 
increasing acceptance of ‘Westemistic’ ideas such as ‘the...universal norm of human equality’, (p. 
340)
21 Dunne, Inventing International Society, pp. 124-125. For this point, I am indebted to the anonymous 
reviewer for the European Journal o f International Relations.
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‘global’ International Society, despite a lack of cultural unity. 22 To this end, Edward 
Keene suggests, they incorporated the ‘standard of civilization’ as a factor which 
facilitated the sharing of the fundamental norms of International Society, rather than 
shared culture. 23 Furthermore, the ‘standard’ could, Gerrit W. Gong states, ‘define the 
legal requirements necessary for a non-European country...to gain full and “civilized” 
status in “civilized” international society’ , 24 and was a useful empirical benchmark for 
the English School scholars to ascertain when non-European entities joined the Society. 
For them, the central question was on the acceptance of the Society, and questions of 
how imperialist expansion may have affected non-European states’ interpretations of the 
Society, or whether or not the norms of ‘coexistence’ were actually transmitted to non- 
European states, were secondary. Their inherent belief in the progressive nature of the 
Society led them to implicitly assume that the Society and its institutions would 
ultimately gain acceptance.
Second, the English School scholars were committed to a particular notion of 
International Society forwarded by A. H. L. Heeren, which downplays imperialism and 
paints an excessively benign picture of the Society. Heeren noted in his Manual o f the 
History o f the Political System of Europe and its Colonies that the European 
international system was characterised by
...its internal freedom, or, in other words, the mutual independence of its members, 
however disproportionate they may otherwise be in regard to physical power. It is 
this feature which distinguishes such a system from one of an opposite class, that 
is, where an unacknowledged preponderance of one of the members exists.25
The English School scholars appear to have decided that this depiction of 
International Society most matched their theoretical conceptualisation. In the words of 
Adam Watson, ‘the European system since Westphalia -  that is, during most of its 
existence -  has theoretically been a society of independent states which all recognize 
each other as such. The [British] committee accepted the theory. ’ 26
22 This by no means implies that there were no disagreements among members of the British 
Committee over whether or not a common culture was necessary for an ‘International Society’. See 
ibid., pp. 124-129
23 See Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, pp. 23-24. A. H. L. Heeren, who provided the starting 
point for English School scholars’ conceptualisation of International Society, had stated that the 
European state system shared similar ‘manners, religion and degree of social improvement’ and was 
‘cemented together by a reciprocity of interests.’ See Adam Watson, ‘Hedley Bull, state systems and 
international societies’, Review of International Studies (vol. 13, no. 2, 1987, pp. 147-153), p. 150.
24 Gong, ‘China’s Entry into International Society’, p. 179
25 A. H. L. Heeren, A Manual of the History of the Political System of Europe and its Colonies. 
(London: Henry G. Bohn, 1846), pp. vii-viii. C.f. Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 21
20 Adam Watson, ‘Systems of states’, Review o f International Studies (vol. 16, no. 2, 1990, pp. 99-109), 
p. 103. Also see Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in 
World Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 22
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In addition, another reason for the English School’s adoption of Heeren’s concept 
of the society of states appears to be its scholars’ normative commitment to demonstrate 
that a degree of order (and morality), rather than rampant power politics, was possible in 
an anarchic world. The English School scholars were of course fully aware that the 
existence of International Society itself would not necessarily result in the mitigation of 
the insecurities of anarchy and order. They knew that any order brought about by the 
Society was a precarious one, and could be subjected to challenges. However, it was 
this very acknowledgement which seems to strengthen their commitment to forwarding 
the Society as a progressive concept that should -  provided the states system existed -  
be something worth defending and promoting. Martin Wight, for instance, ‘was the Erst 
theorist to reject the bifurcation of international thought into realism and idealism, as he 
believed it to be “the reflection of a diseased situation . ’” 27 Consequently, as Chris 
Brown has noted:
[English School] theory characteristically uses the same terminology or rules and 
norms to describe both the ways in which states actually behave (a matter for 
empirical observation) and the way in which they ought to behave (the product of a 
moral discourse)...norms are assumed to be both the product of the interaction of 
states and regulative of those interactions.28
As a result, some historical works by English School scholars analysing the 
evolution o f European International Society have been coloured by this agenda, leading 
to problematic, uncritical depictions of history designed to demonstrate that a via media 
between realism and ‘revolutionism’ could exist. In particular, Keene argues, their 
embracing of Heeren’s version of international society committed the English School
...to a particular theory of modem history that had been developed in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by scholars who were ‘apologists or 
protagonists’ for the European states-system at a time when it was facing a mortal 
threat from the French Revolution. The idea of a states-system was originally 
developed as part of the attempt to justify certain normative principles as the 
authentic basis for order in modem world politics29
This particular version of history was noteworthy for its heralding of the cooperative 
nature of International Society which promoted coexistence. Its aim was ‘to stigmatize
2' Dunne, Inventing International Society, p. 54. Dunne argues that Bull also noted the fact that states 
did conform to international law and asserted (implicitly) ‘that states should act...in a way which 
strengthens the normative principles of international society. It is at this point that Bull clearly 
departs from the core principles of political realism. In short, by strengthening the institutions of 
international society, the logic of anarchy can be mitigated.’ Dunne, Inventing International society, 
pp. 143-144
28 Chris Brown, ‘World Society and the English School: An “International Society” Perspective on 
World Society’, European Journal of International Relations (vol. 7, no. 4, 2001, pp. 423-441), p. 
438
29 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, pp. 15-16
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the French Revolution, and especially the Napoleonic imperial system as unlawful in 
terms of the “traditional” principles of European public law and order. ’ 30
While the English School scholars themselves certainly did not accept this 
conceptualisation uncritically, Keene argues that Heeren’s account of International 
Society contains two serious weaknesses which may have been missed by English 
School scholars: first, because of its opposition to the French Revolution, republicanism 
features very little. Second -  and more importantly for our discussion here -  there is a 
‘lack of a proper account of the development of international political and legal order 
beyond Europe’ which frequently came about in the wake of violence -  imperialism. 31 
The reason for this omission should be understood in its historical context. As Heeren 
‘was trying to stigmatize the Napoleonic imperial system within Europe,’ argues Keene, 
‘it would hardly have suited that purpose to call attention to the increasingly 
consolidated British imperial system in the world beyond Europe.’
The Janus-faced International Society
Despite these shortcomings, conventional English School scholarship has continued to 
depict the expansion of European International Society as one in which the non- 
European states were incorporated into a Society where the power politics associated 
with imperialism are relegated to the background. Instead, there is heavy emphasis on 
the acceptance of its ‘progressive’ institutions. However, the historical record of 
European imperialism which accompanied the expansion of European International 
Society suggests that the norms of ‘coexistence’ did not apply to non-European polities. 
It seems more plausible to suggest that a different mode of interaction applied to non- 
Europeans at this time.
This possibility has been explored to a certain degree by scholars associated with 
the English School, who forwarded compelling evidence that point to a more 
heterogeneous International Society. Wight stated that there ‘is an outer circle that 
embraces all mankind, under natural law, and an inner circle, the corpus Christianorum 
bound by the laws of Christ. The inner circle is unique. ’ 32 A more contemporary 
example of this can be found in the increasing integration taking place among the 
‘industrialised states’. Observing this development, Barry Buzan and Richard Little 
argue that there exists a ‘more intense’ social structure between the ‘Western states’,
30
31
32
ibid., p. 16 
ibid., p. 25
Wight, Systems o f States, p. 128
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which effectively constitutes a ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ within international society. 33 A 
similar point is made by Ole Wasver in his study of the European ‘security community’. 
Waever argues: ‘Since the end of the Cold War, the international society is marked by a 
relatively high degree of homogeneity organized as concentric circles around a 
dominant “westemistic” centre....The trend is towards redefining sovereignty in 
operational terms as a relationship collectively between insiders (the international 
society) and outsiders -  not primarily an attribute of individual countries within 
international society. ’ 34
The possibility of a much more diverse Society also leads to the empirical 
question of whether or not there exists different modes of interaction within it. With 
regard to the age of imperialist expansion, Wight, in his International Theory, offers one 
of the most perceptive insights into relations between Europeans and non-Europeans 
within the society of states, and implicitly suggests the existence of a different way in 
which the European states dealt with their relations with ‘uncivilised’ or ‘barbarous’ 
polities. 35 ‘The question of relations with barbarians’, Wight states, ‘was a political 
problem forming a bridge between international relations and colonial administrations. 
Non-self-governing peoples, colonial populations, were barbarians who had been 
absorbed into international society but not yet been digested’ . 36 Wight argued that 
towards these peoples and their political communities, the ‘Rationalist’ (or Grotian) 
theory stipulated three principles. First, ‘barbarians’ were granted rights as accorded by 
natural law. Second, treaties with them were to be honoured. Thirdly, and perhaps 
most importantly, it was claimed ‘that international society ha[d] a “dual mandate”.... 
Colonial powers [were] seen as trustees both for the advancement of the subject races,
33 Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, p. 338.
34 Ole Wsever, ‘European Security Identities’, Journal o f Common Market Studies (vol. 34, no. 1, 
March 1996, pp. 103-132), p. 118. A similar notion of the existence of a ‘dual’ international society 
could also be discerned from recent assertions of the existence of a ‘democratic peace’, in which it is 
argued that the increase in shared values among liberal democratic states has rendered them more 
inclined to believe that other liberal democratic states are less likely to resort to force. This, coupled 
with institutional checks and balances of liberal democracies which makes it harder for leaders to 
resort to war, tends to make relations between liberal democracies more likely to be solved using 
non-violent means. See John M. Owen, ‘How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace’ in Michael E. 
Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds), Debating the Democratic Peace. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996), and Bruce Russett’s hypotheses on the 
democratic peace argument in ‘Why Democratic Peace?’ in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones 
and Steven E. Miller (eds). Debating the Democratic Peace. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, 1996), pp. 96-97. See also Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, p. 338.
35 For a discussion of Martin Wight, colonialism and his ‘Theory of Mankind’, see Timothy Dunne, 
‘Colonial Encounters in International Relations: Reading Wight, Writing Australia’ Australian 
Journal o f International Affairs (vol. 51, no. 3, 1997, pp. 309-323)
3o Martin Wight. International Theory: The Three Traditions. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), p. 
50
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and for the development of their material resources for the benefit of mankind.’37 
Furthermore, barbarians were not accorded ‘full rights, not equal rights, but appropriate 
rights.’38
Gerrit W. Gong’s work, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society, 
also points to a duality within the Society. In his case study of Japan, he argues that the 
Western powers’ reluctance to accept Japan as an equal partner in European 
International Society ultimately led the Japanese to rebel against this international order. 
In particular, Gong mentions the Western powers’ reluctance to abrogate the unequal 
treaties with Japan and the ‘Triple Intervention’ of 1895, where Russia, France and 
Germany coerced Japan to return the Liaodong peninsula (which the latter had acquired 
following the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895) to China, only to then demand 
territorial concessions from the Chinese themselves. The latter episode aroused 
particular bitterness among the Japanese, who, ‘[a]fter conforming wholeheartedly to 
the spirit and letter of international law and diplomacy...conclude[d] that, in the end, 
only force mattered in international relations’.39 He also claims: ‘If anything, Japan took 
the standard [of civilization] too seriously and naively, on face value, not understanding 
that even “civilized” international society was characterised by anarchy (the absence of 
a monopoly of legitimate violence) and hierarchy (because without civil society, rights 
depend largely on might)’.40 The implication here is that Japan initially envisaged a 
Society characterised by sovereign equality, but later found out that in fact there existed 
a Society characterised by a very different, hierarchical ordering principle of states. 
Setting aside Gong’s problematic exaggeration of Japanese naivete (the Japanese were 
in fact quite aware of dualities in the Society, as we shall see in the chapters that 
follow), this further suggests that there may have existed a different mode of interaction 
towards ‘uncivilized’ states. However, apart from his passing acknowledgement of 
hypocrisy and highly differential treatment of non-European states by the Western 
powers, Gong does not offer us many clues.
This mode of interaction which governed relations between European powers and 
‘barbarous’ non-European polities has recently been elaborated further by Edward 
Keene. He argues that European International Society operated under very different 
principles from the one which governed the relations among ‘civilised’ states. One of 
the most important constitutive norms of sovereign integrity did not apply to the non-
37
38
39
ibid., p. 78 
ibid., p. 79
Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation ’ in International Society, p. 196
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European ‘barbarians’. Rather than tolerating political difference (which was frequently 
interpreted as ‘backward’ or ‘uncivilised’), the intellectual climate of the late-nineteenth 
century advocated that European International Society and its members had the duty to 
promote good governance until they were deemed ready to ‘join international society’ . 41 
However, because of the English School’s alignment to one particular conceptualisation 
of International Society, theoretical explorations of norms governing European states’ 
relations with non-European states (particularly in the age of imperialism) still remain 
scarce. 42
The ideology/ of the Janus-Faced European International Society
The works discussed above imply that there existed two separate modes of interaction 
within European International Society in the late-nineteenth century. The fact that the 
expansion of the Society all too often took place under coercive imperialism could mean 
that its cooperative institutions and norms may not have played the prominent role they 
are purported to. Furthermore, the sense of racial superiority which heavily coloured 
European interactions with non-Europeans also seems to indicate the existence of a 
hierarchical International Society where dominance, rather than coexistence and 
cooperation, was the norm.
What, then, was this mode of interaction? At this point it is worth spending some 
time in exploring the social structures of European International Society which applied 
to non-European states in the nineteenth century. As mentioned above, the expansion of 
European International Society was strongly connected to the imperialist expansion of 
the West. The explanations for this are manifold. One of the standard, and indeed most 
influential explanations for the emergence of imperialism points to the importance of 
economic factors. 43 Here, it is argued that imperialism originated from European states’
40 ibid., p. 165
41 Wight, International Theory, p. 79. Wight labels such principles ‘paternalism’. At the same time, he 
notes that the Rationalist principles towards the ‘barbarians’ argued that ‘barbarous’ entities are 
destined to eventually disappear as they were gradually accorded recognition as full members of 
international society in their own right. ‘[I]t was already acknowledged in theory’, Wight states, ‘that 
the function of the Rationalist tutelage of barbarians was to work for its own extinction, to make 
itself unnecessary; this was the liberal side of the Rationalist theory.’ See International Theory, p. 
81.
42 Exceptions to this include Dunne, ‘Colonial Encounters in International Relations’ and Paul Keal, ‘ 
“Just Backward Children”: International Law and the Conquest of Non-European Peoples’ Australian 
Journal o f International Affairs (vol. 49, no. 2, November 1995, pp. 191- 206) and European 
Conquest and the Rights o f Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness o f International Society. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
43 Important works include John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1968) and Vladimir Il’ich Lenin, Teikokushugi (Udaka Motosuke, trans). (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 
1998). A useful review and critique of Marxist explanations of imperialism can be found in Tom 
Kemp, ‘The Marxist theory of imperialism’ and Michael Barratt Brown, ‘A Critique of Marxist
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desire to maximise ‘the power and profits of the mother country by monopolizing 
trade. ’ 44 John A. Hobson argues that the rapid growth of manufacturing and the 
consequent emergence of surplus produce furthered imperialism through the search for 
‘outlets for the investment of...surplus capital. ’ 45 The result was an aggressive series of 
imperialist drives aimed at securing raw materials and markets for surplus produce from 
overseas. This search for overseas markets took an increasingly competitive edge in the 
nineteenth century. Again, Hobson explains how this process took place in Britain as 
follows:
So long as England held a virtual monopoly o f the world markets for important 
classes of manufactured goods, Imperialism was unnecessary. After 1870 this 
manufacturing and trading supremacy was greatly impaired: other nations, 
especially Germany, the United States, and Belgium, advanced with great 
rapidity...The encroachments made by these nations upon our old markets, even in 
our own possessions, made it most urgent that we should take energetic means to 
secure new markets.46
However, it would be wrong to assume that European expansion in the nineteenth 
century was driven by economic considerations alone. Although this is not to deny the 
importance of material explanations, we must be equally aware of the fact that European 
imperialism was accompanied and supported by an imperialist discourse which wielded 
considerable influence. While it is true that ‘economic, political and military interest 
groups undoubtedly benefited from imperialism, it would be wrong to assume that the 
discourse was created simply for them or at their behest...[and] reduce imperialism to 
any one particular interest group’ , 47 and it is necessary ‘to take seriously the normative 
and legal environment within which imperial forms of governance were constructed and 
maintained’ .48
theories of imperialism’, both in in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds), Studies in the Theory of 
Imperialism. (London: Longman, 1972)
44 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 78
45 John A. Hobson, Imperialism, p. 71.
46 ibid., p. 72
47 John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), p. 223
48 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 77. Furthermore, it should be noted that despite the fact 
that economic arguments have elucidated an important element of imperialism, there are several 
important empirical shortcomings in their explanatory power. As Jan P. Nederveen Pieterse points 
out, the biggest problem is that because of its emphasis on economic factors, it excludes any forms of 
imperialism which do not fit into this category. Consequently, it cannot explain imperialism which 
predates the development of capitalism: by implication, neither can it explain ‘the continuities of the 
expansion of European social formations within Europe which preceded and formed the basis for 
expansion outside of Europe.’ Similarly, it has trouble accounting for imperialistic behaviour which 
took place when there was a disjuncture between economic and political interests, which was fairly 
ubiquitous. See Jan P. Nederveen Pieterse, Empire and Emancipation: Power and Liberation on a 
World Scale. (London: Pluto Press, 1990), p. 7
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Within the context of the nineteenth century, in addition to the explosive growth 
in the economic power of Europe, it is important to note the growing confidence in 
European civilisation. The term ‘civilisation’, which originated in France, had initially 
connoted sound governance. However, it gradually ‘denoted more than just a specific 
form of government; it referred to a process that moved people from customs (moeurs), 
institutions, and a material existence that was identified as primitive, to one that was 
more sophisticated or “civilized . ” ’ 49 In his discussion of Norbert Elias, John Keane 
states that this process of ‘civilisation’ was also inextricably linked to the process of 
state-building where ‘uncivilised’ violence was taken out o f individuals into the hands 
of the modem nation-state. While this may have had the effect o f reducing arbitrary- 
violence among the people, it also meant a potentially dangerous concentration of 
violence in the hands of the state, which consequently became capable of inflicting this 
on an unprecedented scale. In the not too distant past, the mass murder o f the Jews by 
the German state sen/ed to vividly remind humanity of this less palatable aspect of so- 
called ‘civilisation’ . 50
By the time of the nineteenth century, remarkable technological advances had 
increased the confidence in the progressive nature of European civilisation, to the extent 
that progress was seen very much as an inevitable process. The influence of this 
thinking can be discerned from the writings of political theorists such as Marx and 
Hegel, who both forwarded teleological theories of dialectical progress. As Arthur 
Herman argues:
...the nineteenth-century version of progress made explicit an issue that had been 
only implicit in the Enlightenment. This was that the lone individual did not have 
much choice in these matters. The social and economic processes that make up 
civil society are large, complex, and inexorable. Those processes are themselves 
governed by hidden but inevitable laws, including that of Progress itself. The 
civilized individual is their product, rather than the other way around....Human 
beings have become cogs in the wheels of history as they inevitably grind 
forward. 51
Furthermore, this comfortable assurance with European progress manifested itself 
in a propensity to adopt dismissive attitudes towards non-European societies and their
49 Arthur Herman, The Idea of Decline in Western History. (New York: The Free Press, 1997), pp. 21- 
22 .
30 See John Keane, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 
particularly pp. 116-130.
51 See Arthur Herman, The Idea o f Decline in Western History. (New York: The Free Press, 1997), p. 
31. Such notions, of course, did not match reality. John Keane reminds us of this when he states that 
even advanced civil societies can display ‘patterns of incivility or behaviour prone to violence than 
can and do threaten to accumulate synergetically to the point where the occasional violence of some
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peoples. Although these sentiments originated from political, religious and cultural 
differences, as the nineteenth century progressed, Michael Adas notes, ‘technological 
and scientific standards’ were increasingly forwarded ‘as the most reliable basis for 
comparisons between societies and civilizations.’52 Material comparisons also seemed 
to provide a more objective standard of comparing European and non-European 
societies.
This belief in the inevitable progress of humankind led by the White/European 
race had important ramifications for international politics. First, it generated an 
increasing sentiment of superiority among Europeans and the dehumanisation of non- 
Europeans. The Europeans, Adas states, lumped ‘Africans and Melanesians together 
indiscriminately as savages or primitives. The term “barbarian” was reserved for 
peoples who, like the Chinese and Indians, had advanced somewhat and then stagnated 
and declined.’53 An anonymous reviewer of a Missionary’s account of his travels in 
China noted the stagnation of China by describing them as ‘childish’, thus participating 
in the creation of what John M. Hobson calls the ‘Peter Pan theory’ o f the East, which 
‘conjured up a romantic image of the Other as more helpless than cruel, as well as being 
alluring, promiscuous and exotic. In effect it imagined the East as an innocent child 
who would never grow up of his/her own accord.’54 Such writings reflect typical 
attitudes held by Europeans in the context of the late-nineteenth century, and a passage 
from the Edinburgh Review published in 1855 is worth citing in length:
If we look at savage nations, we still see amidst them the rude germs of what, by 
instruction from without, may be readily developed into the ordinary and normal 
forms of civilisation. Among the Chinese, we see not only much that is defective, 
but more that is abnormal; and to complete the contrast, we find, in many respects, 
the extremes of civilisation and barbarism side by side; -  the most refined culture 
and the most artificial civilisation in combination with astounding ignorance, 
prejudice, and childishness....Another not less striking peculiarity of this singular 
nation, and another proof of extreme dissimilarity to the rest of the world, is the 
contrast it presents with other nations in point of progress...[h]aving carried 
several species of arts and manufactures to a great pitch of refinement...not only 
do these remain much as they have been for ages, but they have led on to no 
proportionate general progress in the arts of social life.55
against some within a civil society degenerates into the constant violence of all against all.’ See 
Keane, Civil Society, p. 136
52 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure o f Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies o f Western 
Dominance. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 144
53 ibid., p. 195. See also John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins o f Western Civilisation, pp. 228-231
54 John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, p. 228
35 Anonymous, ‘The Chinese Empire: forming a Sequel to the Work entitled “Recollections of a 
Journey through Tartary and Thibet” By M. Hue, formerly Missionary Apostolic in China. In 2 vols. 
London: 1855’, Edinburgh Review (vol. 101, April 1855), pp. 422-424
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Second, there also emerged an increasing belief that Europe had a manifest 
destiny ‘to civilize the peoples under their imperial rule, encouraging economic and 
technological progress and giving them the best possible government, at the expense of 
the authority of indigenous rulers if necessary’ , 56 giving imperialist expansion an 
additional impetus. Theories of ‘oriental despotism’ readily supplied justifications for 
extending the trappings of European civilisation and governance. It was claimed ‘that 
Europe was the birthplace of democracy and hence the carrier of economic and political 
progress, while Asia was dismissed as the home of despotism and hence the victim of 
stagnation. ’ 57 The ‘civilised’ European powers had the duty to ensure the ‘uncivilised’ 
polities conformed to the ‘standard of civilisation’ and followed the path to progress. In 
this sense, ‘the standard became a stimulus for reform and a guideline for the changes, 
adjustments, and adaptations needed to fulfil its requirements. ’ 58 There are of course 
dangers in overemphasising this aspect of imperialism, as the ‘civilising mission’ was 
cited as a justification for what could be interpreted as sheer territorial aggrandizement. 
However, as Adas persuasively argues:
Undoubtedly, claims that colonial conquests had been undertaken in order to uplift 
African or Asian peoples could be little more than cynical camouflage for brutal 
exploitation, as the Belgian King Leopold II and his rapacious agents demonstrated 
in Congo in the late nineteenth century. But many of those who justified imperial 
expansion or colonial policies in the name of higher purposes linked to the 
civilizing mission were firmly convinced that they were acting in the long-term 
interests of the peoples brought under European rule.59
Furthermore, it should also be noted that this ‘standard of civilisation’ was also applied 
to European states. The increasing differentiation between ‘civilised’ European and 
‘uncivilised’ non-European polities served to enhance the identity of the former, thus 
facilitating their differentiation through an elaborate development of rules and 
institutions which governed relations between European states. 60 The ‘standard of 
civilisation’ thus evolved into ‘representing] a code of expected “civilized” behaviour 
which Europe imposed upon itself, rather than simply some kind of fig-leaf for its 
territorial aggression. 61
56 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 83. See also Watson, ‘European International Society and 
its Expansion’, p. 27
5' John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins o f Western Civilisation, p. 224
58 Gong, The Standard o f ‘Civilization ' in International Society, p. 8
59 Adas, Machines as the Measure o f Men, p. 200.
60 For this use of the ‘other’, see Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The Other in European self­
definition: an addendum to the literature on international society’, Review o f International Studies 
(vol. 17, no. 4, 1991, pp. 327-348).
Dl Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard o f ‘Civilization’ in International Society. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984), p. 6
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The ‘civilising’ mode of interaction in European International Society
This European belief in a manifest destiny to introduce the trappings of ‘civilisation’
translated into the emergence of two separate modes o f interaction within European
International Society. One the one hand, there existed the international order based on
the Westphalian system within Europe. The purpose of this order was to promote the
coexistence of sovereign states. Accordingly, Edward Keene argues, its norms
stipulated
...that each state should recognize the territorial sovereignty of the others, and 
therefore that states should respect each other’s equality and independence. The 
logic of this norm implied that the institutions that maintained order in the society 
of states had to be exiremely decentralized and voluntaristic, both of which criteria 
were fulfilled by the balance of power, diplomacy and positive international law.62
Relations between European states and non-European states, however, were based 
on fundamentally different constitutional structures. According to Christian Reus- 
Smit’s conceptualisation, constitutional structures o f an International Society are made 
up of three normative beliefs, namely the ‘moral purpose of the state’, the ‘organizing 
principle of sovereignty’, and the ‘norm of procedural justice.’ These norms are 
important in that they decide ‘what constitutes a legitimate actor, entitled to all the 
rights and privileges of statehood; and they define the basic parameters of rightful state 
action’, thus playing a crucial part in the shaping of the fundamental institutions of 
societies of states. 63 Reus-Smit argues that of these three normative elements, the 
‘moral purpose of the state’ -  the reasons for forming some form of political association 
(here, the state) to serve a common good -  plays a crucial role in ‘providing the 
justificatory foundations for the principle of sovereignty and the prevailing norm of pure 
procedural justice ’ . 64 In the case of the modem society of states we see today, the 
legitimate state was expected to provide ‘the institutional climate necessary for human 
flowering’, based on popular consent. 65 This spawned the belief that a state’s 
sovereignty with regard to its internal affairs was, provided it enjoyed popular 
legitimacy, to be respected. The organizing principle o f liberal sovereignty was thus 
bom. Accordingly, institutions such as international law and multilateralism were 
devised to further the implementation of these principles, giving rise to the norm of 
procedural justice based on legislation.
62 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 98
63 Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose o f the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional 
Rationality in International Relations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 30
64 ibid., p. 31 
ibid., p. 12865
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The mode of interaction which the Europeans applied in their relations between 
non-European polities in the nineteenth century was, however, based on the belief that 
the moral purpose of the state (which, in reality, meant the ‘civilized’ European powers) 
and, by extension, that of European International Society, was to disseminate 
civilisation to all comers of the world. Even commentators who were critical of 
imperialism did, to a certain extent, accept this argument. John A. Hobson stated:
...all interference on the part of civilized white nations with ‘lower races’ is not 
prima facie illegitimate...such interference cannot safely be left to private 
enterprise of individual whites. If these principles be admitted, it follows that 
civilized Governments may undertake the political and economic control of lower 
races -  in a word, that the characteristic form of modem imperialism is not under 
all conditions illegitimate.66
While this Society and its constitutive structures shared the same systemic norm 
of procedural justice (based on international law and the ‘standard of civilisation’), it 
was fundamentally different in that it was ‘more centralized and more hierarchical than 
the Westphalian system’ . 67 The organizing principle of sovereignty was not that of 
liberal sovereignty. Instead, the organising principle of sovereignty was of a 
hierarchical nature where states were differentiated on the basis of the degree to which 
they were deemed ‘civilised.’ Liberal sovereignty was deemed to be applicable to 
‘civilised’ states only. John Stuart Mill, for instance, wrote that ‘ “[t]he sacred duties 
which civilized nations owe to the independence and nationality of each other are net 
binding towards those to whom nationality and independence are either a certain evil or 
at best a questionable good. ’ ” 68 Towards those polities deemed ‘uncivilised’, the 
‘civilised’ states had the duty to promote the trappings of ‘civilisation’. In this sense, 
the European society of states as applied to non-European states was ‘a non-social 
community’. The non-European states were deemed as lacking the political capacity to 
enter reciprocal relations with the ‘civilised’ society of states by free will. Instead, a 
‘trustee [had to] act on behalf of a ward because he [could not] act for himself.
66 John A. Hobson, Imperialism, p. 232. Note, however, that Hobson laid down strict conditions that 
imperialism had to fulfil specific conditions to be deemed legitimate: first, imperialism had to be 
directed primarily to advance civilisation, rather than serving the interests of the imperialist power; 
second, the subjugated peoples had to experience ‘improvement and elevation of [their] character’; 
lastly, the above two conditions had to be deemed to have been fulfilled by the civilised international 
community. (Hobson, Imperialism, p. 232) Hobson himself was extremely critical of imperialism by 
the European powers, as he considered them to have not fulfilled these conditions. Furthermore, he 
showed considerable sensitivity to the colonised peoples, claiming that the imperial powers paid 
scant attention to their local traditions. However, as Paul Keal argues, his awareness of what may be 
termed today as ‘cultural imperialism’ had yet to be shared by his contemporaries. See Keal, 
European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, p. 40
67 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 98
68 Cited in Eileen P. Sullivan. ‘Liberalism and Imperialism: J. S. Mill’s Defense of the British Empire’, 
Journal of the History o f Ideas (vol. 44, no. 4, October-December 1983, pp. 599-617), p. 610
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Immaturity may hinder full use of reason, ...or passion may obliterate the discipline, 
moderation, and foresight required of orderly public intercourse.’69
Whether or not this ‘guidance’ was required was often decided on the basis of the 
degree of ‘progress’ a certain polity had achieved. This was classified in three stages, 
as the publicist James Lorimer stated:
As a political phenomenon, humanity, in its present condition, divides itself into 
three concentric zones or spheres -  that of civilised humanity, that of barbarous 
humanity, and that of savage humanity. To these, whether arising from 
peculiarities of race or from various stages of development in the same race, 
belong, of right, at the hands of civilised nations, three stages of recognition -  
plenary political recognition, partial political recognition, and natural or mere 
human recognition.70
This concept of political recognition has been termed ‘positive sovereignty’ by 
Robert Jackson, and assumes that a ‘positively sovereign government is one which not 
only enjoys rights of non-intervention and other international immunities but also 
possesses the wherewithal to provide political goods for its citizens...Since states are 
never at rest owing to cultural transformation, scientific and technological innovation, 
and ultimately the passage of time positive sovereignty is a relative and changing rather 
than an absolute condition’.71 This implied that those unable to fulfil the conditions of 
legitimate statehood (based on the European models) were judged as not have achieved 
sufficient political and economic development, and needed to be guided to ‘civilisation’, 
primarily by the great powers of Europe who had the material preponderance to do so. 
The paternalistic and hierarchical nature of the Society was also aptly captured by J. 
Scott Keltie, who claimed in 1893:
Let those European Powers then, which have thrust themselves upon the native, 
look upon it as both their interest and their duty to train him to habits of industry, 
so that his continent may be prepared in time to take its place alongside of the other 
continents in the general economy of the world....Without pretending to treat the 
African as the equal of the white man in any way, let us, for our own sakes and his,
69 William Bain, ‘The Political Theory of Tmsteeship and the Twilight of International Equality’, 
International Relations (vol. 17, no. 1, 2003, pp. 59-77), p. 70. Bain’s use of ‘non-social social 
community’ is based on R. G. Collingwood’s conceptualisation. ‘Non-social community’ is 
contrasted with an International Society that is comprised of members who joined by an act of free 
will. Because this society ‘is created and sustained by an act of free will, its members must be 
universally equal in respect of authority to declare intent to form a partnership and to grant 
recognition of the sanctity of that partnership.’ See Bain, ‘The Political Theory of Trusteeship and 
the Twilight of International Equality’, p. 70.
70 James Lorimer, The Institutes o f the Law o f Nations: A Treatise o f the Jural Relations o f Separate 
Political Communities (vol. 1). (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1883), p. 
101: Under this classification, European states and states led by people of European descent (such as 
the United States) qualified as ‘civilised’ states. ‘Partial recognition’ extended to Persia, China, 
Siam, and Japan, while the remainder were lumped under the category of ‘savage humanity’.
1 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 29
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deal with him humanely; let us give him fair play; let us not sink ourselves to his
level o f brutality.72
Historical realities are of course often more complex, and late-nineteenth century 
European International Society was no exception. Despite the fact that the mode of 
interaction that governed the ‘civilised’ European states aimed for some form of 
coexistence, by the time of the late nineteenth century when China and Japan’s 
socialisation into European International Society was taking place, the system of 
maintaining the balance of power through a great power Concert had been seriously 
eroded. France, once considered a threat to stability within Europe (particularly by 
monarchist states), no longer sought to ‘export’ revolutions, depriving Austria, Russia 
and, to a lesser extent, Britain of a common cause for unity in maintaining a balance of 
power. Furthermore, the ascendancy of Prussia (later Germany) served to further the 
decline of the concert. Prussian unification of Germany not only alienated France, but 
also caused a rift between Austria and Russia, the two former allies in the Concert.73 By 
the 1870s, argues Henry Kissinger, ‘[w]hen the Great Powers viewed each other, they 
no longer saw partners in a common cause but dangerous, even mortal, rivals. 
Confrontation emerged as the standard diplomatic method.’74 Although the European 
powers were certainly able to keep their rivalries in check through the institutions of 
European International Society, tensions often emerged in the form of imperial rivalries, 
and mutual suspicions were never far from the surface.75
However, the general point still holds. While ‘coexistence’ was not absolute, the 
European states did treat non-European polities and peoples in a fundamentally different 
manner. Their ‘civilised’ identity relied upon the existence and differentiation of 
‘barbarous’ others,76 and the patently racist intellectual climate under which European 
imperialism often operated meant that many non-European peoples and polities were 
‘imagined as savages at best and animals at worst and were, therefore, not entitled to 
claim a sovereign space’,77 while those deemed as ‘semi-civilised’ ‘were conceived of as
72 J. Scott Keltie, The Partition o f Africa. (London: Edward Stanford, 1893), pp. 456-457
3 For excellent, accessible accounts for this period, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy. (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1994) and John Lowe, The Great Powers, Imperialism and the German 
Problem, 1865-1925. (London: Routledge, 1994).
74 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 145
77 This competitive international environment has been captured by Stephen Van Evera’s article which 
argues that European strategic culture was permeated by the ‘Cult of the Offensive’ which places 
strong emphasis on the efficacy of offensive strategies. Such beliefs were strengthened by the 
pervasive influence of social Darwinism. See ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First 
World War’, International Security (vol. 9, no. 1, Summer 1984, pp. 58-107)
76 See Neumann and Welsh, ‘The Other in European self-definition’.
John M. Hobson, The Eastern Origins o f Western Civilisation, p. 238
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the “fallen peoples” and their lands were imagined as “borderless spaces”. Thus, given 
their so-called moral degeneration, it was only appropriate that the Europeans go in and 
regenerate them along civilised Western lines. ’ 78 Mistrust among the European states 
did not stop them from adopting separate forms of interaction vis-ä-vis the ‘uncivilised’ 
non-European entities. While the concept of sovereignty did, to a certain extent, 
restrain European states from outright territorial conquest within Europe, non-European 
polities were seldom accorded this restraint. The institutions for coexistence, no matter 
how precarious, existed among the European states; for the ‘uncivilised’, it did not. As 
the discussions below will show, the ‘civilised’ members of European International 
Society were accorded the prerogative of introducing the trappings of ‘progress’ into 
‘barbarous’ lands, and this was certainly not seen as something the latter should be 
protected from. If restraint was shown by the European powers in the course of their 
imperialist expansion, this was usually related to material constraints or the result of a 
necessity to manage imperial rivalries with their ‘civilised’ peers.
Table 2-1: Constitutional Structures and the Fundamental Institutions of the Dual 
International Societies in the Nineteenth Century
Societies o f States International Society for European 
States
International Society for Europear, 
States and Non-European States
Constitutional Structures 
1. Moral Purpose of State Augmentation of Individuals’ Promotion of ‘Civilization’, i.e.
Purposes and Potentialities Good Government and Economic
2. Organizing Principle of Sovereign Equality, Liberal
Progress
Hierarchy (based on degree of
Sovereignty Sovereignty ‘civilisation’), Divisible
3. Systemic Norm of Procedural Legislative Justice (based on
Sovereignty
Legislative Justice (based on
Justice positive law) natural law)
Fundamental Institutions a. Contractual International a. Paramountcy (British
law Empire)
b. Multilateralism b. Federal Union (United
States)
(Sources: Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose o f the State, p. 7, Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 98)
The institutions o f European International Society as applied to non-European states 
If we are to accept the existence of a dualistic mode of interaction in nineteenth century 
European International Society, the task then becomes one of examining how the 
‘civilising’ side shaped the Society’s institutions in its relations between European and 
non-European relations. 79
78 ibid., pp. 238-239
79 The discussion which follows departs somewhat from the argument forwarded by Reus-Smit in that it 
not only includes the institutions of diplomacy and international law, but also the balance of power, 
war and the role of the great powers. Although Reus-Smit’s primarily constructivist account is 
informed by the English School, his interest lies primarily in cooperative systemic institutions and the 
latter three institutions lie beyond the scope of his study.
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The roles that war, the great powers, and the balance of power played are perhaps 
relatively straightforward to explain. War was primarily aimed at pacifying rebellions 
directed by the non-European polities towards the European powers. Any insurgencies 
against the European powers often came as a genuine ‘shock to those who had hoped 
that Western civilization would be adopted by indigenous populations almost 
automatically’, who often called for strong measures to quell such behaviour. 80 
Moreover, such warfare frequently went unregulated by international law, and resulted 
in heavy losses of lives, usually on the side of the native peoples. 81 Meanwhile, the 
primary role of the great powers in their relations with non-European ‘uncivilised’ 
polities was to lead the way in introducing the trappings of civilisation. While the 
balance of power functioned primarily to protect the interests of the ‘civilised’ members 
of European International Society, Non-European states were hardly accorded the 
protection from other states through a power balance. Rather, it functioned as an 
extension of European politics: the European powers made use of this institution to 
prevent their imperial rivalries from escalating into open conflict. 82 As conflicts over 
the control of non-European states and ‘scrambles’ for territorial and economic 
concessions became more acute, European states’ interests were carefully balanced 
through the establishment of ‘spheres of influence’, thus, in Martti Koskenniemi’s 
words with reference to Africa, directing ‘the scramble...into pacific channels. ’ 83
International law and diplomacy also played a crucial role in providing the 
justification for imperialism, rather than protecting the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the non-European peoples and their political entities. Diplomacy served
80 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer o f Nations: The Rise and Fall o f International Law, 1870-1960. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 147. We must be careful not to take this 
assertion too far, however. European public opinion certainly did not assume that all imperialism 
was some form of benign paternalism, a fact highlighted by the large-scale revulsion at the highly 
exploitative colonial system adopted by the Belgians in the Congo.
81 Indeed, it was even argued that towards ‘savage tribes’ who did not understand international law that 
governed the conduct of war, the commander of the ‘civilised’ state could take any action as he saw 
fit. Elbridge Colby, captain of the United States army, argued ‘that devastation and annihilation is 
the principal method of warfare that savage tribes know. Excessive humanitarian ideas should not 
prevent harshness against those who use harsh methods, for in being overkind to one’s enemies, a 
commander is simply bing unkind to his own people.’ See Elbridge Colby, ‘How to Fight Savage 
Tribes’, The American Journal of International Law (vol. 21, no. 2, April 1927, pp. 279-288), p. 285. 
See also Dan Stone, ‘White men with low moral standards? German anthropology and the Herero 
genocide’, Patterns of Prejudice (vol. 35, no. 2, 2001, pp. 33-46). But note that despite the fact that 
colonial paternalism often did entail imperialistic expansion and the disregard for non-European 
states/political entities’ sovereignty or right to self-determination, many colonial officials themselves 
were often sympathetic to the indigenous populace.
82 It is interesting to note that as early as 1877, publicists had stated that spats among European states 
over African territory ‘would give “a sad image of our antagonisms to the Negroes whom we seek to 
civilize.’” Cited in Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer o f Nations, p. 148
8' ibid., p. 123. J. D. Hargreaves, ‘Towards a History of the Partition of Africa’, Journal o f African 
History, (vol. 1, no. 1, 1960, pp. 97-109), p. 98, supports this assertion.
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three primary functions. First, it played a crucial role in containing imperial rivalry 
among the European powers; multilateral forums such as the Berlin Conference of 
1884-1885 are typical examples. Second, it could also be used as a tool in which to 
legitimate any colonial gains. It is certainly true that the European powers ‘tended to 
doubt and ridicule the propriety of the “treaty game’” , and frequently resorted to 
duplicitous diplomatic tactics.84 They often failed to explain to the non-European rulers 
the full implications o f the treaties. With reference to a treaty with a Kikuyu chief, Lord 
Lugard admitted:
This Company’s treaty is an utter fraud. No man if he understood would sign it, 
and to say that a savage chief has been told that he cedes all rights to the Company 
in exchange for nothing is an obvious untruth. If he has been told that the 
Company will protect him against his enemies, and share his wars as an Ally, he 
has been told a lie, for the Comp, have no idea of doing any such thing and no 
force to do it with if they wished.85
However, many European states and their agents were at the same time often 
extremely anxious to obtain diplomatic agreements from the non-European polities by 
following what was considered the proper procedural norms. Failure to do so would 
often render that particular treaty as legally invalid, substantially undermining the 
territorial claims of that particular state.86 Third, and most importantly, diplomacy also 
played a key role in furthering European penetration. Diplomacy conducted between 
the European and non-European states varied widely. Whereas some states (such as 
China and Japan) were more successful in establishing stable diplomatic channels, often 
enforcing their own systems of diplomacy over the European states, other states were 
not. In the case of African states, Charles Henry Alexandrowicz claims:
African Rulers (with a few exceptions) failed to set up a diplomatic service which 
could have carried out negotiations with colonial officers on more favourable terms 
for the Rulers....on the whole the quality of the African diplomatic service was at 
its lowest when it was most needed i.e. during the period of the European-African 
confrontation when it could have set up a barrier to the ‘scramble’ which proved to 
be an episode of power politics conducted with unconcern for the rules of 
diplomacy.87
84 Saadia Touval, ‘Treaties, Borders, and the Partition of Africa’, Journal o f African History (vol. 7, no. 
2, 1966, pp. 279-293), p. 282
85 Cited in ibid., p. 283
86 See ibid., pp. 280-282.
87 Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, The European-African Confrontation: A Study in Treaty Making. 
(Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1973), p. 109
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Figure 2-1: ‘Die Südsee ist das Mittelmeer der Zukunft (The South Sea is the 
Mediterranean of the Future)’, Kladderadatsch, Berlin, 13th July 1884
Here, Bismarck is criticised for complacently engaging in domestic social reforms while 
the other powers are carving up the world for themselves. (Source: Roy Douglas, ‘Great 
Nations Still Enchained: The Cartoonists’ Vision of Empire 1848 -1914. London:
Routledge, 1993, p. 77)
While Alexandrowicz’s assertion may be correct in the sense that many non- 
European polities (in this case, in Africa) did not possess a ‘diplomatic service’ similar 
to that of the Europeans, his assertion gives an impression that these states had a limited 
understanding of the concept of diplomacy. It is no doubt true that many states were 
annexed under both the explicit and implicit threat of force. Nevertheless, it is also true 
that the expansion of European power took place through regular diplomatic 
procedures, 88 and that the non-European rulers often took an active part in the 
negotiations. While not entirely acquainted with European diplomatic practices, the 
non-European rulers were not ignorant of diplomatic intercourse. Consequently, ‘when 
European emissaries came and offered various inducements in return for treaties, their 
offers often fell upon politically sensitised ears. ’ 89 In many instances, non-European 
leaders signed treaties with the European powers with the hope of obtaining some form 
of benefit, such as military assistance in the event of local disputes. This does not imply
s8 However, we should take care to note that this ‘diplomacy’ was not always carried out by diplomats: 
private individuals (such as employees of chartered companies) would often obtain treaties for 
territorial/sovereign secession and present a fait accompli to the home government for approval. 
Furthermore, there was also the possibility that the latter would refuse to accept these agreements.
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that this form of diplomacy was carried out with the full and willing consent of the 
former, however. Many non-European rulers were aware of the imperial ambitions of 
the European powers, often hidden behind the various treaties the latter requested to 
sign. Philip Mason gives an interesting anecdote which aptly illustrates this point:
‘Did you ever see a chameleon catch a fly?’ Lobengula, King of the Matabele, 
asked of the missionary Helm. ‘The chameleon gets behind the fly and remains 
motionless for some time, then he advances very slowly and gently, first putting 
forward one leg and then another. At last, when well within reach, he darts his 
tongue and the fly disappears. England is the chameleon and I am that fly.’90
International law provided little protection against these colonial ‘chameleons.’ 
This had not always been the case. As A. Claire Cutler argues, Grotius ‘accordfed] to 
individuals a particular status in international relations and under international law’ . 91 
Under these premises, all individuals, as an essential component of the state, were 
entitled to the protection of international law. 92 There were arguments that called for the 
protection of non-Europeans which were grounded on the philosophy of natural law. A 
significant number of individuals also argued that under the law of nations all political 
entities were equal. 93 Francisco de Vitoria, for instance, famously argued that with 
regard to sovereignty, non-European states/individuals were entitled to the same 
protection as the Christian states.
However, by the nineteenth century the referents of the protection of international 
law shrank. Paul Keal identifies three factors which gave rise to this. First, he argues 
that in the age of imperialism, the norms of international law were shelved to make way 
for political and economical interests. 94 Second, as discussed briefly above, with the 
growth of European pride and confidence in the wake of the industrial revolution, there
h9 Touval, ‘Treaties, Borders, and the Partition of Africa’, p. 285. A similar point is made by 
Hargreaves, ‘Towards a History of the Partition of Africa’, p. 108
90 Philip Mason, The Birth o f a Dilemma: The Conquest and Settlement o f Rhodesia. (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1958), p. 105
91 A. Claire Cutler, ‘The “Grotian tradition” in international relations’, Review o f International Studies 
(vol. 17, no. 1, 1991, pp. 41-65), p. 45. Cutler argues that this ‘is attributable to his theory of the 
essential identity of the individual and the state, which in turn reflects a “patrimonial” conception of 
the state and the influence of natural law theory.’ The former is a reflection of the historical context 
in which Grotius wrote his De Jure Belli ac Pads (The Law o f War and Peace), when dynastic states, 
regarded ‘to be “the creature of personal rule”, formed the prevailing view’ in Europe. European 
international relations were still under the influence of dynasties and the ‘abstraction and 
personification of the state and the doctrine of exclusive state personality were only to take root 
firmly later, in the eighteenth century.’ (Cutler, ‘The “Grotian tradition” in international relations’, p. 
45) Also see Keal, ‘ “Just Backward Children’” , p. 202.
92 See Cutler, ‘The “Grotian tradition” in international relations’, p. 45.
93 For a discussion of this, see M. F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government o f Backward Territory 
in International Law: Being a Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion. 
(New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 12
94 Keal, ‘ “Just Backward Children’”, p. 203
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appeared an increasing disdain for non-European peoples and political entities. As a 
result, the non-European states were increasingly labelled as ‘not fundamentally pagan, 
savage, and demonic from a Christian frame of reference, nor fundamentally ignorant 
and superstitious from an Enlightenment frame of reference; rather the other...now 
[became] fundamentally primitive from a progress and evolution frame of reference. ’ 95 
This led to an increasing inability to recognise and respect any non-European concepts 
of political rights and morality.
Finally, Keal notes that natural law interpretations of international law were 
replaced by legal positivism by the nineteenth century. This aspect of the evolution of 
international law was made quite explicit in the writings of the publicists of the West, 
who clearly contended that ‘international law was not the law applicable among all the 
nations of the world, but applied only amongst the Christian States of Europe and 
America. ’ 96 As Henry Wheaton remarked in Elements o f International Law.
Is there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for all the 
nations and states o f the world. The public law, with slight exceptions, has always 
been, and still is, limited to the civilized and Christian people o f  Europe or those o f 
European origin.97
The consequence of this was, as Alexandrowicz argues, that ‘[pjositivism 
discarded some of the fundamental qualities of the classic law [natural law] of nations, 
particularly the principle of universality of the Family of Nations irrespective of creed, 
race, colour and continent’ . 98
It should be noted that Bull himself was not particularly convinced by this view. 
He argued that at best, natural law had existed within International Society only at the 
theoretical level, and had never enjoyed ‘the will or consent of political communities 
throughout the world’ and were not applied to in European and non-European 
intercourse. 99 However, there are several weaknesses which seem to fundamentally 
undermine this counterargument. Keene points out the following important points; first,
95 ibid. Although a detailed treatment of the subject is impossible here, it should also be noted that the 
demarcation of the ‘self and ‘other’, as well as the resulting behaviour towards the ‘other’ has been 
explored in considerable depth. Such works include James A. Aho, ‘Heroism, the Construction of 
Evil, and Violence’, in Vilho Harle, (ed) European Values in International Relations. (London: 
Pinter, 1990); and Jonathan Mercer, ‘Anarchy and Identity’, International Organization (vol. 49, no. 
2, Spring 1995, pp. 229-252).
90 R. P. Anand, ‘Family of “Civilized” States and Japan: A Story of Humiliation, Assimilation, 
Defiance and Confrontation’, Journal o f the History o f International Law (vol. 5, no. 1, 2003, pp. 1- 
75), p. 20
97 Henry Wheaton, Elements o f International Law (The literal reproduction of the edition of 1866, By 
Richard Henry Dana Jr., edited with notes by George Grafton Wilson). (New York: Oceana 
Publications, 1964), p. 15
9S Henry Alexandrowicz, The European-African Confrontation, p. 6.
99 Bull, ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’, p. 120
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Bull’s observation that there had existed no common consent or agreements between the 
two is empirically debatable. Second, Bull’s notion that there is no evidence of consent 
to account for the use of natural law is problematic in that this argument is only 
applicable to positive law. Keene argues that Bull’s
...observation...that European and non-European peoples were not united by 
common interests, a structure of “generally agreed rules” and collective 
participation in common institutions, could hardly be o f interest to a natural lawyer, 
who would see a societas gentium arising...from the already binding force of a 
normative and legal code that is a given feature of the natural order of things, and 
applies to all peoples and rulers whether they agree to it or not.100
In fact, both positivist and natural international law continued to serve several 
important functions in the ‘civilised’ European states’ relations with non-European 
entities. First, positivist international law provided certain guidelines for the conduct of 
states, both European and non-European. It provided legal guidelines for legitimate 
statehood for non-Europeans to follow and attain ‘civilisation’; from our vantage point 
today this often reflected ‘the normative order of the European states that made it and, 
by expecting non-Europeans to conform to it, it was a form of cultural imperialism. ’ 101 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, rather than playing the purported role of 
protecting the territorial and sovereign integrity of states, international law provided 
various legal justifications for imperialism or intervention by European powers in non- 
European states. While Alexandrowicz’s analysis gives the impression that natural law 
could have provided some protection for the non-European polities, this was not always 
true. In the famous case of the Spanish conquest of South America in the sixteenth 
century, Vitoria, while stating that the natives were entitled to the protection of natural 
law, also argued that ‘civilized peoples when among barbarians are under the law, and 
enjoy rights too....There is a natural society and fellowship between the Spaniards and 
the Indians, and the Spaniards have the right to travel freely, to enter and to settle. ’ 102 Of 
course, what this meant was the ‘death-knell of the indigenous civilisations. ’ 103 Tzvetan 
Todorov argues, Vitoria’s ‘role [as defender of the South American Indians] is quite 
different: under cover of an international law based on reciprocity, he in reality supplies 
a legal basis to the wars of colonization’ . 104
100 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 27
101 Keal, ‘ “Just Backward Children’”, p. 192
102 Wight, International Theory, p. 70
103 Dunne, ‘Colonial Encounters in International Relations’, p. 315
104 Cited in Dunne, ‘Colonial Encounters in International Relations’, p. 315. It should also be noted that 
Martin Wight also acknowledges this more negative side to international law, stating that ‘the 
protection of barbarian societies has normally involved the segregation in reserves, that is, pushing
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In the more specific context of the nineteenth century, the rise of positive law 
meant that international law was becoming increasingly applicable to relations between 
European states only. Natural law continued to be used to govern relations between 
European and non-European polities, but again it did not always protect non-European 
polities. As Koskenniemi argues,
‘[l]ate nineteenth-century textbooks normally affirmed international law’s non­
applicability in non-civilized territory -  but not without provision made for the 
universal validity of humanitarian and natural law principles or human rights.. ..But 
if all lawyers accepted that individual non-Europeans enjoyed natural rights, only a 
few extended such rights to non-European communities.’105
International law’s role as the handmaiden of imperialist expansion can also be 
traced back to Grotius. As Keene’s work has shown, as regards territorial appropriation, 
Grotius provided two legal justifications for appropriating territory. First, he advocated 
that while all members of humankind were entitled to possession of private property 
under natural law, if they failed to exercise these rights by ‘exhausting] all the 
possibilities for appropriation, and perhaps even formulated their own civil societal 
institution of dominium [ownership]’, 106 their land would become available for 
appropriation. Second, contrary to Bull’s claim that the Grotian tradition advocated the 
indivisibility of sovereignty (at least between states) , 107 Keene has highlighted that 
Grotius did in fact provide the concept of divisible sovereignty. 108 This translated into a
the barbarians into a comer and leaving the greater part of the land free for the settlers.’ See his 
International Theory, p. 70
105 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer o f Nations, pp. 128-129. Emphasis added. In this sense, Hedley 
Bull was correct in his observation that European International Society and its norms were ‘asserted 
unilaterally by the expanding Europeans’, and...the natural law doctrine of a universal international 
society existing by right provided a rationale for forcing non-European peoples into commercial and 
diplomatic intercourse against their will...the assumption of universal rights to trade and diplomacy 
conferred by nature was menacing to those whose consent to such rights had not been given. Bull, 
‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’, p. 120
106 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 57. Also see pp. 52-59 for discussions on Grotius on 
property rights. Other conditions attached for land to be considered ‘appropriated’ for included 
cultivation or the ‘making [of] “improvements’” to the land (p. 102).
107 Although Bull is careful to qualify his assertion by stating, ‘[i]n Grotius’ time neither the sovereign 
state nor the conventions defining its role in European or world politics were by any means yet fully 
matured’, he does claim that ‘Grotius’ discussion of sovereignty, which he defmes as not being 
subject in one’s actions to the legal control of the another’ furthered the process of the concept of a 
sovereign state system where such norms were to be respected. Furthermore, Bull also argues that 
Grotius claimed that sovereign prerogatives could not be divided among actors who did not enjoy the 
support of the sovereign. See Hedley Bull, ‘The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International 
Relations’ in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts (eds), Hugo Grotius and 
International Relations. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 84-85
108 Grotius gave three examples of the division of sovereignty: First, ‘a ruler might hold all the 
prerogatives of sovereignty, but with the qualifications attached that he or she remained “responsible 
to the people’” ; second, ‘sometimes...’’sovereign power is held in part by the king, in part by the 
people or the senate’” ; and third, ‘ “in the conferring of authority it has been stated that in a particular 
case the king can be resisted”.’ See Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 45.
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series of legal justifications for acts which reduced another state’s sovereign 
prerogatives.
Moreover, Grotius allowed for such ‘usurpation’ of sovereignty. While 
acknowledging that unequal treaties ‘very often lead to some division of the sovereign 
power, to the benefit of the superior party’, ‘if the people in question, or their rulers, do 
not offer resistance, in time “the part of the weaker passes over into the right of ruling 
on the part of the stronger...then either those who had been allies become subjects, or 
there is at any rate a division of sovereignty (partitio fir summi imperii) . ’ 109
The two key concepts of property rights and divisible sovereignty furnished the 
European powers with the legitimacy to implement policies common to imperialist 
expansion. The law of property rights enabled European states to acquire foreign land -  
frequently without any prior consultation with the indigenous peoples -  for securing raw 
materials and establishing concessions or colonies. Supported by Grotius’ arguments on 
divisible sovereignty, the European states saw no wrong in violating non-European 
states’ sovereignty to promote the ‘civilised’ way of governance, and even saw it fit to 
resort to force, if necessary. Accordingly, the norms of this order dictated ‘that 
sovereignty should be divided across national and territorial borders as required to 
develop commerce and to promote what Europeans and Americans saw as good 
government’ 110
Socialisation into a Janus-faced European International Society
The discussions above suggest that English School studies which examine the 
expansion of European International Society are somewhat simplistic. Given the 
existence of a ‘civilising’ mode of interaction, the socialisation of non-European polities 
may have involved a complex interaction with the two modes of interaction inherent in 
the late-nineteenth century, rather than a simple, holistic adoption of the institutions and 
norms of the Society which applied to European states.
Of course, the ‘civilising’ pressures from the Society differed from region to 
region, primarily because their degree of ‘barbarity’ was subjectively decided by the 
European powers, often on racist grounds. Unlike some polities in Africa, both China 
and Japan escaped outright imperial conquest, largely due to the fact that they were 
accorded semi-civilised status, rather than ‘savage’ status, and the pressures from the 
‘civilising’ drive of the European society of states may not have applied as strongly.
109 Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society, p. 49
110 ibid., p. 98
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This, coupled with great power rivalry and geographical fortune meant that both states 
did not suffer outright colonisation at the hands of the Western powers. Furthermore, as 
their interactions with the European powers increased, both the Chinese and Japanese 
began to develop an awareness and understanding of the mode of interaction that 
applied to ‘civilised’ entities.
As will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters, however, this does not mean 
that the Chinese and Japanese did not feel the pressures from the ‘civilising’ mode of 
interaction. The fact that they were equally (if not more) aware of the more coercive 
face of the dualistic European International Society is evident from both states’ eventual 
efforts to fulfil the ‘standard of civilisation’. Furthermore, through various channels, 
the Chinese and Japanese elites became aware of European imperialism and began to 
develop an awareness of how the members of European International Society could rob 
them of their rule. It can thus be surmised that the interpretations of the institutions of 
European International Society would have been coloured by their exposure to both 
modes of interaction, and shaped their interpretation of and socialisation into the 
Society accordingly.
The question thus becomes one of how this particular aspect of European 
International Society affected China and Japan’s socialisation. As the discussions above 
show, it would be disingenuous to presume that non-European states could 
uncomplicatedly commit themselves to the norms of the Society in such a short period 
of time. Although it is probably correct that even improvised rules, ‘if and when they 
are observed for long enough, come to be reflected in common “modes of thought, 
patterns of behaviour and preferred norms and values’” ,1" this can take longer than 
generally assumed by English School scholars. Even the norms that govern the 
institutions of International Society had to evolve over a considerable period of time in 
Europe. Non-European states’ outlook on international politics and the reconfigurations 
of their domestic structures were likely to have reflected the different norms which 
governed their relations with European powers, as well as their own interpretations, 
rather than simply reflecting ‘the dominant European standard of “civilization”.’"2
111 Hedley Bull, ‘The European International Order’ in Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (eds), Hedley 
Bull on International Society. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 184 
Gong, ‘China’s Entry into International Society’, p. 172112
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Conventional accounts o f socialisation into European International Society 
Conventional studies by English School scholars, however, are poorly equipped to 
elucidate this multifaceted socialisation of China and Japan into European International 
Society. This is due to their linear depiction of the socialisation of non-European states, 
which implicitly draws from functionalist conceptualisations of the socialisation 
process.
According to this approach, a social system is depicted as arising from actors’ 
minimum needs which ‘may be said to begin with the biological prerequisites of 
individual life, like nutrition and physical safety. ’ 113 Its maintenance is dependent on 
actors’ willingness to participate ‘adequately to the performances which may be 
necessary if the social system in question is to persist or develop. ’ 114 Socialisation plays 
an integral part in this process. Defined as ‘the integration of ego into a role 
complementary to that of alter(s) in such a way that the common values are internalised 
in ego’s personality’ , 115 its ultimate goal (and indeed the anticipated outcome in 
functionalist arguments) is the reproduction of actors who will function to maintain the 
social structures already in place. Accordingly, the socialisation process follows a 
generally determinist path. Senior or authoritative members of a society aim to socialise 
junior members’ (or candidates for membership to a society) into conforming to societal 
rules and norms by serving as role models and controlling deviance through a variety of 
sanctions. A junior member’s socialisation can be considered successful when she 
‘internalises’ such norms by coming to identify her interests with conforming to these 
social expectations.
There appear to be two reasons why English School studies of the expansion of 
International Society have adopted this approach. The first, as argued above, was the 
British Committee’s interest and normative commitment to demonstrating that an 
International Society was possible in the absence of a common culture. The second 
reason is perhaps a result of legal positivism adopted by scholars such as Wight or 
Hedley Bull, who believe that entry into European International Society implied an 
almost automatic and reciprocal commitment to its institutions and practices. 116
However, this approach tends to result in explanations which lack agency, a 
weakness which is common to many structuralist approaches. As Theodore E. Long 
and Jeffrey K. Hadden point out, the entire process is described as ‘the production of
113 Talcott Parsons, The Social System. (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 28
114 ibid., p. 29
115 ibid., p. 211
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desired results...[there] is no...ambiguity, permitting the choice of one meaning or the 
other...the novice’s fitness results naturally and inevitably from members’ training 
activity. ’ 117 In the case of states’ socialisation, it ‘assumejs] that agents at the systemic 
level have relatively unobstructed access to states and substate actors from which to 
diffuse new normative understandings. ’ 118 While the English School scholars’ central 
question regarding the expansion of European International Society was indeed an 
interesting and perfectly legitimate one, it did mean that any subtle differences in non- 
European states’ perceptions and acceptance of the norms and institutions of the Society 
would be downplayed. Because of the nature of the questions asked by the approach, 
the ‘outcomes’ of non-European states’ socialisation were already pre-determined in 
terms of the adoption of the institutions and norms of the Society (which applied to 
‘civilised’ entities) and the fulfilling of the ‘standard of civilisation’.
Figure 2-2: Functionalist/Structuralist concept of Socialisation
Socialisation Outcome
Senior Member --------------------- ► Junior Member/Candidate -------- ► Learning
for Membership Internalisation
Role model for emulation;
Controller of deviance;
Distributor of rewards for 
compliance
(Adaptedfrom Parsons, The Social System)
The result is a ‘thin’ account of the socialisation process, which hardly seems to 
do justice to the complexities inherent within nineteenth-century European International 
Society. Consequently, such studies can only study ‘successful’ cases, and any 
disparities are either downplayed or ignored. To an extent, the English School scholars 
were aware of this. Gerrit W. Gong, for instance, shows considerable sensitivity 
towards Japanese perspectives when he notes the bitterness felt by the Japanese towards 
the discrimination of non-European states and the discrepancies between the theory and 
practice of diplomacy by the ‘civilised’ Western powers. However, he does not deviate
116 See Cutler, ‘The “Grotian tradition’ in international relations’, pp. 49-58
117 Long and Hadden, ‘A Reconception of Socialization’, p. 39. Emphases added.
118 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Treating International Institutions as Social Environments’, International 
Studies Quarterly (vol. 45, no. 4, 2001, pp. 487-515), p. 492
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radically from the linear depiction of Japan’s socialisation or the somewhat rigid use of 
the ‘standard of civilisation’ as a marker of Japan’s entry in to the Society, thereby 
ending up with an inadequate examination of whether or not the Society had attained 
legitimacy among the Japanese. Gong argues:
Whether because Japan’s conceptions of “civilization” and “civilized international 
society” were incongruous with what it actually discovered, or whether because its 
innate sense of racial distinctiveness and of inferiority prevented it from feeling 
fully part of a European-dominated international community, it is easier to date 
Japan’s entry into international society from the perspective of the other powers 
than it is from its own.119
Another problem with this approach is that it fails to take account of the 
possibility that a socialisation process can take place even though the outcomes are not 
successful. In the case of China and Japan’s incorporation into European International 
Society, existing English School accounts thus cannot fully explain why Japan appears 
to have ‘learned’ imperialistic behaviour following its encounter with the Society or 
why China took a longer time to socialise itself into the norms of European International 
Society in comparison to Japan, despite the fact that ‘societal pressures’ (in terms of 
Western interest in China) for it to do so were much stronger than the latter.120
The narrow confines of legal positivism also serve to impoverish the accounts of 
China and Japan’s entry into the Society. The signing of treaties alone does not 
necessarily constitute an acceptance of the culture and norms of European International 
Society. Furthermore, while it is certainly true that the reproduction of the institutions 
of European International Society has taken place, the process was not a simple one. 
For a start, as the Chinese and Japanese cases will demonstrate, entry into the Society 
involved a complex engagement with the Society’s dual modes of interaction. 
Furthermore, there exists a distinct (and underexplored) possibility that the motives 
behind establishing these institutions may have been quite different. The norms and 
rules which governed the institutions of international society had their origins in 
Europe. International law gained recognition by the nineteenth century, while the 
concept of maintaining a balance of power (as a conscious policy) and the diplomatic 
system came into being through the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815, respectively. European states’ frequent interactions with one another, 
and their subsequent ‘development of a degree of recognition and accommodation
119 See Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization ’ in International Society, p. 200
120 The need to account for variances in socialisation is also pointed out by Johnston, ‘Treating 
International Institutions as Social Environments’, p. 495
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among them’ resulted in the emergence of international society. 121 A degree of cultural 
affinity and familiarity may also have helped facilitate this sense of commitment to 
shared norms. In contrast, many of the non-European states did not participate in the 
founding of international society. A lack of geographical proximity meant that both 
sides had insufficient contact with one another, and neither did they share a common 
culture or god. Bull himself agrees that prior to European imperialism which resulted in 
the expansion of European International Society,
...neither the Europeans nor the non-Europeans in their dealing with one another 
can be said to have moved by common interests they perceived in maintaining an 
enduring structure of coexistence and co-operation among independent political 
communities over the world as a whole. They were not able to invoke a common 
and agreed set of rules to this end, such as came later to be assumed as the basis of 
international intercourse over the world as a whole.122
Figure2-3: Socialisation into European International Society -  Conventional Works
Socialisation
The The ‘uncivilised’
‘Civilised’ ------------------------ --------- ^  non-European
States states
Role model for emulation;
Controller of deviance;
Distributor of rewards for 
compliance (i.e. recognition 
of Icivilised' status) and 
membership of international 
society
It is therefore highly likely that a simplistic adoption and interpretation of the 
Society’s norms which governed relations between ‘civilised’ states did not occur. 
Although the English School scholars are correct in their claims that the institutions of 
European International Society have found widespread recognition, this does not mean 
that their adoption by non-Western states was somehow an unproblematic process.
It should be pointed out here that this weakness is not unique to the English 
School alone. A similar tendency to concentrate excessively on outcomes to 
demonstrate evidence of socialisation can be seen in some liberal institutional works. 123
Outcome
Internalisation of the 
norms of international 
society; adoption of the 
institutions of 
international society, 
membership of 
international society
121 Buzan, ‘From International System to International Society’, p. 334
122 Bull, ‘The Emergence of a Universal International Society’, p. 118 
Ikenberry and Kupchan, for instance, define socialisation as ‘a process of learning in which norms 
and ideals are transmitted to another’ and where ‘national leaders internalize the norms and value
123
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This problem has also been pointed out in works by constructivists (for whom the 
socialisation process is a crucial concept) where the ‘macrohistorical diffusion of values 
and practices’ are ‘measured by correlations between the presence of a global norm and 
the presence of corresponding local practices.. ..Once actors are interacting inside 
[social] institutions, the diffusion and homogenisation of values in the “world polity” 
seems virtually automatic, even, and predictable. ’ 124 In a recent effort to sharpen the 
conceptual tools of socialisation theory and offer ‘a much-needed focal point around 
which various perspectives on state socialization can coalesce’, Kai Alderson has 
defined socialisation ‘as an outcome’ ‘by which states internalise norms originating 
elsewhere in the international system. ’ 125 However, Alderson also makes the same 
mistake by choosing to focus on the outcome as evidence that socialisation has taken 
place. His definition does not really go beyond that of conventional studies, 126 and 
results in an implicit assumption that any process of socialisation is inevitably going to 
result in a particular, expected form of internalisation and behavioural outcome on the 
part of the new entrant. In reality, socialisation is a more complex process, and its 
success cannot be guaranteed: for instance, while it is obvious that most children go 
through a process of socialisation (e.g. do not steal, do not indulge in drugs, etc), some 
do persistently deviate from these norms and subsequently get labelled as ‘delinquents’. 
As Sharon Hays observes, while ‘social life is fundamentally structured...[t]hat 
reproduction process, however, is never fully stable or absolute and, under particular
orientations espoused by the hegemon and, as a consequence, become socialized into the community 
formed by the hegemon and other nations accepting its leadership position.’ Internalisation here 
indicates behavioural outcomes which are ‘compatible with the hegemon’. This assumption again 
can only examine ‘successful’ cases, allowing little variation in the outcome of socialisation. 
Socialisation is an outcome, not a process. See Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and 
Hegemonic Power’, pp. 289-290.
124 See Johnston, ‘Treating International Institutions as Social Environments’, p. 492. Johnston does, 
however, claim that such tendencies may be a result of the earlier constructivist agenda to 
demonstrate the importance of norms in international politics.
125 Kai Alderson, ‘Making sense of state socialization’, Review o f International Studies (vol. 27, no. 3, 
2001, pp. 415-433), p. 417
125 This is somewhat curious, as Alderson does correctly note elsewhere that ‘state socialization in no 
way compromises agency. Indeed, ...state socialization is always the project of domestic social and 
political actors: it is never the direct impression of external imperatives upon a passive and plastic 
national society.’ (p. 428) However, in his attempt to provide a strict definition he again reiterates a 
rather restrictive notion that ‘[t]he content of state socialization is limited to the durable option of 
“public norms”: explicit beliefs or implicit assumptions about what actions are possible, permissible, 
or advisable for state authorities’ (p. 422). By only focussing on durable norms, logically he can 
only analyse successful socialisation where the dominant social structures are reproduced, which 
again has difficulty in accounting for varying patterns of outcomes of socialisation. See Alderson, 
‘Making sense of state socialization’. In his critique of Alderson, Cameron G. Thies points out, 
‘since socialisation is often seen as an ongoing, “lifelong” process by most constructivists in 
international relations, and many scholars in the interdisciplinary field of social psychology, viewing 
it as an outcome is probably not going to pique much interest.’ See Thies, ‘Sense and sensibility in 
the study of state socialisation: a reply to Kai Alderson’, Review o f International Studies (vol. 29, no. 
4, 2003, pp. 543-550), p. 544
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circumstances, the structured choices that agents make can have a more or less 
transformative impact on the nature of the structures themselves. ’ 127
A new approach to the socialisation process
To address these shortcomings, this study forwards an alternative analytical framework 
that will help enrich our understanding of China and Japan’s entry and socialisation into 
European International Society. The first step taken is a simple one that is informed by 
the historical context of the late-nineteenth century. In light of the dualities inherent 
within the Society, it is more fruitful to conceptualise China and Japan’s socialisation 
process as an engagement with a Janus-faced European International Society. As 'semi- 
civilised’ entities, both states encountered the modes of interaction that aimed for 
coexistence among ‘civilised’ states and ‘civilising’ the ‘backward’ polities. Chinese 
and Japanese attempts to gain admission to the Society (provided that they sought to do 
so) are most likely to have involved the adoption of certain characteristics of both faces 
of the Society. By taking the Society’s dualities into account, we will be able to come 
one step closer to a better understanding of the multifaceted, complex process of the 
expansion of European International Society and the socialisation of non-European 
states.
The second step is taken by forwarding a more process-oriented account for 
socialisation. This requires taking into account the importance of agency and moving 
beyond structuralist and functionalist approaches. This is not to suggest that the focus 
should be exclusively on the agents: an exclusive agent-centred approach is equally 
problematic as an overly structural one, as ‘some causal mechanisms exist only on a 
macro-level, even though they depend on instantiations at the micro-level for their 
operation. ’ 128 Moreover, although it is possible to explain events by relying on an agent­
centric approach, there is a possibility that this would generate a ‘laundry list’ of 
possible causalities which can only explain specific events, rather than a general trend 
of events. 129 Although debates over the primacy one should accord with regard to 
structure and agency have frequently tended to be somewhat dichotomised between the
l2’ Sharon Hays, ‘Structure and Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture’, Sociological Theory (vol. 
12, no. 1, March 1994, pp. 57-72), p. 65
128 Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics, p. 154
129 For instance, I may behave in a bad-tempered way to Tom, Dick and Harry within the same week: 
my irritable disposition towards them can be explained in an issue-specific manner, such as Tom 
pulled a face at me on Tuesday and Dick failed to say hello to me on Wednesday, and so on. 
However, such explanations may not be able to locate the reason of my bad temper to overarching 
factors: for example, I may have been behaving irately because I had been suffering from immense 
psychological depression.
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two camps (as can be seen in the agent-structure debate) , 130 it is clear that a theoretical 
approach which synthesises both approaches is of most explanatory value.
The socialisation concept applied in this study adopts Long and Hadden’s model. 
Socialisation is defined as 'the process o f creating and incorporating new members o f a 
group from a pool o f newcomers, carried out by members and their allies. ’ 131 Within 
this concept, the socialisation process is led by the senior members of the community, 
whose goal is to ‘create persons who can sustain confidence that they meet the 
requisites of membership and to incorporate them into membership . ’ 132 To achieve this 
end, senior members assume the identity of role model (showing) and dispense positive 
and negative sanctions to encourage conformity (shaping). They are also responsible 
for conferring ‘member status’ to newcomers (certification) and encouraging the 
participation of new/junior members in the activities of the collective.
While the ultimate goal and the roles of the senior members remain broadly 
similar to that of the aforementioned Parsonian conceptualisation of socialisation, in this 
study socialisation is treated as a process, rather than an outcome. The main difference 
of this conceptualisation from functionalist accounts is that the outcome o f the process 
remains open-ended, and leaves the possibility for variations in outcome. Successful, 
wholesale socialisation is by no means guaranteed. This is because, Long and Hadden 
point out,
All.. .participants [in a social group] -  members, novices, and allies -  are entangled 
in additional social worlds beyond those of socialization and group membership.
Ties to the wider society, loyalties to families and friends, and other associations
130 One of the most famous discussions of the agent-structure debate is by J. David Singer, ‘The Level- 
of-Analysis Problem in International Relations’, World Politics (vol. 14, no. 1, October 1961, pp. 77- 
92). See also Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 7-9, 210-214. Hollis and Smith claim that structure-oriented 
approaches are suited for ‘explaining’ the cause and effect of regular behavioural patterns in 
international politics, while agent- (or unit) level approaches are more useful for ‘understanding’ how 
such patterns of behaviour were generated in the first place. However, their somewhat dichotomous 
presentation of the two approaches has been subject to criticism: Hidemi Suganami, for instance, has 
argued that ‘ “causal” (in the sense of “mechanistic”) accounts of events, on the one hand, and 
accounts of actions in terms of the actors’ processes of reasoning, on the other...are both subsumable 
as elements in the overall “causal”. . .narrative of the event or phenomenon in question.’ See ‘Agents, 
Structures, Narratives’, European Journal o f International Relations (vol. 5, no. 3, 1999, pp. 365- 
386), p. 371. Other works on the agent-structure debate include Alexander E. Wendt, ‘The Agent- 
Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’, International Organization (vol. 41, no. 3, 
Summer 1987, pp. 335-370).
131 Long and Hadden, ‘A Reconception of Socialization’, p. 42
132 ibid., p. 45. See also Stephen Walker, ‘Symbolic Interactionism and International Politics: Role 
Theory’s Contribution to International Organization’ in Martha L. Cottam and Chih-yu Shih (eds), 
Contending Dramas: A Cognitive Approach to International Organizations. (New York: Praeger, 
1992), p. 22. Here, the equivalent process is defined as ‘an exchange process [which] expresses the 
allocation of values among participants in the political process’ and ‘an authorization process 
[which] refers to a shared set of expectations established and maintained regarding the terms of 
allocation among the participants in the exchange process’.
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engage the commitment and time of members and novices to varying degrees.
Their precise influence on socialization will differ by the degree to which they are 
segregated or integrated with socialization, the degree to which their commitments 
complete [sic] with socialization, and the particular aspects of socialization with 
which they intersect. 133
Furthermore, even though the novice is deemed ‘successful’ in her socialisation 
and becomes a full member of a society, it is also likely that the end result of the 
socialisation process does not exactly replicate the patterns of ‘socially sanctioned 
behaviour’ as advocated by the senior members. Norms of a new social environment 
are not mechanically accepted: rather, as Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink point out, 
they are subject to ‘communication, argumentation, and persuasion’, where the 
legitimacy of the new social environment and its norms are discussed. The degree to 
which the novice accepts her socialisation is likely to depend significantly on the 
outcome of this interpretive, negotiating process. 134 Similarly, what is deemed as 
‘legitimate’ by the senior members can also be fluid. Ian Clark further argues that ‘the 
emergence of legitimacy within the global order is likely to be no more and no less the 
result of political processes’ which involve ‘shifting compromises and tentative 
adjustments’ . 135
The focus of this study is precisely this negotiation process which took place in 
China and Japan. 136 It moves beyond the ‘thin’ description of non-European states’ 
entry into European International Society, and forwards a multifaceted analysis which 
can account for variations in the outcomes of socialisation which have been subject to 
much neglect. Accordingly, the resulting behavioural outcomes following socialisation 
are not predetermined in this study. The degree to which socialisation is ‘successful’
133 Long and Hadden, ‘A Reconception of Socialization’, p. 44. For farther discussion in avoiding 
conceptualisations of socialisation processes with predetermined outcomes, see Jack S. Levy, 
‘Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield’, International Organization (vol. 48, 
no. 2, pp. 279-312), p. 290
134 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of international human rights norms into 
domestic practices: introduction’ in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The 
Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), p. 13.
135 Clark, ‘Legitimacy in a Global Order’, p. 93
136 It can also be said that this study is a story of the legitimation process the Chinese and Japanese elites 
may/may not have undertook. In this sense, it is more interested in what Ian Clark calls legitimacy 
‘pertaining to order (and largely focused on issues of community).’ Clark argues that studies of 
legitimacy in international relations has been divided into those which study the acceptance of 
authority, and those which study issues involving ‘principles governing admission to, and recognition 
by, international society’ (Clark, ‘Legitimacy in a Global Order’, p. 84), with the latter remaining 
relatively underexplored. I agree with Clark that this neglect needs to be addressed, as studies of the 
legitimacy of authority cannot be prior to deciding on the community where this authority exists. 
Clark himself seems to point to this when he states: ‘We cannot know what rule-making structures 
are suitable to be put in place until we have settled the primary issues of who is to count for 
membership, within what context, and for what purpose.’ See Clark, ‘Legitimacy in a Global Order’, 
p. 92
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will be contingent on the novices’ interpretations of their new social environment, as 
well as their negotiation between the norms of their pre-existing (and possibly 
competing) social worlds. This, however, does not mean that the novice is doomed 
never to be accepted as a full member of the society. Socialisation is not only a process 
of learning social rules; it is also a ‘confidence-building process [which] directs 
attention to the audiences of socialization, those who rely on it as a basis for making 
attributions of membership. ’ 137 What is important here is that the novice is capable of 
convincing her peers that she has attained the attributes necessary to qualify for full 
membership. 138
In order to systematically conceptualise the degree to which a novice is successful 
in her socialisation and account for any variations among novices in the degrees of 
success, this study follows Long and Hadden’s framework and identifies three ‘drivers’ 
which motivate the socialisation process. These consist of ‘knowledge’, ‘competence 
and skill’, and ‘commitment’, and the empirical enquiry is divided into these three 
stages, although it is acknowledged that in practice the three processes frequently 
overlap. Acquiring ‘knowledge’ can be seen as the first steps in the development of an 
awareness for the social rules of the environment in which the novice finds herself. It is 
‘an obvious condition for...social reproduction’, as knowledge of these rules indicates, 
at the minimum, a ‘mental readiness to use them as needed. ’ 339 The learning of 
‘competence and skill’ takes the socialisation process one step further. This stage of 
socialisation can be seen as a stage in which the novice is able to comply with the 
procedural norms of her social environment. Here, not only is the novice assumed to 
possess knowledge of the social rules, she is also considered to be able to apply these 
rules in her interactions. However, this does not indicate a ‘commitment’ to the 
novice’s social environment. The novice has yet to accept her environment as 
legitimate, and has not yet fully developed the desire to have her actions defined by its 
norms. The novice will consequently (whether intentionally or not) violate the 
behavioural standards as stipulated by the society on occasion. A deeper form of 
socialisation is more likely to result when ‘commitment’ occurs. Here, the novice 
commits herself to her new social environment by ‘(putatively) takfing] the members’ 
social world as the definitive guideline for action’; ‘faithfully orient[ing] personal action
13 Long and Hadden, ‘A Reconception of Socialization’, p. 43
138 See also Walker’s discussion of ‘self-role congruence’ in ‘Symbolic Interactionism and International 
Politics’, p. 27
l?<; Long and Hadden, ‘A Reconception of Socialization’, Sociological Theory (vol. 3, no. 1, Spring 
1985, pp. 39-49), p. 43
THE JANUS-FACED EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL. SOCIETY 65
to conform to its principles and to achieve its reproduction’; and ‘willingly [being] held 
accountable to its requirements should something go awry.’140
Figure 2-4: Stages of Socialisation
Adaptation 
Rejection < ----------------
Strategic
Learning
---------------------------- ► Acceptance
Emulative
Learning
The degree to which a state is deemed as having been ‘socialised’ into its new 
social environment by its peers will depend on whether or not the novice state possesses 
these three ‘drivers’ of socialisation. Here, the degree to which a state is ‘socialised’ 
has been divided into three stages; ‘adaptation’, ‘strategic learning’ and ‘emulative 
learning’, as shown in Figure 4. Here, I treat ‘strategic learning’ and ‘emulative 
learning’ as processes of socialisation, as they involve some degree of changes in state 
interests and identities as well as the internalisation of new social norms, while 
‘adaptation’ consists only of changes in behavioural patterns but no change in the state’s 
identity and interests.
‘Adaptation’ is treated as a level at which a state (and its leaders) possesses only 
the ‘knowledge’ of its social environment, and is similar to what Joseph S. Nye Jr. has 
labelled ‘simple learning’.141 A state’s response to changes in its external environment 
is likely to be highly superficial.142 There will be no changes to state identities and 
interests, and ‘rigid operating procedures are not adjusted to recognize a changed task 
domain.’143 Any institutional changes which take place in response to new environments
140 ibid., pp. 43-44. See also Klotz, Norms in International Relations, p. 31
141 Joseph S. Nye Jr., ‘Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes’, International Organization 
(vol. 41, no. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 371-402), p. 380
142 Here I use the word ‘environment’ primarily to mean ‘external environment’. It is of course highly 
likely that a similar process can take place within the domestic realm, however, and my emphasis on 
the international realm should not be seen as denying domestic influences.
143 Peter M. Haas and Ernst B. Haas, ‘Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance’, Global 
Governance (vol. 1, no. 2, September-December 1995, pp. 255-285), p. 262. Haas and Haas also 
maintain that in the process of adaptation, ‘[n]o effective scan of the technical and scientific 
communities for new ideas is undertaken to muster political support for organizational reforms’ (p. 
262). This definition seems somewhat narrow in that it implies that autocratic states (such as the 
People’s Republic of China) with a weaker civil society are incapable of learning, even though this is 
clearly not the case. This point has also been made by Jack S. Levy, ‘Learning and foreign policy: 
sweeping a conceptual minefield’, International Organization (vol. 48, no. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 279- 
312), p. 284. For an empirical examination, see Stuart Harris, ‘China’s role in the WTO and APEC’ 
in David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising: Nationalism and interdependence. 
(London: Routledge, 1997). Also see Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Institutional Dynamics in Collapsing 
Empires: Domestic Change in the USSR, Post-Soviet Russia, and Independent Ukraine’ in Andrew 
P. Cortell and Susan Peterson (eds), Altered States: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and
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are likely to be of a short-term nature: well-entrenched, conventional institutions are 
likely to re-emerge once the external pressures are perceived to have subsided.
‘Strategic learning’ is a higher level of socialisation. 144 Here, the state not only 
possesses the knowledge of the social rules of its international environment, but also 
adopts them in its dealings with other states to a certain extent. This results in some 
limited attempts to undertake institutional reforms to respond to the new social 
standards, as opposed to superficial reforms of an expedient nature. These broadly 
correspond with the attainment o f ‘competence and skill’.
An ‘emulative learning’ process results in a change in national identities and 
interests, and wide-ranging institutional changes are undertaken to achieve this. *. This 
form of socialisation often takes the form of imitating other actors who are seen as 
thriving within this new social environment. Although emulation in itself often takes 
the form of imitating more ‘successful’ practices by others, this process can in fact 
further the socialisation process. As Alexander Wendt argues, the measurement of 
‘success’ itself is decided socially and has never been static. Standards of success 
‘are...always constituted by shared understandings that vary by cultural context. ’ 145 In 
order to be judged as successful by other members of the new social environment,
Institutional Change. (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002), pp. 145-168 and Thomas Risse 
and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: 
introduction’ in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power o f Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
especially p. 12.
144 I acknowledge that there may be different competing conceptualisations of ‘learning’. Perhaps one 
reason for this is that within the literature of ‘learning’ theory in international relations, there are also 
a variety of definitions. Dan Reiter, defines learning as ‘the application of information derived from 
past experiences to facilitate understanding of a particular policy question’ (Dan Reiter, Crucible of 
Beliefs: Learning, Alliances and World Wars. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 19-20). 
Peter M. Haas and Ernst B. Haas define learning as ‘a process whereby “consensual knowledge” is 
applied by policymakers to change their policy projects.’ (Haas and Haas, ‘Learning to Learn: 
Improving International Governance’, p. 259) Again, Haas and Haas assume that ‘learning’ can only 
take place when a strong civil society (in the form of epistemic communities) exists and wields 
considerable influence in the political decision-making process -  ‘consensual knowledge’ is thus 
defined as ‘structured information about causes and effects among physical and social phenomena 
that enjoys general acceptance as true and accurate among the members of the relevant professional 
community’ (Haas and Haas, ‘Learning to Learn’, p. 259). Alastair Iain Johnston, meanwhile, 
considers learning to take place when ‘new information about the external environment is 
internalised by decision-makers’ (Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining 
Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s’, The China Journal (no. 31, January 
1996, pp. 27-61), p. 31) and results in a change of interests, goals, and, (in the case of security policy) 
the ‘fundamental evaluation of the strategic environment’ (Johnston, ‘Learning Versus Adaptation’, 
p. 33). My own conceptualisation is closer to Johnston’s: Reiter’s definition of learning is mainly 
restricted to the using of past experiences to guide current political decision-making, and is not the 
same as the creation and acquiring of membership of a social group. I also find the Haas and Haas 
model too restrictive’ for reasons cited above. For an overview of the various definitions of the 
learning process, see also George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, ‘Introduction’ in George W. 
Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, Learning in US. and Soviet Foreign Policy. (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991)
145 Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics, p. 325
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actors must often transform their identities and interests in order ‘to be associated with 
and evaluated through the framework of the community’s shared values by emphasising 
desirable traits’ . 146 This act in itself indicates a willingness to be judged by an actor’s 
peers, and indicates a high degree of internalisation of the norms of the new social 
environment associated with ‘commitment’.
Table 2-2: The Processes of Socialisation
S ta g e s  o f  
S o c ia lisa t io n
A d a p ta tio n S tr a te g ic
L e a r n in g
E m u la t iv e
L e a r n in g
D rivers o f  
S ocia lisa tion
K n ow ledge Y es Y e s Y es
C om petence  
a n d  S k ill
N o Y e s Y es
C om m itm en t N o N o Y es
Conclusion
This chapter has forwarded two basic claims: first, conventional accounts of the 
expansion of European International Society by the English School are based on 
selective history which conceives the society as a progressive force which promotes 
some form of coexistence among its members. This conceptualisation ignores the fact 
that such norms were generally limited to govern relations between European states 
only, and that there were separate norms which aimed at promoting ‘civilisation’ 
towards non-European states.
Second, conventional English School studies of the socialisation of China and 
Japan into European International Society generally mirror linear, functionalist accounts 
of socialisation, and do not sufficiently account for the perspectives of the agents. The 
net result of these accounts is a ‘thin’ account of the socialisation process which 
downplays the role of imperialism and dualities inherent within European International 
Society in the late-nineteenth century. Furthermore, owing to the normative 
commitments of the English School approach, conventional studies have been interested 
in how International Society came to be accepted by non-European states. 
Consequently, the focus of these studies is exclusively on outcomes -  usually in terms 
of non-European states’ adoption of international law and European-style diplomacy. 
Any ambiguities and complexities, which are part and parcel of the socialisation 
process, are not accorded sufficiently examination.
146 Klotz, Norms in International Relations, p. 31
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By forwarding a more flexible framework for examining the process by which 
China and Japan were socialised into European International Society, this section has 
augmented the English School approach in at least two ways. First, by interpreting 
China and Japan’s entry into the Society as a multifaceted phenomenon which involved 
an engagement with two different modes of interactions, it pays greater attention to the 
more imperialistic European International Society and non-European states’ 
socialisation into it, moving beyond the ‘progressive’ interpretations of the expansion of 
international society. Second, by forwarding a new conceptual framework for 
understanding the expansion of European International Society and the socialisation of 
China and Japan, it undertakes a more nuanced examination of this complex process, 
and strengthens the English School approach’s theoretical utility as a framework for 
socialisation.
The following chapters will utilise this analytical framework and systematically 
chart the historical process of China and Japan’s engagement with the Society. The 
empirical discussions will be divided, for organisational purposes, in accordance with 
the three ‘drivers’ of socialisation o f ‘gaining knowledge’, Teaming the competence and 
skill’ and ‘demonstration of commitment’. Before this is undertaken, however, one task 
remains. As this study is concerned with the evolution of China and Japan’s identities 
and interests following their encounter with the Society, it is necessary to examine in 
some detail what these were prior to the expansion of European International Society. 
Accordingly, the following chapter will analyse the international order of East Asia by 
applying the theoretical framework utilised in this chapter. The constitutive structures 
of the East Asian international order and China and Japan’s identities and interests will 
be examined in this context.
THE ANCIENT EAST ASIAN INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Introduction
This chapter aims to explore Chinese and Japanese identities and interests within the 
East Asian international order prior to the mid-nineteenth century. Here, identity is 
defined in collective terms, and is understood to be formed through membership of an 
international order and interaction with its members. It is, in Alexander Wendt’s words, 
‘sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, 
that is, as a social object.’1 Members’ interests are derived from their international 
social environment, and are shared collectively throughout members of the order. As 
elaborated below, the ‘moral purpose of the state’ within the East Asian international 
order derived from Confucianism, and aimed for ‘the support and maintenance of the 
moral, social, and cultural order of social peace and harmony.’2 Accordingly, the 
fundamental interests of states within the order became those of enhancing and 
demonstrating the ability to maintain the appropriate social hierarchies that would 
promote cosmic harmony. In the Confucian order, those who stood at the apex of the 
order were charged with the role of maintaining the social hierarchy, a prerogative of the 
virtuous that carried substantial prestige. Member states of the East Asian international 
order thus competed to place themselves in the highest social position possible. This 
was also reflected in the hierarchical ‘organizing principle of sovereignty’ of the order.
The ‘international environment’ under investigation here has been termed the 
‘East Asian international order’. This has often been known as the ‘Chinese world 
order’,3 and there is certainly some justification for use of this particular term. The 
constitutive norms of the East Asian international order were hegemonic constructs that 
originated from China, and were premised on Confucianism and the assumption of 
Chinese supremacy. Many states that wished to enter diplomatic relations with China 
often had little choice but to accept them.
However, the term ‘Chinese world order’ also gives the impression of a 
monolithic order in which China’s pre-eminence was never in doubt. As will become
1 Alexander Wendt, ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, American Political 
Science Review (vol. 88, no. 2, June 1994, pp. 384-396), p. 385
2 Benjamin Schwartz, In Search o f Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 1964), p. 10
3 The most notable study to use this term is John King Fairbank (ed), The Chinese World Order: 
Traditional China 's Foreign Relations. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968)
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clear in the discussions below, this was hardly the case; much more contestation took 
place within this order than the term ‘Chinese world order’ implies. The Chinese were 
frequently forced to interact with their neighbours on equal terms, and some neighbours 
even engaged in acts that would usurp China’s position at the apex of the East Asian 
international order. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that these states 
never challenged the constitutive norms of the order, indicating that they had to a certain 
extent internalised the normative stipulations of the Sino-centric international order. 
The term ‘Chinese world order’, however, does little justice to this complexity, as it 
implies that non-Chinese states were not in any position to affect these rules.
Of course, any term based on geographic location can be problematic, as the 
boundaries of any area are often unclear and open to varying interpretations. It is 
therefore worth briefly explaining the meaning of ‘East Asia’ here. The term is meant to 
imply a normative boundary, rather than a geographic one. It includes China, Japan, 
Korea, the Ryukyu Kingdom and Vietnam (although Vietnam did not play a significant 
role in Sino-Japanese bilateral relations under the East Asian international order, and is 
not subject to detailed analysis). All of these states had a long history of cultural 
borrowing from China and had, to different degrees, internalised Confucian ideology. 
They also shared a ‘common image of the world’ derived from Sinocentrism, 4 which 
formed the basis for the social structures of the East Asian international order, far more 
than any of China’s other neighbours.
This chapter explores how the social structures of the East Asian international 
order informed both China and Japan’s identities and interests, as well as their bilateral 
relations. As the East Asian international order did not collapse until the expansion of 
European International Society, the chapter covers a long period of time; the arguments 
forwarded in this chapter are thus of a general nature. The chapter is broadly divided 
into three sections. First, it begins by surveying the East Asian international order. The 
emphasis is on how the order was supposed to function in theory, and necessarily takes a 
somewhat Sinocentric view which represents the ‘ideal type’ of the order. While the 
historical origins of the East Asian international order are a contested issue, 5 there
4 Onuma Yasuaki, ‘When was the Law of International Society Bom? -  An Inquiry of the History of 
International Law from an Intercivilizational Perspective’, Journal o f the History o f International 
Law (vol. 2, no. 1, 2000, pp. 1-66), p. 11
5 Various scholars have traced the order’s origins to the Zhou ((J§] 1027 B.C.-403 B.C.), Han, and 
Ming dynasties. John King Fairbank traces the emergence of Chinese ethnocentrism back to the Zhou 
dynasty in his ‘A Preliminary Framework’ in John King Fairbank (ed), The Chinese World Order: 
Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), 
p. 5. He Fangchuan states that Chinese historical records mention foreign entities ‘presenting tribute’
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appears to be some agreement that it reached its apogee around the time of the Ming (Sfj 
1368-1644) and Qing ('/# 1644-1911) dynasties,* 6 and this will be the historical backdrop 
of discussions throughout this chapter. For comparative purposes, it begins by analysing 
the constitutional structures of the order and proceeds to explore how these social 
structures shaped Chinese identity and interest. If the first section look at theory, the 
second section looks at practice. Here, we turn away from Sinocentrism and survey how 
the constitutional structures informed the behaviour of non-Chinese member states. The 
final section examines the specific, and discusses how Sino-Japanese interactions took 
place under this order.
The East Asian international order in theory: the view from China
The East Asian international order itself can trace its intellectual origins back to China. 
As the regional hegemon, China set the rules of diplomatic conduct with foreign polities, 
and also assumed normative supremacy wifnin the order. As China’s contacts with its 
neighbours grew, the order gradually became the dominant institutional form by which 
these groups conducted their diplomatic intercourse.
The constitutional structures o f the East Asian international order
The constitutional structures of the East Asian international order were primarily the 
extension of universalist Confucian philosophy.7 There are two important teachings 
pertaining to governance in Confucianism: respect for and maintenance of the 
(hierarchical) social order, and ethical rule. Its emphasis on social hierarchy derived 
from its ‘concept of the universe -  the entire cosmos -  as an unbroken, orderly stasis- 
continuum.’8 It was also ‘the rational justification of [the hierarchical, familial social 
relationships within Chinese society].. .or its theoretical expression.’9 Human society
to the Han, demonstrating an increasing Sino-centric notions of relations between China and its
surrounding ‘barbarians’. He Fangchuan, ‘ “Huayi zhixu” lun’, Beijing daxue xuebao (zhexue shehui
kexue ban) (vol. 35, no. 6, 1998, pp. 30-45), p. 32. See also James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from
Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy o f 1793. (Durham: Duke University Press,
1995), p. 12.
0 He Fangchuan, ‘ “Huayi zhixu” lun’, p. 35
7 Yongjin Zhang, ‘System, empire and state in Chinese international relations’ Review o f International 
Studies (vol. 27, Special issue, 2001, pp. 43-63), p. 56, Mark Mancall, China at the Centre: 300 
Years o f  Foreign Policy. (New York: The Free Press, 1984), pp. 13-39
8 Mancall, China at the Centre, p. 21
9 Fung Yu-lan, A Short History o f Chinese Philosophy. (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 21. He 
Fangchuan also points to the close connection between China’s agrarian background and the rise of 
the hierarchical nature of the order. He argues that ‘the basic need for peace and stability, 
characteristic within agrarian societies, as well as the Confucian (normative) frameworks of “ruler-
THE ANCIENT EAST ASIAN INTERNATIONAL ORDER 72
was ordered along hierarchical lines, and ‘[stability and order...were the highest virtues 
in the cosmological continuum, secured through the maintenance of hierarchy and the 
performance of rituals.’10 Consequently, Confucianism placed great emphasis on the 
maintenance of hierarchically-defined social relations. This was to be achieved
...by teaching all mortals respect for the five fundamental human relationships: 
those between man and woman..., father and son, older and younger friend, friend 
and friend, sovereign and minister (or subject). When the timeless patterns of 
these associations were fully understood and realized, peace, order, and happiness 
were to prevail in the entire community’."
While Confucianism was conservative in the sense that it taught the people to 
respect their rulers, it was also radical in its emphasis on ethical rule. It was believed 
that humans ‘have their full realization and development only in human 
relationships....Mencius maintained] that “man is a political animal” and can fully 
develop these relationships only within state and society.’12 Therefore, the ‘state is a 
moral institution and the head of the state should be a moral leader.’13 Confucian 
philosophy placed great emphasis on ethical governance, and argued that a 
‘gentleman’ -  particularly a ruler -  should possess the qualities of ‘uprightness or inner 
integrity (chih zhi]), righteousness (z [H yz']), conscientiousness toward others or 
loyalty (chung [/£ zhong]), altruism or reciprocity (shu [$S]), and above all, love or 
human-heartedness (jen [il1 ren]).’14 Those who failed to display these moral qualities 
were not fit to rule, and ‘the people [would] have the moral right of revolution.’15 It was 
this concept of morality that theoretically kept a check on despotic rule.
The ‘Confucian system of government., .regarded all men, including the emperor, 
and all communities, including the world state, as subject to the will of Heaven.’16 
Provided that the ruler adhered to these principles he would command the ‘mandate of 
heaven’. His right to rule would be divinely ordained, as it was argued that ‘Heaven 
delegates its governing functions to a righteous ruler who thereby becomes the one and
subject”, “loyalty and filial piety” naturally extended into the Chinese Empire’s basic diplomatic 
ideals and principals.’ He Fangchuan, ‘ “Huayi zhixu” lun’, p. 37
10 Mancall, China at the Centre, p. 21
11 Adda B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History: From the Ancient Near East to the 
Opening o f the Modern Age. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), p. 135. Also see Chen 
Jiehua, Ershiyi shiji zhongguo waijiao zhanliie. (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 2001), p. 65
12 Fung, A Short Histoiy o f Chinese Philosophy, p. 73
13 ibid.
14 John King Fairbank and Edwin O Reischauer, China: Tradition and Transformation. (Sydney: Allen 
and Unwin, 1989), p. 46; c.f. Cho-yun Hsu, ‘Applying Confucian Ethics to International Relations’, 
Ethics and International Affairs (vol. 5, 1991, pp. 15-31), p. 20
15 Fung, A Short History o f Chinese Philosophy, p. 74
16 Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International Histoiy, p. 135
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only Son of Heaven. ’ 17 Emperors (WY tianzi) were considered ‘superior to ordinary 
mortals because of their unique function in maintaining order among mankind and 
maintaining harmony between human society and the rest of the cosmos. ’ 18 The 
Emperor, as the Son of Heaven, had the duty to rule with benevolence, and his subjects 
were expected to adhere to the Heavenly will and respect his elevated role and social 
position.
While the degree to which China actually applied ‘benevolent’ Confucian 
principles in its international behaviour is highly debatable, 19 the normative need to 
maintain ‘proper’ social hierarchies did find its expression in the constitutional 
structures of the East Asian international order, where the ‘moral purpose of the 
state...[was] to promote social and cosmic harmony. ’ 20 The organising principle of 
sovereignty within the tribute system was thus along hierarchical, familial lines. 21 The 
principle as applied in the East Asian international order provides an interesting contrast 
with European International Society, where its core ‘civilised’ members all nominally 
enjoyed sovereign equality. As Immanuel C. Y. Hsti has argued, relations within the 
East Asian international order ‘were much like those between members of a family, far 
more so that the relations between Western nations. It is literally correct to describe 
them as constituting their own family of nations in East Asia. ’ 22 China assumed (at least 
theoretically) its superior hierarchical position over all the other polities that surrounded
17 ibid., p. 134
10 John King Fairbank, ‘A Preliminary Framework’, p. 6
19 Traditional studies (headed primarily by Sinologists and Chinese scholars) have argued that Chinese 
political thought is unique in that violence was abhorred and played only a peripheral role in the 
Sinocentric order. Such studies include Frank A. Kierman Jr. and John King Fairbank (eds), Chinese 
Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974); Jonathan R. 
Adelman and Chih-yu Shih, Symbolic War: The Chinese Use o f Force, 1840-1980 (Taipei: Institute 
of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 1993); He Fangchuan, ‘ “Huayi zhixu” lun’; 
and Huang Zhilian, Yazhou de huaxia zhixu: Zhongguo yu Yazhou guojia guanxi xingtai lun. (Beijing: 
Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 1992). One of the most powerful counter-arguments to this 
from an international relations viewpoint remains Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic 
Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1995). A more historical account of coercive Chinese foreign policy behaviour is given by Arthur 
Waldron in his The Great Wall o f China: From History to Myth. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990)
20 Zhang, ‘System, empire and state in Chinese international relations’, p. 56
21 The term ‘sovereignty’ is used guardedly with some reservation here, as the term derives from 
European International Society and is commonly understood as ‘territoriality and the exclusion of 
external actors from domestic authority structures’. The members of the East Asian international 
order, however, did not always have clearly demarcated territorial boundaries, and neither was 
sovereign autonomy a marker of legitimate membership of the order. In the context of the East Asian 
international order, the ‘organising principle of sovereignty’ is perhaps better understood as how 
members of the order were socially organised. The definition of sovereignty in European 
International Society is taken from Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 20
22 Immanuel C. Y. Hsii, China’s Entrance into the Family o f Nations: The Diplomatic Phase 1858- 
1880. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 3
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it. The Chinese believed that ‘the all-wise example and virtue (te [Ü de]) of the Son of 
Heaven not only reached throughout China proper but continued outward beyond the 
borders of China to all mankind... albeit with gradually decreasing efficacy, as parts of a 
concentric hierarchy. ’ 23
The positions of other non-Chinese states within this order were not as clear-cut as 
this, however. They often depended on the degree to which the Chinese judged them to 
have been assimilated into Chinese culture and, to a lesser extent, their geographical 
proximity to China. Nomadic societies and their peoples were often treated as the more 
‘barbarous’. By the time of the Qing dynasty, such peoples (such as the Tibetans and 
Mongols) were dealt with the Lifanyuan (JEU |$m) , 24 which can be translated as the 
‘Barbarian Control Office’.
The more ‘sinified’ China’s neighbours were, the more likely they were to be seen 
to be responsive to the virtue of the Chinese emperor, and to enjoy greater prestige. 
When presenting tribute, they would come under the jurisdiction of the Board of Rites 
(floß libu), ‘which was...charged with the performance of that broad spectrum of rites 
that transmitted Confucian culture inside China itself. Ritually, therefore, these regions 
were an extension of China proper beyond the immediately effective control of the 
emperor. ’ 25 States such as Korea and the Ryükyü kingdom constituted the core members 
of this group of states. In the sense that they were seen as sharing a sufficiently similar 
culture to the degree that they could be called an ‘extension’ of the Middle Kingdom, 
they can be seen as the ‘civilised’ states within the East Asian international order, 
although this did not necessarily result in recognition of equality from China.
The ‘systemic norm of procedural justice’ of the tribute system corresponded 
closely to what Christian Reus-Smit has termed ‘ritual justice’. The concept of 
international law hardly had a role to play within the East Asian international order, 
where ‘people.. .understood law with enforcement mechanisms as basically domestic. 
The very notion of applying the law as an enforceable norm outside the territory or 
between independent bodies politic was foreign to them. ’ 26 Accordingly, within the East
23 John King Fairbank ‘A Preliminary Framework’, p. 8. Fairbank’s conceptualisation of this order can 
be found in the table in the same essay, p. 13.
24 The Lifanyuan was created by the Qing dynasty, originally to control the dynasty’s Mongolian affairs. 
It was after the Qing conquest of China proper that its role was expanded to deal with a wider range 
of peoples and polities.
25 Mark Mancall, ‘The Ch’ing Tribute system: An Interpretive Essay’, in John King Fairbank (ed), The 
Chinese World Order: Traditional China ’s Foreign Relations. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1968), p. 74
26 Onuma Yasuaki, ‘When was the Law of International Society Bom?’, p. 16
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Asian international order diplomacy was carried out primarily in the form of elaborate 
rituals which extended from Confucian norms and paid particular attention to members’ 
social standing and its maintenance. 27 This hierarchical difference was based on the 
‘common cornerstone of the ka-i [ lj£ M huayi Middle Kingdom-Barbarian] 
edifice...[which] was the logic of difference’ 28 designed at accentuating the differences 
between the centre of civilisation and peripheral ‘barbarians’, and reflected the core 
metanorm of the ‘moral purpose of the state’ of the East Asian international order. 
Within a given international order, rituals can play an important role in ‘communicat[ing] 
to a community its unity, its values, its uniqueness in both the exclusive and the 
inclusive sense’ , 29 and the tribute system was no exception in this regard. Non-Chinese 
states were expected to demonstrate their loyalty and filiality towards the paternal state 
by offering tribute, which was seen as a ‘ritual appropriate to the maintenance of the 
world order’ . 30 While the terms ‘vassal state (chen E  or shubang/shuguo or
‘suzerain’, which were used in these relations often imply a form of control by the 
dominant power, the Chinese did not necessarily exert domestic control over the 
member states of the East Asian international order, and neither did they control their 
relations with other non-Chinese states. The tribute system and the term ‘vassal state’ 
merely signified a lower status in the social hierarchy of the East Asian international 
order, and only dictated their relations with the Chinese empire. 31 This difference in the 
meanings of ‘vassal statehood’ between the East Asian international order and European 
International Society was to cause problems over the legal status of tributary states later 
on, a theme that we shall return to later.
Non-Chinese states were expected to present tribute (gong ft) to the emperor. In 
the ceremonies hosted for the emissaries, 32 the kowtow was performed, and hierarchical 
relations were confirmed. As Mark Mancall states:
27 For overviews of the regulations of the Tribute system, see John King Fairbank, ‘A Preliminary 
Framework’; Huang Zhilian, Yazhou de huaxia zhixu; and Hamashita Takeshi, Kindai chügoku no 
kokusaiteki keiki: chökö böeki shisutemu to kindai ajia. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1990)
28 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ‘The Frontiers of Japanese Identity’ in Stein Tonnesson and Hans Antlöv (eds), 
Asian Forms o f the Nation. (Richmond: Curzon, 1996), p. 51
29 Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’, p. 726
30 Mancall, China at the Centre, p. 22
31 For this point, see M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia. (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1946), p. 88, and Wang Zhenping, Han tang zhongti 
guanxi lun. (Taipei: Wenjin chubanshe, 1997), p. 28
32 For a detailed discussion of the rituals carried out during imperial receptions of the Tributary envoys, 
see James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy o f  
1793. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 116-133
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As the son of heaven, the emperor connected human society to the rest of the 
cosmos. Entry into the emperor’s presence or court required recognition of these 
principles through the correct performance of the rituals and through tribute 
presentation. Refusal to perform the rituals was tantamount to an insult to the 
universal scheme of things, an unnatural act that could not be tolerated by the 
emperor since it was his role to maintain the harmony of the cosmos.33
In addition to performing these various rituals, the tributary states were expected 
to send additional tributary missions at times of special occasions, such as the death of 
or the enthronement of a new emperor. They were also to send emissaries to announce 
the death or enthronement of their own kings. In return, they received gifts from the 
emperor and were granted trade privileges. They also received investiture from the 
Chinese emperor and were given a seal of patent which was to be used in ineir 
correspondence with China (along with the Imperial Chinese calendar). In addition to 
these ritualistic regulations, there were other norms. Tributary states were expected, in 
accordance with Confucian norms, to ‘treat each other in accordance with ethics (yi li 
xiangdai and ‘not invade each other (ge bu xiangfan ^T 'fl'fE ) ’ . 34 If any
violation of these norms occurred, tributary states were permitted to ask China for 
mediation or military assistance, and at times this was provided. 35
How, then, did the constitutive structures of the East Asian international order 
shape the identities and interests of China? Although we must exercise some caution 
when making broad generalisations which cut across time, two fundamental suggestions 
can be offered. First, China’s identity within this order was that of the pinnacle of the 
social hierarchy of the international order. As Yongjin Zhang argues, the ‘Chinese 
emperor, as the Son of Heaven, had the mandate of Heaven to rule Tianxia ( ^ T  all- 
under-heaven). ’ This meant that it was a given that ‘the Chinese world order had to be 
hierarchical, with the Chinese emperor sitting at the apex of this order with a heavenly 
mandate. ’ 36 This identity in turn informed the fundamental interests of the Chinese 
empire, which centred around the maintenance of appropriate social hierarchies that 
would reaffirm China’s superior moral standing. The order’s fundamental institution, 
the tribute system, served to maintain this by constructing a hierarchical, Sinocentric 
world. Foreign ‘barbarians’ would present tribute, demonstrating that the virtue of the
33 Mancall, China at the Centre: 300 Years of Foreign Policy, p. 22
34 See Huang Zhilian, Yazhou de huaxia zhixu, pp. 95-96.
35 A primary example of this is the Ming’s decision to send troops to assist the Chosön (^S¥) dynasty 
fight of the Japanese invasion of 1592-98. The Qing also provided such assistance as well. The Sino- 
Vietnamese clash of 1788-89 was a result of the Qing’s expedition to provide military assistance to 
the Le dynasty.
36 Zhang, ‘System, empire and state in Chinese international relations’, p. 53
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Son of Heaven had reached far and wide lands. By cherishing these peoples, the 
Chinese emperor in turn would show his paternal, benevolent status befitting that of a 
superior.
Table 3-1. Constitutional structures and fundamental institutions in European 
International Society and the East Asian international order
Societies o f States International Society for European 
States
East Asian International Order
Constitutional Structures
1. Moral Purpose of State Augmentation of Individuals’ 
Purposes and Potentialities
Promoting cosmic and social 
harmony
2. Organizing Principle of 
Sovereignty
Sovereign Equality, Liberal 
Sovereignty
Sovereign hierarchy (civilizational)
3. Systemic Norm of Procedural 
Justice
Legislative Justice (based on 
positive law)
Ritual justice
Fundamental Institutions a. Contractual International 
law
b. Multilateralism
a. Tribute system
(Sources: Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State, p. 7, Zhang, ‘System, empire and state in 
international relations, p. 57)
The tribute system in practice: the view from the non-Chinese entities
A remarkable feature of the East Asian international order is its longevity. The order 
and its fundamental institution, the tribute system, which some scholars trace its origins 
back to the Han dynasty ('/H 202 B.C.-220 A.D.) continued to function well into the 
nineteenth century. It was only in the late nineteenth century following the expansion of 
European International Society that the order was finally dismantled, ironically by 
Japan, itself a former member of the East Asian international order.
What explains the longevity of the order and the tribute system? There is no 
doubt that in many instances power relations were an important determining factor. 
While some scholars (particularly Chinese scholars) have maintained that China’s 
behaviour towards its most Sinified neighbours was generally a peaceful one,37 this 
ignores the fact that in many historical periods China remained the regional hegemon in 
East Asia, and was often in a position to enforce its norms on smaller neighbouring 
polities.38
37 See for example Adelman and Shih, Symbolic War. The geopolitical area where China allegedly 
relied primarily on non-coercive ‘ cultural’ and ‘ideological’ measures has been dubbed the ‘Sinic 
Zone’ by John K. Fairbank. See John King Fairbank ‘A Preliminary Framework’, p. 2.
38 A thoughtful discussion of power relations within the East Asian international order can be found in 
Inoguchi Takashi, ‘Dentöteki higashi ajia sekai chitsujo ron: jühasseiki matsu no chügoku no 
betonamu kanshö o chushin to shite’, Kokusaihö gaikö zasshi (vol. 73, no. 5, February 1975, pp. 36- 
83)
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Unsurprisingly, ample evidence exists that Chinese norms of the constitutional 
structure were transmitted to neighbouring polities. Indeed, it has been argued that 
sustained contact between states tends to reproduce the institutions and norms of the 
hegemonic ideas governing international relations. Barry Buzan, for instance, claims 
that as ‘ruling elites recognize the permanence and importance of the economic and 
strategic interdependence among their states, they will begin to work out rules for 
avoiding unwanted conflicts and for facilitating desired exchanges’ with the hegemon. 39 
Reus-Smit also states that ‘[i]n a mature society of states, exhibiting an established 
network of fundamental institutions, states that wish to engage in stable social 
interaction encounter strong incentives to employ existing practices. ’ 40 As states 
become more integrated into an international system and its constitutive structure, they 
come ‘under a strong compulsion to justify their actions in terms of the system’s 
primary norms of coexistence. ’ 41 The result is a stable pattern of behaviour that strongly 
reflects the system’s constitutional structures.
The member states of the East Asian international order were no exception. The 
expansion of this constitutional structure that resulted in the formation of a distinctive 
Sinocentric regional order was primarily a result of extensive contact between China and 
its East Asian neighbours. States in East Asia engaged in trade and cultural exchanges 
with the Chinese to facilitate their own development. In their dealings with China, by 
far their most powerful neighbour, they often had little choice but to participate in the 
system if they wished to maintain their ties with the Chinese.
Legitimacy o f the East Asian international order
The fact that the Chinese empire dominated East Asia for so long has given rise to a 
number of arguments that inteipret the East Asian international order and the tribute 
system as based primarily on asymmetrical power relations. 42 Indeed, Ikenberry and
39 Buzan, ‘From International System to International Society’, p. 334
40 Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose o f the State, p. 36
41 ibid., p. 35
42 Note, however, that this is not the case of all power-based theories. Neorealists, for instance, are 
extremely sceptical that hierarchical systems can be sustained. While conceding that ‘within an 
international order, risks may be avoided or lessened by moving from a situation of coordinate action 
to one of super- and subordination’, Kenneth N. Waltz argues that the costs of maintaining a 
hierarchical order are prohibitively high. There will be conflict over ‘efforts to influence or control 
the controllers’. Moreover, in ‘a society of states with little coherence, attempts at world government 
would founder on the inability of an emerging central authority to mobilize the resources needed to 
create and maintain the unity of the system by regulating an managing its parts. The prospect of 
world government would be an invitation to prepare for world civil war.’ Waltz, Theory o f 
International Politics, p. 111-112. Also see Buzan and Little, International Systems in World 
History, p. 41
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Kupchan argue that in a hegemonic institution, ‘the manipulation of material incentives
-  the use of threats and promises to alter the preferences of leaders in secondary nations
-  is the dominant form through which hegemonic power is exercised.’43 Buzan and 
Richard Little also see tributary relations as a command model of international relations 
in which ‘vassal kingdoms or tribes paid tribute to imperial suzerains, or, depending on 
the balance of power, imperial suzerains paid appeasement bribes to supposed vassals in 
return for not being attacked by them.’44 The implication here is that states paid tribute 
to the hegemon whenever the balance of power was in the latter’s favour, in a sense 
‘buying’ their security. In this view, the East Asian international order is nothing more 
that an expression of China’s hegemonic desires.45
There is no doubt that presenting tribute did serve the function of maintaining 
peripheral states’ security. Tributary missions presented opportunities to gather 
intelligence, and indeed appease the Chinese. However, it is equally important to note 
that despite the fact that Chinese power waxed and waned over the years, the tribute 
system remained intact. In some cases, member states even remained loyal to a deposed 
Chinese dynasty, despite it making very little sense from the point of their survival. An 
example from Korea further illustrates that security concerns based on fear of Chinese 
coercion did not exclusively constitute non-Chinese states’ participation in the tribute 
system. In the seventeenth century, the Chosön dynasty (#i$$ 1392-1910) in Korea 
faced increasing coercion by the newly established Qing dynasty to enter tributary 
relations, and was eventually forced by the Qing to do so in 1627. However, the 
Koreans remained loyal to the Ming dynasty. Despite the fact that they had reluctantly 
entered ‘tributary’ relations with the Qing, as long as the Ming survived they ‘refused to 
perform even the duties agreed upon toward the “elder brother” nation, the Manchus 
[i.e. the Qing dynasty]’,46 despite the fact that Korea shared a border with the Qing and 
the latter posed a much larger threat to its survival than the Ming.
43 Ikenberry and Kupchan, ‘Socialization and hegemonic power’, p. 283
44 Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, p. 234
45 For a more journalistic account of similar views, see Ogura Kazuo, Chügoku no ishin nihon no kyöji. 
(Tokyo: Chüö köron shinsha, 2001). In the context of Sino-Vietnamese relations, Ösawa Kazuo 
believes that China did not necessarily abandon the idea of dominating the region by military force 
when the balance of power suited was in its favour, as the Ming’s invasion and attempted colonisation 
of Vietnam between 1406-27 demonstrates. See Ösawa Kazuo, ‘Reichö chüki no min, shin to no 
kankei (1527-1682)’ in Yamamoto Tatsurö (ed) Betonamu chügoku kankei shi: Kyokushi no taitö 
kara shin-futsu sensö made. (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1975), p. 334. For a similar account, 
also see Gari Ledyard, ‘Yin and Yang in the China-Manchuria-Korea Triangle’ in Morris Rossabi 
(ed), China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, lO ^-lH 1 Centuries (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983)
46 See Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, p. 80
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This phenomenon is beyond the reach of purely power-based explanations of 
international politics. If, like the arguments above, it is only material threats and 
benefits that sustain a hierarchical system like the tribute system, we should expect that 
a ‘process of constantly recalculating the costs and benefits of any course of action 
should be an observable constant of self-interested actors’ whenever China’s power and 
concomitant ability to provide material carrots and sticks declined. 47 While China’s 
neighbours may not have ultimately been able to overthrow the tribute system and the 
East Asian international order, there is no evidence that they sought to do so until Japan 
did in the late-nineteenth century. Of course, this is not to imply that the members of 
the East Asian international order never challenged the more Sinocentric norms inherent 
in the order, as this did indeed take place (as the following discussions will show). 
Rather, the point here is that while these contestations did take place, they occurred 
within the order, and did not constitute a challenge to the order itself. 48
The problem with purely power-based explanations is that their arguments assume 
that any international hierarchical structure necessarily lacks legitimacy, and cannot be 
maintained for a sustained length of time without resorting to force. However, in the 
case of East Asia, the system seems to ‘[prevail] in times of Imperial China’s military 
weakness precisely because military strength on its own is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for the maintenance of this order. ’ 49 This suggests that the 
constitutional structure of the East Asian international order and the tribute system, its 
fundamental institution, did indeed gain a significant degree of acceptance among the 
Sinic Zone states. As Yongjin Zhang has argued, ‘[s]o long as the hegemonic belief in 
the moral purpose of the state and more broadly, of the political community incarnated 
in Confucianism, prevails, the tribute system as a basic institutional practices [sic] is 
likely to stay. ’ 50
This appears to have been the case in the international relations in East Asia. A 
common culture can be cited as a primary reason for this. 51 Martin Wight has noted that 
a ‘states-system presupposes a common culture’ , 52 and more recently Barry Buzan and
47 Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, International Organization (vol. 53, 
no. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 379-408), p. 396
48 Tanaka Takeo, Chüsei taigai kankeishi. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1975), p. 19
49 Zhang, ‘System, empire and state in Chinese international relations’, p. 57-58
50 ibid., p. 57
51 However, we must be aware when making such arguments that ‘one cannot distinguish peoples and 
regions at a particular time in an unequivocal manner’ and ‘[t]here always exists a certain degree of 
overlapping in a particular human’s belonging to a certain civilization.’ See Onuma, ‘When was the 
Law of International Society Bom?’, pp. 10-11
52 Wight, Systems o f States, p. 46
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Richard Little have argued that a common culture can aid in furthering interaction 
capacity and fostering a common identity, thus facilitating the formation of international 
order(s) . 53 In this sense, it does not come as a surprise that China’s more immediate 
neighbours in East Asia (as well as Vietnam) appear to have absorbed Chinese influence 
the most. They all used the Chinese language to communicate with each other, had an 
elite who were indoctrinated in Confucianism, learnt Buddhism through China, and had, 
at some point in their histories, adopted centralised government structures based on the 
Chinese model. 54 In their correspondence with the Chinese empire they also used terms 
couched in Confucian hierarchy.
These practices further facilitated acceptance of the tribute system to the extent 
that member states’ identities became strongly linked to the East Asian international 
order. 55 In similar fashion to the Chinese, ‘the question whether one was a civilized 
member of the Sinocentric world according to Sinocentric cosmology was regarded as 
crucial’ , 56 and the members identified themselves in terms of their hierarchical standing 
in the Confucian-derived social order. Their interests also became one of maintaining or 
improving their positions. Legitimate statehood was defined in terms of attaining a 
respectable ‘civilised’ position within the hierarchy. To this end, investiture from China 
was often used as a device for legitimating a leader’s rule. 57 As the likelihood of 
attaining a ‘civilised’ position within the East Asian international order was theoretically 
linked to being recognised as such by China, some states went as far as actively 
demonstrating their close ties with the Chinese empire and its civilisation. Indeed, Gari 
Ledyard has argued that ‘acceptance by the tributary of Chinese diplomatic rhetoric is 
part and parcel of its general accptance and respect for Chinese civilization itself. ’ 58 For
53 Buzan and Little label this ‘social technologies of transportation and communication’, and include a 
common language, script, religion, diplomacy, money and bills of exchange, and trade diasporas as 
crucial elements. See Buzan and Little, International Systems in World History, pp. 199-215.
54 This characterisation of the East Asian international order is based on Nishijima Sadao, Yamataikoku 
to higashi ajia: kodai nippon to higashi ajia. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa köbunkan, 1994), p. 164 and 
Mancall, China at the Centre, p. 18-19. For general information on how these states adopted 
Confucianism in their government, see M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern 
Asia. (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1946) and Keith W. Taylor, ‘The 
Early Kingdoms’ in Nicholas Tarling, (ed) The Cambridge History o f Southeast Asia (vol. 1): From 
early times to c. 1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
55 See Nishijima Sadao, Yamataikoku to higashi ajia, pp. 164-166
56 Onuma, ‘When was the Law of International Society Bom?’, p. 10
57 Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order, p. 12; Ronald P. Toby, State and Diplomacy in 
Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development o f the Tokugawa Bakufu. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1991), p. 171; and Onuma, ‘When was the Law of International Society Bom?’, pp. 
13-14.
38 Gari Ledyard, ‘Yin and Yang in the China-Manchuria-Korea Triangle’ in Morris Rossabi (ed) China 
among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983), p. 338
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instance, the Le dynasty (H 1428-1527) of Vietnam were highly dissatisfied when they 
were issued with a copper seal of investiture, and protested this as not befitting their 
status within the tribute system. They were later issued with a silver seal.59 In Ryükyü- 
Chinese relations, we see similar evidence of socialisation into the norms of the tribute 
system. In 1601, the Ming proposed sending military officials to carry out the 
investiture ceremony for the Ryükyü king. The kingdom protested vigorously, claiming 
that a military envoy would imply that Ming-Ryükyü relations were based on enmity, 
and that the Ryükyü king was a ‘hostage king (lu wang iff I E ) \  which was unacceptable. 
They successfully insisted that civilian officials being sent, which was commensurate 
with the more prestigious status of Ryükyü, a long-standing, loyal tributary' of China.60 
But perhaps the most unique example of socialisation into Chinese customs which 
governed tributary relations comes from the writings in Chosön Korea, which is worth 
citing fully:
Our ceremonies, our enjoyments, our laws, our usages, our dress, our literature, 
our goods have all followed after the models of China. The (five) great 
relationships [of Confucianism] shine forth from those above and the teachings 
pass down to those below, making the grace o f our customs like to that of the 
Flowery Land, so that Chinese themselves praise us saying ‘Korea is little 
China.’61
While other member states may not have always identified themselves with 
Chinese civilisation to the extent that the Korean elites did, Chinese investiture still at 
times carried considerable moral authority. For instance, in the early fifteenth century, 
the then shögun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (Ä fÜ  Ji'/iSl) entered tributary relations not only for 
trade reasons but also because of ‘the factor of Chinese prestige in Japan’,62 although in 
what is also evidence of contestation, the move was criticised as detrimental to Japanese 
prestige.63 But Ashikaga Yoshimitsu’s seeking of Chinese investiture is an indication 
that this particular ritual of the order did, to a certain degree, command respect within 
Japanese domestic society to the extent that it could be utilised for legitimating domestic 
rule.
59 See Osawa Kazuo, ‘Reicho chuki no min, shin to no kankei (1527-1682)’, p. 378
60 See Uehara Kenzen ‘Toyotomi seiken no chosen shuppei to ryümin kankei’ in Takara Kurayoshi, 
Tomiyama Kazuyuki and Maehira Fusaaki (eds) Atarashii ryükyüshi zö: Araki Moriaki sensei tsuitö 
ronshü. (Ginowan, Okinawa: Yöjusha, 1996), pp. 35-36
61 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, p. 85
62 Wang Yi-T’ung, Official Relations between China and Japan 1368-1594 (Harvard-Yenching 
Institute Studies IX). (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 35.
63 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, p. 58.
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Contestation within the East Asian international order
However, it would be mistaken to assume that the East Asian international order was a 
monolithic construct where no contestation took place. 64 While the fundamental 
systemic norms of the order were not overthrown by its members, some of the more 
Sinocentric assumptions of the East Asian international order came under challenges. 
The members of the East Asian international order showed themselves capable of 
contesting China’s assumed supremacy within the East Asian international order, even 
though they did not possess the military prowess to pose a threat to Chinese hegemony.
According to Hamashita Takeshi, these contestations took primarily three forms, 
although the three would often overlap. First, states could claim ‘Middle Kingdom’ 
status, and usurp China’s assumed claim to ‘superior moral power’. They would thus 
take over the responsibility ‘for maintaining and harmonizing [the Confucian] social 
order with the moral examples [they] set’ .65
Second, a state would ‘place itself in the “centre” in relation to its tributary and 
non-tributary states, and behave like a “Middle Kingdom” in its own right’ .66 Sakayori 
Masashi notes that this process of sorting surrounding polities in a hierarchical order 
was ‘modelled on Sinocentrism and was a necessary political ideology for legitimating 
domestic rule and, in the context of expanding territorial rule, for demonstrating 
dynastic legitimacy among the ruling elite. ’67 In order to demonstrate its superior social 
status, a challenger would take on the role of receiving tributary missions. In similar 
fashion to China, it would place itself at a higher echelon by requiring its own 
‘Tributaries’ to perform appropriate rituals. The ritual confirmation of the state’s 
‘Middle Kingdom’ status had the effect of demonstrating that the ruler’s ‘virtue’ had 
spread far and wide, thus confirming the challenger’s superior moral status, while 
simultaneously highlighting its capacity to take on the role of a ‘Middle Kingdom’ that 
was able to ‘cherish’ those at the lower end of the social order.
The third form would be one of mutual accommodation of each other’s ‘superior’ 
status. Both states ‘would define themselves as the “apex” of the order while seeing the
64 Cf. Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose o f the State, p. 33
65 Zhang, ‘System, empire and state in Chinese international relations’, p. 53
66 Hamashita Takeshi, ‘Higashi ajiashi ni mini kai chitsujo’ in Hamashita Takeshi (ed) Higashi ajia 
sekai no chiiki nettowaaku. (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1999), p. 38
67 Sakayori Masashi, ‘Kai shisö no shosö’ in Arano Yasunori, Ishii Masatoshi, Murai Shösuke (eds), 
Ajia no nakano nihonshi (vol. 5): jiishiki to sögo rikai. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1993), 
p. 53
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other as a “barbarian”, while turning a blind eye to the other’s challenge and glossing 
over any realities [that would suggest otherwise]’.68
Such contestation, which can be dubbed ‘mimetic challenges’, took place among 
several member states of the East Asian international order. For instance, Vietnam’s Le 
dynasty took the opportunity to claim equal status with China in 1427. In a document 
sanctioned by the Vietnamese ruler, it was claimed: ‘only our Great Viet State is a 
“learned country” ...ever since the founding of the country, our dynasties have stood on 
parity with the Han, Tang, Song and Yuan dynasties ... f=l
7y).’ This, Sakayori Masashi comments, is 
indicative of ‘Vietnamese confidence in its equal status with China, as well as a 
Vietnamese form of “Sinocentrism” which sees its neighbouring peoples as 
“barbarians’” .69
While these actions did indeed contest Chinese superiority, it would be 
inappropriate to assume that this constituted a fundamental rejection of the East Asian 
international order, since the systemic norms of the order remained intact. In a sense, it 
is possible to conceptualise the contestations which took place within the East Asian 
international order as resembling what Stephen D. Krasner has dubbed ‘organized 
hypocrisy’, where ‘[ajctors violate rules in practice without at the same time challenging 
their legitimacy’,70 a point also noted by Zhang.71 This suggests that the normative 
structures of the order were sufficiently adaptable to accommodate some ‘hypocritical’, 
or ambiguous realities without resulting in a complete collapse of the order. As Zhang 
notes:
The hypocrisy embodied in the organizing principles, norms and practices of the 
Chinese world order is embedded as an intended institutional feature. It may be 
indeed argued that it is precisely such purposive institutional ambiguities in the 
actual operation of the tribute system that made it a flexible system for the conduct 
of Imperial China’s foreign relations.72
68 Hamashita Takeshi, ‘Higashi ajiashi ni mini kai chitsujo’, p. 38
69 Sakayori Masashi, ‘Kai shisö no shosö’ in Arano Yasunori, Ishii Masatoshi, Murai Shosuke (eds), 
Ajia no nakano nihonshi (vol. 5): jiishiki to sögo rikai. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1993), 
pp. 52-53. The Vietnamese Nguyen emperors also called their kingdom the ‘Middle Kingdom 
(Zhongguo/Chügoku TUI).’ They established Tributary relations with their neigyhbours, and the 
Nguyen rulers used the title ‘emperor’ for themselves, although this title was supposed to be only 
accorded to the Chinese emperor. See Sakayori Masashi, ‘Kai shisö no shosö’, pp. 48-49 and Takeda 
Ryöji ‘Gen chö shoki no shin to no kankei (1802-1870) in Yamamoto Tatsurö (ed) Betonamu 
chügoku kankei shi: Kyokushi no taitö kara shin-futsu sensö made. (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 
1975), p. 543
70 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Organised hypocrisy in nineteenth-century East Asia’ International Relations o f 
the Asia-Pacific (vol. 1, no. 2, 2001, pp. 173-197), p. 173
71 Zhang, ‘System, empire and state in Chinese international relations’, p. 54 
ibid.72
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However, the constitutive rules of the East Asian international order were not 
rendered meaningless by these actions. While he does acknowledge the role of 
constitutive norms in international orders, Krasner tends to downplay their importance, 
claiming that ‘socialization is less complete in an international environment’ and 
violations of norms will be endemic. 73 This has led him to assert somewhat 
controversially that ‘[t]he international system is not like a game of chess. It does not 
have constitutive rules, if such rules are conceived of as making some kinds of action 
possible and precluding others. ’ 74 But Krasner does not pay sufficient attention to the 
fact that although rules are compromised, this does not mean that they cease to matter. 
As Daniel Philpott notes, a ‘violation or compromise of the rales that constitute 
international relations does not make them any less constitutive...the very concept of a 
compromise or violation presupposes that there is an entity being compromised or 
violated. ’ 75
As regards the ‘violations’ of Sinocentrism which took place in the East Asian 
international order, it is important to note that all these took place within the 
institutional framework of the order. For instance, in usurping China’s role at the 
‘Middle Kingdom’, the members of the East Asian international order would attempt to 
attract tributary missions to their own countries. This action does not depart from the 
order’s constitutional structures. By claiming to be the ‘centre’ of the social order, the 
challenger is merely taking over China’s role in ‘promoting cosmic and social 
harmony’ , 76 while the ‘moral purpose of the state’ remains the same. Similarly, the fact 
that the tribute system continues to be used in the process of legitimating the claims of 
the usurper’s superior social hierarchy is an indication that the ritualistic ‘systemic norm 
of procedural justice’ has been left intact.
Here we see that the interactions of the challengers continued to be framed in 
terms of the East Asian international order. This corresponds to a logic of action known 
as the ‘logic of appropriateness’, where political behaviour is seen ‘as a product of rules, 
roles, and identities that stipulate appropriate behaviour in given situations. ’ 77 The fact 
that hierarchic, ritualistic tributary diplomacy was seen as the ‘appropriate’ form in
73 Krasner, ‘Organised hypocrisy in nineteenth-century East Asia’, p. 176
74 Krasner, Sovereignty, p. 229
75 Daniel Philpott, ‘Usurping the Sovereignty of Sovereignty?’, World Politics (vol. 53, no. 2, January 
2001, pp. 297-324), p. 310.
76 This term is borrowed from Zhang, ‘System, empire and state in Chinese international relations’, p. 
56.
7' Krasner, Sovereignty, p. 5
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which to contest Chinese supremacy indicates that the challengers’ identities as member 
states of the East Asian international order remained the same. This is qualitatively 
different from later actions by Japan in the late-nineteenth century, where it actively 
renounced the constitutional structures of the East Asian international order and adopted 
those of European International Society. Challenges to Sinocentrisim prior to the 
expansion of the Society, then, were challenges in the East Asian order, not of it.
Sino-Japanese relations under the East Asian international order
The findings above suggest that the fundamental international identities and interests of 
the members of the East Asian international order underwent little fundamental changes 
between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries, confirming Zhang’s point that ‘the 
endurance of a particular world order can...be attributed to the persistence of a 
dominant idea about the moral purpose of the state.’78 Moving from the general to the 
specific, we can surmise that Qing China’s fundamental identities and interests in the 
East Asian international order -  an identity as the centre of civilisation and an interest in 
the maintenance of this hierarchy -  did not change radically. Japan poses a somewhat 
complicated picture, as its foreign relations during the Tokugawa (MUN) period (1603- 
1867) are often seen as being minimal, no doubt because of the well-entrenched view 
that its seclusionist policy (known as sakoku iMS) precluded any meaningful diplomatic 
relations between Japan and foreign polities (bar China and the Netherlands), and was 
only changed when the expansion of European International Society forced open Japan’s 
doors (kaikoku füiS). This view, however, has come under sustained criticism from 
historians who have focused on Japanese diplomacy within the East Asian international 
order. In an important essay discussing Japan’s ‘seclusionist’ policy, Tashiro Kazui 
argues:
The attention of most people considering Japan’s foreign relations during the Edo 
period is focused on Dejima and the Dutch and Chinese merchant ships that came 
to Nagasaki for trade...The truth is that during the Edo period Holland and China 
were not the only nations with whom Japan had relations, and Nagasaki was not 
the only window opening out on the world.79
In fact, Japan’s so-called policy of ‘seclusion’ should be seen in the context of 
Japan’s continued participation in the East Asian international order. Tanaka Takeo 
notes the remarkable similarity of Japan’s sakoku policy with the ‘seclusionist’ policies
78 Zhang, ‘System, empire and state in Chinese international relations’, p. 56
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(known as haijin MM in Chinese) undertaken by the Ming and Korea. The policy, 
consisted of the state banning its peoples from private overseas travel and trade. It was 
first implemented by the Ming to prevent ‘Japanese’ piracy (known as wakö or wokou 
filit!) and monopolise trade. 80 The policy eventually evolved to support the hierarchies 
of the East Asian international order and was adopted by China’s neighbours. By 
forcing foreign merchants to participate in ‘official’ trade and its rituals, the member 
states often demonstrated their ‘superior’, ‘Middle Kingdom’ status. ‘Therefore,’ Arano 
Masanori argues, ‘the “haijin ’ policy was not necessarily a policy that “closed a state’s 
borders” but a policy to recognise a given state’s desired way to conduct diplomatic 
intercourse. ’ 81
This seems to suggest that the policy of ‘seclusion’ had an important role in 
legitimating Japan’s (and indeed other states’) position(s) within the East Asian 
international order. A state’s ability to implement these policies was of course
contingent on its geopolitical environment. States that lacked a powerful central 
government or were heavily reliant on entrepot trade were less likely to strictly 
implement some of the policies of seclusion, such as the restrictions on trade. However, 
for those who could afford to do so, the policy had considerable utility. The intellectual 
influences of Confucianism -  which were shared to varying degrees across China, Korea, 
and Japan -  dictated that the ‘unification [of a country] was one of the classical criteria 
of governmental legitimacy in the region’ . 82 The ability of a government to monopolise 
its diplomatic relations highlighted its strength, and recognition of this feat by foreign 
countries had the effect of demonstrating a state’s legitimate membership of the East 
Asian international order. 83
The alternative ‘Japan-centric ’ tribute system
The discussion above shows that despite the strict controls imposed on interstate 
relations, Japan remained an active member of the East Asian international order until
79 Tashiro Kazui, ‘Foreign Relations during the Edo Period: Sakoku Reexamined’ (Susan Downing 
Videen, trans), Journal o f Japanese Studies (vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 1982, pp. 283-306), p. 284
80 Tanaka Takeo, Chüsei taigai kankeishi. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1975), pp. 85-86. Note 
also that Japanese only constituted about 10-20 percent of the ‘Japanese’ pirates. See also Ronald P. 
Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development o f the Tokugawa 
Bakufu. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 96.
81 Arano Yasunori, Kinsei Nippon to higashi ajia. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai,, 1988), p. iv
82 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, p. 56. C.f. Fung, A Short History o f Chinese 
Philosophy, p. 180, where Fung quotes Mencius’ dialogue with the King of Liang, who asks: ‘ “How 
may the world be at peace?” To which Mencius replied: “When there is unity, there will be peace.”
83 Arano Yasunori, Kinsei Nippon to higashi ajia, pp. 30-31
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the expansion of European International Society. 84 This suggests that Japan’s identity in 
the international realm continued to be very much tied to the Confucian social standards 
of the order, although again this is not to suggest that they remained static. Japan 
considered itself a ‘virtuous’ member state of the East Asian international order. Under 
the Tokugawa, it had unified the country, which would assist the prospering of its 
populace. Furthermore, a clear lineage of rulers had been established. This fulfilled the 
Confucian criteria of legitimate domestic statehood, 85 and on these grounds it was 
considered that Japan had and deserved a high position on the hierarchical ladder of the 
order. What remained now was the need to enhance and maintain Japan’s social identity 
and status within the East Asian international hierarchy.
However, pursuit of these particular interests presented the Japanese with a 
dilemma. In theory, a non-Chinese state had to seek China’s investiture for legitimate 
statehood in the East Asian international order. As the regional hegemon, China’s 
claims to moral supremacy were not easily challenged. However, seeking Chinese 
approval for Tokugawa rule was a risky tactic. In the context of the early Tokugawa 
period, it would ‘require that...the representative of Japan...compromise the very 
independent legitimacy and sovereignty that he was seeking to establish, by petitioning 
the Ming emperor in a formal document.. .in which he called himself a “subject” of 
Ming, dated in the Ming calendar. ’ 86 Japan had never completely accepted inferior 
status to China, largely due to Japan’s ‘self-perception, in large measure bound up with 
the mythology of imperial divinity,’ which ‘made the acknowledgement of any 
supervening authority extremely difficult. ’ 87 Any admission of Chinese supremacy was 
sure to hurt Japanese pride and have potentially negative consequences for the 
Tokugawa shogunate’s attempts to legitimate their rule, as the precedent of Ashikaga 
Yoshimitsu had shown.
84 Tanaka Takeo supports this assertion by arguing that the sakoku policy should be seen as ‘nothing 
more than a Japanese expression of the Sinocentric East Asian international order’. See Tanaka 
Takeo, Chüsei taigai kankeishi, p. 272
85 The last criterion is, along with the unification of a country, based on Chinese Confucian philosopher 
Ouyang Xiu’s treatise on legitimacy. See Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, pp. 56, 
60. Ouyang Xiu (1007-1072) was a poet and statesman of the Song dynasty. He was put in charge of 
the civil examinations, and worked in the fields of social, financial and military policy.
86 ibid., p. 58
87 ibid., p. 172. For an illustrative example of this, see the exchanges between the Japanese officials and 
the Ming Hongwu emperor in Wang Yi-T’ung, Official Relations between China and Japan 1368- 
1594 (Harvard-Yenching Institute Studies IX). (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1953), p. 18. Tsukamoto Manabu also discusses how some Japanese intellectual claimed superior 
status to China due to its mythical unbroken imperial lineage and the reverence it commanded from 
the people. See Tsukamoto Manabu, ‘Edo jidai ni okeru “i” kannen ni tsuite’, Nihon rekishi (no. 
371, April 1979, pp. 1-18), p. 3
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The solution to this was found by developing two policies. First, the Japanese did 
not seek investiture from China. While some diplomatic overtures were made to the 
Ming, as the shogunate in Edo (fFF present day Tokyo) strengthened their control over 
Japan, interest in seeking Chinese investiture diminished.88 Japanese attitudes towards 
China around this time can best be described as ambivalent. Studies of Japanese 
Confucianists of the Tokugawa period show that while many of them produced works 
legitimating Japanese claims to civilisational superiority vis-ä-vis China, they harboured 
feelings of admiration towards Chinese civilisation and had difficulties in shaking these 
sentiments off completely.89 However, these inner tensions were to a certain extent 
relieved by the rise of the Manchurian Qing dynasty as the new ruling dynasty of China. 
The rise of the Manchus, who were conventionally seen as ‘barbarians’, came as a 
considerable shock to many of the Japanese elite. While feelings towards China 
remained riddled with contradictions, to a certain extent the emergence of the ‘alien’ 
Manchu Qing dynasty made the Japanese even more reluctant to seek Chinese 
investiture.90
Second, following from above, the Japanese now established their own alternative 
tribute system, which was ‘an alternative order of Japanese fantasy, a looking glass 
which might reflect the reemergent centrality of a newly reunified Japan.’9’ To this end, 
any references which may have implied Chinese superiority were eliminated in Japanese 
diplomatic intercourse. The Tokugawa rulers did not use the title ‘king’ (ö I ) ,  which 
implied inferior status to the Chinese emperor, and neither did they use the Chinese 
calendar in their correspondence. Although it is tempting to suggest that this constituted 
a fundamental challenge to the East Asian international order and indicates a shift in 
Japan’s identity and interest, this was not the case. To be sure, Japan’s actions did 
contest the Sinocentric international order, but in fact, Japan continued to conduct its 
diplomatic relations within the East Asian international order, just as it had before. The 
difference now was that Japan assumed the position of the virtuous state, the ka (#0, or
88 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, pp. 60-61
89 For an excellent study of the contradictory positions of the Tokugawa Confucians, see Kate Wildman 
Nakai, ‘The Naturalization of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan: The Problem of Sinocentrism’, 
Harvard Journal o f Asiatic Studies (vol. 40, no. 1, June 1980, pp. 157-199)
90 Tsukamoto Manabu, ‘Tsunayoshi seiken no rekishiteki ichi o megutte’, Nihonshi kenkyü (no. 236, 
April 1982, pp. 38-56), pp. 46-47. The collapse of the Ming also gave rise to debates among the 
Tokugawa political decision-makers over whether or not to sent troops to China to assist the Ming, 
although in the end caution won the day. The discussions within the Tokugawa leadership 
surrounding the collapse of the Ming and the rise of the Qing are given detailed analysis in Ronald P. 
Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development o f the Tokugawa 
Bakufu. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 110-167, 222-225
91 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, p. 173
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‘Middle Kingdom’. The assumption of this status entailed labelling other polities as 
‘barbarians’ (i M ), and its neighbours (including China) readily filled this position.92 By 
‘excluding those countries which would not abide by the rules of [the Japan-centric] 
diplomatic order,’ Ronald P. Toby argues,
the Tokugawa bakufu proficed a climate which could nurture conceits of Japanese 
centrality, the atmosphere in which an intellectual photosynthesis could transform 
the elements of indigenous ideas of national divinity and the difficult Confucian 
dichotomy of ka and i into an order in which Japan was ka and others, even the 
historical (if not the normative) China, were Z.93
Tributary missions from Korea and the Ryükyü Kingdom continued to be an 
important means by which to enhance Japanese legitimacy, and this is indicative of the 
fact that the ‘constitutional structure of procedural justice’ in the Japan-centric tribute 
system remained one of ‘ritual justice’ informed by the norms of the Sinocentric tribute 
system.94 hi similar fashion to the Chinese reception of tributary missions, recognition 
by fellow member states would serve to show that the Tokugawa’s virtuous rule and 
prestige had emanated far and wide, bolstering the regime’s domestic and international 
legitimacy.95 Indeed, a Tokugawa shogunate official in charge of hosting a Korean 
emissary in 1624 stated:
.. .the shogun is even now not yet supreme, and so the hearts of the people are even 
today not yet submissive. Therefore we awaited the arrival of your embassy most 
eagerly. We thought we would subjugate the land by a boastful display, 
conducting an embassy well suited to the situation. The shogun is deeply pleased.
Had the embassy failed to arrive, the Japanese people might have doubted that we 
were totally at peace.96
The Japanese conducted diplomatic and trading relations with Korea primarily 
through the indirect channels provided by the Tsushima fiefdom. Trade was mainly 
conducted through the fiefdom, headed by the Sö family, which acted as an intermediary 
and maintained a trading house in Korea (the waegwan/wakan füllt). Both states (at 
least theoretically) interacted as equals. There were usually no direct diplomatic 
relations between the Tokugawa shogunate and the Yi dynasty. Direct communications 
took place between the shogunate and Korea in the event of visits by the Korean
92 For similar cases which took place in the context of Europe, see Neumann and Welsh, ‘The Other in 
European self-definition’; Iver B. Neumann, ‘Self and Other in International Relations’, European 
Journal o f International Relations (vol. 2, no. 2, 1996, pp. 139-174); and Iver B. Neumann, Uses of 
the Other: ‘The East' in European Identity Formation. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1999)
93 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, p. 227
94 ibid., p. 170 confirms this assertion.
95 Tanaka Takeo, Chüsei taigai kankeishi, p. 264
96 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, p. 70
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emissaries (tsüshinshi or t ’ongsinsa Ü .  I f f  ) sent on the event of a new shogun 
ascending to power. While these foreign missions were presented as though they had 
been spontaneous sent by their rulers, the Tokugawa had in fact requested their visit to 
Japan. 97 The Japanese authorities hosted the Korean embassy (which was customary 
practice within the tribute system) during their stay. 98 They were also actively 
encouraged to visit shrines dedicated to the Tokugawa, an act that was perceived by the 
Japanese to be evidence of the splendour of Tokugawa rule.99
Sino-Japanese relations under multiple tribute systems
Despite these challenges posed by the Japanese, Japan's actions did not in themselves 
constitute a fundamental challenge to the East Asian international order, and neither was 
China’s hegemonic position within it overturned by them. For most of the time, 
relations among the member states of the East Asian international order were managed 
flexibly.
How did China and Japan interact with each other under their respective tribute 
systems? While Tokugawa Japan did not seek direct diplomatic relations with both the 
Ming and Qing, there is evidence of the first shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu showing interest 
in trade with China; and in reality the Japanese could not entirely ignore their powerful 
neighbour either. 100 The eventual solution was to continue trading without 
compromising Japan’s perceived position as the ‘Middle Kingdom’ of its own tribute 
system. Chinese traders were permitted to come to Nagasaki (Jlrllilf) to trade, and 
indirect trade was continued through Korea and the Ryükyü Kingdom. Sino-Japanese 
relations from the seventeenth century were strictly commercial, however, and no 
embassies were sent by either country. Regardless of this, the Japanese did on some 
occasions make some attempts to impress their ‘virtue’ upon the Chinese. China’s 
hierarchical position within Japan’s alternative tribute system was downgraded 
considerably. Correspondence with China was dealt with by Tokugawa authorities of 
relatively low rank, befitting the former’s inferior status.
97 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, p. 174-177
98 A detailed examination of the Korean envoys visits to Japan can be found in George M. McCune, 
‘The Exchange of Envoys between Korea and Japan during the Tokugawa Period’, The Far Eastern 
Quarterly (vol. 5, no. 3, May 1946, pp. 308-325).
99 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, pp. 97-99
100 Tanaka Takeo, Chüsei taigai kankeishi, p. 265, Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, 
pp. 55-61
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By the eighteenth century, the Japanese took a further step forward in demoting 
the Chinese, no doubt spurred on by the understanding that ‘the rise of the Qing was 
understood by East Asian intellectuals as a change from a “civilised” Han Chinese state 
to a “barbarian” Manchu state’ . 101 The Chinese were now issued with shinpai a
form of passport that was to be used by officially sanctioned merchants. 102 While the 
issuing of the shinpai was also a means to prevent the drain of silver and copper out of 
Japan , 103 it also served to establish Japan’s ‘superior position’ in the international 
hierarchy. In his excellent study of Tokugawa Japan’s diplomacy, Toby explains this 
particular aspect of the shinpai system as follows:
The Chinese were barbarians: the credentials were dated in the Japanese calender; 
they called China ‘T’ang [Tang, or kara in Japanese],’ the vulgar Japanese name 
for that country, rather than ‘ta-Ch’mg [Da Qing],’ the formal name usually used 
in diplomatic discourse...If Chinese merchants accepted the use of the Japanese 
calendar, were they not also signalling Chinese acknowledgement of Japan’s 
central role in the world yielding the center to Japan? 104
China, on the whole, was indifferent to Japanese contestations of its supremacy 
within the East Asian international order. China of course never acknowledged Japan’s 
‘superiority’. In its responses to early Tokugawa overtures of relations, the Ming used 
language deemed inappropriate and offensive , 105 which was unacceptable to the Japanese. 
This rendered early efforts by the Tokugawa regime to establish direct relations with the 
Chinese fruitless, and no further attempts were made by either side. This status quo 
continued even after the Qing’s conquest of China. Although the Qing did attempt to 
entice Japan to send tributary missions via Korea, their overtures were thwarted by 
‘active sabotage’ by the Koreans, 106 and both sides subsequently continued their 
unofficial, indirect relations. The Chinese were similarly unmoved by Japan’s own 
attempts to usurp their claims to the apex of the social hierarchy of the East Asian 
international order. Chinese resentment towards the shinpai system was strong at the
101 Arano Yasunori, Kinsei Nippon to higashi ajia, p. 37
102 The shinpai were tickets with official seals affixed on them. These were then split in half between the 
merchant and the Nagasaki Office of Chinese Interpreters. Whenever a Chinese vessel entered the 
port, the Nagasaki authorities could then check to see if the merchants were those authorised by the 
Tokugawa authorities. The system had also been adopted by the Ming in its trading relations with 
Japan, primarily to protect Chinese shores from Japanese pirates. This form of trade is known in 
Japanese as kangö böeki (Wi'aWBi).
103 Despite the lack of official relations, China and Japan enjoyed thriving trading relations. Japanese 
silver and gold was in particular demand by the Chinese, and this drained out of the country either 
directly or via Korea. See Tashiro, ‘Foreign Relations during the Edo Period’, especially pp. 294- 
296.
104 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, p. 199
105 ibid., p. 62
106 Arano Yasunori, Kinsei Nippon to higashi ajia, p. 35
THE ANCIENT EAST ASIAN INTERNATIONAL ORDER 93
outset, even resulting in the merchants petitioning the Qing officials that Chinese were 
being compelled to enter subordinate relations with Japan. 107 The Chinese were, 
however, in much need of Japanese copper at this time, and did not wish to disrupt 
stable trading relations. The Kangxi emperor eventually decided not to chastise the 
Japanese. 108
Such Chinese postures towards Japan are, to risk stating the obvious, a product of 
multiple factors on the side of the Qing. 109 Its relatively benign policies towards its 
Japanese neighbour (particularly if we consider the latter’s blatant defiance towards the 
theoretical assumptions of Chinese supremacy) seem to fit John King Fairbank’s 
argument that China adopted relatively passive policies towards states which shared a 
similar political culture. However, there are also instances when China did use force 
against its closer neighbours who shared a similar culture, 110 and these historic realities 
do suggest an overly benign view of China on Fairbank’s part. Rather than cultural 
reasons, it seems that there were other reasons for China not taking action towards Japan, 
and we will have to satisfy ourselves with three possible reasons for China’s 
indifference to Japan, which will be forwarded here.
First, it is possible that the Qing were not particularly bent on changing a system 
that was serving its economic interests rather well. Second, it can be argued that the 
Qing was not primarily concerned with Japanese challenges to their security or prestige 
at this time. Even at the height of its powers under the Kangxi, Yongzheng and 
Qianlong emperors, its main preoccupation was subjugating the Jungar Mongols. Third, 
even though Japan’s actions may have been an important change in Japanese eyes, this 
quite possibly did not constitute a significant challenge to China’s own sinocentrism. 
While defiance by member states was frequent within the East Asian international order,
107 The Chinese merchants who protested were primarily from Fujian, as they had not been issued with 
the shinpai, and were susbsequently excluded from trading with Japan. Their complaints, however, 
were framed in terms of indignation at being placed in an inferior social standing vis-ä-vis Japan. 
Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, pp. 199-201.
108 Arano Yasunori, Kinsei Nippon to higashi ajia, p. 38. Arano also states that in the specific case of 
the shinpai, the Chinese could also utilise them to control private trade, thereby furthering the 
implementation of their own policy of restricting private trade.
109 Onuma Yasuaki notes four possible factors that China would have considered. First, ‘the gravity, 
manner and...intent’ of insubordination; second, ‘the comparison in terms of military strength 
between China and the party in question’; third, ‘the distance between China and the party (whether 
the party is so distant that the failure [to respect Chinese supremacy] does not seriously matter in 
Chinese domestic politics’, fourth, ‘the domestic situation (whether it is financially and/or militarily 
possible for the Chinese dynasty to dispatch military forces to sanction the “disobedient” party).’ See 
Onuma, ‘When was the Law of International Society Bom?’, p. 16
110 According to the exhaustive study of the Zhongguo junshi shi editorial group, there are twelve 
instances of military conflicts between the Qing and states within the ‘Sinic zone’, Korea, Vietnam, 
Ryükyü, and Japan. See Zhongguo junshi shi bianxiezu (eds), Zhongguo junshi shi (fujuan): lidai 
zhanzheng nianbiao (vol. 2). (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1986)
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quite often ‘nothing they did caused the Chinese any doubt that the universe accepted 
their position of centrality and paramountcy’, 111 and they could safely ignore such 
challenges ‘by characterizing the objecting party as an ignorant savage whom the 
civilized people such as the Chinese would find it a waste of time to bother with’.112 It is 
perhaps this highly Sinocentric notion of supremacy that allowed ambiguities to 
continue without destabilising the East Asian international order. All that was needed 
was to maintain this supposed ‘supremacy’ of China, and to this end, ‘organised 
hypocrisy’ worked extremely well. While Japan was quite open in its rejection of 
Sinocentrism, all other states within the East Asian international order -  Korea and the 
Ryükyü Kingdom -  at the very' least nominally accepted China’s claims to supremacy. 
This was enough to satisfy the Chinese, and consequently they did not see much need to 
take action towards Japan.
China, Japan, and their Tributaries: Korea
While China and Japan’s lack of official bilateral relations meant that their competing 
claims to normative primacy within the East Asian international order did not come into 
direct conflict, it is important to keep in mind that there was still room for indirect 
friction to occur within the wider realm of the region. In order to legitimate their self- 
proclaimed positions at the apex of the social hierarchy, China and Japan needed to 
solicit tributary relations with their neighbours and showcase their ‘virtue’ towards their 
peers. Geographical proximity meant that the ‘target’ states for both Chinese and 
Japanese would overlap, and this also gave rise to interesting ambiguities -  and 
sometimes conflicts.
Korea was an important state for both the Chinese and Japanese, owing both to its 
strategic location, geographical proximity, and long-standing ties with both states. But 
Korea was in no way completely subservient to its neighbours. In similar fashion to 
Japan, the rise of the ‘barbarian’ Manchu Qing dynasty was a shock to the Koreans, and 
for a while they remained loyal to the Ming, refusing to recognise the Qing as their 
superior and preferring to characterise their relations in terms of a relationship of elder 
and younger brothers. Their recalcitrance eventually brought about an invasion by the 
Qing in 1627 and 1635, and the Koreans entered full tributary relations based on 
paternal relations. The Koreans, however, maintained an independent stance. They
m
112
Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, p. 202
Onuma Yasuaki, ‘When was the Law of International Society Bom?’, p. 16
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were not ‘fully devoted to the Ch’ing [Qing] dynasty, whereas [they] had highly 
respected the Ming, not only because the Ming had given help during the Japanese 
invasions of the late sixteenth century but also because Confucian culture had flourished 
in Ming China. ’ 113 They continued to wear Ming-styled clothing, and refused to use the 
Qing calendar in their correspondence with the Japanese, covertly demonstrating their 
refusal to recognise the ‘barbarian’ Manchu dynasty as their superior. 114
Contestation over social hierarchy was also evident in Japanese-Korean relations. 
While the relationship was theoretically conducted on an equal basis, both sides utilised 
the bilateral relationship to place themselves in a higher position. The Japanese 
frequently described the Korean embassies as ‘tributary' missions’, implying their 
superiority. The Koreans engaged in similar behaviour. Their historical experience ‘of 
transmitter of Chinese culture to Japan’ caused them ‘to regard themselves as culturally 
superior to the Japanese.’ 115 They did not use the Japanese calendar in their 
correspondence with Japan, preferring to use cyclical names for the particular year. 116 
Moreover, the Koreans also maintained their own ‘tributary’ in the form of the 
Tsushima fiefdom. In return for their rights for direct trading and diplomacy with 
Korea, the Sö rulers were issued with ‘official titles or seals from the Korean court’ 
which ‘put themselves in a semi-tributary relationship’ with the Koreans. 117 When 
visiting Korea, Tsushima officials would also present gifts that were termed ‘offerings 
(chinsang iÜ_h) ’ , 118 implying their inferior relationship. In return, the Sö fiefdom 
received gifts and rice from the Korean king as a royal favour. According to the logic of 
the East Asian international order, this again indicated the existence of a form of 
tributary relationship between Tsushima and Korea, the former in a subordinate status of 
a ‘outer servant (,gaishin £ [ £ ) ’ . 119
China, Japan, and their Tributaries: the Ryükyü Kingdom
While the Koreans maintained their tributary relations with China and refused to 
acknowledge deferential relations vis-ä-vis Japan, the Ryükyü Kingdom showed a
113 Hae-jong Chun, ‘Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Period’ in John King Fairbank (ed), 
The Chinese World Order: Traditional China ’s Foreign Relations. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 111
114 See Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, p. 95
115 Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order, p. 21
116 This calendar was based on a sixty-year cycle.
117 Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order, p. 18
118 McCune, ‘The Exchange of Envoys between Korea and Japan during the Tokugawa Period’, p. 321
119 Fujimura Michio, Nisshin sensö zengo no ajia seisaku. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995), p. 20
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different pattern of interaction.120 The historical records indicate that both the Japanese 
and Chinese interacted with the inhabitants of the Ryükyü Islands (also known as the 
Nansei shotö in Japanese) as early as the seventh century. Although the island
was still divided between three rival camps, the first tributary mission was sent to the 
Ming in 1373, and received investiture as the Chüzan ’ö king (4 * lU 3E). After the island 
was unified under Shö ( fnj) lineage, tributary missions with China continued until 
1864.121
However, the kingdom did not merely remain a tributary of the Chinese empire. It 
maintained tributary relations with its other neighbour Japan. The Satsuma lord 
Shimazu Iehisa (Äu^ÜCA) invaded and established control over the island kingdom in 
1609, in part to chastise it for refusing to send a tributary mission of submission to the 
Tokugawa shogunate, but primarily to satisfy motives ‘to utilise the Ryükyü Kingdom’s 
special position [as a tributary state to both China and Japan] and reap the benefits of 
trade’.122 The Ryükyü Kingdom was placed under Satsuma domination. It had to seek 
the latter’s approval for the succession of new kings, and it was also compelled to 
provide taxes for the fiefdom.
This does not mean that the kingdom was under ‘imperial control’ under the 
Satsuma fiefdom. While the Ryükyü kings had to seek Satsuma’s permission for a new 
king to come to the throne, this was compatible with the norms of the tribute system and 
did not necessarily signify ‘imperial control’. Under the East Asian international order, 
all rulers of the ‘tributary states’ were expected to seek investiture from the ‘senior state’ 
(which typically meant China). From this perspective, the Satsuma prerogative vis-a-vis 
the Ryükyü Kingdom was ‘the same as those of the Chinese emperor, who also had the 
right o f investiture on the kings.’123 To be sure, the Satsuma fiefdom exerted greater 
control than China, which never interfered directly with Ryükyü domestic politics.124 
But Satsuma interest in the kingdom was not in outright ‘imperial’ domination.125 By
120 The discussions that follow draw heavily from Hanabusa Nagamichi, ‘Okinawa kizoku no enkaku’, 
Kokusaihö gaikö zasshi (no. 54, vol. 1-3, April 1955, pp. 3-40)
121 A brief, albeit useful survey of Ryükyü history prior to unification can be found in Takara Kurayoshi 
Ryükyü ökoku. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1993) and Harada Nobuo, Ryükyü to Chügoku: 
wasurerareta sakuhöshi. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa köbunkan, 2003)
122 Hanabusa Nagamichi, ‘Okinawa kizoku no enkaku’, p. 12. The invasion of the Ryükyü Kingdom was 
justified on the grounds that the Ashikaga Shogunate ‘rewarded’ the Ryükyü Islands to the lord of the 
Satsuma fiefdom.
123 Uemura Hideaki, ‘ “Hokkaido”, “Okinawa” no shokuminchika to sono kokusaihö no ronri’, PRIME 
(no. 12, March 2000, pp. 55-82), p. 72
124 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Organized hypocrisy in nineteenth-century East Asia’, p. 178
125 This point is supported by Uemura Hideaki, ‘ “Hokkaido”, “Okinawa” no shokuminchika to sono 
kokusaihö no ronri’, p. 71. Robert K. Sakai also notes that the Satsuma fiefdom ‘controlled
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continuing its tributary relations with the Chinese Empire and Japan,126 the Ryükyü 
Kingdom could legitimate its existence as a member of the East Asian international 
order, and was left with a channel to conduct its own independent foreign policy. 
Furthermore, by accepting a subordinate position vis-a-vis the Satsuma fiefdom and 
providing the latter with the means for trade, the kingdom did to a certain extend defend 
its political existence. In this sense, Uemura Hideaki argues, the Ryükyü Kingdom 
‘used trade-centred diplomatic policies to maintain its own nation-state and territory’.127
The Ryükyü Kingdom’s tributary relations with China and Japan equally served 
both states’ interests in enhancing their normative standing within the East Asian 
international order. For the Japanese side, the kingdom served both political and 
economic interests. Economic interests were particularly prominent for the Satsuma 
fiefdom. It used the island kingdom to trade with China, and continuously imposed 
heavy taxes on the island to enrich its own coffers. The Amami islands, traditionally 
closer to the Ryükyü Kingdom, came under direct Satsuma control and were subjected 
to brutal rule.
Political interests were prominent in the minds of both Satsuma and Tokugawa 
rulers. Although the Kingdom was under indirect Satsuma rule, the islands were seen as 
an important ‘tributary’ that could be utilised to enhance both the Satsuma fiefdom and 
the Tokugawa shogunate’s prestige within Japanese society and the East Asian 
international order. In the context of the rule of the third shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu 
(1623-1651), the Tokugawa authorities had tributary missions sent to Edo (present day 
Tokyo), where the Ryükyüans ‘served much the same function for Iemitsu as the 1617 
Korean mission had for [second shogun] Hidetada, helping to confirm the legitimacy of 
his sole possession of the shogunal office’, and ‘parade before the court and the daimyos 
[7r4a feudal lords]...thus producing “the illusion that the shogun’s grace extended 
beyond the seas.’”128 By 1634, Ryükyü visits were described by the Japanese as ‘bearing 
tribute (4 t j f  raikö), clearly signifying the former’s subordinate status.129 In their 
correspondence, the former used the Japanese calendar and addressed the shogun in
[Ryükyü]...primarily by surveillance. Rather few officials were sent to the islands. Their direct 
participation in internal administration was slight, their chief responsibilities being foreign trade and 
foreign relations.’ See Robert K. Sakai, The Ryukyu (Liu-Chiu) Islands as a Fief of Satsuma’, in 
John King Fairbank (ed), The Chinese World Order: Traditional China ’s Foreign Relations. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 119.
126 Apart from regular tributary missions to the Satsuma fiefdom, the Ryukyu kingdom also sent missions 
to the Tokugawa shogunate in Edo.
127 Uemura Hideaki, ‘ “Hokkaido”, “Okinawa” no shokuminchika to sono kokusaihö no ronri’p. 72
128 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, p.72
129 Hamashita Takeshi ‘Higashi ajia shi ni miru kai chitsujo’, p. 34
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respectable language. In accordance with the logic of differentiation between the ‘centre 
of civilisation’ and ‘barbarians’, the Ryükyüans’ ‘exotic’ cultural differences were 
emphasised in order to demonstrate that peoples of lands far away had felt the virtuous 
rule of Satsuma and Tokugawa.130 The embassies were required to dress in traditional 
Ryükyüan clothing, and a decree issued in 1709 further demanded that they ‘carry long 
swords, dress in brocade and bring with them “Chinese style” weaponry. Their 
equipment, above all, must be “of the sort used in a foreign court, so that they cannot be 
mistaken for Japanese”.’131
Sino-Ryükyü relations were primarily of a political nature. Although the Ryükyü 
Kingdom had been an important entrepot for trade between East and Southeast Asia in 
the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, its economic importance had declined. The 
Kingdom found it extremely costly to host the Chinese imperial emissaries; at times it 
could not afford to purchase the goods the latter brought for trade, resulting in squabbles 
between the two. Tributary relations were continued between the two primarily because 
of the political gains that could be derived. For the Ryükyü Kingdom, receiving 
Chinese investiture was an important means by which it could maintain an independent 
identity, and it had also
...attached a high spiritual value to the investiture, even though it had no 
immediate effect on the king’s political authority. During the long period of direct 
contact with China, Chinese influence had permeated Liu-ch’iu [Ryükyö]’s 
administration and Confucianism had become the state ideology. 132 .
The Satsuma fiefdom was similarly interested in maintaining Sino-Ryükyü 
tributary relations for trading purposes, but unwilling to risk a rupture in the two states’ 
ties by revealing its control of the island kingdom. To this end, they engaged in efforts 
to rid Ryükyü of any Japanese influences whenever the Chinese envoys arrived. The 
few Satsuma officials on the islands went into hiding during an emissary’s visit. Locals 
were forbidden to wear Japanese-styled clothing, and the elites were forbidden to talk to 
Chinese officials about the true nature of their relations with Satsuma.133
The Chinese were certainly not ignorant of Satsuma-Ryükyü relations. The had 
received Ryükyüan reports of the Satsuma invasion of 1609. Furthermore, the Chinese
130 The Ryükyü Kingdom’s tributary relations with Satsuma are examined in detail in Sakai, The Ryukyu 
(Liu-Chiu) Islands as a Fief of Satsuma’, p. 123
131 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ‘The Frontiers of Japanese Identity’, p. 52
132 Ta-Tuan Ch’en, ‘Investiture of Liu-ch’iu Kings in the Ch’ing Period’ in John King Fairbank (ed), The 
Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1968), p. 160
133 Sakai, The Ryukyu (Liu-Chiu) Islands as a Fief of Satsuma’, pp. 132-134
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envoys sent to the kingdom noted that the people conspicuously avoided talking about 
the Japanese. While ‘there is no indication that the Liu-ch’iu’s real subordination to 
Satsuma came to [the Chinese envoys’] knowledge...[t]hey realized the Liu-ch’iuans 
were hiding something. ’ 134 However, neither Japanese control of Ryükyü nor the latter’s 
deception seems to have caused a significant problem with the Chinese. As Ronald P. 
Toby argues, ‘[w]hat was critical for the maintenance of the Chinese self-image, the 
perception of Chinese centrality, was merely the appearance of acceptance by foreign 
states. ’ 135 The Ryükyü Kingdom’s loyalty was sufficient to demonstrate China’s 
hierarchical supremacy. Furthermore, even under Satsuma control, the Ryükyüans 
continued to send their students to China for study, serving to further Chinese 
perceptions of their superiority. 136 As long as this perception was held by the Chinese, 
there was little chance that the Qing would take decisive action, and even this was 
contingent on whether or not the Chinese had adequate material power at their disposal. 
Ta-Tuan Ch’en is correct when he writes that the Chinese
...rested content with the loyalty shown by the Liu-ch’iuan government, pleased 
with all the sinicized forms they witnessed in Shuri and Naha. The evidence of all 
the mission journals written in the Ch’ing era indicates that the Chinese envoys -  
and also the Ch’ing court -  remained indifferent toward Liu-ch’iu-Japanese 
relations.137
Conclusion
On the eve of the expansion of European International Society, the diplomatic 
interaction between China, Japan and its neighbours had settled into a pattem of 
‘competing tribute systems’. Both states’ behaviour was thoroughly informed by the 
fundamental norms of the East Asian international order: both states identified 
themselves as ‘Middle Kingdoms’ or the ‘Centres of Civilisation’, and their interests 
were framed in terms of seeking to enhance and maintain this social standing within the 
order by attracting ‘foreigners’ to submit tribute.
134 Ta-Tuan Ch’en, ‘Investiture of Liu-ch’iu Kings in the Ch’ing Period’, p. 163
135 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan, p. 202
136 Harada Nobuo states that the Ming Hongwu emperor was particularly pleased by the Ryükyü’s 
sending of students, no doubt as it vindicated Chinese claims to cultural advancement. Harada Nobuo 
Ryükyü to Chügoku: wasurerareta sakuhöshi, pp. 15-16. Ryükyü practice of sending students 
continued well into the Qing era, and the Qing continued to extend extremely generous support for 
the Ryükyüan students. For a detailed description of the Ryükyü students in China, see Mitsugu 
Matsuda, ‘The Ryukyuan Government Scholarship Students to China 1392-1868: Based on a Short 
Essay by Nakahara Zenchu, 1962’, Monumenta Nipponica (vol. 21, no. 3/4, 1966, pp. 273-304)
137 Ta-Tuan Ch’en, ‘Investiture of Liu-ch’iu Kings in the Ch’ing Period’, p. 163
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These identities were of course not monolithic, and were open to negotiation 
within each polity. China had to make some adjustments to their notions of superiority 
in order to incorporate competing claims and ideologies that challenged it. However, 
the Chinese do appear to have felt more secure in their self-appointed position at the 
apex of the East Asian international order than their challengers. Even if a few states 
within the East Asian international order like Japan challenged their claims to 
supremacy, this had not been particularly significant -  the real challenge to China had 
come from the nomads from the north. China was arguably one of the most powerful 
states in the region, and many of its neighbours were keen to maintain economic and 
political ties. The Chinese consequently had plenty of ‘barbarians’ who would present 
‘tribute’, and in any case the institutional ambiguities inherent in the East Asian 
international order served to preserve the image of a Sinocentric order.
For the Japanese, their claims to ‘Middle Kingdom’ status were arguably more 
tenuous: although they went to considerable lengths to demonstrate their entitlement to 
this status, they were under in the shadow of the regional hegemon, China. Many 
Japanese Confucian scholars, for instance, were proud of their own civilisation and 
actively took part in legitimating Japan’s claims to ‘superiority’; yet they found it hard 
to rid themselves of some sense of admiration for Chinese culture and learning. Japan’s 
own sense of its ‘Middle Kingdom’ status only began to solidify after the rise of the 
‘barbarian’ Qing dynasty, which served to tarnish Japanese perceptions of China as the 
centre of Confucian civilisation.
It is striking to note that both the East Asian international order and European 
International Society were characterised by their hierarchical structures in the context of 
the nineteenth century. European International Society has of course been characterised 
by its notion of sovereign equality. This is true, but only within the narrow confines of 
its ‘civilised’ core. There did in fact exist two hierarchies between the ‘civilised’ and 
‘uncivilised’, and this displays some similarities to the East Asian international order, 
where the ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ were differentiated in terms of their perceived 
attainment of Confucian ‘virtue’.
It is worth pondering to what extent the hierarchies within the East Asian 
international order hindered or facilitated China and Japan’s socialisation into European 
International Society. The East Asian international order and its tribute system had 
made both states highly sensitive to hierarchies within their international environment. 
Furthermore, as their interactions with European individuals increased, both states
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eventually became aware of the concept of differential treatment based on 
‘civilisational’ attainment within their international environment. Whether or not they 
would attempt to climb this newly discovered international social ladder depended on 
whether or not they would accept it as legitimate, and this process will be explored in 
the chapters that follow.
ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE: CHINESE AND JAPANESE 
PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
Introduction
This chapter seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the Chinese and Japanese 
interpretations of European International Society. The period under investigation is 
between the 1840s (when the Chinese experienced their first full encounter with the 
Society) to the 1890s. In the case of Japan, the period covers both the end of the Tokugawa 
era (also known as the bakumatsu period) and the Meiji era (which began in 1868). 
The empirical examinations here correspond to the stage of socialisation of acquiring 
‘knowledge’: it investigates Chinese and Japanese interpretations of the Society, its 
institutions and its social rules. These are often visible in the debates among their elites, 
and took place under different contexts. The empirical cases will reflect this. In the case of 
China, the discussions surrounding the Chinese elites’ adoption of certain institutions of the 
Society are most relevant to our investigation. This took place primarily after the military 
fiasco of the Arrow War (1856-1860), when the Xianfeng ( /b£ H.) emperor and his 
conservative entourage were forced to flee the capital and a group of moderates headed by 
Prince Gong took control of foreign affairs in the ensuing power vacuum. As a result of 
this development, a new office, the zongli ycimen (SSÜfSiH), was established in 1861 to 
specifically deal with the European powers. China began to use international law in its 
dealings with the European powers, and in 1877 Guo Songtao was sent to Britain as 
China’s first Minister overseas. For Japan, the focus is more on the Meiji period, when the 
elite were making a concerted effort to adapt to their new international environment. 
Discussions of European International Society are often found in the written works of 
leading intellectuals, as well as the official records such as the Iwakura Mission (which was 
despatched in 1871), the Japanese leaders’ fact-finding trip to Europe and the United States.
As argued previously, if an actor desires to seek membership into a social group, she 
needs to gain sufficient knowledge of the rules of her social environment for successful 
reproduction that will enable her acceptance by the members of the group. Perceptions -  
what actors ‘believe’ the rules to be -  will thus play a crucial role in shaping the process of 
socialisation. Investigations into initial perceptions of European International Society are, 
then, an integral part of obtaining a better understanding of China and Japan’s socialisation 
into the Society.
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While previous studies of China and Japan’s entry have concentrated primarily on the 
acceptance of European-style diplomacy and international law, this chapter aims to forward 
a more nuanced depiction of this process. In their conceptualisation of the expansion of 
European International Society, works by English School scholars have assumed that a 
Society that aimed for some form of order and coexistence expanded to East Asia. 1 It 
seems worthwhile, then, to compare Chinese and Japanese perceptions of the institutions of 
the Society with the ‘Grotian’ ideal types. The results serve to highlight that both China 
and Japan did not believe themselves to be engaging with a Society which aimed for 
‘coexistence’. They also challenge English School assumptions that these states were 
socialised into an International Society with a single mode of interaction.
China and Japan’s engagement with European International Society was by no means 
an uncritical acceptance of its institutions and moral purpose, but a complex process. Their 
perceptions of the Society were multifaceted, and sometimes contradictory: they reflected 
both the existence of imperialism and order, as well as the historical context of the late- 
nineteenth century, when tensions between European states were never far from the surface. 
Initially, however, both states’ encounter with the Society began with a full confrontation 
with its ‘civilising’ mode of interaction. Consequently, the institutions of the Society were 
initially seen in a coercive light, rather than promoting order or coexistence within 
international politics. One of the consequences of the expansion of the ‘civilising’ mode of 
interaction to East Asia was, however, to force both China and Japan into entering much 
more intense diplomatic relations with the European powers. As both states’ knowledge of 
the European world began to increase as a result, the mode of interaction that supposedly 
governed the ‘civilised’ members became known to them. The consequence was an 
ambivalent and dualistic interpretation of European International Society and its 
institutions.
1 This is not to imply that the English School scholars were unaware of different understandings of these 
institutions. Hedley Bull himself concedes, for instance, that great powers can abuse their power, and 
that the preservation of the common good -  such as the balance of power -  has often been achieved at the 
detriment of the weaker states. This of course leaves open the possibility for alternative interpretations of 
International Society and its institutions. Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 103-105, 200-201 and 220.
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The Expansion of European International Society: encountering the ‘civilising’ face
Witnessing the 'civilising’ mode o f interaction: early Chinese elites ’perceptions 
China’s incorporation into European International Society came in the wake of the Opium 
War of 1840-1842. The War had its origins in Qing confiscation and the destroying of 
British-imported opium. The British had become the leading importer of opium by the late- 
eighteenth century, and the abolition of the East India Company’s monopoly of the China 
trade resulted in increased imports. From the British point of view, this was indeed a very 
effective way of redressing the chronic trade deficit it had suffered in its trade with China.2 3
The Qing despatched an imperial commissioner, Lin Zexu to deal with the opium
problem. Lin took decisive action. In March 1839, he ordered foreign traders to hand over 
all of their opium and sign a bond assuring the Chinese that they would not engage in the 
smuggling of the drug. When he encountered resistance, Lin suspended trade and besieged 
the British traders’ quarters. With Chinese compradors and servants withdrawn, the British 
were without regular supplies of food and were eventually forced to surrender their opium, 
which was then burned by the Qing authorities.
Back in Britain, there was outrage at what was seen as arbitrary destruction of British 
goods and insults to British subjects, fuelled by lobbying from the business community 
with links to China, who were, ‘unanimous in asking...that vigorous measures shall be 
taken against the Chinese’.4 The British took military action against the Qing, and 
succeeded in overwhelming Chinese resistance. The following year, the British proceeded 
to occupy Hong Kong and besieged the City of Guangzhou also known as Canton). 
In 1842, Shanghai was occupied. The Chinese were no match for British naval prowess 
and firepower. Lin Zexu was made the scapegoat for the entire military fiasco and hastily 
dismissed from his post by the emperor.5 A conciliatory stance was shown to placate the
2 Immanuel C. Y. Hsii notes that ‘[ajfter 1826 the balance [of payments] began to slip the other way [to 
Britain]; between 1831 and 1833 nearly 10 million taels flowed out of China. The reversal gathered 
further momentum as time went on.’ Immanuel C. Y. Hsii, The Rise o f Modern China. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 168
3 Lin Zexu (1785-1850) was an official from Fujian province. He served in various posts including 
governor of Jiangsu and governor-general of Huguang, and was noted for his incorruptibility.
4 Secret despatch from Viscount Palmerston to Captain Elliot, R.N., Superintendent of Trade, 18th October, 
1839. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential
Print (series E, vol. 16: Anglo-Chinese War and Its Aftermath, 1839-1849). (Frederick, Maryland: 
University Publications of America, 1994), p. 1
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‘English barbarians’, and after some negotiations, the Treaty of Nanjing was signed on 29th 
August 1842.
The Treaty marked the beginning of China’s incorporation, into European 
International Society. Yongjin Zhang has noted that the ‘process through which China was 
forcibly drawn into the world-wide European-dominated international system is that of the 
demise of Sinocentrism.’3 *6 In 1842, this took place in two senses. Firstly, the treaty 
stipulated equality in official correspondence, thus breaking down the traditional 
sinocentric notion of the assumed superiority of China. The Chinese were forced to 
acknowledge sovereign equality, at least at a superficial level. Secondly, the Treaty forced 
the Chinese to accept British consuls in Guangzhou, Xiamen (MH), Fuzhou (fljil), Ningbo 
and Shanghai (±#f), if not at the capital Beijing (jbjjC).
Another feature of the Society’s expansion was the notion of extraterritoriality, 
whereby British nationals were to be tried by their own consuls rather than according to 
Chinese law. This was a hallmark of an ‘uncivilised’ identity, and signified that China not 
yet fulfilled the ‘standard of civilisation’,7 and symbolically placed China in an inferior 
position vis-ä-vis Britain. The Chinese were not aware of the significance of this. Their 
‘inferiority’ was based on the social standards of European International Society, which (at 
this stage) did not command much legitimacy, and meant little to them. However, in the 
future, if China was to share the sovereign prerogatives which European states enjoyed, it 
would have to fulfil the ‘standards of civilisation’, and further its socialisation into the 
norms and mles of the Society.
Preliminary Chinese reactions to this latest encounter with the Society came in the 
form of a number of works aimed at understanding the West. Studies such as Lin Zexu’s 
translation of Murray’s Cyclopaedia o f Geography, the Sizhou zhi (OT'lhil* A Gazetteer of 
Four Continents), Wei Yuan (f^M )’s Haigno tuzhi Illustrated Treatise on the
3 Arthur Waley notes that the emperor ‘was quite wrong in thinking that China’s defeat was due to the 
inexperience of her military leaders. Superiority of fire-power and command of the sea and of the major
waterways were what made the English invincible.’ Arthur Waley, The Opium War Through Chinese
Eyes. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 185
6 Yongjin Zhang, China in the International System 1918-20. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 16
7 Charles Elliot, the British Chief Superintendent of Trade in Canton (present day Guangzhou), had earlier 
already made clear to Viscount Palmerston that ‘[i]f...written assent to the laws of a foreign country 
involving conditions utterly incompatible with the fundamental principles of the law of England, are 
suddenly proposed to British subjects, there can be no voluntary lawful intercourse with that country till 
the difficulty shall have been removed, or met by special enactment.’ Despatch from Captain Charles 
Elliot, R. N. to Viscount Palmerston, 17th January, 1840. British Documents on Foreign Affairs (series E, 
vol. 16: Anglo-Chinese War and Its Aftermath, 1839-1849), p. 32
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Maritime States) and Xu Jiyu s Yinghuan zhilüe A Brief Survey of the
Maritime Circuit), were published in quick succession . 8 These works, particularly the 
Haiguo tuzhi, 9 give significant clues to early Chinese perceptions of European International 
Society for several reasons. Firstly, as Jane Kate Leonard notes, they constituted the first 
serious works by the Chinese ‘to make a realistic geopolitical assessment of the worldwide 
dimensions of Western expansion and of its implications for Asian trade and politics’ . 10 
Second, these works’ influence on Chinese political decision-makers’ perceptions of the 
European international order was considerable. According to Earl Swisher, the Haiguo 
tuzhi, for instance, ‘was made required reading for all Chinese officials dealing with foreign 
affairs and was a standard work on the subject for two decades’ * 11 and influenced later 
Chinese reformers such as Kang Youwei (JÜWM ) . 12
The starting point for both the Haiguo tuzhi and the Yinghuan zhilüe is the shock at 
witnessing the clear weakness of China in face of the challenge from the West. 
Accordingly, these accounts of the West are coloured by fear. The Yinghuan zhilüe painted 
a picture where European states, particularly Britain, were described in a somewhat 
predatory fashion. In describing the annexation of India by Britain, Xu Jiyu wrote:
In 1755 Bengal was annexed, and taking advantage o f their victories the English 
stealthily encroached on the various states like silkworms eating mulberry leaves. The 
various parts, scattered and weak, could not resist, and consequently more than half 
became British colonies.13
The Dutch and the Spanish, he continues, feared British power. Similarly, in the Haiguo 
tuzhi, the fate of those who had been colonised by the European powers was depicted as a 
miserable one . 14
8 1841, 1843 and 1848, respectively.
9 The Sizhou zhi written by Lin Zexu was handed over to Wei Yuan by the former during his trip to exile 
following his dismissal, along with other pieces of information concerning the West. The Haiguo tuzhi is 
based heavily on these materials. It therefore seems safe to assume that there are overlaps between the 
Sizhou zhi and Haiguo tuzhi and to restrict analysis here to the Haiguo tuzhi.
10 Jane Kate Leonard, Wei Yuan and China’s Rediscovery o f the Maritime World. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984), p. 2
11 Earl Swisher, ‘Chinese Intellectuals and the Western Impact, 1838-1900’, Comparative Studies in Society 
and History (vol. 1, no. 1, October 1958, pp. 26-37), p. 29
12 See Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Shisö kadai to shite no ajia. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001), p. 211
13 Cited from Ssu-yii Teng and John K. Fairbank, China’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 
1839-1923. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 43
14 Wei Yuan, Haiguo tuzhi (abridged edition). (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1999), p. 167. Any 
translations in this study are, unless stated, my own.
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Wei paid attention to the increasing expansion of European states, and attributed this 
to the increasing needs of commerce. For Wei, the pressures for trade were responsible for 
the bellicose behaviour by the Europeans, particularly the British; this possibly suggests his 
moral disapproval of European behaviour, particularly if we consider that Confucian 
philosophy tended to see commerce and merchants as ‘corrupt’, ‘treacherous and therefore 
selfish’ . 15 Furthermore, such states were described as destabilising the peace within Europe 
for the sake of their own narrow interests. By utilising ‘an inaccurate blend of accounts of 
the Roman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire,’ Jane Kate Leonard states, ‘Wei deduced 
that all Europe had once been unified under a vast empire centered in Rome in the country 
currently known to him as Italy. ’ 16 On this basis, Wei drew parallels to the Roman and 
Chinese Empires by claiming that the pope was responsible for ‘“act[ing] on Heaven’s 
behalf to nurture the people’” ft^E L fh ) . 17 He argued that commercial
greed motivated England and France to disregard their religious duties and take over the 
power of the papacy and the Roman Empire, eventually causing the empire to fragment. 
Since a unified state was the Confucian ideal, British and French actions further implied 
immoral behaviour had plunged the populace into disorder and misery. The problem as 
defined by Wei was that the British in particular had ‘neglected their duties of keeping to 
the teachings of Christianity and concentrated on trade. What is more, in order to support 
their trade, they [Britain] used their soldiers; commerce and military helped each other, and 
they finally overpowered the [other] island barbarians MfW> JTfeJf WLILf
The net result of such views of the West was a portrayal of 
the European international order as an immoral, competitive one. Leonard argues that Wei 
believed this lack of morality stemmed from the need to trade. This had led ‘to...the 
emergence of the competitive, nation-state system. Both these characteristics had promoted 
patterns of national self-aggrandizement which were out of harmony with Chinese political 
values. ’ 19
15 Fung, A Short History o f Chinese Philosophy, p. 18. In reality, however, Chinese officials were often not 
above engaging in private trade themselves.
16 Leonard, Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery o f the Maritime World, p. 155
17 See Wei Yuan, Haiguo tuzhi (abridged edition), p. 267, ‘Ouluobazhou geguo zongxu (Preface to 
Europe)’. The translation is rendered from Leonard, Wei Yuan and China 's Rediscovery o f the Maritime 
World, p. 155
18 Wei Yuan, Haiguo tuzhi (abridged edition), p. 267
19 Leonard, Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery o f the Maritime World, p. 155
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We must be careful not to overstate the influence of these early works, however. 
Despite these developments, most of the Chinese elite remained unaware of the Chinese 
Empire’s position in the international arena and did not notice the full impact of the 
expansion of the Society into China.20 Defeat by Britain was just another in the long line of 
defeats at the hands of ‘barbarians’, and the concessions the Chinese were forced to grant 
the British ‘were adequately explained by the traditional and reassuring formula' of 
claiming that the emperor had bestowed an ‘imperial favour’ on the troublesome Western 
barbarians.21 The Treaty of Nanjing was viewed by the Daoguang (ÜLTfc) emperor ‘as a 
device that would “permanently prevent further troubles from happening’” .22 It would take 
a few more ‘shocks’ to spawn a reorientation in Chinese perceptions of their international 
order.
Later Chinese elites’ perceptions
If the first Opium War did not shake the foundations of the world view of the Chinese elite, 
the Second Opium War (also known as the Arrow War) served to finally force this. The 
war itself was ‘fought over a petty and dubious incident in which the British consul 
demanded an apology from the Guangdong governor general’ for boarding a British- 
registered ship.23 However, the consequences were catastrophic for the Chinese. British 
and French troops not only proceeded to occupy Guangzhou, but also captured Tianjin 
V#), an important coastal city not far from the capital Beijing (jbf^)- The Chinese 
aggravated matters by attacking the British delegates sailing to Beijing to ratify the Treaty 
of Tianjin that had been concluded in 1858. British and French troops sacked the Summer 
Palace in retaliation, and the Xianfeng emperor fled.
The Second Opium war and its aftermath are significant events in China’s 
incorporation into European International Society in that they compelled a larger number of 
the Chinese elite to recognise and accept the fact that China was now part of a new
20 It is interesting to note that the reformist intellectual Wang Tao also commented in his meeting with 
Japanese in 1879 that Wei Yuan’s Haiguo tuzhi was not taken seriously during Wei’s lifetime. See 
Yamamuro Shin’ichi,, p. 217.
21 Earl Swisher, ‘Chinese Intellectuals and the Western Impact, 1838-1900’, p. 26
22 See Yen-p’ing Hao and Erh-min Wang, ‘Changing Chinese views of Western relations, 1840-95’ in 
Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank (eds), The Cambridge History o f China (vol. 11: Late Ch’ing, 
1800-1911, part 2). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 154
23 Henrietta Harrison, China: Inventing the Nation. (London: Arnold, 2001), p. 63
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international system which they could not afford to ignore.24' This acceptance was by no 
means an easy one, however. Many members of the court were forced only by the sheer 
power asymmetries between the Chinese and the European powers to accept that China had 
to enter relations with the latter on terms dictated by European International Society. 
Although they acquiesced to adopting some institutions of the Society, they remained 
deeply opposed to these changes, and their presence continued to constitute a significant 
force. Even those who were considered relatively conciliatory towards the Western powers 
often were so from a sense of lack of viable options.25
The fact that China was coerced into the Society meant that the Chinese elites’ views 
of the European international order were often coloured by fear. This is of course not to 
say that the perceptions of the Chinese elite remained static. As their interaction with the 
Western powers and their diplomats and nationals increased, some officials did argue that 
the Western powers were not necessarily aiming to conquer China, and were primarily 
interested in trade. Zuo Zongtang for instance argued in 1875 that ‘the true
intentions of the Western states’ plotting against us lies entirely in obtaining the benefits of 
trade, and they do not necessarily harbour sinister intentions against us
m ,  i m w f ä f t u y *
However, such views did not rid the Chinese elites’ fears. Negative perceptions of 
the Society as a perilous entity persisted over time and among a wide range of individuals. 
More benign views frequently referred only to specific Western states during specific
24. Indeed, Yen-p’ing Hao and Erh-Ming Wang state that whereas only one scholar commented upon the 
great changes in China’s international environment between 1840 and 1860, this number jumped up to 
forty-three between 1861 and 1900. See Hao and Wang, ‘Changing Chinese views of Western relations, 
1840-95’, p. 156
23 Several factors can be cited to explain why such views came to be held. First, such officials tended to 
have had first-hand experience of dealing with Western diplomats and had witnessed the sheer power of 
European military technology. Second, the higher-ranked officials who were involved in the political 
decision-making had access to military field reports and confidential memorials, and had a more accurate 
picture of the military superiority of the European powers. Third, there was ‘a latent but not negligible 
influence for peace’ (Banno: 71) by Chinese who were engaged in trade with the European powers, as 
well as some officials whose jurisdictions included treaty ports. See Masataka Banno, China and the 
West 1858-1861: The Origins o f the Tsungli Yamen. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1964), pp. 54-92, for a full discussion on the domestic context.
26 Zuo Zongtang, Tuchen haifang saifang ji guanwai jiaofu liangyun qingxing xi’, Memorial dated 7th day 
of Third Month, 1875. Zuo Zongtang quanji: zougao (vol. 6). (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 1992), p. 188. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Guo Songtao (1818-1891), who served as the first Chinese 
ambassador to Britain between 1877-79. See Sasaki Yö, Shin matsu chügoku ni okeru nihon kan to seiyö 
kan. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2000), p. 85. But note that Zuo’s comments may have taken 
place around the time when there was a lively debate over where the Qing should concentrate its defences: 
Zuo was in favour of strengthening land defences, and he may have underplayed the threat from the 
maritime European powers to support his case.
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periods, and whenever the Western powers (later joined by the Japanese) encroached on 
Chinese territory or China’s tributary states, Chinese anxieties would reappear.27
Table 4-1: Western Encroachment on China and its Tributaries
1854 Russia occupies northern Heilongjiang.
1856(-I860) The Second Opium War: British and French troops occupy Guangzhou and Tianjin, sack 
Summer Palace in Beijing.
1871(-1881) Russia occupies Ili (Yili).
1874 Japan’s expedition to Taiwan
(1879) (Ryukyu kingdom absorbed into Japan: becomes Okinawa prefecture)
1884 (-1885) Sino-French War
(1886) (Britain annexes Burma)
(1887) (French Indochina established)
1894 (-1895) Sino-Japanese War
1898 The scramble for concessions -  Germany establishes concessions in Jiaozhou, Russia in 
the Liaodong peninsula, Britain in Weihaiwei, and France in Guangzhou.
The European international order was often compared to the Spring and Autumn (770-403 
B.C.) and Waning States periods (403-221 B.C.).28 Yen-p’ing Hao and Erh-min Wang 
state that this was a result of China’s increasing awareness of its position as a state among a 
multiple number of states.29 The analogy between the Spring and Autumn/Waning States 
periods and the European-dominated international order demonstrate, they argue, Chinese 
intellectuals’ recognition that ‘China was not the Middle Kingdom but rather a state among
27 A similar point is made by Mary C. Wright: even during the 1860s, when the Western powers were 
adopting a ‘co-operative policy’ with China, ‘Chinese officials...were never quite certain what was 
behind the Co-operative Policy.’ Although there was a degree of trust placed in some of the Western 
diplomats (who played an important role in implementing the ‘Co-operative Policy’) ‘and they were 
quick to grasp the opportunities for maneuver that the new diplomatic atmosphere provided...the latent 
distrust of the foreigner’s ultimate intentions remained and quickly returned to the surface in times of 
crisis.’ See Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand o f Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 
1862-1874. (New York: Atheneum, 1967), p. 41. For a different viewpoint, however, see Owen H. H. 
Wong, A New Profile in Sino-Western Diplomacy: The First Chinese Minister to Great Britain. 
(Kowloon, Hong Kong: Chung Hwa Book, 1987), p. 5
28 Hao and Wang observe that by 1894, Feng Guifen, Zheng Guanying, Ma Jianzhong, Zeng Jize, Wang 
Tao, Peng Yulin, Chen Qiu and Zhang Zhidong had used the Spring and Autumn period to characterise 
the new international order. See their ‘Changing Chinese views of Western relations, 1840-95’, p. 189. 
There are different opinions regarding the exact period which constitutes the Spring and Autumn Period. 
John K. Fairbank and Edwin O. Reischauer give 722-481 B.C. as the dates of the Spring and Autumn 
Period (see John K. Fairbank, and Edwin O. Reischauer, China: Tradition and Transformation). 
However, recent works have shown that 722 B.C. indicates the date the Confucian text Chunqiu (Spring 
and Autumn) was written, rather than the actual start of the period itself. Here I use the periodisation 
used by Kamei Takayoshi, Mikami Tsugio, Hayashi Kentarö and Horigome Yözö (eds) Sekaishi nenpyö, 
chizu. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa köbunkan, 1995)
29 I do not, however, agree with Hao and Wang’s analysis that the invoking of the Spring and Autumn and 
Warring States periods denotes Chinese acceptance of itself as ‘a state among equal states’. While there 
is no doubt that many Chinese were beginning to see the European powers as ‘civilised’ as China was, 
Sino-centric notions of superiority were difficult to overcome, and this was precisely one of the reasons 
why the Chinese found accepting their ‘barbarous’ status within European International Society so 
difficult.
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equal states, like the state of Chin [Qin] in late Chou [Zhou]’, where ‘the Chinese world 
was made up of a conglomeration of separate states and principalities that resembled the 
multistate system of the late nineteenth century. ’ 30 Although this is no doubt true, Hao and 
Wang fail to note that both periods were traditionally seen in a highly negative light as 
periods in which war, alliance-making and diplomatic intrigues flourished. 31
Meanwhile, others observed that in such an environment, competition for survival 
was the norm. Xue Fucheng (ülf noted that the states of the West ‘reified] on 
intelligence and energy to compete with one another t t l ?  Feng
Guifen noted in Jiaobinlu kangyi that the Western world was one of
a highly zero-sum nature, where the barbarians worried that if one country became strong, 
then that would translate into the weakness of their own country
S P ^ I S ^ H ^ C ) . ’ 33 Similar perceptions permeated the writings of higher-ranked officials 
in charge of foreign affairs. Zeng Guo fan (ff (HÜ) stated:
Generally speaking, the foreigners in Europe have been annexing each other’s 
territories for several hundred years, for no other reason than to seize the profits of the 
business people of the one country so that the ambitions of the attacking country may 
be satisfied....Since the hostilities, the Chinese people have been for a long time in 
deep suffering, as if immersed in water or fire. 34
Witnessing the ‘civilising' mode o f interaction: Bakumatsu Japanese perceptions 
Japan’s first full encounter with European International Society took place shortly after the 
latter had expanded into China. This expansion was partly a result of desires to open 
trading relations. As far as the European states were concerned, the East Asian
30 Hao and Wang, ‘Changing Chinese views of Western relations, 1840-95’, p. 189
31 See Satö Shin’ichi, Kindai chügoku no chishikijin to bunmei. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1996), 
p. 76. For a typical statement of this, see Wang Tao, Taoyuan wenlu waibian. (Shanghai: Shanghai 
shudian chubanshe, 2002), p. 33. See also Paul A. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T’ao 
and Reform in Late Ch ’ing China. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard 
University, 1987), pp. 92-93.
32 Translation rendered from Teng and Fairbank (eds), China's Response to the West, p. 142. The original 
text can be found in Xue Fucheng, ‘Bianfa’ in Chouyang chuyi. (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 
1994), p. 89
33 Feng Guifen, Jiaobinlu kangyi. (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2002), p. 53. For similar 
perceptions, also see Ma Jianzhong, ‘Shikezhai jiyan’ in Caixi xueyi (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin 
chubanshe, 1994), pp. 161-162
34 Cited in Teng and Fairbank, China 's Response to the West, p. 65. Similar sentiments were expressed by
Li Hongzhang. ‘At present,’ Li wrote, ‘all the countries around the globe pay attention to military affairs, 
and all that matters is power JakjE).’ In this competitive world China’s
very existence was under threat, and ‘China’s strength as a whole is the key which decides whether 
foreigners will cause trouble or not Li Hongzhang, ‘Haijun
yamen junjichu hui zou di’, Li Hongzhan quanji (vol. 7): haijun han’gao. (Changchun: Shidai wenyi 
chubanshe, 1998), p. 4002.
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international order did not seem particularly conducive to the free trade that the Western 
merchants wished. China, Japan and Korea continued to operate within the normative 
framework of the East Asian international order. Private trade was forbidden, and only 
highly controlled government-approved trade was allowed.35 To many Western merchants, 
such restrictive trading agreements ran contrary to their commercial interests of exploiting 
what they believed to be a lucrative East Asian market. While China and its market was 
their most important target, there also had a keen interest in the Chinese Empire’s 
neighbour, Japan.36
Japan’s perceived closing of its borders and refusal to participate in diplomatic 
intercourse as dictated by European International Society was an additional reason for the 
Society’s members to force its doors open. Japan had previously fired upon European 
vessels (with the exception of the Dutch) that had approached its waters. This was regarded 
as fundamentally ‘uncivilised’ behaviour that had to be corrected. Referring to Japan’s 
continued policy of sakoku (closing off its borders to foreign contact), an article which 
appeared in The Times on 26th March 1852 claimed:
Now, we deny the right of any nation situated upon, and occupying a portion of the 
sea-coast of the world, to refuse all commercial intercourse with other nations. Such a 
course may be tolerated by civilized nations so long as it does not interfere with their 
commerce and the welfare of the human race; but we insist that it is the right of 
civilized and Christian nations to compel barbarians thus situated to submit to the 
general law of nations, and to a certain degree of intercourse....37
That day would finally come on July 1853, when the fleet of Commodore Matthew C. 
Perry of the United States appeared outside Tokyo Bay. Perry demanded the opening up of 
Japanese ports to provide shelter and assistance for any American ships in distress. The 
Treaty of Peace and Amity was signed between the U.S. and Japan in March 1854, and 
within two years an American consul (Townsend Harris) had arrived on the shores of Edo. 
This incident was Japan’s first introduction with a key institution of European International
35 In China, trade with the West was only allowed to be carried out in the port of Canton. This form of 
trade is known as the Canton system of trade. In the case of Japan, trade was confined to Nagasaki (with 
the exception of Korea). However, this system did not always function as efficiently as the political elite 
hoped -  private trade, usually in the form of smuggling, continued to flourish.
36 An article that appeared in The Times on 26th March 1852, gives a good example of European interest in 
Japan’s market and resources. This article originally appeared in the New York Courier and Enquirer, 
and is reproduced in Kokusai nyüsu jiten shuppan iinkai and Mainichi komyunikeishonzu (eds) Kokusai 
nyüsu jiten: gaikoku shinbun ni miru nippon (vol. 1, genbun hen) (International News Dictionary: Japan 
Seen through Foreign Newspapers). (Tokyo: Mainichi komyunikeishonzu, 1989), p. 19
3 ibid., p. 18. Emphasis added.
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Society -  the diplomatic system -  and can be said to mark Japan’s first full encounter with 
the Society.
The Japanese, however, had formed some opinions of the European international 
order as early as the first half of the nineteenth century. They got a taste of the highly 
realpolitik-dominated European international order in 1808, when the British (who were at 
war with the French-occupied Netherlands) sent the warship Phaeton into Japanese waters 
at Nagasaki with the aim of seizing Dutch ships. The British eventually captured two 
Dutch trading personnel located in Nagasaki and demanded a supply of food and water in 
exchange for the hostages. At the same time, British and Russian ships were increasingly 
encroaching on Japanese shores, requesting trading relations.
It was under these circumstances that Aizawa Seishisai (^K IE iS ^r) wrote Shinron ( 
0rlm), which discusses the new international order that was drawing closer to Japan. 
Aizawa himself had had the chance to come into direct contact with Europeans, having 
interviewed British sailors who had landed on the shores of the Mito fiefdom in 1824. 
Aizawa’s account of the international order outside the vicinity of East Asia is of a highly 
dangerous environment. He compares the international order to that of the highly 
realpolitik-dominatGd ‘so-called seven states of the end of the Zhou dynasty’, the Spring 
and Autumn/Warring States period „ ^1*3 JH)
hitmtezbot.  /j
The European states, or ‘Western barbarians’, intent on invading China would first ‘scheme 
with Persia against Turkey, and if victorious would then turn south and attack the Mogul 
empire. They would then fight with the Qing over the land of the Jungars [i.e. Oirat 
Mongolia], and if victorious would then sail over in droves and attack the celestial land 
[Japan].’39
The Opium War of 1840-1842 and China’s subsequent defeat gave the Japanese 
political leadership a stronger sense that the new Western-dominated international order 
was one which could pose a grave threat to Japan.40 The Japanese gained their knowledge
38 Aizawa Seishisai, ‘Shinron’ in Imai Usaburo, Seya Yoshihiko, and Bito Masahide (eds) Nihon shisö 
taikei: Mitogaku (Japanese Thought Series, vol. 53). (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1953), p. 93.
39 ibid., p. 92
40 This point is also confirmed by Meiji oligarch Ökuma Shigenobu (WPiI J lIIO. See Ökuma Shigenobu 
and Enjöji Kiyoshi, Ökuma haku sekijitsu tan (vol. 1). (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1980), pp. 
207-208. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi also notes that the ‘First Opium War...drastically altered long-held 
Japanese perceptions of Japan’s place in international power relations.’ See his ‘Opium, Expulsion,
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of international affairs through Chinese and Dutch written works, which were regularly 
imported. There is evidence that Wei Yuan’s Haiguo tuzhi was imported to Japan as early 
as 1851, and was read by the political elite. The Tokugawa shogunate also had access to 
Dutch and Chinese intelligence reports, and news of the Opium War reached the Japanese 
through both these reports (Oranda füsetsusho INflPT)IlI&1lr and Kara füsetsusho /If III t& If 
). By 1841, Tokugawa shogunate official Shibukawa Rokuzö41 (?><JI|/\/ic) had submitted a 
memorial pointing to the possibility of a Chinese defeat and a subsequent invasion on Japan 
by the British,42 and in 1842 intelligence from the Netherlands had reported that the Qing 
had suffered a catastrophic defeat in their war against Britain, and that Hong Kong had 
been ceded.43 In 1853, the Dutch told the Tokugawa regime in advance of American plans 
to send a fleet to Japan, and urged them to commence peaceful trading relations in 
accordance with American wishes. The American fleet, the Dutch letter warned, 
‘comprises of several steam ships and sailing ships, and are equipped to an extent that we 
cannot guarantee that they will not use force i f  their rightful demands are not met. ’ 44 Such 
information was clearly resulting in highly negative understandings of the European 
international order even before Perry and his gunboats arrived. The Japanese political 
elite45 was beginning to perceive this order as a highly coercive and insecure one in which 
Japan’s survival would be precarious.
These views were confirmed when the Japanese finally experienced their full 
encounter with European International Society in 1853, when they were confronted by a 
fleet of American gunboats at the doorstep of Edo. As far as many quarters in the West
Sovereignty: China’s Lessons for Bakumatsu Japan’ Monumenta Nipponica (vol. 47, no. 1, Spring 1992, 
pp. 1-25), p. 2.
41 Shibukawa Rokuzö occupied the post of tenmongata (WütTJ), which was responsible for analysing 
foreign intelligence. His memorial cited here was submitted to the röjü ( ^ T )  Mizuno Tadakuni. The 
rojü was the second highest post in the shogunate bureaucracy, and responsible for policy formation of 
the Tokugawa shogunate. Therefore, it can be assumed that Shibukawa’s memorial would have had 
some impact on the the Japanese political elites’ perceptions of the European-dominated international 
order.
42 Iwashita Tetsunori, ‘Ahen sensö jöhö no dentatsu to juyö: Tenpö jü nen kara jüsan nen made’ in Meiji 
ishin shi gakkai (eds), Meiji ishin to seiyö kokusai shakai. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa köbunkan, 1999), p. 15
43 Cited in ibid., p. 19.
44 Miyako Voss (ed and trans), Bakumatsu dejima mikökai bunsho: Donkeru-kuruchiusu oboegaki. (Tokyo: 
Shinjinbutsu örai sha, 1992), p. 209. Emphasis added.
45 Wakabayashi also notes that some accounts of the Opium War were disseminated in the form of fiction 
(he gives Mineta Fükö’s Kaigai shinwa as an example) among circles outside the political elite. 
Although many of these accounts were frequently inaccurate, this did contribute to some awareness and 
sensitivity to the outside world among the Japanese populace. See ‘Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty’.
ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE 115
were concerned, this was quite acceptable. In an article titled ‘The United States 
Expedition Against Japan’, The Times noted:
It is a fair question how far any tribe or race of human beings possesses the right of 
excluding the rest of mankind from all participation in the benefits to be derived from 
an extensive and beautiful region....Is this right of exclusion founded on reason or on 
force? If on reason, we should be curious to see the arguments by which it can be 
maintained. If the right of exclusion is simply the right of force, why, let those who 
appeal to such a principle be prepared at all times to make it good. They may feel well 
assured that, some time or other, their pretensions will be put to the test. In any case, 
they can lay little claim to sympathy. They have by their own acts put themselves out 
of the pale of the great brotherhood of nations. They have refused all aid to others; 
how can they ask it for themselves?46
Meanwhile, a slightly more sympathetic article ‘Japan and the United States’ 
appeared in the New York Times on 24th February 1852:
A fleet composed of several steamers, backed by a frigate and one or two corvettes, is 
by no means a peaceful demonstration; and we fear that the effect of the arrival of 
these ships in the waters of Japan will be to frighten the poor Japanese out of their 
seaport towns, and out of their wits at the same time, so that it will be impossible to 
bring them to terms in good faith.4
Japanese reactions to Perry’s arrival seem to prove correct the above correspondent’s 
fears. Although the event had, to a certain degree, been anticipated by the political elite, 
the sight o f the gunboats indeed seems to have ‘frightened’ them ‘out of their wits’. Perry’s 
gunboats and their knowledge of China’s defeat at the hands of the West forced them to 
conclude that any resistance against the United States’ wishes would be futile.48 As far as 
the Japanese were concerned, their incorporation into the European-dominated international 
order took place under the implicit threat of military force.49 Their signing of the unequal 
trading treaties -  which limited Japan’s sovereignty and were not reciprocal -  also took 
place under the threat of force from U.S. consul Townsend Harris, who warned the
46 Kokusai nyusu jiten shuppan iinkai and Mainichi komyunikeishonzu (eds), Kokusai nyiisu jiten: gaikoku 
shinbun ni miru nippon (vol. 1: genbun hen), pp. 16-17
47 ibid., p. 15
48 Satö Seizaburö notes that the röjü, Abe Masahiro ( H o P IE'jA 1819-1857) reported that opinions tended to 
be more hardline the further they were from Edo, while those ‘who came to Edo and “understood the 
situation of foreign countries’” were more realistic and tended to call for some form of accommodation 
with the U .S.’s demands. See Satö Seizaburö, ‘Bakumatsu/Meiji shoki ni okeru taigai ishiki no 
shoruikei’ in Satö Seizaburö and R. Dingman (eds) Kindai nippon no taigai taido. (Tokyo: Tokyo 
daigaku shuppankai, 1974), pp. 16-17
49 Perry even sent the Japanese two white flags for their surrender in the event that the Japanese would 
refuse American demands the war would ensue, implying that any resistance to the U.S would be futile. 
This can be seen from Tokugawa Nariaki (1800-1860)’s memorial, ‘Jujö goji kengi sho’ (1853) in 
Yoshida Tsunekichi and Satö Seizaburö (eds) Nihon shisö taikei (vol. 56): Bakumatsu seiji ronshü. 
(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1976), p. 9. See also Miwa Kimitada, ‘Perii “dai yon no shokan’” Kokusai seiji 
(no. 102, February 1993, pp. 1-21).
ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE 1 1 6
Japanese that British and French naval forces could arrive to force Japan to conclude 
trading treaties.50 It is not surprising that we again see highly negative Japanese accounts of 
the Society, similar to those written prior to 1853. For instance, Kuroda Narihiro 
), the daimyö (AidS feudal lords) of the Fukuoka fiefdom, commented that warfare was ‘a 
constant state of affairs in foreign countries [i.e. the West] ’, 51 while fellow daimyö 
Matsudaira Yoshinaga (J& ^Iüzk) stated that the international situation that Japan now 
found itself in was a place where ‘Fights take place between those who conquer and who are 
conquered.’52 Hotta Masayoshi who became röjü ( ^ d 3), the second highest
bureaucratic position under the Tokugawa regime, came to similar conclusions. His 
memorial to the shogunate in 1857 states that ‘The current international situation resembles 
that of China’s Spring and Autumn period and the last years of Ashikaga rule in Japan. (—
<£>)’, indicating both fear of the seemingly menacing international order Japan faced, as 
well as domestic disorder the encounter with it would bring about.53
How was Japan to adapt to this new international environment? This was an obvious 
question that was to occupy the minds of the Japanese elite for years to come. Drawing on 
Arnold Toynbee, Minamoto Ryöen states that the Japanese political elite showed two 
different responses.54 The first type was what Toynbee called the ‘Zealots’, who clung to 
their traditional culture and showed strong xenophobic reactions towards the newly 
introduced culture. In Japan, this took the form of attacks on foreigners and their property ( 
WiM joi). Naturally, the consequences of this form of reaction were disastrous for Japan. 
The protection of foreign nationals and their property was seen as an imperative component 
of the ‘standard of civilisation’ at the time; failure to do so would often render the 
‘uncivilised’ state beyond the pale of the protection of international law and invite more
50 Indeed, Japanese memorials are peppered with references that Japan should not make the same mistake 
the Chinese had committed. See, for example, ‘Röjü tassho’ (1857); ‘Hyöteijo ichizajöshin sho’ (1857); 
‘Kaibögakari no ömetsuke, metsuke jöshinsho’ (1857) in Yoshida Tsunekichi and Satö Seizaburö (eds) 
Nihon shisö taikei (vol. 56): Bakumatsu seiji ronshü., p. 51, 53 and p. 58 respectively. See also 
Wakabayashi, ‘Opium, Expulsion, Sovereignty’, pp. 17-18.
51 Kuroda Narihiro, ‘Kuroda Narihiro jösho’ in Yoshida Tsunekichi and Satö Seizaburö (eds), Nihon shisö 
taikei (vol. 56): Bakumatsu seiji ronshü, p. 34
52 Cited in Satö Seizaburö, ‘Bakumatsu/Meiji shoki ni okeru taigai ishiki no shoruikei’, p. 15.
53 Hotta Masayoshi, ‘Hotta Masayoshi ikensho’ in Yoshida Tsunekichi and Satö Seizaburö (eds), Nihon 
shisö taikei (vol. 56): Bakumatsu seiji ronshü, p. 69. The end of Ashikaga rule is known as Japan’s own 
‘Warring States Period (sengoku jidai). During this time, many local warlords vied for the unification of 
Japan.
34 Minamoto Ryöen, ‘Bakumatsu, ishin ki ni okeru “Kaikoku zushi” no juyö: Sakuma Shözan o chüshin to 
shite’ Nihon kenkyü (no. 9, September 1993, pp. 13-25), pp. 20-21
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foreign intervention. Moreover, the West, fully aware of the potential resentment caused 
by the domineering manner in which they incorporated non-European states into European 
International Society, often believed that a demonstration of military might would be a 
useful way to enforce observance of the code of conduct as stipulated in the treaties and 
‘standard of civilisation’ . 55
Another response, which is labelled the ‘Herodian’ approach, was to adopt superior 
elements of an alien culture/society and to ensure the survival of the indigenous culture. As 
jö i movements resulted in frequent clashes with the West and subsequent defeats for the 
more xenophobic Japanese, it became increasingly clear that the only chance for Japan to 
ensure its survival was by adopting a more ‘Herodian’ approach. The drive to take on what 
was considered to be superior elements of Western technology -  military hardware was the 
earliest choice -  gathered momentum . 56 Eventually, an increasing number of Japanese 
samurai came to the conclusion that the political system had to be overhauled as well. The 
Tokugawa regime’s weakness in face of the ever-present Western threat would mean that 
Japan could never regain its former status as a fully sovereign nation57 free from the yoke of 
the Western states. A new political system had to be adopted. It was in this context that 
the Meiji Restoration (TEf/pItUr Meiji ishin) took place, and Japan started taking real steps 
towards fully integrating itself into European International Society.
Meiji Japanese perceptions
However, fears of the European international order persisted among the Meiji political elite, 
and the Japanese political leadership continued to see their international environment as a
65 As the British Minister to Japan, Sir Rutherford Alcock argued: ‘It is weakness, or the suspicion of it, 
which invariably provokes wrong and aggression in the East, and is a far more fertile cause of bad faith 
and danger among Asiatics than either force of the abuse of strength. Hence it is that all diplomacy in 
these regions which does not rest on a solid substratum of force, or an element of strength, to be laid bare 
when all gentler processes fail, rests on false premises, and must of necessity fail in its object.’ Cited in 
W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945, p. 20
56 For instance, the Yögakusho dedicated to the study of Western studies of national interest, was
established in 1855. The same year, steelworks were established in Nagasaki.
57 I use this word guardedly and with reservation: sovereignty as a concept did not exist in East Asian 
international relations, as states were arranged -  often hypothetically -  into hierarchical orders. 
Sovereign equality was not usually the norm. However, ‘sovereignty’ can be said to have existed in the 
sense that states within the tributary system did not interfere with each other’s domestic affairs. Owen N. 
Denny, the U.S. diplomatic advisor to Korea in 1885, noted that ‘the past tribute relationships were 
sustained by a faith unshakable as long as China’s treatment of its tributaries remained gentle, cordial, 
and fair and did not seek to interfere either with another country’s system of tributary relationships or 
with its sovereignty and independence.’ However, Denny himself ‘was not sure whether or not Korean 
state sovereignty existed at all.’ See Takeshi Hamashita, ‘The Intra-regional System in East Asia in 
Modem Times’ in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (eds), Network Power: Japan and Asia. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 126-127. I am indebted to Miwa Hirono for this point.
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highly insecure one.58 A brief survey of memorials describing international politics by key 
political leaders in Japan reveals a similarity to those of the Tokugawa officials. In a 
famous memorial submitted in 1869, shortly after the Meiji Restoration, Iwakura Tomomi ( 
S  JfJlrf!) offered this opinion of the international order at the time:
...although it can be said that all states overseas maintain contact with each other, in 
the end all states overseas are our country’s enemies 3 V
# h ^ H 6 $ U  77[INN#!;;b M d  J  ]J  ). What are these enemies? All
foreign states nowadays study, improve their technology and aim to become rich and 
strong. Even small states like the Netherlands stand proud and independent, even 
though they are surrounded by great powers....All foreign states wish to stand above 
others states (?® ^7 J[IN '''# K  Ei lH 7  fikP /  _h — 'y f  V  =i state A
wants to stand above B, B over C. It is for these reasons that I say that foreign states 
are all our enemies.59
Moreover, such views appear to have persisted during the Meiji period. This can be 
discerned from numerous memorials on international politics by the Meiji leaders. Calls 
for military build-up, for instance, were regularly made by referring to the dangerous 
international realm. While this claim may at times have been rhetorical, the very fact that it 
was used indicates that such interpretations had considerable resonance.60 In a memorial 
submitted in 1880, we see Yamagata Aritomo (lll^WJUl), one of the key members of the 
Meiji leadership, claiming that ‘nowadays all states stand equally. They possess their own 
clearly demarcated territories and are responsible for protecting it themselves. If their 
soldiers are not strong, it is impossible for them to maintain their own independence.’61 In 
1887, another leader Inoue Kaoru (JT Jh S I)  submitted a policy paper in which the 
international order was described as follows:
Since the 1870s and 1880s, troubles have been settled between Europeans states, and it 
has become impossible to wantonly resort to force. However, these [European states]
58 See Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration o f Korea, 1895-1910, pp. 15-18. 
Banno Junji’s point that ‘up to the early and mid Meiji period, there was no change in Japan’s 
international relations that would force a radical revision of its macro-international outlook (EH!!,67 & M 
^[11 kyoshiteki na taigaikan) that was formed during bakumatsu Japan’s opening to the West’ also 
supports this assertion. See Banno Junji, ‘Meiji shoki (1873-85) no “taigaikan”’ Kokusai seiji (no. 71, 
August 1982, pp. 10-20), p. 16. Satö Seizaburö states that this meant that the ‘Warring States’ model of 
international relations would frequently make a comeback in Japanese discourse of diplomacy whenever 
Japan experienced an international crisis. See ‘Bakumatsu, Meiji shoki ni okeru taigai ishiki no 
shoruikei’, p. 28
59 Iwakura Tomomi, ‘Tomomi gaikö kaikei ezochi kaitaku no sanken o chögi ni fu suru koto’ in, Iwakura 
kö jikki (Tada Kömon, ed) (vol. 2). (Tokyo: Hara shobö, 1968), p. 699
60 See Thomas Risse, ‘ “Let’s Argue!”’, pp. 8-9
6‘ Yamagata Aritomo, ‘Shin rinpö heibi ryakuhyö’ in Yamagata Aritomo ikensho (Öyama Azusa, ed). 
(Tokyo: Hara shobö, 1966), p. 91. This memorial was written in the context of growing Japanese fear of 
China’s military build-up following its ‘self-strengthening’ programme, which will be examined in 
greater detail in the chapters that follow.
ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE 119
have recently tended to concentrate on political tactics in the colonies....Ah! The 
continents of Asia and Africa have now become a hunting ground for the West. 62
Similar sentiments were expressed by the Iwakura Mission, the Meiji government’s fact­
finding mission sent to the United States and Europe. Its members had the chance to 
witness the colonised Southeast Asian states for themselves, and they appear to have 
concluded that European international order was indeed a perilous environment in which 
only the fittest could survive. The delegation’s secretary Kume Kunitake 
recorded: ‘The flesh of the weak is eaten by the strong. Ever since the Europeans began 
sailing to faraway lands, the weaker states of the tropics have been devoured by them [the 
European powers] ’ . 63
Seeing a Janus-faced European International Society
The Chinese and Japanese were both incorporated into the Society of the states against their 
will, and initially confronted the ‘civilising’ mode of interaction of European International 
Society, and witnessed its more coercive side. It is not surprising, then, that both the 
Chinese and Japanese first interpreted European International Society as a highly coercive 
international order where only the fittest could survive.
However, this does not mean that the Chinese and Japanese only saw a competitive, 
almost Darwininan world. While these views certainly did persist over time, as their 
interaction with the European powers intensified, their knowledge of the Society, its 
institutions, and the mode of interaction that governed the relations among its ‘civilised’ 
members also increased. Western books were translated, and contributed greatly to 
increased information of the Society and its members. Both the Chinese and Japanese sent 
diplomats or statesmen abroad, and their accounts often brought in much needed 
information of the Society. Furthermore, the forcible ‘opening’ of China and Japan to the 
Society brought in a larger number of European diplomats, missionaries, or foreign 
advisors. While some were admirers of both states’ culture, they were also creatures of 
their time; they often saw it as their duty to introduce the trappings of European 
‘civilisation’ to China and Japan, and pressed upon the Chinese and Japanese of the 
necessity to conform to the ‘standard of civilisation’ if they wanted to be accorded equal 
treatment with the Society’s ‘civilised’ members. This, in turn, resulted in increasing both
62 Inoue Kaoru kö denki hensan kai, Segai Inoue kö den (vol. 3). (Tokyo: Naigai shoseki, 1934), p. 907-908
63 Kume Kunitake, Beiö kairan jikki (vol. 5). (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1982), p. 307
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states’ awareness of a different mode of interaction which applied to ‘civilised’ states and 
the dualism of European International Society. Accordingly, the Chinese and Japanese 
began to acquire a more complex understanding of the Society which moved beyond their 
initial coercive depictions. This will be discussed below with reference to Chinese and 
Japanese perceptions of the institutions of European International Society.
Figure 4-1: 'Another "sick man"', Punch, London, 8th January 1898
The Sultan (cheerily). ‘Going to pieces, old man? Nonsense! All you want is a dose of “Concert of Europe!” 
Why -  look at me!!' Of course, there were significant gaps between how the Europeans and non-Europeans 
envisaged the institution of the balance of power. Source: Roy Douglas, ‘Great Nations Still Enchained: The 
Cartoonists’ Vision o f Empire 1848-1914. London: Routledge, 1993, p. 130
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Chinese perceptions o f war, balance o f power and the great powers
War is perhaps the institution which requires the least explanation. As the discussion of 
Chinese perceptions of European International Society has shown, war was seen as fairly 
ubiquitous within the European international order. Military action, or the threat of it, was 
often used by the European powers against China, the ‘semi-civilised’ entity, to stamp out 
any ‘barbarous’ practices. 64 China saw itself as a victim of these wars, and there was little 
room to perceive the institution of war in Grotian terms, where ‘[p]eace is the norm, and 
war the violation or exception; peace is logically prior to war’ and ‘war is a necessary evil, 
to be minimized as far as possible. It is necessary, because it is the only means of justice 
when there is no political superior. ’ 65 Little appreciation was shown for the role of war in 
enforcing international justice.
In this context, neither was the institution of the balance of power always seen in 
terms of a conscious policy to protect weaker states. In fact, many Chinese elites saw the 
balance of power in terms of alliances that they could utilise for their survival. Chinese 
history provided rich examples. There was the famous tactic of ‘playing barbarians off 
other barbarians’; the Spring and Autumn period also provided classic examples of small 
states surviving in a competitive world. 66 However, as Chinese interactions with the 
European states increased, there began to emerge among them a growing understanding of 
the concept of the balance of power as a conscious policy that was designed to facilitate 
coexistence among the Society’s members. 67 Li Hongzhang noted this aspect of
the balance of power, and argued that it was a concept that was intentionally maintained by 
treaties among the great powers, operated within Europe, and benefited smaller states (££!§■
64 A typical example can be found in the 1870 Tianjin Massacre, where an anti-Christian riot resulted in the 
burning of a church and the death of foreign nationals. Although military conflict did not break out, 
European gunboats anchored off Tianjin and successfully demanded an indemnity and the despatch of a 
mission of apology.
63 Wight, International Theory, pp. 206-207
66 Hao and Wang, ‘Changing Chinese views of Western relations, 1840-95’, p. 198 
ibid., p. 19967
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Jianzhong, Li Hongzhang’s protege, wrote from Paris (presumably to the zongli yamen), 
and also provided a comprehensive understanding of how the institution of the balance of 
power functioned to preserve order within Europe.
Within Europe, there are many neighbouring states. Although each state can decide its 
civilian and military affairs itself, they promise not to cause trouble between their 
neighbours and bully other countries for their interests. Therefore, the states make a 
pact where the weak and strong look after one another and the big and small promise 
each other to form a balance of power. This is the same concept as the peaceful 
friendly alliances during the Warring States period. Now within Europe, this concept 
has been the dominant way in which to conduct diplomacy.69
Did this indicate some degree of acceptance of the institution of the balance of power 
among the Chinese? Hao and Wang consider this to be the case: they point to increasing 
Chinese elites’ references to the concept of balance of power, as well as suggestions that 
the institution could be applied in East Asia as well.70 It is certainly true that there was an 
awareness of the concept of the balance of power as applied among ‘civilised’ members, 
but it is difficult to gauge China’s ‘acceptance’ of the institution of the balance of power 
from proposals on how the institution should be applied in East Asia. Li Hongzhang did, 
for instance, suggest that Korea could benefit from it,71 but his proposal was written in 1885, 
amid growing fears of Sino-Japanese rivalry over Korea. While Li’s statement may reflect 
a genuine desire to utilise the balance of power in East Asia to preserve order, Korea was 
seen as a buffer for China, closely linked to Qing strategic interests. It could therefore be 
equally argued that Li’s ideas were somewhat myopic, assigning top priority to China’s 
interests of survival, rather than that of maintaining order within East Asia as a whole.
From this perspective, China shows limited interest in utilising the balance of power 
for the common good of protecting other states from encroachment: even Li Hongzhang’s 
suggestion, while claiming to be primarily interested in protecting Korean security, is
68 Li Hongzhang, ‘Zhu chaoxian deguo shushi tiaoyi’, Li Hongzhang quanji (vol. 8): yishu hangao, 
diangao. (Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe. 1998), p. 4769
69 Ma Jianzhong, ‘Shikezhai jiyan’ in Caixi xueyi, pp. 161-162. A similar recognition of the balance of 
power in operation can also be found in Wang Tao, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, pp. 102-103, 190-191. 
Writing after the collapse of the Qing, Kang Youwei also noted that the balance of power could help 
maintain some form of stability. See Kang Youwei, Datongshu. (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji 
chubanshe, 1998), p. 107.
70 Hao and Wang, ‘Changing Chinese views of Western relations, 1840-95’, p. 198
'* Li Hongzhang, ‘Zhu chaoxian deguo shushi tiaoyi’, Li Hongzhang quanji (vol. 8), pp. 4769-4771
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ultimately connected to China’s security.72 Despite these limitations, Li’s interpretations of 
the institution as applied within Europe reflected an increasing Chinese awareness of how 
the institution served to protect weaker European states. This, in turn, demonstrated to the 
Chinese the possibility that a very different, more cooperative international environment 
was possible.
Chinese views of the role of great powers was also mixed. Towards the 1880s there 
was an increasing awareness that the great powers within Europe did play a role in holding 
the balance of power within Europe, and that this had benefited another ‘weak’ state -  
Turkey. The influential Shanghai intellectual Wang Tao, who had experienced living in 
Britain, noted:
...among the four great powers of Britain, France, Prussia and Russia, there is always 
one state that will control the balance and settle it. Otherwise, nothing could have 
guaranteed the peace, and everyone would have preyed on Turkey.73
However, this awareness does not mean the Chinese now accepted that the great 
powers held a special responsibility for ensuring the survival of the members of the Society. 
This is not surprising, as China was classified as ‘semi-civilised’ throughout the 1840s- 
1890s, and continued to be subjected to the Society’s coercive, ‘civilising’ mode of 
interaction.74 These ambivalent views reflect the dualism of European International Society 
in the late-nineteenth century, as well as a growing awareness of this dualism on the part of 
the Chinese elite. Wang Tao was aware that the great powers play a crucial role in 
preserving weaker states within Europe, but he was equally, if not more, cognisant of the 
fact that the European powers did not behave in a similar manner within Asia. In this 
context, the great powers were seen as constituting more of a danger to China’s survival, 
rather than playing a special role in preserving order and protecting weaker states. They 
were at the forefront of propagating ‘civilisation’, and engaged in interfering with China’s 
diplomacy and domestic politics. Furthermore, they united in sharing the spoils from their 
encroachment of China through the most favoured nation clauses in their treaties. If they
72 In a separate occasion, Li Hongzhang advocated forming an alliance with Japan to ‘prevent the 
Westerners from getting too close to Japan [lit. using Japan as an outpost]’. See Li Hongzhang, ‘Lun 
tianjin jiaoan’, Li Hongzhang quanji (vol. 7): pengliao hangao, jiaotang hangao, haijun hangao, yishu 
hangao. (Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 1998), p. 4045. Hao and Wang also state that other 
Chinese intellectuals of this time were of a similar opinion. Ma Jianzhong ‘cited examples to show that 
cooperation and the making of alliances formed the most effective policy for the management of foreign 
relations.’ Similarly, Zheng Guanying advocated forming an alliance with the United States. See 
‘Changing Chinese views of Western relations, 1840-95’, p. 199
73 See, for example, the views of Wang Tao, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, p. 104
74 Wang Tao, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, p. 82
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exercised any form of restraint, it was often among themselves in not expanding their 
economic and territorial privileges in a way that would arouse the jealousy of their peers. 
The consequences were scepticism on the part of the Chinese elite who ‘were clearly 
disillusioned by the cynical way the western powers...seemed to exploit every opportunity 
to gain the maximum “profit” for themselves by using force...which, in the Chinese world 
view, were not morally justified . ’ 75
Figure 4-2: The partition of China
The Chinese were not the only ones who viewed the European partition with disdain. Note the gunboats, the 
British lion and Uncle Sam in the background, while the Russians and the Germans try and bite a piece off the 
hapless Chinese. Source: Sir Wilfred Lawson and (Sir) F. Carruthers-Gould, Cartoons in Rhyme and Line, T. 
Fisher and Unwin, London, 1905.
75 John Cranmer-Byng, ‘The Chinese View of Their Place in the World: An Historical Perspective’, China 
Quarterly (no. 53, January-March 1973, pp. 67-79), p. 69
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Chinese perceptions o f  international law
As regards international law, China’s first real contact with this institution of European 
International Society occurred in 1864.76 In a famous and oft-cited memorial, Prince Gong 
(^ M i)s ta te d :
We have learned that there is a book called Wan-kuo lii-li Wanguo liili],
‘Laws and precedents of all nations.’ Yet when we wanted to seek it directly, and 
entrust its translations to the foreigners, we were afraid that they might wish to keep it 
confidential and not have it shown to us....Shortly thereafter, in October of last year,
Martin [TItil. W. A. P. Martin] was brought for an interview and presented four 
volumes of the Wan-kuo lii-li, saying that it should be read by all countries having 
treaty relations with others. In case of dispute it can be taken for reference and can be 
quoted.77
The Chinese rendition of international law was derived from Henry Wheaton’s 
Elements o f  International Law , and became known as Wanguo gongfa. Its translator, W. A. 
P. Martin, ‘was acting on the conviction that he was giving the best fruit of Christian 
civilization to the Chinese, and that through this work the Chinese government might be 
brought closer to Christianity.’78 He went to great lengths to use Chinese concepts to make 
international law more comprehensible (and possibly palatable) to the Chinese. Natural 
law was a concept that was used in particular. One reason for this was that Martin himself 
was ‘a close associate of the Natural Law School of international law’. 79 However, 
Martin’s use of the concept was also to facilitate Chinese acceptance of international law by 
appealing to the universality of natural law. For instance, the Wanguo gongfa stated that
The rules of humans are called “natural law”, and when this is extended to its limites 
and applied to states, it becomes “international law” [gongfa]. Pufendorf agreed with 
Hobbes and stated: “Apart from the extension of natural law, there is no other 
international law that can attain states’ respect and obedience.” Therefore, all civilised 
states set definite rules and laws [i.e. international law] to avoid the cruelties of war.80
Martin’s introduction o f the concept of ‘natural law (ttife  x in g fa f,  Satö Shin’ichi argues, 
was a deliberate one: as ‘orderly relations based on human nature and the propagation of 
these relations’ were the hallmarks of a civilised state in Confucianism, Martin wanted to
76 Earlier, Lin Zexu had made use of Vattel’s Le Droit des gens in his letter to Queen Victoria to request the 
halting of opium smuggling. He made reference to a state’s right to prohibit illicit trade.
7 Cited in Teng and Fairbank, China 's Response to the West, p. 98
78 Immanuel C. Y. Hsii, China’s Entrance into the Family o f Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858-1880. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 126
79 ibid., p. 129
80 Ding Weiliang (W. A. P. Martin), Wanguo gongfa. (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2002), p. 3
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convince ‘the Chinese, who thought of themselves as civilised, had the moral duty to obey 
international law’, which was conceptualised ‘a legal norm based on human nature’ .81
The Chinese elites’ ‘discovery’ of international law marked an important event in its 
engagement with European International Society. Its theoretical notion of the equality of 
states before the law, Yamamuro Shin’ichi argues, showed them that ‘all states in the world 
have, as sovereign states, equal rights’ , 82 furthering their knowledge of the theoretical 
notion of ‘liberal sovereignty’, which was different from the hierarchical ordering of states 
in the East Asian international order.83 The Chinese elite also witnessed the effectiveness of 
international law when they managed to score some diplomatic victories in their disputes 
with the European powers. One of the most famous cases was when Prince Gong utilised 
international law to protest the Prussian seizure of Danish merchant ships in Chinese 
territorial waters, eventually obtaining financial compensation.
Furthermore, Satö Shin’ichi notes, as their knowledge of the Society increased, the 
Chinese admitted that international law seemed to serve some purpose in keeping peace 
within the European nations. The European international order was not an ‘anarchic one 
where every state pursued its own interest, but one where shared rules existed’ . 84 For 
instance, Dong Xun (Urft)), a minister at the zongli yamen, wrote in the preface for the 
Wanguo gongfa, ‘there are many nations outside China. If there is no law to regulate them, 
how are nations possible [AM
Such statements were also an acknowledgement of the existence of shared, reciprocal 
no mis and rules among the European states. Furthermore, as China’s interactions with the 
members of European International Society increased, Yongjin Zhang notes, ‘the Chinese 
officials were very much impressed that Western powers generally observed treaties 
faithfully’ , 86 and some of them even gradually came to see them less as rapacious
81 Satö Shin’ichi, Kindai chügoku no chishikijin to bunmei, p. 72. Sumiyoshi Yoshihito also argues that the 
usage of Chinese philosophical terms was to facilitate Chinese comprehension, but was also related to the 
fact that Martin was a missionary who hoped to spread Christian thought through the translation of 
Elements o f International Law. See Sumiyoshi Yoshihito, ‘Meiji shoki ni okeru kokusaihö no dönyü 
(The Introduction of International Law in Early Meiji Japan)’ Kokusaihö gaikö zasshi (vol. 71, no. 56, 
pp. 32-58), pp. 34-35, 56.
82 Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Shisö kadai to shite no ajia: kijiku, rensa, töki, p. 230
83 ibid.
84 Satö Shin’ichi, Kindai chügoku no chishikijin to bunmei, p. 65
85 Translation rendered from Immanuel C. Y. Hsii, China’s Entrance into the Eamily of Nations, p. 134. 
The original text can be found in Ding Weiliang (W. A. P. Martin), Wanguo gongfa. (Shanghai: Shanghai 
shudian chubanshe, 2002), p.l.
86 Zhang, China in the International System, 1918-20, p. 18
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‘barbarians’ but more as a people whose actions were regulated by a shared civilisation and 
etiquette, 87 For instance, Guo Songtao wrote:
Nowadays, England, France, Russia, America, and Germany, all of them great nations 
which have tried their strength against each other to see who is pre-eminent, have 
evolved a code of international law which gives precedence to fidelity and 
righteousness and attaches the utmost importance to relations between states...they 
have evolved a high culture on a firm material basis. They surpass by a long way the 
states of our Spring and Autumn period. 88
As their views of international law and the European powers changed, some Chinese elites 
even began to advocate that international law was not an institution that only applied to 
European states, but also something that China should actively adhere to. Xue Fucheng, for 
instance, argued that China, as a ‘civilised’ state, also had the reciprocal moral duty of 
honouring international treaties and treating the Western powers and their diplomats with 
respect. 89 If China wanted to retain its identity as the most civilised entity within the East 
Asian international order, it was unacceptable for it to be placed beyond the pale of 
international law.
The significance of Xue’s observations should not be overstated, however. While 
Prince Gong’s aforementioned memorial did state that ‘[i]n this book [Wanguo gongfa] 
there are laws which can to a considerable extent control the foreign consuls, and this is 
certainly a useful thing’ , 90 this does not indicate a deep sense of normative commitment to 
international law. This point is underscored by the fact that Prince Gong also claimed that 
‘the contents of this book [the Wanguo gongfa] of foreign laws do not entirely agree with 
the system in China’, which, claims Satö Shin’ichi, shows little indication that ‘there was a 
belief that China had an obligation to obey international law’. Prince Gong’s statement of 
the incompatibility of international law and Chinese law ‘suggests that there still existed a 
value-laden assumption that the Chinese system was superior’ and international law carried 
less moral authority. 91 The lack of a detailed explanation for the incompatibility between
87 Sato Shin’ichi, Kindai chugoku no chishikijin to bunmei, p. 89; Hao and Wang, ‘Changing Chinese views 
ofWestem relations, 1840-95’, pp. 188-189
8S See Guo Songtao, Shixi jicheng. (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1994), p. 39. Translation 
rendered from Guo Songtao, The First Chinese Embassy to the West: The Journals o f Kuo Sung-t'ao, Liu 
Hsi-hung and Chang Te-yi. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 72
89 See Satö Shin’ichi, Kindai chügoku no chishikijin to bunmei, p. 83
90 Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, p. 98
91 Satö Shin’ichi, Kindai chügoku no chishikijin to bunmei, p. 66. The translation of the passage in Prince 
Gong’s memorial is rendered from Teng and Fairbank, China ’s Response to the West, p. 98
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Chinese domestic and international law indicated that this view was widely accepted by the 
Chinese elite at the time.
Immanuel C. Y. Hsii confirms this point, and argues that despite China’s ‘discovery’ 
of international law, the Chinese elites failed to make full use of it, and even as time passed, 
their views of the law did not depart radically from Prince Gong’s. Hsii gives two reasons 
for this. First, there was deep-seated fear of foreign demands, and the safest policy at the 
time was seen as avoiding any further disputes with the European powers by appeasing 
them as much as possible.92 International law was thus reduced to ‘a diplomatic reference 
book with which the Ch’ing [Qing] officials might restrain “wild” foreign consuls and 
avoid diplomatic mistakes. ’ 93 Second, he notes the unequal treatment meted out by the 
European powers were not seen as a grave threat to China. The ‘unequal treaties’ signified 
‘uncivilised’ status within European International Society, but China had yet to accept the 
social standards of the Society, and refused to be judged by them. While constructivist 
insights have noted that a ‘negative reputation’ within the international political community 
can at times constrain an actor and force it to conform with international norms, 94 this 
(except when outright coercion is used to force compliance) is only effective when the actor 
shares the social values held by the community. The lack of common values between 
China and European International Society meant that the Chinese elite perceived no 
‘shame’ in its negative reputation as a ‘semi-civilised’ state, and consequently felt little 
need to improve their social position within the Society. Adherence to international law 
was a marker of ‘civilised’ status within European International Society, but in the eyes of 
many Chinese elites, China was equally (if not more) civilised than the European powers. 
There was no need to demonstrate their ‘civilised’ identity by adopting international law, 
bar in the face of coercion and the necessity to occasionally deal with the troublesome 
Westerners.95
92 This was known as the ij im i\  or ‘loose rein’ policy, and had a long-standing place in China’s diplomacy, 
particularly when dealing with northern nomads who were militarily stronger than the Chinese dynasty at 
the time.
93 Immanuel C. Y. Hsii, China ’s Entrance into the Family o f Nations, p. 145 For similar points, see Jacques 
deLisle, ‘China’s Approach to International Law: A Historical Perspective’, American Society of 
International Law: Proceedings o f the Annual Meeting (Washington 2000, pp. 267-275), p. 271 and 
Gong, ‘China’s Entry into International Society’, p. 181.
94 See Klotz, Norms in International Relations, pp. 30-31 and John M. Hobson, ‘What’s at stake in 
“bringing historical sociology back into international relations?’, p. 25
95 Xue Fucheng notes this point in his polemic, ‘Lun zhongguo zai gongfa wai zhi hai’. ‘Asian countries’, 
he writes, ‘claim that their customs, political institutions and language are different, and rejected 
international law from the beginning’. As Xue’s essay was in part intended as a political message to call
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Hsü is thus certainly correct that the Chinese elite adopted international law as a 
matter of expediency, but he does not explicitly mention the contradictory effects of the 
dualities of European International Society and international law, and how these 
contributed to the inability of international law to attain any form of legitimacy. To explain 
the persistence of suspicion towards international law despite its acceptance by some of the 
Chinese elite, one should take note of the following two additional factors. First, the sense 
of injustice felt by the Chinese must not be underestimated. As Jacques deLisle states, 
‘...as Chinese scholars and officials learned about the newly encountered barbarians’ 
international law, ...[t]hey expressed outrage at foreign states’ use of ostensibly neutral or 
universal legal doctrines to advance self-interested agendas, and the great powers’...actions 
[undertaken] against China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.’96 This again lessened the 
chances that the European powers would be seen as a source of emulation.
Second, we should note that positive sentiments towards international law were based 
primarily on observations of European international relations. In the nineteenth century, 
the dualistic European International Society and the rise of positive international law meant 
that there existed two very different sets of norms that governed European International 
Society’s relations with European states, on the one hand, and non-European states on the 
other. The Chinese were beginning to develop an awareness of this. Li Hongzhang noted 
bitterly in 1879 that the unequal treaties which China had signed with the European powers 
went against the stipulations of international law, and placed them beyond the pale of its 
protection. Li wrote: ‘when China signed treaties with Britain and France before, it was 
under the threat of force. We were threatened and deceived. These treaties cause losses 
and they are outside the scope of international law [J/ttud3
for China to adopt international law, we must take some exaggeration into consideration. However, 
Xue’s claims do give us a glimpse of how international law was initially considered a fundamentally 
alien concept. See Xue Fucheng, Chouyang chuyi, p. 156.
96 deLisle, ‘China’s Approach to International Law: A Historical Perspective’, p. 271. For instance, 
dismissing any reliance on international law as ‘stupid (M )’, Zhang Zhidong argued: ‘If there is a 
balance in power there can be law, but if there is an imbalance, there is little room for law. Since ancient 
times when various states dealt with each other, if their strength was equal they competed with bravery, if 
they were equal in bravery they competed with guile. There has never been such a thing as international 
law that controls states ^  3k^iJ[I]f0k!FZlt]±. ÄsftEl
iP§ fh HiL See Zhang Zhidong, Quan xue bian. (Shanghai:
Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2002), p. 73.
9' Li Hongzhang, ‘Tuochou qiuan zhe’, Li Hongzhang quanji: zougao (vol. 3). (Changchun: Shidai wenyi 
chubanshe, 1998), p. 1541. Emphasis added. For another important document that notes China’s
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Fucheng also noted in 1892 that within Europe, small states were able to coexist among the 
great powers. However, with regard to China he noted that international law tended to 
protect the interests of the European powers, and that China was placed ‘beyond the pale of 
international law gongfa zhi w ai)\9& He criticised previous political decision­
makers for this:
Once upon a time, the Westerners used international law to criticise us. The political 
elite at the time, replied: ‘China does not want to enter relations with you based on 
international law. Chinese and Western customs are different, how can you force us to 
be the same? We really do not care about international law.’ Since then, the 
Westerners have said that China is beyond the pale of international law, and we have 
not been able to enjoy the benefits of international law....If we were strong...nobody 
would accuse us if we opposed international law and refused to deal with Westerners.
But since we are weak, if we had adhered to international law, at least we would not 
have suffered as badly (as we have). What harm the past officials’ careless remarks 
have caused us!"
Xue’s views were, however, in a minority. Chinese political institutions were seen as 
equally, if not more, ‘civilised’ by many members o f the elite saw no need for a 
fundamental reconfiguration of China’s identity along the lines of European models.100 In 
their eyes, what was needed to be afforded the protection of international law was military 
power. This attitude was typical of the Chinese elite of this period. Subsequently, rather 
than meticulously complying with international law and demonstrating their ‘civilised’ 
identity (as judged by European International Society), most of the Chinese political elite 
advocated continuing on the path of accumulating military power. The results were 
recurring violations of international law and military coercion by the European powers -  all 
of which served to reproduce Chinese moral outrage and the rejection of international law.
Chinese perceptions o f diplomacy
The Chinese elites’ engagement with the institution of diplomacy took place amid sustained 
pressure by the members of European International Society to adopt Western-styled 
diplomacy. For the European powers, the persistence of the diplomatic system of the East 
Asian international order disadvantaged them in at least two aspects. Firstly, the continued 
Sinocentrism constituted an insult to the European powers. Secondly, the European powers
position as ‘beyond the pale of international law’, see Xue Fucheng, ‘Lun zhongguo zai gongfa wai zhi 
hai’, Chouycing chuyi, pp. 156-157
98 See Xue Fucheng ‘Lun zhongguo zai gongfa wai zhi hai’ in Chouyang chuyi, p. 157
99 ibid.
100 It should be mentioned, however, that Xue did advocate the reform of some political institutions, and this 
in itself was considered radical during his time.
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found that the system put international matters in the hands of provincial officials whose 
political interests lay primarily in local matters, hindering diplomatic intercourse with the 
central government. This latter aspect was particularly problematic as it rendered the 
European powers unable to pressure the imperial government to control anti-foreign riots 
and protect Western life and property within China.101 China’s adoption of European 
practices of diplomacy, it was believed, would enable the European powers to pressure the 
imperial government directly to put an end to these grievances. Furthermore, in the age of 
imperialism, there existed ‘mutual distrust among the British, French, and Russians, with 
each fearing the partition of China... an arena where the powers could jealously watch one 
another, preferably in Peking, the center of China’s politics’ was desirable.102
The Chinese, for their part, balked at the idea. The Xianfeng emperor and a 
significant number of conservatives within the court were bitterly opposed to the posting of 
Western diplomats in Beijing. Previously, Satö Shin’ichi argues, as ‘China did not [at least 
in theory] admit to the existence of states which stood on an equal footing of China, there 
was no way that the concept of diplomacy [among sovereign equals] could exist.’103 For 
them, the notion of foreign representatives in the imperial capital challenged China’s 
assumed superiority in the Sinocentric order.104 The very idea of foreign representatives 
demanding direct audiences with the emperor and possibly refusing to kowtow to him was 
equally unacceptable. The European powers were determined to impose their demands on 
China, however, and the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin (which followed the Arrow War) finally 
established the right of European powers to permanently station diplomatic representatives 
at the capital.
Further developments took place after the skirmishes that followed the concluding of 
the Treaty of Tianjin and the British and French forces’ sacking of the Summer Palace. 
One was the establishment of the zongli yamen, a foreign ministry that was charged to deal 
with China’s relations with the European powers. This abolished the practice of interacting 
with Europeans through the offices that administered China’s hierarchical tributary 
relations, and highlighted the nominal endorsement of one of the most fundamental
101 Banno Masataka, China and the West 1858-1861: The Origins o f the Tsungli Yamen. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 13-14.
102 ibid., pp. 17-18
103 Satö Shin’ichi, Kindai chügoku no chishikijin to bunmei, p. 61
104 Banno Masataka, China and the West 1858-1861, p. 36. This point is further elaborated by Immanuel C. 
Y. Hstl, China's Entrance into the Family o f Nations, pp. 111-113
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normative features of the Society, sovereign equality, and signified a modification of the 
hierarchical East Asian international order.105 The event has been described by Yongjin 
Zhang as ‘the beginning of the end of the traditional tributary system...and the acceptance 
of the existence of foreign relations defined by the European international society.’106
We should not overemphasise the significance of this, however. While China is seen 
to have accepted -  at least nominally -  the concept of sovereign equality in the Treaty of 
Tianjin in 1861, the Chinese’ adoption of diplomacy also shows a certain sense of 
expediency, rather than a ‘progressive desire to conform government institutions and 
international relations to Europe’s accepted standard’ as argued by Gerrit Gong.107 
‘Psychologically,’ Immanuel Hsii states, ‘the majority of mandarins eschewed foreign 
affairs as beneath their dignity and foreign assignment as a form of banishment’108
Cultural differences aside, we must also note the fact that European-styled diplomacy 
was clearly forced upon the Chinese. Prince Gong’s memorial of 1861 which proposed the 
establishment of the zongli yamen clearly confirmed that the introduction of European- 
styled diplomacy was merely a temporary measure to control the Western powers, until 
China could attain the power to militarily ward them off.109 The memorial stated that when 
‘the affairs of the various countries are simplified, the new office will be abolished and its 
functions will again revert to the Grand Council fo r  management so as to accord with the 
old system Y 10 This clearly highlights that the adoption of some features of European-styled 
diplomacy were, at least at the beginning, motivated by self-interest. The new institution
105 This point is supported by Gong, ‘China’s Entry into International Society’, p. 180. Evidence of this can 
be found in the question of granting Western diplomats audiences with the emperor without the kowtow. 
In response to a query on this matter, Zuo Zongtang ‘wrote emphatically that the audience the Western 
powers asked was no more than reasonable, since China had already recognised them as equals.’ See 
Wright, The Last Stand o f Chinese Conservatism, p. 273. Article 3 of the Treaty of Tianjin stipulated: 
‘He [the British Representative] shall not be called upon to perform any ceremony derogatory to him as 
representing the sovereign of an independent nation, on a footing of equality with that of China. On the 
other hand, he shall use the same forms of ceremony and respect to His Majesty the Emperor as are 
employed by the Ambassadors, Ministers, or Diplomatic Agents of Her Majesty towards the sovereigns 
of independent and equal European nations.’ Cited in Tseng-Tsai Wang, ‘The Audience Question: 
Foreign Representatives and the Emperor of China, 1858-1873’, The Historical Journal (vol. 14, no. 3, 
September 1971, pp. 617-626), p. 618
106 Yongjin Zhang, China in the International System, 1918-20, p. 18. Also see Masataka Banno, China and 
the West 1858-1861, p. 1.
107 Gong, The Standard o f ‘Civilisation’ in International Society, p. 150. Emphasis added.
108 Immanuel C. Y. Hsii, The Rise o f Modern China, p. 305
109 See Prince Gong’s memorial in Jiang Tingfu (ed) Jindai zhongguo waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao (shang juan). 
(Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1982), pp. 323-324. Also see Teng and Fairbank, China’s 
Response to the West, p. 48
110 Jiang Tingfu (ed) Jindai zhongguo waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao (shang juan). (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu 
yinshuguan, 1982), p. 324. Translation rendered from Teng and Fairbank, China’s Response to the West, 
p. 48. Emphasis added.
ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE 133
had not attained legitimacy, and its acceptance was contingent only on whether or not its 
benefits outweighed the costs of not having them. This superficial nature of China’s 
adoption of European diplomatic practice points to the fact that the institution of diplomacy 
had yet to gain sufficient legitimacy in the early 1860s."1
However, events did not proceed as Prince Gong had hoped in his memorial. The 
European powers were there to stay, and now began pressing the Chinese elite to send 
diplomatic missions themselves. This, however, was again at odds with the Sinocentric 
notions of superiority, as it implied reciprocal relations among equals, and the Chinese 
resisted."2 The European diplomats recognised this. The British Minister, for instance, 
stated that ‘Britain would not be satisfied that China had dropped its pretensions to 
superiority until a Chinese plenipotentiary had been accredited’, and other European 
powers echoed these views.113 Furthermore, the Western diplomats impressed the Chinese 
upon the benefits of adopting such an institution. Thomas Wade, the British Minister, 
presented two advantages that could be gained: first, increased and direct communication 
could reduce misunderstandings and the possibility of war between China and the Western 
powers. Second, it could afford China greater protection from other Western states."4
In response, the zongli yamen despatched a secret letter to seek the views of the 
leading high officials at the time."5 The zongli yamen pointed out that the sending of 
diplomatic missions abroad would benefit China in two ways: first, China would be able to 
collect first-hand information of the European powers and be able to interact with them 
more effectively. ‘This would be in keeping with the ancient Chinese military exhortation:
111 Ian Hurd argues that if a system and its rules lack legitimacy and are adhered to only out of self-interest, 
‘[a]ctors are constantly recalculating the expected payoff to remaining in the system and stand ready to 
abandon it immediately should some alternative promise greater utility.’ Prince Gong’s statement seems 
to readily match this pattem of behaviour. See Ian Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International 
Politics’, International Organization (vol. 53, no. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 379-408), p. 387
112 Satö Shin’ichi, Kindai chügoku no chishikijin to bunmei, pp. 88-89
113 Knight Biggerstaff, ‘The Secret Correspondence of 1867-1868: Views of Leading Chinese Statesmen 
Regarding the Further Opening of China to Western Influence’, The Journal o f Modern History (vol. 22, 
no. 2, June 1950, pp. 122-136), p. 127.
114 Owen H. H. Wong, A New Profde in Sino-Western Diplomacy: The First Chinese Minister to Great 
Britain. (Kowloon, Hong Kong: Chung Hwa Book, 1987, p. 11
115 The Yamen received replies from Zuo Zongtang (governor general of Shaangan), Ruilin (governor- 
general of Liangguang), Duxing’a (military governor of Shengjing), Ding Baozhen (governor of 
Shandong), Li Hanzhang (acting governor-general of Huguang and governor of Jiangsu), Shen Baozhen 
(commissioner in charge of the Fuzhou dockyard), Jiang Yili (governor of Guangdong), Zeng Guofan 
(grand secretary and governor general of Liangjiang), Yinggui (Tartar general at Fuzhou), Liu Kunyi 
(governor of Jiangxi), Chonghou (superintendent of trade for the three northern ports and vice-president 
of the board of war), Wu Tang (governor-general of Minzhe), Li Hongzhang (governor general of 
Huguang), Ma Xinyi (governor of Zhejiang), Li Futai (governor of Fujian), Guo Boyin (acting governor 
of Jiangsu and governor of Hubei), and Guanwen (acting govern or-general of Zhili).
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“Know your enemy as you know yourself.’” 116 Second, it was asserted that the sending of 
missions abroad would help bypass the domineering European representatives in China. 
The replies sent to the zongli yamen were largely supportive of sending Chinese diplomats 
abroad, and ‘conceded the desirability of obtaining by this means firsthand information 
about foreign countries’,117 as well as protecting overseas Chinese.118 These views were 
reinforced following a number of diplomatic disputes with the European powers,119 and 
eventuated in the decision to despatch Guo Songtao as China’s first ambassador in 1876.
But ambivalence towards European diplomats persisted, and this can again be 
attributed to China’s experience of engaging with European International Society’s 
coercive mode of interaction. Despite acknowledging the utility of adopting the Society’s 
diplomatic institutions, many of the political elite continued to see Western diplomats as 
highly domineering and adopting a coercive stance in their dealings with the Chinese.120 
Despite their acknowledgements of the benefits of diplomacy, even the memorials sent to 
the zongli yamen in response to the ‘secret letter’ were, according to a British Consulate 
report of 22nd May 1868, ‘more or less bitter against foreigners, accusing them of a desire 
to subvert the Empire, to reap harvest sown by the industry of the natives’.121
110 Biggerstaff, ‘The Secret Correspondence of 1867-1868’, p. 128 
ibid.
118 This point was made by Li Futai in his reply to the secret letter circulated by the zongli yamen. See also 
Wang Tao, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, p. 44-47. Zeng Guofan was of the opinion that ‘the terms of amity 
between us and other nations will necessarily bring about constant intercourse’ and the ‘duty of an Envoy 
is to represent the dignity of the Government, and to smooth over difficulties. On the whole, therefore, 
(the despatch of an Envoy), may be conceded.’ British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and 
Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, (part I, series E, Asia, 1860-1914, vol. 20: China’s 
Rehabilitation and Treaty Revision, 1866-1869) (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of 
America, 1994), p. 160. Zeng’s original reply can also be found in Zeng Guofan quanji: Zougao (vol. 9). 
(Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 1994), pp. 5784-5787. Li Hongzhang suggested that ‘Chinese representatives 
in foreign countries would be in a position to study Western developments which China might adopt to 
strengthen itself against further foreign aggression.’ Cited in Biggerstaff, ‘The Secret Correspondence of 
1867-1868’, p. 128.
119 These incidents included the 1870 mission to France to apologise for the Tianjin massacre, the 1874 
dispute with Japan over Taiwan (which will be examined in later chapters), and the Sino-British dispute 
over the 1875 murder of British consulate officer Augustus R. Margary. See Immanuel C. Y. Hsti, 
China’s Entrance into the Family o f Nations, pp. 167-179
120 See, for example, Wang Tao, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, p. 88. Such sentiments were even held by some 
British diplomats. Lord Elgin, who concluded the Treaty of Tianjin, was appalled by the high-handed 
attitude of some members of the British diplomatic legation in China.
121 British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. 
(part I, senes E, Asia, 1860-1914, vol. 20: China’s Rehabilitation and Treaty Revision, 1866-1869), p. 
161. This is confirmed by Biggerstaff, ‘The Secret Correspondence of 1867-1868’, p. 135. It is 
interesting to note that officials such as Xue Fucheng who had first-hand experience of diplomatic 
practice within the core of European International Society did criticise traditional Chinese diplomacy as 
being the root-cause of this. Xue claimed that China had previously refused to engage in diplomacy 
because of its clinging to the norms of the Sinocentric international order, and it was China’s 
unwillingness to engage with European diplomats that had encouraged them to adopt a coercive stance to
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When China began to send its officials abroad, however, alternative views began to 
appear.122 Some Chinese had the opportunity to witness the mode of interaction which 
applied within Europe, and, consequently, how diplomacy among ‘civilised’ states was 
conducted. There was also some appreciation of the effective functioning of diplomacy 
among ‘civilised’ states. Wang Tao claimed that in Europe ‘diplomacy relies on certain 
principles, and is therefore carried out with courtesy td
).’123 Meanwhile, Xue Fucheng, who had first-hand experience of diplomatic practice 
among ‘civilised’ members of European International Society, observed in 1891 that while 
Western diplomats stationed in China were domineering and troublesome, within Europe 
the diplomats
.. .appeared to have some rules in their dealings with one another. They deal with each 
other with courtesy and manners, and they pay special attention to friendship. They do 
not show any intentions of relying on force to bully others, and neither do they rely on 
tactics and tricks. Not only British and French diplomats, but all the [European] 
uiplomals are like this.124
Similar views pervaded the views of Guo Songtao, China’s first Minister to Britain, whose 
aforementioned entry in his diary noted that Western states interacted with one another on 
the basis of common ethics. It was this perception of diplomacy based on shared values 
that led Xue Fucheng to criticise traditional Chinese diplomacy as being the root-cause of 
European ‘gunboat diplomacy’. He claimed that China had previously refused to engage in 
diplomacy because of its clinging to the norms of the Sinocentric international order, 
without recognising the moral dimension of European diplomacy. He was particularly 
critical of the foreign policies of the Daoguang and Xianfeng era. It was China’s 
unwillingness to engage with European diplomats that had encouraged the latter to adopt a 
coercive stance to get their demands or grievances m et.125 Such views of diplomacy 
reflected the complex process of engagement between European International Society and 
China. On the one hand, first-hand observation of the institution and its functioning within
get their demands or grievances met. Xue Fucheng, 20th day, 6th Month, 1891, in ‘Chushi riji xuke’, 
Chouyang chuyi, p. 128
122 But many Chinese were still opposed to the sending of Chinese diplomats abroad. Upon hearing of Guo 
Songtao’s appointment as first Chinese envoy to Britain, one official lamented: ‘Kuo Sung-tao [Guo 
Songtao] stands out for his learning and literary talents, but he should not have accepted the mission to 
the West! I am truly regretful for him.’ Cited in Hao and Wang, ‘Changing Chinese views of Western 
relations, 1840-95’, p. 183
123 Wang Tao, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, p. 47
124 Xue Fucheng, ‘Chushi riji xuke’, Chouyang chuyi (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1994), p. 127.
125 Xue Fucheng, ‘Chushi riji xuke’, Chouyang chuyi (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1994), p. 128
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‘civilised’ Europe made a favourable impression with individuals such as Xue Fucheng. 
His critique of Sinocentrism is, in a sense, an admission that the European powers were just 
as ‘civilised’ as China was, and their diplomatic institutions were well worth adopting.
But on the other hand, the reality in China was that the members of the Society 
deemed China as ‘uncivilised’ and adopted the coercive mode of interaction to ensure the 
Qing adhered to the ‘standard of civilisation’ and ‘enlighten’ its policies. European 
diplomats were consequently viewed with suspicion. In Chinese elites’ eyes, diplomacy 
thus often became a form of war. Wang Tao wrote that diplomats ‘use their brushes to 
battle, their tongues to battle, and their minds/hearts to battle. There is no concrete form of 
control here, and victories are gained without using soldiers.’ 126 To survive in this 
competitive arena, China needed to train intelligent diplomats that could adapt to any 
condition in international politics. The usefulness of diplomats in such a world was noted in 
Ma Jianzhong’s letter from Marseille in 1878. ‘[Beginning with the edicts of Emperor 
Han Wudi, it was deemed proper to refer to envoys in the same breath as generals and 
ministers. We can thus see how important they must have been!’127 Here, the allusion to 
the role of diplomacy to ensure a state’s survival is clear: Wudi was famed for his foreign 
policy of forging alliances with non-Chinese states to counter the threat from the nomads in 
northern China.128 Ma points to the vital role that could be played by diplomacy in ensuring 
China’s survival. In a separate letter to a friend from Paris, he admiringly writes about the 
exploits of Machiavelli, stating: ‘Considering that Florence is such a small place, what 
would it have done without the diplomatic letters of Machiavelli to convince the powerful 
merchants of Venice and take away the ambitions of France?’129 What China needed was 
more intelligent diplomats. Chinese diplomats, argued Ma, were considered by the 
Western diplomats a laughing stock. Professional diplomats in the Han dynasty were of 
much higher ability. ‘Their intelligence, courage and resourcefulness had to be
126 Wang Tao, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, p. 47
127 Ma Jianzhong, ‘Reply from Marseille to a Friend’, Strengthen the Country> and Enrich the People: The 
Reform Writings o f Ma Jianzhong (1845-1900) (Durham East Asia Series, no. 2). (Richmond, Surrey: 
Curzon Press, 1998), p. 51
128 See Paul J. Bailey’s notes in ibid., p. 55, fn. 9.
129 Ma Jianzhong, ‘Bali fu youren shu’ in Caixi xueyi. (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1994), p. 161
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exceptional; their urbanity and wide learning had to be sufficient so as to cope with any 
situation’, and they needed to know the courtesies of diplomacy. 130
Meiji Japanese perceptions o f war, great powers and the balance o f power 
Japanese perceptions of the institution of war were similar to those of the Chinese. The 
Western powers themselves did not show a strong interest in colonising Japan, and 
consequently, Satö Seizaburö argues, ‘the view of imminent war in which Japan’s very 
survival was at stake’ receded after the Meiji Restoration. 131 However, this did not mean 
that the Meiji leadership had begun to see their international environment as a secure one. 
Indeed, as Satö states:
...even when the direct threats of war had faded away, “wars” such as “economic 
wars” or “diplomatic wars” were constantly on the minds of [the Japanese]. Therefore, 
the “Warring States” analogy, while taking a different form, remained and returned as 
the framework of analysis for international affairs whenever an international crisis 
broke out. 132
In such a dangerous world, neither the great powers nor the balance of power were 
initially seen as playing the role of maintaining order, at least within Asia. The maintenance 
of the balance of power among the European powers did, as Toyama Shigeki argues, keep 
any outright expansion in check at the time of early Meiji Japan. 133 However, this did not 
stop the great powers from stripping Japan of its sovereign prerogatives. In fact, the 
Western powers joined up to force Japan to sign unequal treaties, and, through the Most 
Favoured Nation clause, made sure any economic benefits to be derived from trading with 
Japan would be equally enjoyed by all powers. This meant that the institution’s ability to 
protect smaller, lesser states was viewed with some suspicion.
On the other hand, as the Japanese began to develop a greater awareness of the two 
different modes of interaction within the Society, they acknowledged the roles the balance 
of power and great powers played in maintaining order. The Iwakura Mission’s records
130 Ma Jianzhong, ‘Reply from Marseille to a Friend’, Strengthen the Country and Enrich the People: The 
Reform Writings o f Ma Jianzhong (1845-1900) (Durham East Asia Series, no. 2). (Richmond, Surrey: 
Curzon Press, 1998), p. 51
131 Satö Seizaburö, ‘Bakumatsu, Meiji shoki ni okeru taigai ishiki no shoruikei’, p. 28
132 ibid.
133 Another factor was that economic expansionism was still in command during the West’s expansion to 
Japan, and informal economic imperialism was consequently the main form of expansion the West 
adopted. See Toyama Shigeki, ‘Meiji shonen no gaikö ishiki’ in Ronshü nihon rekishi kankökai and 
Haraguchi Munehisa (eds), Ronshü nihon rekishi (vol. 9): Meiji ishin. (Tokyo: Yüseidö shuppan, 1973), 
p. 131.
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indicate that its members noted that ‘the states of Europe all differ in size and strength, and 
their independence is preserved because the five great powers maintain a balance of 
power.’ 134 They noticed that small states like Belgium were able to maintain their 
autonomy thanks to their military morale and agreements among European states ‘not to 
use Belgium as a route for advancing their armies’, which can be interpreted as a form of 
balance of power, as it prevented the annexation of Belgium and the destabilising of the 
balance.135 Furthermore, there emerged an understanding that this institution applied to 
states of a similar identity. Fukuzawa Yukichi the highly influential Meiji
intellectual, noted ‘at times, among states o f a similar kind, if a smaller state is on the brink 
of disaster [i.e. invasion], others will come to its aid. This balancing is known as the 
“balance of power” • 7 7  • / \ 7 ) ’.136
However, in East Asia this was a different story. Again, Fukuzawa forwarded a 
perceptive explanation of the reasons, again pointing to differences in identity:
At the end of the day, the balance of power only gets implemented [among the 
European powers] because emotionally the Europeans feel empathy for those of a same 
kind. However here in the Orient they stand by and watch Westerners do whatever 
they want; not one of them intervenes to stop this.137
Here, Fukuzawa identified the key social logic of nineteenth-century European 
International Society: the demand for homogeneity. He concentrates primarily on racial 
similarities in the passage above, and does not mention the ‘standard of civilisation’, which 
was also a key component of this ‘sameness’ the Society required if a new entrant was to be 
subjected to the ‘coexistence’ mode of interaction. However, racial difference was an 
important element of ‘civilised’ identity within European society (both domestic and 
international) at this time, and his opinions must be concluded as extremely astute.
Dualistic observations also permeated Japanese views of the great powers. Japanese 
who observed European international politics came to the view that the balance of power, 
which protected the smaller, weaker European states, was maintained by the great powers. 
Nakae Chömin ('fQXjiSK) pointed to this in his famous satirical work, Sansuijin keirin 
mondö (E ü #  He claims that there exists some form of common ethics
134 Kume Kunitake, Beiö kairan jikki (vol. 4). (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1980), p. 106. The five great powers 
here are Britain, France, Germany, Austro-Hungary and Russia.
135 Kume Kunitake, Beiö kairan jikki (vol. 3). (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1979), p. 190
136 Cited in Hatsuse Ryühei, ‘“Datsua ron” saikö’ in Hirano Ken’ichirö (ed) Kindai nippon to ajia: bunka no 
koryü to masatsu. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1984), p. 27. Emphasis added.
Cited in ibid.137
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(although fragile) within European diplomacy, which is in turn indicative of his awareness 
of a societal element within European international relations. Nakae explicitly points out in 
the same work that this ‘balance o f power’ is not a fortuitous one, but an ‘idea’ that is 
consciously maintained The implication is that the great powers, because
of their sheer preponderance, play a crucial role in this.
All states, at first glance, may seem as relying only on power and not ethics, but power 
does not matter to the degree that many people think. If one country out of Prussia,
France, Britain and Russia became too powerful, perhaps they would rely on force and 
ignore international law. But this isn’t the case today. Because a balance of power is 
maintained, these great powers have no choice but to adhere to international lawr to 
some extent, and this is why many smaller states [in Europe] escape being swallowed 
up.139
Despite this evidence of increased knowledge of European international politics and 
the existence of a separate mode of interaction, the great powers continued to be viewed 
with the utmost suspicion and were regarded as the biggest threat to the survival of the 
Japanese state. Here, we see the effects of Japan’s engagement with the Society’s more 
coercive, ‘civilising’ mode of interaction. Yamagata Aritomo’s statement in 1880 is a 
typical example:
Now it is said that that the Western countries do not massacre other tribes like ancient 
barbarians, but merely paralyse a state’s armies and use their own soldiers to bring 
about the capitulation of others. Therefore, they will not take over others’ 
lands.. ..Now how can that be true? It is not about the West not doing this or not being 
able to do this, it is merely about them caring about their own gains. Therefore we see 
Poland being split into three and India being swallowed up by Britain. Is this not about 
seizing another state?...The Western states compete with each other over their 
weapons, each vying to overtake another...they are like greedy wolves and eye each 
other like tigers, trying to take advantage of the slightest chance presented to them.. .14°
The great powers were thus viewed in a contradictory fashion. They were not only 
sources of fear, but also sources of emulation. As Japan increasingly sought to be judged 
by the social standards of European International Society, many Japanese came to admire 
the industrial and technological progress the European great powers had attained, and 
sought to model Japan on them. Furthermore, as Japan’s engagement with the dualistic 
European International Society deepened, there also began to emerge an understanding that 
a ‘civilised’ state was also given the prerogative to ‘civilise’ the ‘barbarous’ polities, and as
138 Nakae Chomin, Sansuijin keirin mondö. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001), p. 201
139 ibid., pp. 200-201. The translation here is based on Kuwabara Takeo and Shimada Kenji’s modem 
Japanese translation, which can be found in pp. 102-103.
140 Yamagata Aritomo, ‘Shin rinpö heibi ryakuhyö’ in Yamagata Aritomo ikensho, p. 91
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the most ‘civilised’ entity in East Asia, Japan had the prerogative to enlighten its barbarous 
Asian neighbours, just like the European powers. This dualistic understanding of the great 
powers was to have important consequences in subsequent Meiji Japanese imperialism, and 
will be examined in greater detail in the following chapters.
Meiji Japanese perceptions o f diplomacy and international law
In similar fashion to the Chinese, the Japanese initially found the introduction of the 
European-styled institutions of diplomacy difficult. There was strong resistance to 
allowing foreigners to reside in Japan, leading to the ouster of the röjü Hotta Masayoshi. 
Under the tairö (jk.%) Ii Naosuke the Tokugawa shogunate eventually forced
through the signing of the 1858 Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States 
and Japan. This paved the way for increasing foreign diplomatic presence on Japanese soil, 
but also resulted in Ii Naosuke’s assassination two years later. There were, however, calls 
to adopt the institution of diplomacy, even from the shogunate’s opponents. Iwakura 
Tomomi, for instance, argued in 1867 that the sending of diplomatic missions could help 
Japan collect valuable information about the European states.142 In his letter of 1865, 
Terashima Munenori who later became foreign minister, also wrote that if
Japan wanted to protect itself from the European powers and achieve parity with them, ‘it is 
time for the ruler of Japan to open his eyes and rid Japan of old habits. Japan must be 
reborn. This means that Japan must send ambassadors to several great powers overseas’.143
Japan’s seemingly eager participation in the diplomatic system should not be taken as 
a sign of an immediate and full commitment to the norms of diplomacy of European 
International Society, however. Although Terashima’s letter above is partially in favour of 
introducing elements of Western-styled diplomacy, his statements took place in the context 
of overthrowing the Tokugawa regime. His statements are not only a reflection of his 
engagement with European International Society, but also a desire to overthrow the 
domestic political order, and should not be taken at face value.
The diplomatic system of exchanging envoys gained increasing acceptance in the 
Meiji period, and the leadership did indeed continue to participate in European styled
141 The tairö outranked the röjü and was the highest official position within the Tokugawa bureaucracy. The 
post was created only at times when the shogun was deemed in need of assistance in political decision­
making.
142 Yasuoka Akio, ‘Iwakura Tomomi no gaikö seiryaku’, Hösei shigaku (vol. 21, 1969, pp. 1-23), pp. 7-8
143 Cited in Inuzuka Takaaki, ‘Meiji shoki gaikö shidösha no taigai ninshiki: Soejima Taneomi to Terashima 
Munenori o chüshin ni’ Kokusai seiji (no. 102, February 1993, pp. 22-38), p. 24
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diplomacy (Japanese diplomats were, for instance, dispatched to Germany, France, and the 
United States in 1871). But Western diplomacy and its diplomats were seen as inherently 
coercive. Some of this thinking was a result of memories of events in the 1850s and 1860s: 
members of the Meiji elite had witnessed European ‘gunboat diplomacy’ for themselves.144 
Inoue Kaoru and Itö Hirobumi, who were from the Chöshü fiefdom, had witnessed the 
European powers bombard the city of Shimonoseki in August 1864, in retaliation for the 
Chöshü fiefdom’s attacks on foreign ships in the previous year. The ensuing settlement 
(which was concluded in the shogun’s name) resulted in an indemnity of three million 
Mexican Dollars, and continued to place a terrible burden on the Meiji government after the 
Meiji Restoration. Diplomacy was thus seen as an arena in which ‘exchanges of favours, 
threats, and secret treaties of war’145 are played out. In 1872, the secretary of the Iwakura 
mission noted: ‘In Western diplomacy (^HsUT chipuromachikku), on the surface everyone 
behaves in a friendly manner, but behind the scenes it is shot with deception and tricks.’146 
Without ‘extreme bravery and deep knowledge of European diplomacy,’ Japanese 
diplomats ‘could fall under the tricks of European diplomats and leave unspeakable 
national difficulties in the future.’147
In the minds of the Japanese leadership, one of the most important institutions in 
European International Society was international law. However, despite this agreement, the 
Japanese elites’ attitudes remained ambivalent.148 In his diary entry in 1868, Kido 
Takayoshi confessed his mistrust of international law, stating:
I am forced to believe that the military power of the Empire [Japan] must be great 
enough to deal with the great powers of the West as potential enemies. One cannot 
depend on international law without having a well-prepared military force. Many 
countries use the cloak of international law to seek their own interest in dealing with 
weaker nations. This is one of the reasons that I call international law a mere tool for 
depriving a weak nation of its rights.149
144 See W. G. Beasley, ‘The foreign threat and the opening of the ports’ in Marius B. Jansen (ed), The 
Cambridge History o f Japan (vol. 5): The Nineteenth Century. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), pp. 259-307
145 Itö Hirobumi (ed) ‘Jöyaku kaisei ni kansuru hökoku’ in Itö Hirobumi (ed), Hishoruisan: Gaikö hen (vol. 
1). (Tokyo: Hishoruisan kankökai, 1936), p. 167
146 Kume Kunitake, Beiö kairan jikki (vol. 3)., p. 116
147 Itö Hirobumi (ed) ‘Jöyaku kaisei ni kansuru hökoku’, Hishoruisan: Gaikö hen (vol. 1), p. 167
148 A brief, albeit useful summary of Japanese views on international law can be found in Yasuoka Akio, 
Bakumatsu is hin no ryödo to gaikö. (Osaka: Seibundö, 2002), pp. 16-18
149 Kido Takayoshi, The Diary o f Kido Takayoshi (vol. 1). (Sidney Devere Brown and Akiko Hirota, trans). 
(Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1983), 8th Day of the Eleventh Month (21st December), 1868, p. 148
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Such views may well have been strengthened by the opinions o f other international 
leaders. During the Iwakura mission’s fact-finding visit to Berlin in 1872, the famous 
practitioner of power politics, Bismarck, offered the Japanese delegation his views of 
international politics. The Japanese delegation concluded that Bismarck’s words ‘were 
extremely meaningful, and we should take note of his mastering o f diplomatic courtesy and 
political manoeuvring.’150 Bismarck’s remarks on international politics appear to have 
made a deep impression on the Japanese delegation, and are worth citing in length:
...although all states of the world nowadays interact with each other in a friendly and 
courteous manner, this is entirely superficial. Behind the scenes, states both strong and 
weak compete with each other, and have little respect for each other. When I was 
young and Prussia was weak, the political leaders cared little for the country. Upon 
seeing the realities of small states I always felt aggrieved, and this has never left my 
mind. As for international law, it is supposed to be a law which protects the rights of 
states. However, once the interests of great powers are concerned, the law is used to 
protect the rights of the great powers, and if international law is contrary to the 
interests of the great powers, military might is used instead. Although small states may 
try to keep to the courtesies and rules of diplomacy to protect their independence, once 
they face military tactics (by others) it is usually the case that they are unable to 
maintain their independence.151
It is not surprising that the members of the Iwakura mission found Bismarck’s words 
of interest: despite the fact that states were supposed to be guaranteed their sovereignty, the 
Japanese found their sovereignty limited by the Treaty Port system. The realities of 
international law as stipulated in Western works seemed to have little resemblance to 
Japan’s reality. Moreover, the fact that Chinese translations of international war tended to 
emphasise the role of natural law in international law only served to highlight the 
disparities between the ideals and realities of an international order supposedly regulated by 
international law.152
But this does not mean that the Japanese elite failed to recognise that international 
law did exert a certain degree of normative influence, albeit within Europe. Hirosawa 
Saneomi who became councillor in the dajökan ( > f c : i § S n ! r )  government,153
acknowledged the role international law plays in protecting the sovereignty of states by 
stating in 1869 that ‘small states rely on this [international law] for their preservation,
150 Kume Kunitake, Beio kairan jikki (vol. 3), p. 330
151 ibid., p. 329
152 See Tanaka Tadashi, ‘Waga kuni ni okeru sensöhö no juyö to jissen: bakumatsu, meijiki o chüshin ni’ in 
Önuma Yasuaki (ed), Kokusaihö, kokusai rengö to nippon. (Tokyo: Köbundö, 1987), p. 396
153 The dajökan government refers to an early form of government in the Meiji era. It was modelled on the 
central government institutions of direct imperial rule that was established in the eighth century. The 
dajökan governmental structures continued until a cabinet was introduced in Japan in 1885.
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compelling the larger states to refrain from using threats and force.’154 Similarly, Sanjö 
Sanetomi who held the highest position of president o f the dajökan government,
acknowledged the function international law is supposed to serve in his memorial to 
Iwakura Tomomi in 1871:
The existence of international law (^ij[!]<£'/£ rekkoku köhö) is to enable states, with 
equal rights and free from the threats of aggression, to profit from trade and engage in 
diplomacy on equal terms. As states possess equal rights, it goes without saying that 
the treaties they sign are on equal terms. International law exists to preserve states’ 
independence, the balance of power and the benefits of diplomacy and allow states to 
enjoy the benefits of trade. It controls imbalances of power...and assists the norms of 
heaven and humanity.155
To a certain extent, the positive perceptions of international law in Japan was a result 
o f Chinese influence. One of Japan’s earliest introductions to international law was via the 
Wanguo gongfa (77[II4V/;fe Bankoku köhö in Japanese). As a result, early Japanese views 
tended to view international law as a form of natural law similar to Confucian ethics that 
was applicable to all nations, and this facilitated their acceptance of it to a degree.156
Japanese knowledge of international law was furthered by the introduction of positive 
international law. One of the more famous texts was Nishi Amane (M I^)’s Bankoku köhö, 
published in 1868. Nishi’s writings were based on the lectures given to him by Simon 
Vissering, professor of Leiden University in the Netherlands. Vissering made use of the 
most current treatises on international law for this purpose, and Taoka Ryöichi argues that 
Nishi’s work strongly suggests that Vissering had used Berlin legal positivist August 
Wilhelm Heffter’s work Das europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart for his lectures.157
It is not surprising, then, that Nishi’s Bankoku köhö reflects the influences of legal 
positivism. He describes international law as ‘ Western international law’ taisei
köhö], and this reflects the fact that international law was considered to apply only to
154 Cited in Yasuoka Akio, ‘Bankoku köho to Meiji gaiko’, Seiji keizai shigaku (no. 200, January, February 
and March 1983, pp. 188-199), 194
155 Sanjö Sanetomi, ‘Tokumei zenken taishi haken chögi no koto’ in Iwakura kö jikki (vol. 2) (Tada Kömon, 
ed). (Tokyo: Hara shobö, 1968), p. 927
156 Tanaka Tadashi, ‘Wagakuni ni okeru sensöhö nojuyö tojissen’, p. 396
157 Taoka Ryöichi, ‘Nishi Shüsuke “Bankoku köhö’” Kokusaihö gaikö zasshi (vol. 71, no. 1, 1972, pp. 1-57), 
pp. 24-25. While Vissering has been described elsewhere as an advocate of natural law by Richard H. 
Minear, Taoka Ryöichi notes that this view ignores the historical context of the time when positive 
international law was gaining ascendancy. The nineteenth century was a transitional time when despite 
the expansion of European International Society, international legal positivists such as Georg Friedrich 
von Martens continued to refer to the law as ‘European’ international law (Le droit des gens de VEurope 
or Das positive europäische Völkerrecht) to differentiate themselves from proponents of natural law. 
Richard H. Minear, ‘Nishi Amane and the Reception of Western Law in Japan’, Monumenta Nipponica 
(vol. 28, no. 2, Summer 1973, pp. 151-175), p. 156
ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE 144
certain polities -  the ‘civilised’ members of European International Society. 158 
Furthermore, it pointed towards the possibility that international law was not a universal 
discourse as Martin’s Bankoku köhö had suggested. N ishi’s translation reminded its 
readers that while ‘states which are able to effectively govern themselves and possess 
autonomy [ iü C O Ü ] are, in accordance with Western international law, entitled to equal 
rights with other states’, they were differentiated on the basis o f power [f^Tj seiryoku].159 
‘According to this power’, Nishi wrote, ‘European countries are classified as primary 
countries, secondary countries and third-rate countries [Cl 'O HKü
e < 7 > § & [ o]v6°
The introduction of positive international law into Japan increased the awareness that 
international law was selective (in the sense that it originated from and had traditionally 
only governed intra-European relations), and only those who were deemed ‘civilised’ could 
enjoy the protection of international law.161 Iwakura Tomomi, for his part, claimed in a 
memorial in 1875:
They say that international law is there to protect peaceful relations between states and 
preserve peace. The logic of international law is said to be precise, and its ethics 
[‘way’], wide-ranging and fair. If so, even if a state is poor, its soldiers weak and its 
polity is not formed, it has nothing to fear. However, this is certainly not the case. Is it 
not claimed that there is nothing better than self-protection [to preserve peace] (fl i l l  
11 jishu jigo)? Is it not also claimed that large states stand on equal terms with each 
other and maintain the balance of power for this, but they do not take part in 
international law?162
Iwakura’s comments are somewhat ambivalent and contradictory. On the one hand, 
he claims that the European powers are accorded equal status. The very notion of states
158 While Nishi mentioned that ‘Western international law’ derives from natural law, this is, Taoka argues, 
‘common in writings on international law in the eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century, when 
international legal studies gradually began shifting towards positive law’. Taoka Ryöichi, ‘Nishi 
ShQsuke “Bankoku köhö’” , p. 32
139 Cited in Yamamuro Shin’ichi Shisö kadai to shite no ajia: kijikn, rensa, töki, p. 231.
160 Cited in ibid. Emphasis added.
161 See Közai Shigeru, ‘Bakumatsu kaikokuki ni okeru kokusaihö no dönyü’, Högaku ronsö (vol. 97, no. 5, 
1975, pp. 1-38), p. 38; Sumiyoshi Yoshihito, ‘Meiji shoki ni okeru kokusaihö no dönyü’ Kokusaihö gaikö 
zasshi (vol. 71 no. 5-6, 1972, pp. 32-58); and Taoka Ryöichi, ‘Nishi Shüsuke “Bankoku köhö’”
162 Iwakura Tomomi ‘Tomomi gaikö no kimu o hitsuroku shi goran ni kyö suru koto’, Iwakura kö jikki 
(Tada Kömon,ed) (vol. 3). (Tokyo: Hara shobö, 1968), p. 233. Iwakura expressed similar sentiments in a 
separate memorial, where he claimed: ‘...it is claimed that trade...is supposed to be mutually beneficial 
and within the spirit of international law [T^iitl J tenchi no ködö, the way o f heaven and earth]. 
However, in reality the foreign countries only care about their own benefits, and care little for the other 
countries losses. Therefore, rhetoric such as sharing the profits o f the world and adhering to norms of the 
world is nothing but an excuse for foreign states to satisfy their greed.’ See ‘Tomomi seiji no sakugi o 
Nijö Naritaka ni jö zuru koto’, Iwakura kö jikki (Tada Kömon, ed) (vol. 2), p. 27
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standing as equals was a fundamental departure from the hierarchical East Asian 
international order, and suggests an unconscious recognition of a ‘core’ within European 
International Society where powerful states shared the notion of sovereign equality and 
mutually recognised this in their dealings with one another: this notion was of course 
supported by international law. He also notes in a later passage that if Japan strengthened 
itself, it could obtain equal rights with the European powers,163 thereby implying that the 
Society was not lawless, but a realm where shared rules/norms did exist. On the other 
hand, Iwakura’s own experiences of dealing with the coercive face of European 
International Society makes him unsure of how reliable these shared norms (including 
international law) are, and leads him to argue that power matters most. The result is a 
simultaneous acknowledgement and rejection of the existence of shared values.
There were Japanese elites who expressed the dual modes of interaction more 
explicitly, however. The intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi noted in an unpublished essay in 
1874 that ‘international law was a law for European countries and does not function at all 
in the Orient.’164 Here, rather than identify military power as the determining factor of 
whether or not international law applied to a state, Fukuzawa points to regional factors. In 
identifying that the law only applied to European states, he again identifies some form of a 
common identity that seems to enable certain states to qualify for the protection of 
international law.
What did these dualistic interpretations of international law result in? First, as we 
will see in the chapters that follow, the Japanese elites acknowledged that those who were 
deemed to have a common characteristic were more likely to be afforded the protection of 
international law. This was of course the result of the emergence of the ‘standard of 
civilisation’, which had emerged by the time Japan was incorporated into European 
International Society and had the effect of placing those states labelled as ‘uncivilised’ 
beyond the pale of the protection of international law as afforded to European states. It 
took some time for the Japanese to realise this, and initially many thought that this 
‘common’ feature was military power. However, as the existence of the ‘standard of 
civilisation’ became known, the Japanese leadership began to interpret international law as 
a marker of ‘civilised’ identity. Reference to international law in diplomatic intercourse
163 Iwakura Tomomi, ‘Tomomi gaikö no kimu o hitsuroku shi goran ni kyö suru koto’, Iwakura kö jikki 
(Tada Kömon, ed) (vol. 3). (Tokyo: Hara shobö, 1968), p. 233
164 See Hatsuse Ryuhei, ‘“Datsua ron” saikö’, p. 28. Emphasis added.
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would serve to demonstrate Japan’s efforts to becoming a ‘civilised’ member of European 
International Society. They thus undertook concerted efforts to comply with the ‘standard 
of civilisation’ , 165 and also utilised international law to protect Japanese interests from the 
West. During a dispute with British Minister to Japan, Sir Harry Parkes, over the Meiji 
government’s punishment of Christians, Ökuma Shigenobu invoked the laws of domestic 
sovereignty, claiming that ‘foreign countries had no right to interfere with Japan punishing 
its own people in accordance with its own laws. ’ 166 Furthermore, the Japanese incorporated 
the vocabulary of international law in their interactions with (their sometimes bewildered) 
neighbours to differentiate themselves from the ‘backward’ Asian states.
Conclusion
The empirical examinations here differ from previous studies that have examined China 
and Japan’s entry into European International Society. They show that Chinese and 
Japanese understandings and perceptions were multifaceted, and increasingly reflected their 
awareness of the dualities within the Society.
Chinese and Japanese perceptions of European International Society share much in 
common. Contrary to the simplistic depictions by conventional English School studies, 
they did not just encounter and absorb the norms of the Society which only applied to 
‘civilised’ states. Japan and China had encountered a Janus-faced European International 
Society, and they accumulated knowledge of the rules which governed the interaction 
among ‘civilised’ states and between ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ states. They began to 
understand that European states’ sovereignty tended to be respected, but not theirs. This 
makes sense if we take the Society’s duality and the operation of the ‘standard of 
civilisation’ into account; but the Chinese and Japanese elites initially found it difficult to 
recognise this, and the Society thus seemed contradictory (if not downright hypocritical) in 
their eyes.
This resulted in often ambivalent understandings and interpretations of the Society’s 
institutions. The Chinese and Japanese elites’ initial reactions after their encounter with the 
European-dominated international order was a heightened sense of insecurity which, given 
the coercion exerted by the Society at this time, is not particularly surprising. However,
165 Sanjö Sanetomi/Tokumei zenken taishi haken chogi no koto’ in Iwakura kö jikki (Tada Komon, ed) (vol. 
2). (Tokyo: Hara shobö, 1968), p. 929
166 Ökuma Shigenobu with Enjöji Kiyoshi, Ökuma haku sekijitsu tan (vol. 1), p. 285
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both the Chinese and Japanese did, to a certain extent, acknowledge that within Europe, the 
European powers seemed to apply norms that did, to a certain degree, appear to aim for the 
protection of small, weaker states, even if these were qualified to an extent by accounts of 
latent rivalry among the European states. This identification of the existence of some form 
of common rules correspond, to a certain extent, to Hedley Bull’s observation that ‘[i]f 
states...form an international society...., this is because, recognising certain common 
interests and perhaps some common values, they regard themselves as bound by certain 
rules in their dealings with one another’ . 167 In this sense, then, it is arguable that the 
Chinese and Japanese were beginning to envisage -  hazy though it may have been -  the 
existence of a form of ‘International Society’, even though they may not have termed it as 
such. 168 Furthermore, Nakae Chömin’s satirical essay, Sansuijin keirinmondö, for instance, 
gives an account of the European international order by three different individuals, Mr. 
Brave, Mr. Western Learning, and Mr. Nankai. Each of them give an account of the 
Society from the perspective of power politics, the possibility of a form of ‘democratic 
peace’ inspired by Kant, and a picture of a precarious societal order maintained by states’ 
common interests. Nakae’s treatise almost resembles that of Martin Wight’s seminal 
lectures of the ‘three traditions’ of International Society, and is a testament to the rich 
understanding of the Society the Chinese and Japanese were beginning to develop around 
this time.
The findings of this chapter confirm Keene and Wight’s insights of a dualistic 
European International Society, but more importantly challenge conventional English 
School works’ simplistic views of Chinese and Japanese perceptions of the Society. As 
argued previously, these works have conceptualised both China and Japan’s entry into the 
Society as a process of accepting the institutions and norms which governed the ‘civilised’ 
European states. Any discrepancies are seen in terms of both states’ elites concluding an 
‘absence’ of a Society. With reference to Japan’s bitterness towards the Society’s 
differential treatment, Gong wrote:
If anything, Japan took the standard [of ‘civilisation] too seriously and naively, on face
value, not understanding that even ‘civilized’ international society was characterized
167 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 13
168 Nakae Chömin, for example, uses the term ‘shokoku kösai\ or ‘intercourse among states’. See Nakae 
Chömin, Sansuijin keirin mondö, p. 200
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by anarchy (the absence of a monopoly of legitimate violence) and hierarchy (because 
without civil society, rights depend largely on might) . 169
Gong, however, fails to appreciate that many Chinese and Japanese elites held these 
sentiments while simultaneously admitting to the existence of societal relations within 
Europe, because he assumes European International Society to be one with a single mode 
of interaction which facilitates order. These feelings by the Chinese and Japanese can be 
explained more satisfactorily when we understand them as anger towards the discrimination 
within European International Society, rather than a rejection of the Society per se . x70 
However, Gong misses this aspect of China and Japan’s engagement with the Society 
because his narrow conceptualisation of it.
By conceptualising China and Japan as entering a Janus-faced European International 
Society, this chapter has highlighted greater complexities and ambiguities in Chinese and 
Japanese interpretations of the Society than conventional studies have suggested. Gong’s 
aforementioned passage implies that the Japanese only became aware of the Society’s 
double standards after their attempts to attain parity with the European powers had failed, 
and can only make sense if we assume that the Japanese thought that they saw a ‘single’ 
International Society with norms and rules which applied equally to all its members. This 
thesis, however, elucidates the fact that neither the Chinese or Japanese elites were as naive 
as Gong thinks. Their ambivalence towards the Society’s members and institutions go back 
further, and this suggests that the historical roots of their subsequent rebellious policies in 
the twentieth century go much deeper.
Chinese and Japanese perceptions of the existence of a dual mode of interaction 
within the Society also reflected and pointed to an important social logic. In the context of 
the late-nineteenth century, there existed an almost contradictory tension within the moral 
purpose of the Society: it was supposed to aim for ‘tolerance’ and ‘coexistence’, but prior 
to this came the less ‘tolerant’ demand for ‘homogeneity’, in the form of fulfilling the 
‘standard of civilisation’ and being judged as ‘civilised’. This was made quite clear by S. 
Wells Williams, the Charge d’Affaires at Beijing, who wrote in a letter to the U.S.
169 Gong, The Standard o f ‘Civilization ’ in International Society. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 165
170 This can be seen from the fact that Japan and China continued to utilise international law and participated 
in European-styled diplomacy, which continued even during Japan’s ‘rebellion’ against the Society 
during the 1930s-1940s: Japan sent an ‘ambassador’ and solicited other states to send their diplomatic 
envoys to the puppet state of Manchukuo. Even when Japan had seemingly rejected the Society and its 
norms, the institution of diplomacy had been internalised to the degree that it was unthinkable for Japan 
to abolish it in its diplomatic relations.
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Secretary of State William H. Seward on 23ui November 1865 with reference to introducing 
international law to China and Japan:
An authentic study of this work [Wanguo gongfa] by the officials in both China and 
Japan will probably lead them to endeavor to apply its usages and principles to their 
intercourse with foreign countries. This will gradually lead them to see how greatly 
the principle of exterritoriality [sicj contained in their treaties with those countries 
modifies the usages in force between western and Christian powers.171
Williams’ letter encapsulates this logic where non-European entities could only be 
subjected to the mode of interaction which governed the ‘civilised’ members if they 
fulfilled the criteria set by the ‘standard of civilisation’.172 Whether or not China or Japan 
would be subjected to the more cooperative mode of interaction depended very much on 
their elites’ ability to identify and conform to this ‘logic’, which was part and parcel of the 
Janus-faced European International Society.
The Chinese and Japanese were beginning to develop an awareness of this. This was 
expressed in the realisation that certain types of states were treated in a very different 
manner from themselves, as well as the fact that they were ‘beyond the pale’ of the 
protection of the Society’s institutions. The key, then, was to understand what 
characteristics these states shared, and what was needed for China and Japan to qualify to 
be accorded the more ‘cooperative’ mode of interaction. While many remained sceptical as 
to whether the institutions of the Society mattered at all, the very fact that some were 
beginning to recognise a ‘criteria’ to qualify for different form of interaction was important: 
it pointed to the possibility of China and Japan undergoing a concerted effort to discern 
what this ‘standard’ was, and gain legitimate membership of ‘civilised’ European 
International Society by conforming to it. This would push the socialisation process to a 
deeper level.
This was by no means guaranteed, however. The question thus becomes one of how 
the Chinese and Japanese elites decided to act upon the knowledge they accumulated 
through their interaction with European International Society. It will be recalled that this 
‘knowledge’ is needed a priori for social reproduction if the actor wishes to enter her new 
social environment. How then, did the Chinese and Japanese elites act on this knowledge? 
To what extent did their awareness of the social demands of the Society play a part in their
171 United States Department of State, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs (Part I, 1866). (New York: Kraus 
Reprint Corporation, 1965), p. 486
172 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 32
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socialisation? Did any divergences between the two emerge? If so, why? Furthermore, in 
light of our findings of an increased awareness of a Janus-faced Society on the part of 
China and Japan, it is necessary to pay particular attention to how these perceived dualities 
and coercive features of the Society played a part in both states’ socialisation, if such 
socialisation occurred. This will be attempted in the following two chapters.
Figure 4-3: International hierarchies and Great Powers from the eyes of the Japanese
The picture gives us a glimpse into which states the Japanese thought of as most civilised. From the second 
row top, Britain and France, followed by the U.S., Germany, Italy, Russia, and the Netherlands below. The 
figures further below are China and Korea. Also note the ‘trappings of modernity’, telegraph lines, 
steamboats and trains. Source: Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration o f Korea, 
1895-1910. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995)
LEARNING THE COMPETENCE AND SKILL TO BE A 
‘CIVILISED’ STATE: STATE RECONFIGURATION IN CHINA
AND JAPAN
The Master Said: Put me in the company of any two people at random -  they will 
inevitably have something to teach me. I can take their qualities as a model and 
their defects as a warning. (The Analects o f Confucius, 7.22)
Introduction
This chapter follows on from the previous discussions which investigated both China 
and Japan’s acquisition o f ‘knowledge’ -  the development of an awareness for the social 
rules of the environment the actor finds herself in -  by concentrating primarily on 
exploring the ‘strategic learning’ and ‘emulative learning’ phase of the socialisation 
process.
The previous chapter has demonstrated that some of the Chinese and the Japanese 
elites were beginning to engage with the two faces of a Janus-faced Society. They were 
beginning to notice that some states were accorded the protection of the Society’s 
institutions more than their own countries, and that these states shared similar features. 
What then, were these features? In Chinese and Japanese eyes, The most conspicuous 
was military and industrial power. This is not surprising, as these material 
characteristics were most readily discemable. In the context of Chinese and Japanese 
experiences of encountering the Society’s coercive, ‘civilising’ mode of interaction, 
military power was also seen to afford a state protection from the powerful armies and 
navies of the ‘civilised’ members of the Society.
The result of this was a concerted call for China and Japan to adapt to their new 
international environment by undergoing reforms that would transform their states into 
‘rich and powerful’ states. However, was military power alone enough to be accorded 
the same treatment which the European powers enjoyed? To a certain extent it was, but 
the social logic of late-nineteenth century European International Society dictated that in 
addition to being militarily powerful, a state had to be judged as ‘civilised’ in order to be 
accorded the protection of its institutions. They had to demonstrate ‘competence and 
skill’ in applying the rules of the Society in order to convince the ‘civilised’ members 
that they had undergone a successful process of socialisation, and were now ready to 
enter the ‘civilised family of nations’ and be accorded the protection of their sovereign
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independence and territorial integrity -  and in an era of clear European military 
dominance, the ‘uncivilised’ non-European states often had little choice but to comply.
The Chinese and Japanese elites would thus have to recognise this ‘social'logic’ 
and become militarily powerful and fulfil the social standards of the Society 
simultaneously. It is here that divergences between the two states appeared. Some of 
the Chinese reformist elites did attempt to introduce European industry and technology 
and modernise the military. Any reforms that they undertook, however, were not 
intended to demonstrate their ‘commitment’ to the norms and expectations of the 
Society. Therefore, the Chinese did not go beyond introducing Western technology and 
weapons. They did not introduce European-styled political institutions on a wide scale 
(the establishment of the zongli yamen being a notable exception). Japan, on the other 
hand, also introduced European technology and industry, but took a very different route. 
Their reforms not only sought to make Japan a military power, but also to demonstrate 
Japan’s ‘commitment’ to adhere to the Society’s norms and prove itself a worthy 
candidate of ‘civilised’ membership. To this end, they attempted to reinvent Japan into 
a ‘Europeanised’ state, thereby transforming Japan’s identity from a member of the East 
Asian international order to a ‘civilised’ member of European International Society.
This chapter focuses on the process by which China and Japan attempted to 
acquire (what they perceived to be) the ‘competence and skill’ needed to be accorded 
‘civilised’ status within European International Society. It will be recalled that at this 
stage an actor is assumed to have acquired some degree of knowledge of her new social 
environment, and while this has yet to attain legitimacy in her eyes, the actor is, to a 
certain extent, able to conform to its procedural norms. The chapter begins by 
examining the theoretical considerations surrounding the global diffusion of 
‘Europeanised’ states. It then proceeds to examine the socialisation processes of the 
Chinese and Japanese states by examining a number of reforms which took place in both 
states after their exposure to European International Society. The divergent paths 
followed by the two states mean that while the primary empirical cases presented here 
are, for organisational purposes, from the stage o f ‘gaining knowledge and competence’, 
in reality the analysis does overlap with the ‘commitment’ stage of socialisation in the 
case of Japan. The empirical examinations are divided into four broad themes: identity 
formation, state centralisation, industrialisation and mass mobilisation. The intellectual 
origins of these reforms and the processes of implementation are examined within these 
themes. While the emphasis of this chapter is primarily on the role international social
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pressures played in initiating these reforms, it must be emphasised from the outset that 
this does not deny that domestic socio-political factors played a role in the attempts to 
‘Europeanise’ the state. Here, no attempt is made to discuss which factor mattered 
more, given the difficulties of disentangling the two causal factors. Rather, the simple 
proposition made here is that, amongst other factors, international social factors were 
important.
The empirical analysis concentrates primarily on the domestic reforms that China 
and Japan undertook between the 1860s and early 1890s following their encounter with 
European International Society. In the Chinese case, this period began shortly after the 
end of the Arrow War, when the reformists wielded some influence (particularly in 
foreign affairs). However, the reformists certainly did not enjoy a free hand in political 
decision-making either. The conservative faction was a powerful force to be reckoned 
with, and the Court continued to manipulate both reformists and conservatives to 
preserve their political power. Although the chapter does examine reforms that were 
implemented primarily by the reformists, it should be made clear that I do not wish to 
depict the process as a linear, unproblematic one, and, in light of the opposition the 
reformists faced, neither should we overstate the significance of their reforms.
A similar point should also be made in the case of Japan. The Meiji government 
had overthrown the Tokugawa regime in 1867, and faced less institutional constraints. 
Japanese society, however, was still in a transitional stage, and the implementation of 
reforms inevitably brought about opposition from groups whose interests from the 
Tokugawa era were threatened. Furthermore, the adoption of a ‘Europeanised’ identity 
elicited considerable debate among members of the Meiji elite, who were sometimes 
unsure of wholesale ‘Westernisation’, and resentful of the European powers.1 The 
process often became one of learning the best from the Western states while still 
retaining Japanese identity; these goals were of course extremely hard ones to attain 
simultaneously, and were subject to varying interpretations and disputes. To this end, 
Japan’s attempts to become a ‘Europeanised’ state also became a political process.
Robert Eskildsen makes this point aptly when he remarks: ‘the reproduction of Western civilization 
existed in tension with an antipathy to its corrosive effects on Japanese culture, and for better or for 
worse Western imperialism left Japan little choice but to engage Western civilization, which meant 
that the corrosion could not be avoided.’ See Robert Eskildsen, ‘Of Civilization and Savages: The 
Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan’, The American Historical Review (vol. 
107, no. 2, April 2002, pp. 388-418), p. 393
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Theoretical considerations
Before the examining China and Japan’s socialisation, it would be worthwhile 
discussing some of the theoretical aspects of this process. This is primarily because 
these cases are somewhat problematic in that both states’ policies following their initial 
encounter with European International Society were aimed at attaining ‘wealth and 
strength’. Based on this, it is possible to view any forms of emulation of the European 
powers as a result of functional necessity: it is arguable that the introduction of Western 
weapons and technology, as well as the adoption of domestic political institutions 
modelled on Western states, took place in China and Japan because they provided the 
most efficient means by which both states could maximise their power and wealth. This 
possibility requires us to examine functionalist and sociological theoretical perspectives 
that seek to explain attempts by the Chinese and Japanese political decision-makers to 
reconfigure their states.
State reconfiguration in China and Japan: a comment on functionalist explanations 
As argued previously, many conventional works by English School scholars on China 
and Japan’s state reconfigurations following their engagement with European 
International Society are undergirded by functionalist accounts. Their main arguments 
can be summarised as follows: if the Chinese and Japanese elites wished to ‘modernise’ 
and reach the level of development of Western states, they needed to adopt the political, 
economic, and social institutions of the Western states. Japan quickly recognised this 
need and adopted these institutions to become a ‘rich and powerful’ state. China took 
longer to adopt these institutions, but once defeat by Japan -  which it traditionally saw 
as inferior -  proved the efficacy of Western institutions, it also began to reform along 
Western lines.
One reason for the prevalence of functionalist explanations for the adoption of 
Western institutions by China and Japan is the influence of modernisation theory and 
historical studies of the 1960s and 1970s that implicitly adopted this analytical 
framework.2 In essence, modernisation theory posits the existence of a particular
2 The consequences of this, among others, was a downplaying of the exploitation which took place 
alongside ‘modernisation’; the tendency to see the domestic reforms that took place in Japan (and, to 
a lesser extent, China) following their encounter with the West as inherently ‘rational’ and 
progressive; and a tendency to place great (even excessive) importance on the political, economic, 
and social developments that took place as a result of the ‘impact of the West’. An excellent 
discussion of Asian history and its adoption of modernisation theory can be found in John W. Dower, 
‘E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History’, pp. 3-101, and Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in 
China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1984).
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trajectory that must be followed by humankind to ‘subject natural forces to rational 
explanation and control, as well as...[to] promote social welfare, moral progress, and 
human happiness. ’ 3 The theory suggests that modernisation entails the adoption of 
certain institutions which are most suited to maximise the efficiency of functionally 
differentiated institutions and the extraction of resources; various social changes which 
accompany modernisation are also presented as ‘transformational in its impact and 
progressive in its effects. ’ 4 As industrialised, developed states (in practice, Western 
states) are unproblematically assumed to be the most ‘modernised’, it is also tacitly 
assumed that modernisation will involve the adoption of political, economic and social 
institutions modelled on these industrialised societies. The ‘modem state’, with 
domestic political institutions similar to those of industrialised, European states, is an 
integral part of these institutions.
There are a number of problems with this particular approach. The first problem 
is that the influence of modernisation theories lends itself to a somewhat narrow view of 
history. The Meiji Restoration and its policies of modernisation are generally presented 
in a positive light, often neglecting the misery many Japanese (particularly the rural 
sector and women) had to endure in the process. In the case of China, which failed to 
‘modernise’ at the same pace as Japan, ‘traditional’ society is frequently depicted as 
static and incapable of change from within. 5 However, more recent scholarship has 
demonstrated that traditional Chinese intellectual frameworks were indeed open to new 
intellectual influences, and not rigidly conservative as often assumed. 6 A similar 
tendency, particularly with reference to China, is the implicit assumption ‘that China’s 
traditional culture was an obstacle to a timely (and presumably felicitous) response to 
the West, allowing for modernization along Western lines. ’ 7 Failure to adopt the
3 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations’, International Organization (vol. 47, no. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 139-174), p. 145. See also 
Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Political Modernization: America vs. Europe’, World Politics (vol. 18, no. 3, 
April 1966, pp. 378-414)
4 Dean C. Tipps, ‘Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical 
Perspective’, Comparative Studies in Society and History (vol. 15, no. 2, March 1973, pp. 199-226),
p. 202
5 Works that adopt this line include Immanuel C. Y. Hsii, The Rise o f Modern China. For an extended 
discussion of this point with reference to China, see Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China.
6 Philip A. Kuhn, Origins o f the Modern Chinese State. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 
for example, amply disproves the ‘static’ notion of Confucian culture by telling a fascinating story of 
the debates surrounding political reform in the late Qing.
7 Robert Marks, ‘The State of the China Field: Or, the China Field and the State’, Modern China (vol. 
11, no. 4, October 1985, pp. 461-509), pp. 465-466. Mary C. Wright’s classic study, The Last Stand 
of Chinese Conservatismis one study that follows this argument, and , to a lesser extent, the influences 
of this attitude is visible in John L. Rawlinson, China 's Struggle for Naval Development 1839-1895. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967)
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trappings of modernity is portrayed somewhat simplistically as a result of ‘stubbornness’ 
or ‘ignorance’ . 8 This leads to an unfortunate implication that the Chinese were 
incapable of understanding the benefits that Western civilisation can bring; the result is 
an ethnocentric understanding of China which is not that different from that of the 
nineteenth century.
The second problem with these arguments is a simple one: its functionalist 
explanations do not work. It is by no means clear that institutions based on European 
models that emerge as a result o f ‘modernisation’ are most suited for effective extraction 
and mobilisation of resources . 9 Furthermore, the case of ‘failed states’ show that 
‘modem institutions’ epitomised by the Westernised state do not in themselves 
guarantee better governance and the greater well-being of humanity. 10 Martha 
Finnemore underscores this point succinctly:
Conventional arguments about the rise of the modem state emphasize its functional 
advantages at providing security and extracting revenue to explain its success at 
the expense of other forms of political organization. This may (or may not) be true 
of the rise of the state in Europe, but it does not explain the expansion of Western- 
style states to all comers of the world.* 11
Functionalist and modernisation theories are oblivious to this fact, the latter not helped 
by its ethnocentric assumptions which ‘evaluate the progress of nations...by their 
proximity to the institutions and values of Western, and particularly Anglo-American 
societies. ’ 12 Similar assumptions are visible in Gerrit W. Gong’s work on the ‘standard 
of civilisation’, albeit implicitly. While he outlines the process by which China and 
Japan adhered to the ‘standard’, Gong is silent on the fact that in practice these 
‘standards’ had to be attained by the adoption of Western-styled institutions. This point 
is again particularly pertinent when we consider that Western-styled institutions are not
8 For example, in discussing Chinese elites’ rejection of Western political institutions, Knight 
Biggerstaff comments as follows: ‘...one is struck by their general ignorance and blindness...[only a 
few officials] gave evidence of possessing the intelligence and open-mindedness needed to cope with 
the situation. The thinking of the others was characterized by cultural arrogance and a complacent 
acceptance of traditional ways of doing things.’ See Biggerstaff, ‘The Secret Correspondence of 
1867-1868’, p. 136
9 As John W. Meyer et al. point out, many domestic institutions of the ‘Westernised state’ (such as 
mass schooling), while ‘inscribed in commonsense descriptions and social-scientific theories of “the 
way things work”...may not mesh well with practical experience.’ John W. Meyer, John Boli, 
George M. Thomas and Francisco O. Ramirez, ‘World Society and the Nation-State’, American 
Journal o f Sociology (vol. 103, no. 1, July 1997, pp. 144-181), p. 149
10 For a brief discussion of failed states, see Gerald Helman and Steven R. Ratner, ‘Saving Failed 
States’, Foreign Policy (no. 89, Winter 1992-93), pp. 3-20.
11 Martha Finnemore, ‘Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism’, 
International Organization (vol. 50, no. 2, Spring 1996, pp. 325-347), p. 332. See also George M. 
Thomas and John W. Meyer, ‘The Expansion of the State’, Annual Review o f Sociology (vol. 10, 
1984, pp. 461-482), p. 462
12 Dean C. Tipps, ‘Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies’, p. 206
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necessarily the only means by which the standard can be achieved, and while the said 
institutions may work successfully within Europe, they may not do so in non-European 
states and societies. 13 While he is more sensitive to the international social structures 
and pressures which were exerted on non-European states, Gong cannot explain why 
these polities had to reinvent themselves as ‘Europeanised’ states, as he focuses only on 
the legal requirements expressed by publicists.
The emergence of ‘Westernised’states: a social approach
The emergence of ‘Westernised states’ thus does not appear to have been a result of 
purely functional necessity. Instead, it points to the existence of social demands for 
homogeneity within International Society, and that the Society has promoted certain 
types of actors as the only legitimate actors within international politics. 14
Compliance with this demand can be brought about by two ways. First, it is 
possible that common interests result in convergence of actors’ identities. Provided that 
common interests are recognised and the norm of ‘legitimate membership’ gains 
acceptance, a homogenous Society may emerge. An aspirant member may emulate the 
‘civilised’ members of the Society because it has accepted the certain aspects of the 
Society’s standards of ‘membership’ as legitimate. As Ann Florini argues:
Although it is rational for people to adopt innovations when they observe that 
someone they know who has already adopted the innovation has succeeded, it is 
also common for an innovation to be emulated because the person who has already 
adopted it has prestige.15
With reference to becoming a ‘Europeanised’ state, Meyer argues that aspirant 
members may be motivated to adopt Western political, social and economic institutions 
(regardless of their actual capacity to facilitate ‘effective government’) because it
13 With regard to China, the Republican government’s attempts to extract resources via ‘modem’ 
Western-styled institutions were not successful, and the state eventually reverted to institutions which 
resembled Qing local political institutions. See Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural 
North China, 1900-1942. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988)
14 Hendrik Spruyt, who has also adopted a functionalist approach to explain the rise of the sovereign 
state, ‘The specification of internal and external realms continues as a constitutive rule of 
international affairs....Since states have been one way of ordering international relations, ethnic and 
irredentist movements define themselves as statist in their intent. With the possible exception of 
Islamic fundamentalism, movements define themselves in the terms of the international state system 
in order to be recognized by the other members. They claim international legitimacy based on their 
adherence to the constitutive rule of the system -  sovereign territoriality.’ Hendrik Spruyt, 
‘Institutional selection in international relations: state anarchy as order’, International Organization 
(vol. 48, no. 4, Autumn 1994, pp. 527-557), p. 557
15 Ann Florini, ‘The Evolution of International Norms’, International Studies Quarterly (vol. 40, no. 3, 
Special Issue: Evolutionary Paradigms in the Social Sciences, September 1996, pp. 363-389), p. 375. 
It is also important to note that ‘successful behaviour’ is socially defined. As Wendt argues, it is 
never static or pre-determined, but ‘constituted by shared understandings that vary by cultural 
context.’ See Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics, p. 325
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furthers their chances of being recognised as a legitimate member of a community. In 
the case of European International Society, ‘legitimate’, ‘civilised’ membership could 
offer a state greater respect for its sovereign integrity, and this provided some 
motivation for compliance. Attempts to adopt a similar identity, Meyer argues, ‘enables 
a rational account to be given of how progress is being achieved’,16 and demonstrates the 
level of commitment an aspirant member has towards entering the Society. Furthermore, 
it could result in smoother interactions, as similar domestic structures ‘provides internal 
organizational elements that parallel and link up with similar elements in other countries 
and in the system as a whole. A state organization parallel to the others in the system 
maximizes external linkages and supports.’17
The second way in which ‘homogeneity’ is achieved is through the imposition of 
certain social standards, and this is particularly likely to happen when there exists little 
common interests, values or culture between the Society’s members and other polities. 
Fred Halliday is correct in pointing out that Hedley Bull’s ‘communitarian’ 
conceptualisation of an International Society as ‘a grouping with shared values’ is an 
inadequate one because it downplays elements of power within it.18 As the guardians of 
the Society are great powers, this often means that aspirant members have to recast 
themselves ‘in the image of the dominant power or group of powers of the time’.19 
While states may indeed decide to conform on their own accord, it must not be forgotten 
that such behaviour will be conditioned by the possibility that compliance will be met 
with positive rewards and deviation by sanctions.20
This, however, does not imply that there existed strict, rigid criteria by which a 
state could be deemed to have gained the ‘competence and skill’ to have been socialised 
into European International Society. There were instances where some European states 
did not meet the ‘standard of civilisation’ (such as in Latin America),21 but were 
nonetheless accorded membership in ‘civilised’ European International Society. This 
aspect was not lost on Meiji statesman Itö Hirobumi who wrote bitterly in a
letter to his colleague Matsukata Masayoshi in 1883:
16 John W. Meyer, ‘The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State’ in George M. Thomas, 
John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez and John Boli (eds), Institutional Structure: Constituting 
State, Society, and the Individual. (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1987), p. 56
17 ibid.
18 Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p. 101
19 Paul Keal, ‘An “International Society”?’, p. 72
20 However, neither does this negate the existence of a society and the possibility of shared values 
emerging. The functioning of most societies involves the exercise of coercion in the form of 
sanctions for ‘deviant’ behaviour.
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When East and West interact, the Europeans always unite and try and overrun 
Japan, which is isolated. The reason for this is simply because we are different 
from them both in race and religion. One could say that this happens because our 
civilisation has not reached their standard, but why is it they recognise Bulgaria,
Serbia, Montenegro or Romania, all states that have a civilisation no better than 
mountain monkeys, as civilised? The fact that Japan is far more civilised than 
these small, miserable countries is a well-known fact. In the final analysis, they 
[the European states] respect the barbarous mountain monkeys as civilised because 
they share the same religion.22
Itö’s observations point to the stark reality that nineteenth century European 
International Society was still coloured by patently racist notions that Asian and African 
peoples and their political entities were either ‘uncivilised’ or ‘barbarous’, and this 
influenced their decisions in awarding ‘civilised’ membership to non-European entities; 
a point which Gong inexplicably (and perhaps naively) downplays when he claims that 
the emergence of the ‘standard of civilisation’ was a ‘response to the philosophical 
problem’ of deciding which entities were worthy of membership in the Society.23
What then, were the criteria for legitimate membership into ‘civilised’ European 
International Society? One of the most important has been that of sovereign statehood, 
which, Daniel Philpott argues, was ‘codified into legitimacy’ in the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648.24 This new form of legitimacy was placed on firmer ground when 
states ‘rearticulat[ed] it in subsequent treaties and law. They practiced it by crowding 
out the effective authority of alternative polities and by replicating themselves all across 
the globe.’25 By the time China and Japan encountered European International Society, 
however, there were four additional criteria. The first was of course the fulfilment of 
the ‘standard of civilisation’, which has already been well-documented.
The second was popular sovereignty, which was beginning to emerge as an 
additional criterion for ‘civilised’, legitimate membership. We should be careful not to 
overstate this point, as not all European states had fully attained this criterion of 
‘legitimate’ statehood, but at the same time it must be noted that ‘the progressive move
21 See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states, pp. 61-66
22 Itö Hirobumi, ‘Öshü no kenbun ni tsuki Itö Hirobumi shokan’ in Shibahara Takuji, Ikai Takaaki and 
Ikeda Masahiro (eds), Nihon kindai shisö taikei (vol. 12): taigaikan. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1988), 
p. 56
23 Gong, The Standard o f ‘Civilization’ in International Society, p. 24. But Gong does admit that 
admission to the Society was often decided on a subjective basis. He states: ‘Even after it emerged as 
an explicit legal concept, the standard was still subject to the admixture of contrasting elements -  
political and legal, subjective and objective, explicit and implicit -  associated with any doctrine of 
recognition.’ See Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization ’ in International Society, p. 21, and pp. 21-23 
for an expanded discussion of this problem.
24 Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 97 
ibid., p. 9125
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toward constitutional and representative forms of governance’ was gradually taking 
place, 26 and presented itself as a powerful intellectual influence around this time. The 
emergence of popular sovereignty as a norm of legitimate statehood was partly 
connected with power politics within Europe as well. Revolutionary France had been 
the first state to invoke the concept of popular sovereignty, and its challenge to 
eighteenth-century European International Society had demonstrated the possibility of 
mobilising a state’s populace to successfully conduct ‘total war’, providing an important 
model of emulation among the members of the Society. 27 Consequently, a number of 
states within Europe also began to introduce means to mobilise their citizens. An army 
based on mass mobilisation was ‘combat effective’ and was a source of emulation, and 
mass conscription began to be introduced in some states. 28
Although the emulation of mass armies may, on the surface, be seen as a form of 
rational ‘copying’, Mlada Bukovansky insists that such emulation involved the 
transmission of ideas of popular sovereignty and nationalism as well; after all, she 
claims, ‘using nationalism as a tool of mobilization may not have evolved at all without 
the impetus of Enlightenment ideas’ . 29 Mobilisation of popular nationalism required 
giving a state’s citizens a political role. While the state also created and made use of 
this sentiment, the ‘upsurge of nationalism was not simply generated from the top down, 
but resulted from the collapse of the old regime’ of dynastic sovereignty and the 
emergence of states based on popular sovereignty. 30 An increased perception that 
citizens had ‘invested the institutions and representatives of the state with sovereign 
authority’ 31 to protect their individual rights fostered what Benedict Anderson calls a
26 Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose o f the State, p. 131. Reus-Smit argues that the rise of legislative 
justice was deeply intertwined with the rise of popular sovereignty for two reasons: ‘first, ...only 
those subject to the rules have the right to define tehm and, second, that the rules of society must 
apply equally to all citizens, in all like cases.’ To this end, laws were reconceived as an expression of 
increasingly codified, mutually binding agreements, as opposed to commands of a superior whose 
legitimacy and authority lay in hereditary rights.
27 This emulation process is discussed by Mlada Bukovansky, ‘The altered state and the state of nature -  
the French Revolution and international politics’, Review o f International Studies (vol. 25, no. 2, 
1999, pp. 197-216), and within a neorealist framework by Barry R. Posen, ‘Nationalism, the Mass 
Army, and Military Power’, International Security (vol. 18, no. 2, Autumn 1993, pp. 80-124)
28 See Armstrong, Revolution and World Order, pp. 88-89 and Posen, ‘Nationalism, the Mass Army, 
and Military Power’, pp. 82-83
29 Bukovansky, ‘The altered state and the state of nature’, p. 201
30 Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in 
International Political Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 207
31 Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose o f the State, p. 129
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‘deep horizontal comradeship’ necessary to ‘imagine’ a community as a rallying point 
for loyalty.32
Third, the attainment of science, technology, and industry was crucial to being 
deemed civilised. As Michael Adas has persuasively argued, by the nineteenth century 
these particular aspects ‘became the key gauges by which even the missionaries 
compared other civilizations to their own and vital sources of their sense of 
righteousness and purpose. ’ 33
Finally, the findings of Meyer et al. and Finnemore suggest a fourth criterion: that 
the two aforementioned conditions for membership of the Society had to be met by 
becoming a state based on European models. 34 They have noted the remarkable global 
spread of the ‘nation-state model’ -  in itself a Western concept -  and its domestic 
institutions, regardless of how ‘functional’ such models may be. 35 They find the cause 
for this in a ‘world culture’ which actively promotes the Westernised nation-state as a 
social good, and claim that in this sense, the Westernised nation-state is a social 
construct. Consequently,
... [o]rientation to the identity and purposes of the nation-state model increases the 
rate at which countries adopt other prescribed institutions of modernity. Having 
committed themselves to the identity o f the rationalizing state, appropriate policies 
follow -  policies for national development, individual citizenship and rights, 
environmental management, foreign relations. These policies are depicted as if 
they were autonomous decisions because nation-states are defined as sovereign, 
responsible, and essentially autonomous actors. Taking into account the larger 
[global] culture in which states are embedded, however, the policies look more like 
enactments of conventionalised scripts....Even if a state proclaims its opposition to 
the dominant world identity models... [i]t will find... itself modifying its traditions 
in the direction of world-cultural forms.36
In the context of the late-nineteenth century, the ‘Europeanised’ state and its 
political institutions were inextricably linked with ‘civilised’ identity. This was also a 
reflection of ‘a presumption of superiority based not simply on ethnocentrism but also 
on demonstrated achievements of Europeans in science, technology, warfare,
32 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism. 
(London: Verso, 1991), p. 7
33 Adas, Machines as the Measure o f Men, p. 206
34 Bukovansky also claims that ‘states experience pressure not only to emulate successful behavior, but 
also to organize their domestic structures in such a way as to coincide with the dominant legitimacy 
conceptions of the day.’ See Bukovansky, Legitimacy and Power Politics, p. 35.
35 It should be noted that while Meyer et al use the term ‘nation-state’, by this they actually emphasise 
the various political and economic institutions seen in almost all sovereign/nation-states.
36 John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas and Francisco O. Ramirez, ‘World Society and the 
Nation-State’, p. 159
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government, political economy, architecture, literature, and the rest. ’ 37 Theories of 
Social Darwinism that were prevalent at this time suggested that the industry, scientific 
technology and political institutions of the ‘civilised’ states of the West represented the 
highest form of development in humankind. As the course of evolution was described 
as a linear one, the Western model of the ‘civilised state’ was the only form of statehood 
that could serve as a model for emulation.
This meant that states that were deemed as ‘barbarous’ or ‘uncivilised’ were 
subjected to social pressures to reform their states along Western lines if they wished to 
be accorded membership to ‘civilised’ European International Society and escape being 
subjected to its ‘civilising’ mode of interaction. As D. Eleanor Westney argues, ‘[t]he 
standards by which [Western] societies measured “civilization” were obviously those of 
their own societies, and the surest way for [non-European states] to meet those standards 
was to take their institutions as models. ’ 38 Furthermore, the European powers were 
usually able to militarily impose their social standards of ‘legitimate’ membership, and 
non-European states had very little choice but to follow them if they wished to preserve 
their independence. Yamamuro Shin’ichi summarises this with reference to the 
adoption of international law by non-European states as follows.
The expansion of international society and its European-originated state system 
meant that its international law was presented as an inherently superior law that 
ought to be applied to all political societies throughout the globe. At the same 
time, this indicated that the civilisation which undergirded [European] 
international law -  while allowing the existence for multiple civilisations -  became 
a universal and normative standard as the highest form of civilisation. [Under 
these circumstances]...the drive to become ‘civilised’ was not simply a matter of 
changing indigenous customs or Europeanising (öka BME) ways of living; it was a 
demand imposed by international law and a necessary condition for 
independence.39
37 Jackson, Quasi-states, p. 61
38 D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer o f Western Organizational Patterns to 
Meiji Japan. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 22
39 Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Shisö kadai to shite no ajia: kijiku, rensa, töki, p. 41
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Figure 5-1: Adopting European weapons
‘My army is equipped and by the Europeans and well-trained, of course we will defeat the Babaoro’m!’ 
says the chieftain proudly. (Herge, Tintin Au Congo, clip supplied and reproduced by kind permission of 
Moulinsart s.a., Brussels). In the racist context of the early-twentieth century, Non-European peoples’ 
efforts to emulate the West were sometimes the subject of ridicule by the Europeans, as this clip shows.
Applying social explanations to the Chinese and Japanese cases
In the cases of China and Japan, the preliminary' goal that emerged among its elite 
following both states’ exposure to European International Society was to become a 
strong, wealthy state that would be able to ward off the threat from the Western powers 
and rid themselves of the unequal treaties. 40 However, as the discussion below will 
indicate, the Chinese and Japanese embarked on two different courses. While the 
Chinese elites’ pursuit of ‘wealth and strength’ primarily entailed attempts to introduce 
some level of Western technology and industry, the Meiji leadership’s endeavours to 
achieve the same goal went further. Not only did they introduce Western technology 
and industry, but they also consciously sought to emulate the political institutions and 
culture of the ‘civilised’ states. In other words, Japan’s attempts to become a ‘rich and 
powerful’ state entailed the adoption of the identity of a ‘civilised’ state as collectively 
decided by the Society. Here we see an important difference between the Chinese and 
Japanese in their interaction with the expanding European-dominated order. The 
Japanese experience (which will be examined in detail below) strongly suggests that the
40 Note, however, that the motivation to repudiate the unequal treaties did depend to a certain extent on 
recognising their symbolic value. It will be recalled that the signing of the unequal treaties did not 
immediately cause outrage in China.
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elites were prepared to enter European International Society and be judged by the 
latter’s social standards, while China was unwilling to do so.
While the elites from both countries were conscious of the military threat posed by 
the Society and wanted to attain ‘wealth and strength’, this difference in attitude would 
take China and Japan along different paths. Alexander Wendt has pointed out that 
‘[identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a “portfolio” of interests that 
they carry around independent of social context; instead they define their interests in the 
process of defining situations. ’ 41 It is this newly adopted identity that then goes on to 
define and shape the interests and goals of states. Subsequently, Japan’s desire to attain 
the identity of a ‘civilised’ member of European International Society and be judged by 
its social standards meant that its reforms would take place based explicitly on European 
models. 42 As Roger Hackett has argued, the Japanese leadership’s desire to attain 
military and economic strength was not limited to ‘the desire for Japan to hold its own 
in the modem rivalry and struggle between nations; there was [also] the ambition to be 
accepted as a civilized nation, with the standing of a Great Power. ’ 43 It attempted to 
become ‘rich and powerful’ while at the same time complying with the social demands 
of attaining ‘civilised’ statehood. In contrast, China’s emulation (if it can be called as 
such) of the ‘civilised’ members of European International Society remained superficial.
Accordingly, the in-depth empirical analysis that follows below examines how 
China and Japan interacted with the ‘social pressures’ to attain ‘Europeanised’ statehood 
in the course of their reforms aimed at strengthening the state. The crucial benchmark 
by which to gauge the degree of China and Japan’s attainment of ‘competence and skill’ 
in applying the social norms of European International Society (and with it, the degree 
to which is has socialised) was the degree to which both states’ elites were willing to be 
judged by the standards of the Society’s ‘civilised’ members. If a state was more 
receptive to the social pressures of European International Society, it was likely that it 
would seek to attain the identity of a ‘Europeanised’ (or, to use the terminology of the 
nineteenth century, ‘civilised’) state that was also rich and strong. A state that was less 
receptive to the social norms of the Society was more likely to attempt to become ‘rich
41 Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’, p. 398
42 Of course, the ‘West’ was not a monolith: while the Japanese elite did emulate the ‘West’, this was 
based on a variety of countries. For instance Japan modelled the navy, telegraph system, postal 
system, and postal savings system on Britain; the national bank system, and the Sapporo Agricultural 
College on the United States, the judicial system and military police on French models; and the Bank 
of Japan on Belgium. See Westney, Imitation and Innovation, p. 13
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and strong’ by other means. In the latter case, a ‘Western-style’ state was not seen as 
possessing social prestige, and neither was success seen in terms of attaining a 
‘Europeanised’ identity.
With regard to attaining military power, I draw on Michael Howard’s argument 
that c[o]nly sophisticated and wealthy political organisms [can] produce and sustain 
regular armies’ equipped with capital-intensive weaponry. To this end, a state needed 
efficient ‘[t]ax systems to pay for them [the military], the bureaucracy to levy and 
maintain them, the arsenals to manufacture their weapons, all [of which] implied a 
degree of social organization that was becoming palpably higher in Western Europe than 
among the other societies with which Europeans were in contact.’44 The analysis of 
institutional reforms to become a military power is thus divided into three broad themes: 
state centralisation; adoption of technology and industry; and mass mobilisation. 
Chinese and Japanese attempts to become ‘rich and powerful’ states are explored within 
these themes, with particular reference to both states’ responses to the normative 
constraints and demands of European International Society that called for the adoption 
of European-styled domestic institutions.
Becoming a powerful ‘Westernised’ state?
As we have seen from the previous discussion in Chapter 3, the confrontational manner 
in which China and Japan encountered European International Society elicited wide 
debate among the political elites of both states. The attainment of military power 
eventually emerged as a principal goal for both states,45 and this reflected the Chinese 
and Japanese elites interactions with the ‘civilising’ face of the Janus-faced European 
International Society. Their experiences of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ and what they
43 Roger F. Hackett, ‘The Meiji Leaders and Modernization: The Case of Yamagata Aritomo’ in Marius 
B. Jansen (ed), Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1965), p. 245
44 Michael Howard, ‘The Military Factor in European Expansion’ in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson 
(eds), The Expansion o f International Society. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 36. William H. 
McNeill also points out that by the nineteenth century the capacity to transport and supply large 
numbers of troops became increasingly important: this led to the necessity to develop highly efficient 
sea or land transport. As a consequence, states were required to develop either railroads or large 
shipping fleets. These were both capital-intensive undertakings that called for a further industrialised 
economy. See William H. McNeill, The Pursuit o f Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society 
since A.D. 1000. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), pp. 223-261.
45 The attempt to become a military power was epitomised by the slogans offuguo qiangbing or fukoku 
kyöhei (1l [I I^ JT ), which can be translated as ‘rich country, strong army’. The term has a long 
historical heritage. It appeared in the works of Shang Yang (died 338 B.C.), who guided the policies 
of the Qin dynasty (221-206 B.C.).Legalism, according to Wm. Theodore de Bary et al., was one of 
the most influential schools of Chinese philosophy of its time. Its ‘exponents [were] practicing 
politicians, more concerned with immediate problems and specific mechanisms of control than with
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perceived to be the blatant differentiation between European and non-European entities 
left them with a deep sense of suspicion of the European states. A weak state unable to 
provide effective defence and governance within its borders was certainly not going to 
be able to ward off their threats. Furthermore, the Chinese and Japanese were aware 
that those ‘civilised’ states which were given greater respect for their sovereignty and 
territorial integrity tended to be militarily powerful ones. The decision to strengthen a 
state militarily flowed easily from this observation.46
To realise these goals, however, some form of institutional reforms seemed 
inevitable: the Western powers posed an unprecedented threat with their vastly superior 
military, technology, and industrial development. China and Japan appeared incapable 
of attaining parity with the European powers in these areas. Many of the Chinese and 
Japanese political elites were most certainly aware of the necessity to reform. But they 
were to subsequently attempt to realise this in different fashion.
The Japanese case: state reinvention
Although the Japanese elite began to embark on a concerted effort to reform along 
Western lines following the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1867, acceptance 
of wholesale reforms along Western lines did not come easily. Some Japanese 
intellectuals who were exposed to Western learning (or ‘Dutch learning’, rangaku 
were more favourably disposed to adopting Western technology and showed some 
interest in European political institutions. However, Torii Yözö (MsMWM), an official 
of the shogunate, described the European powers in the 1840s as only interested in ‘the 
pursuit of profit, in contrast with a society intent on rites and rituals; it waged war to 
compete, rather than defend morality.’47 He was opposed to the adoption of ‘Western 
technique [because this] necessarily meant adopting the culture that had produced it.’48 
When Perry arrived on Japanese shores, some changes took place. Some justified the
the underlying principles of government.’ See Wm. Theodore de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan, and Burton 
Watson, Sources o f  Chinese Tradition (vol. 1). (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 122
46 Richard J. Smith lists four initial responses to the ‘threat from the West’ held by the Chinese and 
Japanese. These are: ‘(1) [Recognition of Western military superiority; (2) recognition of Western 
scientific technology as the basis of military superiority; (3) recognition of the need to train native 
personnel in Western military technology; ...and (4) recognition that scientific technology in the 
military sphere is merely part of Western science and technology in general, and that in order to 
develop it, the pure science and general learning of the West also had to be introduced.’ See Richard 
J. Smith, ‘Reflections on the Comparative Study of Modernization in China and Japan: Military 
Aspects’, Journal o f the Hong Kong Branch o f the Royal Asiatic Society (vol. 16, 1976, pp. 12-24), 
p. 13
47 H. D. Harootunian, ‘Late Tokugawa culture and thought’ in Marius B. Jansen (ed), The Emergence o f 
Meiji Japan. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 125 
ibid.48
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adoption o f Western methods on the grounds of compatibility with Confucian 
scholarship. Confucian scholar Sakuma Shözan claimed in 1862 that
‘[t]he learning skills developed in the West are conducive to the learning of the sages’.49 
Similarly, in 1860, after the signing of the trade treaty between Japan and the United 
States, Yokoi Shönan ( $ t# /h $ i ) ,  the Confucian samurai-official, also claimed that 
engaging in trade and diplomacy was not a ‘Western’ phenomena. ‘From the very 
beginning’, Yokoi claimed,
commerce with foreign countries has been an important part of the trade of a 
country, and its path has been firmly fixed by principles of heaven and earth.
Those who rule others must be nourished by the latter, and those who nourish must 
be ruled. This is the way of trade, and the same applies to government. 
Nourishing the people is the main work....The rule of the empire of [the sage 
kings] Yao and Shun was none other than this.50
Yokoi even began to question traditional notions of Chinese learning, which had 
often been held in high regard. Pointing to China’s continuous weakness towards the 
Western powers, he contemplated whether ‘China was trapped in its traditional 
Sinocentrism while its civilisation and ethics were close to collapse,’ while the West, by 
‘promoting learning, ruling benevolently, respecting justice, and empowering and 
enriching the state...had in fact attained the goals which Confucianism had always 
advocated.’ 51 However, it must be noted that Yokoi’s questioning of traditional 
governance was still a guarded one: despite the crises China faced, Confucian 
governance was still seen as the ideal form of governance, rather than European political 
institutions.
These statements suggest that in the context of the late-Tokugawa period, a 
holistic acceptance of the institutions of European states as a source of emulation had 
not necessarily take place among many Japanese. It is certainly true that Western 
technology and science were seen as conducive to achieving ‘wealth and strength’, and 
some European institutions were equated with Confucian thought meant that some 
Japanese had ‘elevat[ed] the Westerners from their usual category of beasts to men’,52 
placing them on an equal footing with themselves. Individuals such as Sakuma, 
however, continued to believe that the weakness of Japan ‘was physical and material’,
49 ibid., p. 130
50 Yokoi Shonan, ‘Kokuze Sanron: The Three Major Problems of State Policy’ (D. Y. Miyauchi, trans.), 
•Monumenta Nipponica (vol. 23, no. 1/2, 1968, pp. 156-186), pp. 166-167
31 Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Shisö kadai to shite no ajia: kijiku, rensa, töki, p. 167
52 Marius B. Jansen, ‘Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization’, in Marius B. Jansen (ed), 
Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965),
p. 60
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and did not require emulating the West. 53 This indicates that the ‘Western-styled’ state 
was still not fully regarded as a legitimate expression o f ‘prestige’ or ‘success’.
Figure 5-2: Fulfilling the Standard of Civilisation is not easy -  Japan Punch, December 
1881
Here, the British Minister Harry Parkes tells the complacent Japanese to wake up from their slumber to 
work hard, if they want to treated as equals to the European powers. Source: Shimizu Isao and Yumoto 
Köichi, Gciikoku manga ni egakareta nippon. (Tokyo: Maruzen bukkusu, 1994), p. 31
A gradual change took place following the transition from the Tokugawa period to 
the Meiji period. Although they had overthrown the feudal Tokugawa regime, the new 
Meiji leadership provided some form of continuity in that they were equally committed 
to the goal offukoku kyöhei, or making Japan rich and strong. The biggest departure by 
the Meiji leadership was, however, its determination to undertake reforms along 
Western lines, a policy which resulted in the despatching of the Iwakura fact-finding
53 Ökuma Shigenobu confirms this point in his memoirs first published in 1895. During the bakumatsu 
period, Ökuma claims, ‘[although we studied Western studies out of necessity at the time, we did not 
necessarily wish to open up the country and interact with the West. We merely wished to leam their 
strengths and correct our shortcomings (kare no chö o torite ware no tan o oginawan to hossuruni 
sugisarishi nomi (D f l  D T  fr» Jr <D M  & IS (T A  t  " T  ^Millie*' £  *9 LGQ<A).’ Ökuma 
Shigenobu and Enjöji Kiyoshi, Ökuma haku sekijitsu tan (vol. 2). (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku 
shuppankai, 1981), p. 446. Also see pp. 447-448.
' L i / ' wyi.
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mission in 1871.54 This is not to suggest that the Meiji leadership were committed
from the beginning to reconfigure Japan into a ‘Western’ power, even though they were 
united in their desire to transform Japan into a strong power that could defend itself 
against the ‘civilising’ face of European International Society. The new leadership did 
contain individuals who had been exposed to Western learning, but a coherent 
programme of reform had yet to emerge. As W. G. Beasley notes, proposals for reform 
in the early days of the Meiji era can be characterised by the lack of ‘the specifically 
Western ingredient that was eventually to color the modem bureaucracy, industry, and 
military establishment.’55 Subsequent suggestions for future political structures made 
references to Chinese models or political systems of eighth-century Japan.56 This also 
reflected of the fact that the leaders of the Meiji Restoration had used the return of 
power to the emperor (known as ösei fukko zElEfcJiC'S') as its rallying point.57 Similarly, 
the new criminal code (the Shinritsu köryö of 1870 was still based on the
legal codes of the Ming dynasty (the Darning lii to the extent that ‘any
individuals aspiring for a legal career had no choice but to learn the Chinese classics’.58
However, as the new Meiji leadership consolidated its power in Japan, calls for 
Japan to adopt a more ‘Europeanised’ identity grew stronger. There were three reasons 
for this. First, we should not ignore the aspects of power relations behind Japan’s 
decision to adopt the identity of a ‘civilised’ state. The Japanese knew that the 
European powers were able to enforce the social standards of the Society by force if 
needed, and any attempts to resist them would be futile. China provided an excellent 
(negative) example of this.
Second, the Meiji leadership became alert to the fact that the dualistic European 
International Society was far more likely to protect the sovereignty of ‘civilised’ states. 
This recognition was by no means an obvious or easy one. As we have seen, some
54 Needless to say, this gesture was positively welcomed by the ‘civilised’ members of European 
International Society. In a report on 18th November 1871 to British Foreign Secretary Earl Granville 
on the impending departure of the Iwakura mission, British diplomat reported that he had told the 
Japanese that the project was ‘an admirable one, that as we might now hope that the Mikado’s 
Government was becoming a real Power, it was time that a well-chosen Embassy should be sent 
abroad’. See ‘Mr Adams to Earl Granville’ in Ian Nish (ed), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: 
Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print (Part I, Series E, Asia, 1860-1914, 
vol. 1 Japan and North-East Asia, 1860-1878). (Lanham: University Publications of America, 1989), 
p. 300. Emphasis added.
55 W. G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 305
56 ibid., p. 304. The ‘Fujiwara’ refers to a powerful clan of court nobles who dominated court politics 
during Heian period (794-1192).
57 See also D. Eleanor Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer o f Western Organizational 
Patterns to Meiji Japan. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 3
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Japanese thought that European states were treated differently because they were 
military powers, while some believed that racial similarities facilitated this. However, 
as their interactions with the Society’s members intensified, they became increasingly 
aware that they were also differentiated on the basis of ‘civilisation’. By the early 1870s, 
Wayne C. McWilliams’ asserts, ‘the Meiji leaders were well aware of the practical as 
well as the symbolic disadvantages of the treaty system imposed on Japan by the 
Western powers.’59 The Europeans often made a point of telling the Japanese elite that 
attaining a ‘civilised’ identity on European International Society’s terms would greatly 
facilitate the protection of Japan’s sovereignty, and members of the Japanese elite also 
came to a similar conclusion: it was necessary for the Japanese elites to fulfil certain 
normative requirements if they wanted Japan to be accorded equal treatment with the 
European states.
Fukuzawa Yukichi put this in stark terms in his 1875 Bunmeiron no gairyaku (3C 
where he stated: ‘Today, the Japanese are trying to attain civilisation in 
order to maintain the independence of the country. Therefore, the independence of 
Japan is an end, the people’s attainment of civilisation is the means.’60 Fukuzawa’s 
conceptualisation of ‘Western civilisation’ was a wide-ranging one, and he argued that 
the priority was to teach the populace the Western ‘spirit of civilisation (bunmei no 
seishin <Z)ff^)’, namely nationalism and critical thinking.61 At the same time, 
neither did he deny the importance to attain Western material civilisation, namely 
‘clothing and food, machines, dwelling, and legal codes’.62 In this sense, Yamamuro 
Shin’ichi is correct in pointing out that Fukuzawa’s argument is a symbolic statement of 
his understanding of the intertwined nature of European International Society’s 
differential modes of interaction and its demand for civilisational homogeneity.63
58 Yamamuro Shin’ichi, ‘Kindai nippon ni okeru kokumin kokka keisei no shosö’, Hoseishi kenkyu (no. 
34, 1984, pp. 1-22), p. 3
59 Wayne C. McWilliams, ‘East Meets East: The Soejima Mission to China, 1873’, Monumenta 
Nipponica (vol. 30, no. 3, Autumn 1975, pp. 237-275), p. 239
60 Fukuzawa Yukichi, Bunmeiron no gairyaku. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995), p. 297.
61 This stemmed from Fukuzawa’s scepticism towards what he considered to be the superficial 
emulation of European industry, technology, and institutions. Also note that Fukuzawa himself was 
not an uncritical supporter of European civilisation either: although he does call for Japan to adopt 
Western civilisation, he claims that this is only because it is, for the moment, the highest form of 
civilisation available, not because it is inherently civilised (Fukuzawa, Bunmeiron no gairyaku, p. 
29). An excellent discussion of Fukuzawa’s Bunmeiron no gairyaku can be found in Maruyama 
Masao, Maruyama Masao zenshii (vols. 13, 14). (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996). My thanks to 
Tomoko Akami for pointing me to this source.
62 Fukuzawa Yukichi, Bunmeiron no gairyaku. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995), p. 30. C.f. Yamamuro 
Shin’ichi, Shisö kadai to shite no ajia: kijiku, rensa, töki. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001), pp. 43-44.
63 Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Shisö kadai to shite no ajia, p. 41
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The third reason was the Japanese elites’ increasing desire to be deemed a 
‘civilised’ state by the social standards of the Society. This necessarily entailed a 
reluctant acceptance of Japan’s status as a ‘semi-civilised’ entity, and understandably 
hurt Japanese pride.64 At the same time, the Meiji leadership included a number of 
individuals (such as Itö Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru, and Ökuma Shigenobu) who pushed for 
greater ‘Westernisation’. The members of this group were either immersed in ‘Western 
learning’ or had the experience of living abroad. It appears that increased contact with 
the member states of European International Society left a deep impression of Japan’s 
‘inferiority’ in comparison to the West. The European states’ scientific and 
technological achievements impressed many Japanese, and they were committed to 
transforming Japan into a Western-styled state, and, in the words of a somewhat critical 
Iwakura Tomomi, ‘wanted “to adopt foreign inventions at once and advance the country 
as it were at telegraphic speed’” .65 This desire to attain the identity of ‘Europeanised' 
statehood strongly indicates Japan’s willingness to become a member of European 
International Society, indicating an acceptance of the new international order and its 
social norms. These sentiments can be seen in documents exchanged among the 
members of the Meiji leadership.66 In a letter written in September 1871 discussing the 
objectives of sending a mission to the ‘civilised’ Western states, Sanjö Sanetomi, the 
head of the dajökan government, wrote to Iwakura Tomomi as follows:
States possess equal rights and refrain from encroaching upon one another; on an 
equal footing, they engage in polite, cordial diplomacy and enjoy the benefits of 
trade. This is why international treaties exist. It goes without saying that states 
should naturally possess equal rights, and treaties should therefore be concluded 
on an equal basis (itfc 1 ' S T ' s MiTS hill b@3 V
y )....[S]ince the Meiji Restoration, we have desired to recover 
lost rights and stand on an equal footing [with the Western states] without having 
our territory encroached upon. However, the [unequal] treaties have yet to be 
rectified and old obstacles have yet to be removed, and the governments and 
ministers from other states still believe Japanese political institutions to be 
belonging to those of the Orient....Therefore, we have undertaken painful 
reflections on this matter and unified the country, reformed our institutions, laws,
64 This point is supported by R. P. Anand, Family of ‘Civilized’ States and Japan’, p. 16; Gong, The 
Standard o f ‘Civilization ’ in International Society. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 172-173 
ü5 Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, p. 353. There were of course plenty of criticisms for the 
‘progressives’ from other quarters of the leadership, who considered the group as being overly hasty 
in implementing these reforms.
66 Marius B. Jansen claims that in the earlier years of the Meiji period ‘a class of “intellectuals” had not 
as yet clearly emerged, and...most men of letters shared the goals and hopes of their contemporaries 
in government service.’ See Jansen, ‘Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization’, p. 65
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and authoritarian rule, ...and thereby laid the foundations for standing on an equal 
footing with the Western powers.67
The document again indicates an acceptance of European standards o f ‘legitimate’ 
statehood. There is (in similar fashion to Fukuzawa’s views cited above) an 
acknowledgement that ‘the Meiji leaders felt that the country’s internal reforms had not 
yet progressed to the point that it could boast a completely modernized system of 
laws. ’ 68 This confirms the growing acceptance by leading Japanese intellectuals and 
political leaders of Japan’s ‘inferior’ political position within European International 
Society, which was based on the ‘standard of civilisation’. It also suggests that the 
‘institutionalisation’ of the ‘standard of civilisation’ had taken place and the ‘standard’ 
had, to use Kai Alderson’s definition, become ‘entrenched where [it] is disseminated 
throughout the organizational fields which compose the polity, permeating society at a 
variety of levels. ’ 69
The acceptance of European International Society’s social hierarchy inevitably 
meant that if the Japanese wished to improve its standing within it, they would have to 
reinvent Japan as a ‘Westernised state’, which stood at the apex of this new 
civilisational ranking. This again appears to conform with Kai Alderson’s argument that 
once ‘institutionalisation’ of a particular norm occurs, it ‘not only alters incentives but 
also shapes the cognitive categories through which the world is perceived and strategies 
are crafted. ’ 70 A typical statement of this phenomenon can be found in a policy 
document written by Inoue Kaoru during his tenure as Foreign Minister:
67 Sanjö Sanetomi, ‘Tokumei zenken taishi haken chögi no koto’. This document can be found in 
Shibahara Takuji, Ikai Takaaki and Ikeda Masahiro (eds), Nihon kindai shisö taikei (vol. 12): 
taigaikan. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. 1988), pp. 17-19; and, Iwakurakö jikki (Tada Kömon, ed) (vol. 
2). (Tokyo: Hara shobö, 1968), pp. 927-929. The letter was based on a document entitled A Brief 
Sketch, written by Guido F. Verbeck (1830-1898) to Ökuma Shigenobu in 1869. Verbeck was a 
missionary who taught Ökuma Shigenobu ‘Western studies’ in Nagasaki. He later served as a 
political advisor to the Meiji government. Although based on Verbeck’s document, Sanjö’s letter can 
be seen as a reflection of Meiji interests for several reasons. First, the document was rewritten and 
altered by Sanjö himself; second, as Albert Altman argues, ‘[t]he basic motivations for the [sending 
of] the Embassy came from the Japanese. The Meiji leaders required no Verbeck to inspire 
dissatisfaction with the treaties and Japan’s international status. Neither did they need him to instruct 
them to desire reform of their instituitions, and that, along Western lines.... Verbeck’s paper...offered 
the Meiji leaders a design which they adapted to their ends, not his.’ Albert Altman, ‘Guido Verbeck 
and the Iwakura Embassy’, Japan Quarterly (vol. 13, no. 1, January-March 1966, pp. 54-62), p. 57. 
Verbeck’s role in the sending of the Iwakura mission is also discussed in Umetani Noboru, Oyatoi 
gaikokujin (vol. 11): seiji, hösei. (Tokyo: Kajima shuppankai, 1971), pp. 32-41.
68 Akira Iriye, ‘Japan’s drive to great-power status’ in Marius B. Jansen (ed), The Emergence o f Meiji 
Japan. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.283. See also Joseph Pittau, Political 
Thought in Early Meiji Japan 1868-1889. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 40
69 Alderson, ‘Making sense of state socialization’, p. 420. Key-Hiuk Kim also argues that Japan 
‘accepted the Western argument that unequal treaties were justified and necessary when they were 
substantial differences in the level of cultural enlightenment between the contracting parties’. See 
Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order, p. 157
70 Alderson, ‘Making sense of state socialization’, p. 420
LEARNING THE COMPETENCE AND SKILL TO BE A ‘CIVILISED’ STATE 173
We must make our empire a European-styled empire; make our people a European- 
styled people, create a new, European-styled empire in the Orient. Only by doing 
so can our empire climb to an equal position in terms o f treaties with the 
Occidental states ( f k ^ S  V  i t  i / ' r M l I f r W I l  M ?  3 ,  $ c | l
A brief comment on the source may be necessary here. Here, Inoue is responding 
to criticisms made by Tani Tateki (^T 1̂  , also known as Tani Kanjö) in 1887, who, 
among other things, criticised Inoue’s ‘Europeanisation’ policies Oka
seisaku). However, this neither necessarily means that Inoue’s calls to construct a 
‘Europeanised’ empire were merely a rhetorical device for refuting Tani’s remarks, nor 
that the program of ‘Westernisation’ was in serious danger of being rejected. There are 
two reasons for this assertion. First, while critical of the holistic, superficial manner and 
the timing in which ‘Westernisation’ was occurring, Tani himself does not criticise 
Westernisation per se. Second, Inoue’s memorandum also argues that if Korea also 
demanded equal treatment with Japan, there was no way that Japan would permit it, 
because Korean laws would not be able to protect ‘the interests of Japanese citizens’.72 
At this stage, Korea had yet to accept the ‘standard of civilisation’, and the very fact that 
Inoue judges Korea as unworthy of equal treatment with Japan on this basis is an 
indication that he had internalised the notion that legitimate ‘civilised’ statehood had to 
be based on the standards of European International Society.73 His argument that the 
‘Europeanisation’ of Japan was necessary in order to be treated equally with the West 
was thus a logical extension of his beliefs.
This is not to imply that the Japanese were engaged in an uncritical adoption of 
every aspect of ‘Europeanised’ identity, and we must caution against portraying Japan 
and its leaders as a monolithic entity striving towards attaining this status. The official 
secretary of the Iwakura mission occasionally *attack[ed] the sometimes
71 Inoue Kaoru, ‘Jöyaku kaisei mondai ikensho’ in Shibahara Takuji, Ikai Takaaki and Ikeda Masahiro 
(eds), Nihon kindai shisö taikei (vol. 12): taigaikan. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1988), p. 68. The full 
text of this document, along with some commentary more sympathetic towards Inoue, is also available 
in Inoue Kaoru kö denki hensan kai, Segai Inoue kö den (vol. 3). (Tokyo: Naigai shoseki, 1934), pp. 
907-937. Tani Tateki’s memorial, Ikensho, can be found at ‘Kindai dejitaru raiburarii’ database 
(http://kindai.ndl.go.ip/index.html), available from the National Diet Library, Tokyo.
72 Inoue, ‘Jöyaku kaisei mondai ikensho’, , pp. 7475
73 Shibahara states that Inoue must have made such arguments because they were views commonly held 
by other Meiji leaders and were most likely to have fallen upon sympathetic ears. This again 
highlights the fact that the ‘standard of civilisation’ had indeed gained acceptance among the Meiji 
elite; and while the ‘standard’ remained a legitimate one in Japanese eyes, there was a widespread 
recognition that Japan was still ‘inferior’ to the West and needed to ‘catch up’ with the West by 
attaining the identity of a ‘European-styled empire’ and a similar level of ‘civilisation’. Shibahara 
Takuji, ‘Kaisetsu’ in Shibahara Takuji et al, Nihon kindai shisö taikei (vol. 12): taigaikan. (Tokyo: 
Iwanami shoten, 1988), p. 485
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undiscriminating enthusiasm for Western fashions in Japan. ’ 74 Noting that the European 
industrial exhibitions had contributed to a gradual decline of the adoration for anything 
French, Kume Kunitake wrote:
The present day is for us very much like that earlier time in European history when 
everyone was fascinated by the brilliance of Louis XIV and France. If we ignore 
our traditions and rush to model ourselves on Europe, is it not conceivable that we 
shall fall into the same delusion as European countries before the Great 
Exhibition?75
The importing of foreign culture and foreign domestic institutions created other 
backlashes within Japanese society. As Hirakawa Sukehiro remarks, ‘the assimilation 
of Western culture was dictated by reasons of state, yet such efforts were fraught with an 
uneasiness that Japan’s cultural self-identity might be violated. ’ 76 Inoue Kaoru’s 
attempts to revise the unequal treaties through a policy of rapid modernisation and 
allowing of foreign judges to sit on Japanese courts caused a nationalist outcry, as can 
be seen in Tani’s memorial. The event culminated in Inoue’s resignation, 77 The identity 
crises which took place in all walks of Japanese society resulted in increasing pressures 
for ‘a genuine appropriation of the best in Japanese tradition’ , 78 and neither did the Meiji 
leadership advocate a total abandonment of Japanese culture and tradition.
It is, however, important to keep in mind that this ‘identity crisis’ within Japanese 
society did not signify the end of Teaming from the West’. As Carol Gluck argues, ‘[i]t 
is a trivialization...to regard [traditional] ideologists as anti-Western, which the majority 
emphatically were not, or as apostles of a return to the past, which had little hold on 
most of them. ’ 79 Most activists continued to wear Western clothing and ‘were
74 Andrew Cobbing, ‘Britain [1]: Early Meiji Travel Encounters’ in Ian Nish (ed), The Iwakura Mission 
in America and Europe: A New Assessment. (Richmond: Japan Library, 1998), p. 47
75 ibid. The original text can be found in Kume Kunitake, Beiö kairan jikki (vol. 2) (Tanaka Akira, ed). 
(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978), p. 69
76 Hirakawa Sukehiro, ‘Japan’s turn to the West’ (Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, trans.) in Marius B. 
Jansen (ed), The Cambridge History of Japan (vol. 5): The Nineteenth Century. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 498
77 Inoue Kaoru’s diplomacy included, among others, a charm offensive towards the Western nationals to 
showcase Japan’s ‘Western’ identity. To this end, a dance hall, the Rokumeikan, was even built to 
entertain the Westerners. Inoue’s diplomacy subsequently became known (with some ridicule) as 
‘Rokumeikan diplomacy (Rokumeikan gaiko). It is interesting to note that criticism of Inoue’s 
policies even came from foreign quarters: French legal advisor to the Japanese government, Gustave 
Emile Boissonade de Fontarabie (1825-1910), also warned against what he considered to be Inoue’s 
excessive concessions towards the Western powers, particularly allowing foreign judges to sit in 
Japanese courts. See Umetani Noboru, Oyatoi gaikokujin (vol. 11): seiji, gaikö. (Tokyo: Kajima 
shuppankai, 1971), pp. 144-150
78 Hirakawa Sukehiro, ‘Japan’s turn to the West’, p. 489
79 Carol Gluck, Japan ’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985), p. 20. Gluck points out that reaction to ‘Westernisation’ are too complex to 
be labelled as such: one particular essay titled ‘Lamps and the Ruination of the State (Ranpu 
bökokuron)’ had ‘involved a Buddhist defense of the faith against Christianity and Copemican theory,
LEARNING THE COMPETENCE AND SKILL TO BE A ‘CIVILISED’ STATE 175
themselves the frequent targets of satirical anti-westemism, their coats and trousers 
mocked, their “beer, brandy, vermouth” caricatured in song.’80
The Chinese case: state reconfiguration
The reforms that began to take place in China from the 1860s were, as noted above, a 
reflection of the Chinese elites’ attempts to engage with European International Society 
by attaining wealth and strength. However, there also existed influence from European 
diplomats, missionaries, and technical experts in the employment of the Qing, who 
attempted to pressure the Chinese elites to undergo reforms that would bring them 
closer to the ‘standard of civilisation.’ One example of this pressure can be found in the 
British Minister in China, Sir Rutherford Alcock’s note to Prince Gong:
...among the most revered of the ancient writings, there is one axiom which is not 
without application now. For Confucius taught, that “when a system is exhausted 
it must be modified, that modified it will work, and that working it will endure.”
The present machinery of Chinese Administration is exhausted, and no longer fit 
for fne work to be done. It requires modification to adapt it to a totally new order 
of wants.81
One such European attempts to bring about reform in China came from Robert 
Hart and Thomas Francis Wade in November 1865 and March 1866 respectively.82 The 
memorandums were roughly similar in content, and give an insight into the nature of 
socialisation pressures the Qing dynasty faced. Some were, unsurprisingly, directly 
related to China’s entry into European International Society. The necessity to adhere to 
international treaties was emphasised, and Hart and Wade strongly encouraged China to 
start sending its diplomats overseas. Significantly, Hart and Wade’s proposals did not 
just stop at the adoption of the institutions of European International Society. As will be 
elaborated below, they forwarded a series of proposals calling for the reform of China’s 
domestic institutions, which they argued would maximise the power of the state and 
facilitate industrial development. While this coincided with the Chinese elites’ desires 
to attain wealth and strength, Hart and Wade’s proposals went further in that they 
represented an attempt to reform the Chinese state along European lines. Both men
as well as an anti-establishment call for self-help in villages suffering the economic consequences of 
“civilization.” (Gluck, Japan ’s Modern Myths, p. 20)’
80 Gluck, Japan ’s Modern Myths, pp. 20-21
81 Ian Nish (ed), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office 
Confidential Print (Part I, Series, E, Vol. 20: China’s Rehabilitation and Treaty Revision, 1866- 
1869). (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1994), p. 107. The memorandum 
was enclosed in Rutherford Alcock’s letter to British foreign secretary Lord Stanley, dated 23rd 
December 1867
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were relatively ‘SinifiecT, in that they had developed considerable respect for China and 
its heritage. However, to use Mary C. Wright’s words, ‘they were no eccentrics in flight 
from their own age. They understood the meaning of the nineteenth century and the 
relentless force of the Industrial Revolution.’83 In an age where ‘civilised’ status entailed 
the possession of Western-styled domestic institutions and attaining industrial and 
military prowess, both men had no doubt that it was important for the Chinese elite to 
carry out reforms on ‘Europeanised’ lines if they wished to be treated as an equal to the 
‘civilised’ member states of the Society.84
However, the degree to which the Chinese political decision-makers would (or 
could) transform China along Western lines depended very much on their understanding 
and acceptance of the Society’s demands for homogeneity, as well as their 
acknowledgment of the standards of ‘success’ within European International Society. 
Ultimately, most of the Chinese elite refused to do this. The very recognition of the 
Society’s benchmarks for legitimate ‘statehood’ meant a denial of China’s claims to 
superiority, and a concurrence with the Society’s portrayal of China as an ‘uncivilised’ 
entity. Despite their comprehensive defeat at the hands of the British in the Opium War 
and Arrow War, the Chinese leadership found accepting these social demands extremely 
difficult.
There were of course variations among the Chinese officials. The more anti- 
Western elites opposed reforms that were based on introducing European practices, even 
though they accepted the need for some reforms to make China powerful. This went 
against their belief in the superiority of China and its institutions, and was a 
fundamentally misguided way to strengthen the country. The Grand Secretary Woren 
(ilHE) memorialised the Qing Court in 1867, questioning whether the learning of 
Western technology and learning would help China in any way. ‘Whether we win the 
war [against the European powers]’ he argued, ‘depends on our ability to recruit men of
82 Thomas Francis Wade was British Minister to China from 1870-1883, and Robert Hart was in the 
service of the Qing government as Inspector General for the Chinese Customs.
83 Wright, The Last Stand o f Chinese Conservatism, p. 268
84 It is also interesting to note that these ‘pressures of socialisation’ came from less official quarters: in 
1885 a British officer told Zheng Guanying, the Chinese merchant/intellectual and the author of 
Shengshi weiyan, that the key to making China a powerful state was the development of industry and 
the possession of a parliamentary political system. This is indicative of the implicit ‘standard of 
civilisation’ which measured ‘civilisation’ according to the level of industrial and political 
development a state had achieved. China, the officer told Zheng, ‘should reform its old institutions in 
the fields of commerce, mining and technological industry; second, China should develop a shipping 
industry, railways, telecommunication systems; third, China should establish parliaments and modem 
schools. If China could accomplish these three matters, there would be nothing to fear.’Cited in Key 
Ray Chong, ‘Cheng Kuan-ying (1841-1920): A Source of Sun Yat-sen’s Nationalist Ideology?’, The 
Journal o f Asian Studies (vol. 28, no. 2, February 1969, pp. 247-267), p. 250
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virtue and whether or not our policies match the teachings of the sages A
fr® . W f ! I ? l f i^ # ) . ’85
Even among officials who believed in the efficacy of introducing some European 
technology, industry, and political institutions, there often existed an inherent 
assumption that China was as superior as the European powers (if not more). The 
typical attitude adopted by these elites towards Western culture and its institutions was 
epitomised by the slogan ‘Chinese studies at the base, Western studies for practical use ( 
zhongti xiyong) '.86 ‘Chinese studies’ primarily meant ‘traditional Chinese 
political and economic systems and their corresponding ideologies’,87 while ‘Western 
studies for practical use’ was limited primarily to ‘Western science and technology. 
Western institutions (particularly political institutions) and thought were seen as heresy 
and dichotomous to “Chinese learning” and were subjected to rejection.’88 One early 
expression of the concept came from Li Hongzhang’s secretary, Feng Guifen ($iti3f). 
It should be noted that while Feng himself may have given expression to this particular 
formula, he himself was by no means a rigid conservative, and was quite open to new 
ideas. He advocated drastic reforms of fundamental Chinese political institutions, and 
recognised the importance of Western studies and learning from Western political 
institutions.89 He also called for the establishment of schools which taught science and 
Western languages.
Despite these personal qualities, Feng did not question the primacy of Chinese 
institutions. In his famous essay ‘Cai xixue yi ( j^ H ^ s i) ’, Feng instead claims that 
‘Western’ ways can be used to strengthen Chinese institutions. He claims: ‘Would it 
not be best if we can use Chinese ethics and teachings as the base and use the method of 
strengthening from other countries to make up for the [former’s] shortcomings (^nLld3
Similar sentiments
were expressed in Li Hongzhang’s oft-quoted phrase, ‘[everything in China’s civil and
85 Cited in Fujita Yuji Ajia ni okeru bunmei no taiko: joiron to shukyu ron ni kansuru nippon, chosen, 
chügoku no hikaku kenkyü. (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobö, 2001), pp. 276-277
86 This particular slogan was made famous by Zhang Zhidong shortly after the Sino-Japanese War, but 
similar concepts are also known, such as zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong
Wei Yuan’s earlier exhortations to ‘use the barbarian to control the barbarian yi yi zhi yi)’
can also be seen as a variant on this theme.
87 Yan Qinghua, ‘Zhongri jindaihuachu de liangzhong duiwai kaifangguan: “zhongti xiyong” yu “hehun 
yangcai” sixiang bijiao’, Jingji pinglun (no. 2, 1995, pp. 66-71), p. 67
88 Wu Anlong, ‘Cong “hehun hancai” dao “hehun yangcai”: jianshuo “hehun yangcai” he “zhongti 
xiyong” de yitong’, Riben yanjiu (no. 1, 1995, pp. 61-66), p. 64
89 Kuhn, Origins o f the Modern Chinese State, p. 55
90 Feng Guifen, Jiaobinlu kangyi, p. 57
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military systems [was] far superior to the West Azi-t ) . ’ 91
Thus, there was some need for Teaming’ from the West, but only its technology and 
industry. There was no need to reinvent China as a ‘Europeanised’ state, and even when 
some institutions were created in response to European demands, this was seen as a 
temporary measure This attitude is similar to those of Prince Gong’s in his memorial 
concerning the establishment of the zongli yamen.
However, we must be careful not to assume that the Chinese elite as a whole 
rigidly adhered to the ideology of ‘Chinese studies at the base, Western studies for 
practical use’. The lower reformist elite also shared the belief that greater 
industrialisation (such as opening up mines) was necessary to enrich and strengthen 
China,92 but some of them also now began advocating political institutional change 
along Western lines. For reformists outside official circles, argues Lloyd E. Eastman, 
‘the increasingly palpable shortcomings of the self-strengthening movement and the 
consequent diminution of Chinese complacency’ and ‘a considerable, if grudging, 
admiration for the Meiji leaders, who were bringing wealth and power to Japan’,93 
provided additional stimuli for this shift. Within official circles, Ma Jianzhong recorded 
his observations of European political institutions and saw a link between such 
institutions and European strength. However, one of the most symbolic statements of 
this new line of thinking was Guo Songtao’s famous phrase, written in 1877, that ‘The 
kingdoms of Europe date back for some 2,000 years. Their governmental and 
educational systems are well-ordered, enlightened, and methodical (M # al[1] ij&
Moreover, the Western nations had both the ‘essence and the peripheral (JIW 
A A )’.94 Previous discourse among the proponents of ‘self-strengthening’ had portrayed
91 Letter by Li Hongzhang to the zongli yamen, June 1863. For the Chinese original, see Jiang Tingfu 
(ed), Jindai zhongguo waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao (vol. 1). (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1982), p. 
365. A partial translation of this document is found in Teng and Fairbank (eds), China ’s Response to 
the West, p. 70. However, we should exercise some caution in taking Li’s statement at face-value: Li 
Hongzhang, while certainly not free of the conservatism of his background and generation, was one of 
the most open-minded and reformist officials of his time. As will be discussed later, there was strong 
conservative resistance to reforms, and Li Hongzhang himself may have been writing this simply to 
placate the conservatives. This, however, does not take away from the fact that strong opposition 
existed towards the adoption of European-styled domestic institutional reforms.
92 See for example Wang Tao, ‘Jian tielu’, ‘She dianxian’, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, pp. 61-62, 71-73; 
Ma Jianzhong, ‘A Discussion of Railroads’, ‘On Enriching the People’, in Strengthen the Country 
and Enrich the People; and Zheng Guanying, ‘Shangzhan (part 1 and 2)’, ‘Tielu (part 1 and 2)’, 
‘Kaikuang (part 1 and 2)’, Shengshi weiyan. (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1998)
93 Lloyd E. Eastman, ‘Political Reformism in China before the Sino-Japanese War’, The Journal o f 
Asian Studies (vol. 27, no. 4, August 1968, pp. 695-710), p. 707
94 Guo Songtao, Shixi jicheng, p. 23. A translation is available in 'The First Chinese Embassy to the 
West: The Journals o f Kuo Sung-t’ao, Liu His-hung and Chang Te-yi (J. D. Frodsham, trans.). 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 43. However, the translated passage of the ‘essence’ and 
‘peripheral’ is my own, as this is omitted in Frodsham’s translation.
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(as in Li Hongzhang’s remark above) China as possessing the ‘essence (Tf: ben) ', that is 
‘the correct rituals, ethics, and political systems’, while the advantages the West 
possessed tended to belong within the ‘periphery (zfc mo)', ‘such as machines and 
technology. ’ 95 Guo’s argument had ‘revolutionary implications, since it asserted the 
existence of a civilization morally equivalent to China, and thus undermined completely 
China’s claim to superiority.. .to admire the ethical basis of Western civilization was to 
sound the death-knell of the Confucian world-order. ’ 96 Furthermore, his assertion 
opened up some intellectual space for exploring the possibility of China adopting 
Western political institutions.
But such views were limited. Although there was increasing acknowiedgmeni of 
the potential efficacy of Western political institutions that may have been conducive 
towards the eventual adoption of a ‘Europeanised’ state identity, these were limited 
during the Tongzhi Restoration. There appear to be at least two reasons for this. First, 
the conservative factions within the court posed too formidable an obstacle for the 
reformists. Numerous attempts for reform encountered strong resistance from various 
levels of Chinese society, rendering sweeping changes (such as those undertaken in 
Japan) impossible. Some scholars have forwarded the notion that Confucian ideology 
was in itself not conducive to change, 97 claiming that ‘the Restoration failed because the 
requirements of modernization ran counter to the requirements of Confucian stability. ’ 98 
Such arguments are simplistic, and the failure of the movement cannot be reduced 
simply to ideological resistance. 99 However, it is certainly true that even ‘moderate’
95 Satö Shin’ichi, Kindai chügoku no chishikijin to bunmei, p. 79. A similar observation can be found 
in Wang Tao, ‘Ji yingguo zhengzhi’, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, p. 89. Also See Paul A. Cohen’s 
discussion in Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T ’ao and Reform in Late Ch ’ing China. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987), p. 225
96 J. D. Frodsham, ‘Introduction’ in The First Chinese Embassy to the West: The Journals o f Kuo Sung- 
t ’ao, Liu His-hung and Chang Te-yi (J. D. Frodsham, trans.). (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 
xlii. Also see Satö Shin’ichi, Kindai chügoku no chishikijin to bunmei, pp. 80-81.
97 The most famous of these proponents includes Mary C. Wright, whose work The Last Stand o f 
Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874. (New York: Atheneum, 1967) still 
remains a classic. Another similar argument can be found in Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China 
and its Modern Fate: The Problem o f Intellectual Continuity. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1958), pp. 59-78
98 Wright, The Last Stand o f Chinese Conservatism, p. 9
99 While not wishing to suggest that the reformists themselves were not without their conservative 
limitations, the fact that Confucian scholars themselves could be receptive to new ideas can be seen, 
as David Pong points out, from the fact that many of the reformist officials -  all indoctrinated in 
Confucianism to certain degrees -  were in fact responsive to Western innovations. See David Pong, 
Shen Pao-chen and China’s Modernization in the Nineteenth Century. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p. 2. Wei Yuan was also another Confucian scholar who is known to have 
displayed a remarkable ability to transcend orthodoxy in his writings. For instance, his fascination 
with Western political institutions and ‘his enthusiastic description[s] of the American and Swiss 
electoral systems indicated a breach in the traditional confidence in Confucian institutional-normative
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reforms -  ‘conservative’ as though they may seem from our vantage point today -  were 
bitterly opposed by the conservative faction.100
During the 1860s and 1870s, the reformists did enjoy support from the court, and 
any conservative resistance was relatively muted. However, following the anti-Christian 
Tianjin Massacre in 1870 and the increasing atmosphere of xenophobia, 101 the 
conservative factions, most notoriously the qingyi ( Tim t § ) group, increased their 
influence within the court.102 ‘By the mid-1890s’, writes Mary Backus Rankin, ‘this 
strain of critical opinion within the bureaucracy had become one aspect of a national 
political consciousness that could be called public opinion.’103 Their power was such that 
they successfully lobbied to have the printed edition o f Guo Songtao’s report from 
Britain, the Shixi jicheng  burnt. Guo himself was intimidated into early
retirement, and did not visit Beijing upon his return from Britain for fear of his own 
safety.
Second, such impediments to the reform programmes as discussed above were 
further exacerbated by court politics. The empress dowager Cixi (MiM) found it 
expedient to acquiesce to the wishes of the conservative faction. Her primary interest 
was to further her own power within the court,104 and in order to attain this goal, she
universality.’ Peter M. Mitchell, ‘The Limits of Reformism: Wei Yuan’s Reaction to Western 
Intrusion’, Modern Asian Studies (vol. 6, no. 2, 1972, pp. 175-204), p. 203.
100 One of the most famous of these conservative views is the official Woren’s memorial opposed to 
Western learning. In this document, Woren insisted that ‘the way to establish a nation is to lay 
emphasis on propriety and righteousness, not on power and plotting. The fundamental effort lies in 
the minds of people, not in techniques.’ See Teng and Fairbank, China’s Response to the West, pp. 
76-77.
101 The Tianjin Massacre occurred after an anti-Christian riot escalated into the burning down of a 
church and the murder of the French consul, Henri Fontanier. In the course of subsequent 
negotiations, Zeng Guofan recommended heavy penalties for the rioters and Tianjin local magistrates. 
Zeng’s proposals incited strong reactions from the conservatives, however, and Zeng was eventually 
withdrawn from his role as negotiator with the French.
102 Qingyi can be translated as ‘pure discussion’, and had a long pedigree in Chinese history. According 
to Mary Backus Rankin, ‘[sjometimes it took the form of broadly reformist public dissent from 
government policies’ while at other times it ‘appeared to focus on narrow issues of procedure or ritual 
or to deteriorate into a vehicle for petty, irresponsible careerism within the bureaucracy. In all 
instances it was distinguished by a moralistic, sometimes intemperate rhetorical style that was 
repeatedly associated with the expression of opposition.’ See Rankin, ‘ “Public Opinion” and 
Political Power: Qingyi in Late Nineteenth Century China’, Journal o f Asian Studies (vol. 41, no. 3, 
May 1982, pp. 453-484), p. 453. It must also be made clear that while the qingyi group did at times 
oppose the reformist groups, their motives were mixed, and not all of them were opposed to the 
reforms per se. For instance, Zhang Zhidong, one of the key reformist-officials in the 1890s, was also 
a key member of the qingyi group.
103 ibid., p.454
104 While she attained a significant degree of power, the empress dowager Cixi suffered from several 
weaknesses in her legitimacy to rule. First, as a female ruler she had to battle constant suspicion from 
the literati, who were indoctrinated in the belief that females had no place in politics. Second, 
rumours about her involvement in sinister political schemes (such as her part in murdering her co­
regent and the widow of the Tongzhi emperor) were rife, making the legitimation of leadership 
doubly difficult. See Lloyd E. Eastman, Throne and Mandarins: China ’s Search for a Policy during
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often lent her support to the conservatives at the expense of the reformist officials. The 
fact that even the empress dowager -  who was also regent to both the Tongzhi and 
Guangxu emperors -  needed to solicit the support of the conservatives to consolidate 
her power within the court is indicative of the level of influence the conservative 
factions exerted . 105 Consequently, the conservatives, often with Cixi’s backing, blocked 
many of the reform programmes. This aspect of court politics can be discerned from Li 
Hongzhang’s letter to Guo Songtao:
I remember last winter when I visited the capital to have an audience with the 
emperor. I called in at Prince Gong’s house, and went to great lengths to inform 
him of the benefits of railways, suggesting that we could establish a line between 
Qingjiang to Beijing, thereby facilitating transport between north and south China.
Prince Gong agreed with me, but said that nobody would dare propose this. When 
I pleaded with him again to take the opportunity to mention this to the two empress 
dowagers, Prince Gong told me that even they could not make such a big decision 
by themselves. We never discussed the issue again (s '
g, urn#®, mmmm, immmm, wmr
Although the empress dowager did often recognise the necessity of reforms, the goal of 
maintaining her own personal power took precedence over benefits to the Chinese state. 
Cixi’s manipulation of the conservatives was, in Lloyd E. Eastman’s words, ‘a necessity 
of her political existence; a means of preserving the power of final decision from a 
power-hungry bureaucracy and self-engrossing mandarins . ’ 107 Eastman’s depiction of 
officials as ‘power-hungry’ and ‘self-engrossing’ exaggerates the role that myopic, 
personal interests played in the self-strengthening movement, and may not give 
sufficient credit to the reformist elite’s nationalism and loyalty towards the Qing
the Sino-French Controversy 1880-1885. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1967), pp. 214-217.
105 Mary Backus Rankin holds a different view. She claims that qingyi proponents were often calling for 
enhanced roles for the bureaucracy, which could potentially challenge the power of the throne. 
Therefore, she concludes that ‘qingyi was no tool of autocracy in the late nineteenth century’ (‘ 
“Public Opinion” and Political Power’, p. 464). Although Rankin is probably correct in her 
assumption that the empress dowager Cixi did not actually encourage the qingyi movement, I do not 
agree with her assertion that the qingyi ‘was no tool of autocracy’: Cixi’s record of involvement in 
court intrigues suggest that she was an expert in political manoeuvres, and she was not above using 
the qingyi group as a device for divide-and-rule tactics. As Lloyd E. Eastman observes, ‘to deny that 
the Old Buddha [Cixi] was capable of using ch ’ing-i for her own political purposes...would be to 
underestimate grossly her political skills.’ Lloyd E. Eastman, ‘Ch’ing-i and Chinese Policy 
Formation during the Nineteenth Century’, The Journal o f Asian Studies (vol. 24, no. 4, August 1965, 
pp. 595-611), p. 606. Also see Ding Richu, ‘Dowager Empress Cixi and Toshimichi [sic]: A 
Comparative Study of Modernization in China and Japan’, in Frederic Wakeman Jr. and Wang Xi 
(eds), China's Quest for Modernization: A Historical Perspective. (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian 
Studies, University of California, 1997)
106 Li Hongzhang, ‘Fu guo yunxian xingshi’, Li Hongzhang quanji: pengliao hangao (vol. 6). 
(Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 1998), p. 3691
107 Eastman, Throne and Mandarins, p. 213.
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dynasty.108 However, it does give a strong indication of how court politics served to 
severely undermine the efforts of reform.
Institutional reforms: state centralisation
Once a state had decided to adopt the identity of a ‘Westernised state’, it was inevitable 
that it would have to undertake some administrative reforms. One of the best known of 
these was the process of legal reform, where non-European states transformed their legal 
codes to meet the demands imposed upon them by the ‘standard of civilisation’ of 
European International Society. While these reforms were no doubt an important 
component of the process by which a non-European state attained ‘civilised’ status 
within the Society, they have been given comprehensive treatment elsewhere,109 and are 
not the main focus of this chapter. Here, particular attention is paid to centralising the 
state’s system of governance. By abolishing aristocratic power and estates, the French 
Revolution had demonstrated that a state’s power could be strengthened through 
centralisation. It is noteworthy that when China and Japan encountered the Society, the 
‘civilised’ states had just undergone a similar transformation themselves. As Westney 
notes, in the 1830s and 1840s, technological innovations such as the railroad and the 
telegraph had ‘removed many of the constraints on coordination and control that in the 
past had limited organizational expansion and the physical separation of subunits, and 
they provided the means of centralizing and integrating activities on an unprecedented 
scale.’110 To Western diplomats who firmly believed in the necessity to introduce the 
trappings of European civilisation such as ‘sound governance’ and ‘industry’, a 
centralised domestic political structure modelled on European states was the best system 
of governance to realise these objectives, and was actively promoted. In East Asia,
108 While the reformist officials may have stood to benefit from their programmes, such undertakings 
were cannot be said to have been dominated by personal interests, and were often backed by 
nationalistic concerns. Furthermore, the reformist officials owed their positions of power to the Qing 
court, and were in no way likely to challenge the dynasty. Furthermore, these arguments (particularly 
scholarship from the People’s Republic of China) have frequently been a product of Chinese 
nationalism, which has traditionally seen the reformists as traitors who capitulated to the European 
powers, and are ideologically driven. See Samuel S. Chu, ‘Li Hung-chang: An Assessment’ in 
Samuel S. Chu and Kwang-Ching Liu (eds), Li-Hungchang and China’s Early Modernization. 
(Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 271-278. For views similar to Eastman, see Stanley 
Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Regionalism. 
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964, pp. ix-x. The Marxist historian Mou Anshi also 
appears to come to a similar conclusion: he claims that most of the reformers consisted of men who 
‘established themselves either by commercial activities or by becoming warlords’ ( Yangwu yundong, 
p. 17). The self-strengthening movement, in this view, was a movement designed to consolidate the 
reformists’ grip on military power, rather than strengthen China (see Yangwu yundong. Shanghai: 
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1956).
109 Gong, The Standard o f ‘Civilization ' in International Society
110 Westney, Imitation and Innovation, p. 10
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however, China had traditionally provided a model of a centralised, bureaucratic empire, 
and the European states were not necessarily the only models available. This added 
another layer of complexity to the debates that surrounded state centralisation, 
particularly in Japan.
A centralised ‘European-styled’ state in Japan: motivations and intellectual origins 
The motivations for centralising the Japanese state were complex, involved both 
pragmatic, ideational, domestic and international motivations, and was a radical 
departure from the decentralised, feudal structures of the Tokugawa shogunate.111 
Practical matters undoubtedly played an important role. For a start, the Meiji leadership 
had to consolidate their rule as the sole ‘legitimate’ government of Japan and make their 
authority be felt throughout what was still a feudal state.112 This need was also given 
urgency by the fact that the ‘increased encounters between foreigners and the Japanese 
brought about a[n]...even pressing need to clarify the locus of the legitimate governing 
authority of the nation.’113 The leadership faced further problems. A strong Japan would 
need to develop some form of system to extract resources necessary to finance its 
reforms. However, at the time the Meiji leadership took control of Japan, the fiefs 
continued to tax their own lands, and the only source of revenue the new Meiji 
government could rely on was from the lands confiscated from the Tokugawa. 
Furthermore, the Meiji leadership had come to power by utilising the prestige of the 
emperor and calling for the return of his political prerogatives. This meant that the 
position of the emperor and his future relations with the feudal fiefdoms inevitably came 
to the forefront of debate.
It was as part of this debate that the ideas of centralisation arose. In 1868, Kido 
Takayoshi expressed his concern that ‘every one of the feudal domains was becoming 
and acting like a “miniature bakufu [shogunate],” with little or no sense of the 
significant change in the central government’.114 He highlighted the potential problems 
of continued feudalism in a memorial addressed to Iwakura Tomomi and Sanjö 
Sanetomi. Reminding them that one of the very reasons for the overthrowing of the
111 Gong is certainly correct in asserting that the dismantling of the feudal order was one of the most 
significant reforms in the course of the reconfiguration of the Japanese state. Gong, The Standard o f 
‘Civilisation ’ in International Society, pp. 175-176
112 By ‘feudal state’ here, I mean a state where land (and a degree of political power) was shared out 
among hereditary lords in return for military service.
113 Michio Umegaki, After the Restoration: The Beginning o f Japan 's Modern State. (New York: New 
York University Press, 1988), p. 55 
ibid., p. 59114
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Tokugawa shogunate was in order to allow ‘Japan to stand equally among other states in 
the world’, Kido wrote:
When we observe the current situation of the fiefs and the imperial court, we see 
that each is competing with one another over their military strength. The court 
relies on the fiefdoms of Satsuma and Chöshü, the latter two fiefs rely on their own 
forces, and the other fiefs do not differ greatly...it is not clear where power 
exists...once the war in the East has come to an end and all the fiefdom troops 
return and start governing their localities again, it would be very hard to remove 
the harm this would create.115
Why had a centralised state come to be seen as a viable form of governance? In 
the early days of the Meiji period, it was by no means a foregone conclusion that 
attempts to produce a militarily powerful state would result in the emergence of a 
centralised state. Even though the feudal leadership under the Tokugawa had been 
overthrown, this ‘did not produce a corresponding realization that the feudal domains 
would be incompatible with the new Imperial government.’116 Some samurai activists ( 
shishi) who had earlier called for a greater elevation of the emperor,
...though often contemptuous of their [feudal] superiors, had not planned to 
abolish the whole structure that sustained them; they had proposed rather to 
replace the Bakufu with an Emperor-centered feudalism and create an imperial 
domain in which they and the Court nobles might find suitable rewards.117
At the same time, however, it appears that other members of the Meiji government did 
indeed believe that a centralised state was most suited for Japan. Although in 1858 
Iwakura Tomomi was suggesting China’s inability to defeat Britain in the Opium War 
was because of its centralised, bureaucratic structure, by 1867 he had shifted his 
position, advocating the centralising of the Japanese state.118 Itö Hirobumi was also an 
enthusiastic supporter of a centralised state long before the notion garnered significant 
support. In response to a request from the Himeji ($EI£§) fiefdom to return its lands to 
the emperor in 1868,119 Itö stressed that if Japan was ‘to stand up as an equal to other
115 Cited in Iwakurakö jikki (Tada Kömon, ed) (vol. 2). (Tokyo: Hara shobö, 1968), p. 673. Here, the 
‘war in the East’ refers to the civil war that was still raging between the Meiji Restoration forces and 
the Tokugawa loyalists.
116 Umegaki, After the Restoration, p. 5
117 Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, pp. 302-303
118 Iwakura’s statement of 1858 can be found in Asai Kiyoshi, Meiji ishin to gunken shisö. (Tokyo: 
Gannandö shoten, 1968), p. 25. One example of his statement (made in 1870) for state centralisation 
can be found in Iwakura Tomomi, ‘Tomomi kenkoku saku o chögi ni fusuru koto’, Iwakurakö jikki 
(Tada Kömon, ed) (vol. 2), pp. 830-831. While it is difficult to ascertain why Iwakura changed his 
mind, one factor may have Japan’s equal inability to deal with the foreign threat. While it is possible 
(and to an extent plausible) to claim that Iwakura’s calls for a centralised state in the late Tokugawa 
and early Meiji were aimed at consolidating his own power, this argument inaccurately downplays the 
nationalist motivations of the Meiji leaders and should be treated with caution.
119 The request from the Himeji fiefdom was made in the context of a power struggle between the new 
lord Sakai Tadakuni (iS^ffS'^fjand the Tokugawa loyalists within the domain. Sakai Tadakuni’s
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foreign countries and carry out civilised, enlightened rule ( fk il^  y r '/ S ^ - ^ S  FÜ aZIx
)’, it would be necessary to abolish the feudal structures and 
centralise power to the imperial government. 120 Significantly, at a time when 
centralisation had yet to gain wide acceptance, he wrote:
...if  we wish to bring all [political power] to the centre, we need to put an end to 
the current situation, where all fiefs possess their own forces and compete with 
each other. If we do not do so, we cannot get the people to obey the laws of the 
Court; neither can the people be protected from the impartial laws and share in the 
benefits of the [central] government. Furthermore, if military forces remain 
fragmented, there is simply no way we can protect Japan from the insults of 
foreign states and demonstrate the imperial glory of Japan overseas.121
Where did such ideas and motivations for centralising the state came from? The 
ideas and motives of the members of the Meiji leadership undoubtedly originated from 
practical, functional concerns, as discussed above. However, very few ideas develop in 
a vacuum: the intellectual origins of the idea of centralising the state were no exception. 
It is here that an interesting interaction between the ideas of traditional statehood and 
‘modem’ statehood of European International Society can be found. Finding 
precedents in Chinese and Japanese history was, as we have seen, a common way to 
justify political change around this time, and state centralisation was no exception. The 
Japanese had experimented with a more centralised system (known as gunken seido 
rfrJäO based on Tang (Ilf 618-907) institutions,122 where officials appointed by the 
imperial government governed provinces. A return of political power to the emperor 
harked back to this system, and played a role in furthering the possibility of establishing 
a centralised state.
However, by the later half of the nineteenth century there were two salient 
differences. First, in an international environment where the main actors were sovereign 
states with a monopoly over domestic sovereign prerogatives, the Japanese leadership 
now had to represent the ‘Japanese state’, and this weakened their feudal/local 
loyalties.123 Second, Japan now had a new source of inspiration in the ‘civilised’ states 
of European International Society. As the social standards of the Society gained
request itself can be interpreted as an attempt to gain the support of the Meiji government in order to 
strengthen his own position within the domain, and should not be simplistically seen as Sakai’s 
acceptance of centralised rule per se. For this point, see Haraguchi Kiyoshi, Nihon kindai kokka no 
keisei. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1968), pp. 50-53.
120 Cited in Iwakurakö jikki (Tada Kömon,ed) (vol. 2), pp. 674-675. Itö’s statement here took place
before other fiefs had ‘returned’ their lands to the emperor (Hanseki hökan This is
discussed in detail in Umegaki, After the Restoration, p. 46
121 Cited in Iwakurakö jikki (Tada Kömon, ed) (vol. 2), p. 675
122 This centralised system of governance was established in 645.
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acceptance, China increasingly began to serve as a negative example. During the 
Tokugawa era, the Japanese had mixed views of the Chinese system of governance. 
Tokugawa Confucian Dazai Shundai for instance, had praised Japan’s
feudal system as superior: it came closer to the political systems of the days of mythical 
sages, when the feudal rulers were closer to their people and ‘invested great effort in 
government and in ensuring the welfare of the people.’ 124 China’s centralised 
bureaucratic government rotated officials from province to province, and the rulers thus 
developed few bonds with the people. Japan’s feudal system was thus a source of its 
national strength. Many Tokugawa Confucian scholars, however, also admired the 
centralised bureaucratic Chinese state, and this was typical of the paradoxical views held 
by many Japanese towards China at the time. There was ‘an envy,’ W. G. Beasley 
states, ‘natural to those of only modest rank, of the fact that in China...“ a man bom 
among the peasantry” could “advance to the position of one of the chief ministers of the 
State.”’125
As the European powers expanded to East Asia and the Qing’s inability to ward 
them off became apparent, China’s centralised bureaucratic system was now criticised 
as a source of weakness (as Iwakura did in 1858). Japan’s own inability to effectvely 
resist the Europeans, however, soon cast doubts over the strengths of a feudal political 
system. Ironically, China again served as a metaphore for Japan’s weakness. It was 
claimed that Japan was similar to the feudal Zhou (jiU 1027 B.C.-403 B.C.) dynasty, 
unable to protect itself from foreign encroachment because of its fragmentation. As the 
‘social standards of success’ began to be less located in China, Japan increasingly turned 
to the examples of the European states. It is here that it is possible to trace part of the 
intellectual motivations and social pressures from European International Society that 
were attempting to push Japan towards transforming itself into a ‘civilised’, centralised 
state.
Information on the centralised state stmctures of the Western nation was available 
via journalistic works on the Western states and translated Chinese sources.126 Asai 
Kiyoshi notes one particular instance of Yamagata Aritomo’s encounter with a
123 Fujimura Michio, Nisshin sensö zengo no ajia seisaku. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995), p. 17
124 Nakai, ‘The Naturalization of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan’, p. 177
125 Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, p. 303
126 Asai Kiyoshi also provides some evidence of the transmission of federalism, which, among others, 
took place through the publishing of translations of Wei Yuan’s Haiguo tuzhi. He also states that 
there is also evidence of federalism in a constitution drafted by the Dutch-trained shogunate official 
Nishi Amane and submitted to Tokugawa Yoshinobu in 1867. See Asai Kiyoshi, Meiji ishin to 
gunken shisö. (Tokyo: Gannandö shoten, 1968), p. 45-56
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translation of A. W. Fonblanque’s How We are Governed, an exposition on British 
political history.127 Here, it was stated that ‘feudalism crumbled when [Britain] became 
civilised and “the people became more enlightened, the state became richer, and people 
began to engage in crafts other than war-making.’” 128 Similarly, Asai traces another 
Western intellectual source in the lectures of Simon Vissering, which also helped spread 
the intellectual link between a ‘civilised state’ and a centralised state.129 In Tsuda 
Shin’ichirö (ÄPS Ä — also known as Tsuda Mamichi)’s translation of his lectures, 
titled Taisei kokuhöron (^Mllffifra), Vissering not only claimed that feudalism could 
weaken a country because of its fragmented authority; he also claimed that feudal 
political systems were a hallmark of uncivilised status. He stated that ‘feudal systems 
are intricate in their system of governance; but this system only exists in semi-civilised 
s t a t e s y
V )’. 130 This demonstrates the significant fact that centralised states were, to a 
considerable extent, linked with the identity of ‘civilised’ status within European 
International Society in the late-nineteenth century.
The British Minister to Japan, Sir Harry Parkes, provides further evidence of 
social pressures from European International Society. W. G. Beasley quotes Parkes as 
expressing his ‘anti-feudal prejudices and expectations’ in 1869 to Iwakura Tomomi as 
follows:
The government o f the country having now been reconstituted under the Mikado, it 
is obvious that the latter must be supported by a central organisation and by 
material power; and although much may still be left to local administration, still 
certain cardinal functions o f government, such as legislation, national defences, 
foreign affairs, etc., should be conducted from the centre.131
While it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which the Meiji leaderships’ 
engagement with the Society influenced their decision to push forward with abolishing 
feudalism and establishing a ‘modem’, centralised state, it does seem plausible to 
assume that the Meiji elite’s acceptance of the ‘standards of success’ of the Society did 
result in increased responsiveness to such ideas.132 This can be discerned from their
127 The Japanese title was Eisei ikaga (^Sfe^OfEf).
128 Cited in Asai Kiyoshi, Meiji ishin to gunken shisö, p. 97
129 For this point, see ibid., pp. 97-98
130 Tsuda Shin’ichirö, Taisei kokuhöron. (Tokyo: Buntokudö, 1876), pp. 67-68
131 Cited in Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, pp. 309-310
132 This point is supported by ibid., pp. 305-306. Interestingly, the leaders of the Tokugawa shogunate 
appear also to have come to a similar point of view: in a letter to Leon Roches, the French Minister to 
Japan, Tokugawa Yoshinobu wrote: ‘After having studied the general situation of the nations which 
inhabit the globe, and after having given very careful thought to the different forms of their 
constitutive powers, I acquired the conviction that there did not exist in Europe a single government
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statements where they locate the success of European states in their centralised political 
systems. Itö Hirobumi stated in his memoirs that during his visit to Britain in 1863, he 
witnessed the strength of Britain and its centralised political system, and was ‘reassured 
of his conviction that feudalism needed to be abolished in Japan.’133 Such views were 
also seen in leaders who (at the time of their writing) had still yet to visit the West. In 
the following passage written as an entry in Kido Takayoshi’s diary on 30th October 
1869, Kido states:
When we discussed hereditary awards, I made the point that if we limit the 
strength of our nation with the hereditary system, how can we hope to confront 
those nations whose power is not limited by this system? How can we maintain 
the prestige of our Empire in the future?134.
Here, ‘hereditary awards’ means political power attained according to hereditary 
status, and refers to Japan’s feudal state structure. The ‘nations whose power is not 
limited by this system’ refers to the stronger Western states. The implication here is that 
Japan had to abolish its feudal system of governance and adopt those of the European 
states in order to stand on an equal footing with them.
Implementing state centralisation in Japan
While the feudal lords remained in their lands and retained their power however, the 
political process of centralising the Japanese state remained a delicate one. This was 
especially so because the samurai of the fiefdoms of Satsuma and Chöshü had been 
instrumental in overthrowing the Tokugawa shogunate. There were fears that the 
continued domination of the two fiefdoms would arouse suspicion of a Satsuma and 
Chöshü takeover of the country and cast doubts over how genuine the ‘restoration’ 
under the name of the emperor was.135
where power was not concentrated in the hands of only one ruler, and I am persuaded that this system 
is the only one capable of uniting in one single and solid bundle all the sentiments of our people and 
the forces of our country.’ Cited in Jean-Pierre Lehmann, ‘Leon Roches -  Diplomat Extraordinary in 
the Bakumatsu Era: An Assessment of his Personality and Policy’, Modern Asian Studies (vol. 14, no. 
2, 1980, pp. 273-307), p. 301
133 Cited in Asai Kiyoshi, Meiji ishin to gunken shisö, p. 101. The cited passage comes from Ito’s own 
recollections. While Asai himself states that the source is of a reliable nature, he rightly points out 
that they were not written at the time when the political process to abolish feudalism was actually 
taking place, and must be treated with some caution.
134 See Kido Takayoshi, The Diary o f Kido Takayoshi (vol. 1) (Sidney Devere Brown and Akiko Hirota, 
trans)., p. 284. More examples can be found in Asai Kiyoshi, Meiji ishin to gunken shisö, pp. 98-101
135 Consequently, the Meiji leaders acted cautiously and gave the feudal lords a voice in the new 
govemment.The government structures underwent rapid transformation around this time. There were 
three offices in January 1868, which were then reconfigured into three offices and seven departments 
in February. By late February this had changed into three offices and eight bureaus. In June 1868, a 
new quasi-constitution, the Seitaisho was promulgated, and this structure now had eight offices with a 
government structure with a separation of powers. Interestingly, in the drafting of the Seitaisho,
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The Meiji leadership, however, gradually succeeded sidelining the daimyö.116 In 
1869, members of the Meiji leadership persuaded the leading fiefdoms of Satsuma, 
Chöshü, Tosa and Hizen to return the fiefs to the court hanseki hökan),
thereby ‘making the daimyo imperial governors of the lands they had held in fief.137 
This was by no means an easy process: for instance, Kido Takayoshi’s effort to persuade 
the Chöshü fiefdom to surrender its domain register to the imperial court was met with a 
hostile response.138 Despite these initial difficulties, the process of transferring the 
registers back to the emperor was completed quickly. Once the fiefs of Satsuma, 
Chöshü, Tosa and Hizen had submitted their memorials to request the return of their 
fiefs to the imperial government, the remaining domains quickly followed suit, 
motivated by ‘the fear of becoming the last to endorse the action of the four key 
domains.’139 The returning of the domain registers to the emperor received positive 
evaluation from Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister, who stated:
I am glad to say ...that light breaks out through the cloud....Several o f  the leading 
Daimios have come forward and offered to surrender the Governm ent o f  their own 
territories -  their revenues, forces, jurisdiction, etc. -  into the hands o f the 
M ikado’s Government in order that a strong Central Power may be created.140
Despite Parkes’ optimistic appraisal, the process of centralising state power was 
far from over, as the feudal lords continued in power, albeit under the title of ‘governor ( 
chijiy, and remained ambivalent towards the central government.141 The European 
diplomats continued to press the Meiji leadership to establish ‘[o]ne firm and compact 
State...not merely because this was the way to be civilized, but also because it would
several works on Western political systems (such as Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Seiyo jijo) were consulted. 
For this particular aspect, see Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Shisö kadai to shite no ajia, p. 166
136 For a detailed discussion of this process, see Albert M. Craig, ‘The Central Government’ in Marius B. 
Jansen and Gilbert Rozman (eds), Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986)
137 Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, p. 325 However, it must be noted that the process of replacing feudal 
lords with governors was not a linear process that took place after 1869. This process had in fact 
been taking place in former Tokugawa lands that had been confiscated and governed by the new Meiji 
central government.
138 See Umegaki, After the Restoration, pp. 59-60. Kido himself alludes to this in an entry in his diary 
on 26th January 1869: ‘Incessant argument’, he wrote, ‘has raged in Chöshü since last spring. Owing 
to this controversy I have endured a better experience...beyond the power of my writing brush to 
express.’ See Kido Takayoshi, The Diary o f Kido Takayoshi (vol. 1) (Sidney Devere Brown and 
Akiko Hirota, trans.), p. 168. See also Asai Kiyoshi, Meiji ishin to gunken shisö, pp. 135-136.
139 Umegaki, After the Restoration, p. 61
140 Beasley, The Meiji Restoration. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 332
141 This was the case even within the Meiji government. Continuous rivalry between members from 
Satsuma and Chöshü was, Umegaki states, ‘a telling indication that something fundamental from the 
past had remained intact behind the facade of change since the Restoration.’ (Umegaki, After the 
Restoration, p. 64). Some members of the leadership even suggested that the spoils from the civil 
war in Japan be distributed in the form of new fiefs; another testament to the lingering intellectual 
remnants of the feudal order.
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give the [central government] a means of intervening in local affairs in order to punish 
samurai who attacked foreigners.’142 By 1871, the Meiji leadership had reached the 
decision to abolish the feudal domains altogether. On August 29, the daimyö were 
informed of this decision, thus bringing an end to the feudal system of governance in 
Japan (JÜWf\3LHe haihan chikeri).w
The success in abolishing the feudal political structures was a departure from 
‘uncivilised’ feudal governance, played a crucial role in demonstrating Japan’s 
eagerness to attain membership of ‘civilised’ European International Society. This, 
combined with concerted efforts by the Meiji government to adopt European 
institutions, resulted in positive evaluation by the Society’s members. The Meiji 
government and many samurai paid a price for this, however. In the process of 
increasing central government penetration into feudal affairs, the Meiji government 
placed increasing legal restrictions on the domains. This entailed limiting the 
expenditures on stipends for the samurai.144 This caused considerable resentment among 
the already impoverished samurai, and even resulted in rebellions. However, the plans 
to abolish the feudal systems of governance were not derailed by this. Michio Umegaki 
states that one critical reason for this was the relatively weak links the Meiji leadership 
had with their feudal lords (many of the Meiji leadership came from middle to low- 
ranking samurai families). This, he argues, insulated the former from conflicting 
loyalties, and meant that there were fewer vested interests in preserving the old political 
order.
There can be no doubt that the abolition of the last vestiges of feudal governance 
greatly strengthened the ability of the Meiji government to penetrate Japanese society. 
The elimination of feudal military power meant that the government could now 
concentrate all military forces to itself. Economically, the state could now (at least 
potentially) maximise its ability to extract badly needed resources from the populace to 
aid it in its goal of reinventing Japan into a ‘rich and strong’ country modelled on the 
‘civilised’ states of European International Society. Prior to the haihan chiken, the 
feudal domains continued to issue their own currency, severely devaluing the central
142 Beasley, The Meiji Restoration. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 344
143 The surprisingly peaceful acceptance of this new policy was, in part, related to the fact that increased 
fiscal constraints on the domains had rendered them close to bankruptcy. Therefore, many 
lords/govemors considered it advantageous to obtain central government assistance in dealing with 
their increasingly difficult financial situation.
144 Other reforms instigated by the Meiji government included the revision of feudal political structures 
and the implementation of promotion based on merit, which had an effect of weakening traditional
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government currency and prompting protests from the foreign diplomatic corps.145 
Abolition of the fiefs meant that the Meiji government could now stabilise its finances 
and centralise the taxation process. It would take a step in this direction in 1873, with 
the introduction of a land tax.146 Finally, it helped Japan gain recognition that it was 
willing to conform to the social standards of legitimate statehood within European 
International Society.
Already centralised, and not emulating the European powers: the case of China
In comparison to Japan, China’s case presents us with less evidence of its elites 
responding to European International Society’s pressures for state centralisation. This is 
mainly for two reasons. First, during the period covered by this study, the Chinese had 
yet to accept the ‘Europeanised’ state as legitimate, and there is not a lot of evidence 
that demonstrates that there were serious attempts to alter the Chinese state and its 
institutions based on European models. Second, and more importantly, there were less 
pressures for China to centralise political power than Japan, because the Chinese had 
laid the foundations for a centralised, bureaucratic state at a much earlier stage of their 
history. The Qin dynasty, which unified China in 221-206 B.C., had divided its territory 
into districts and placed them under direct central government rule as early as 350 B.C. 
Unlike Europe, R. Bin Wong states, in early stages of state formation in China there 
were very few ‘scales of resources or their multiple concentrations to sustain interstate 
competition’,147and the independent power of nobles and elites had been destroyed by 
the mid-tenth century.
This, however, is not imply that European International Society did not exert 
pressures on the Qing leadership to strengthen central rule along Western lines. Banno 
Masataka claims that while the Europeans considered China’s institutions of governance 
to be a centralised one, they found the provinces too powerful, operating more or less as 
they pleased.148 They therefore called for greater central government control. For 
instance, while calling for the adoption of Western industry and technology, Robert Hart
powers within the domains, further eroding vested interests that could have prevented future 
centralisation plans.
145 Umegaki, After the Restoration, p. 80. C.f. Hendrik Spruyt, ‘Institutional selection in international 
relations’, p. 550.
146 In the early Meiji years, many domains continued to adjust tax rates, defying central government 
intstructions. This process of centralising the fiscal system in Japan is given detailed treatment in 
Seki Junya, Meiji ishin to chiso kaisei. (Kyoto: Mineruva shobö, 1967).
147 R. Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits o f European Experience. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 76
148 See Banno, The Origins o f the Tsugli Yamen, pp. 16-17.
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and Thomas Wade also advocated domestic political changes that went beyond the usual 
calls for reform proposed by the Chinese elite.149 While they continued to press the 
Chinese to strengthen their armies and open railroads or mines, they argued that the 
Qing’s political institutions were ill-equipped to implement these reforms. Hart and 
Wade identified fiscal weaknesses and local misgovemment as the main cause. Wade 
charged that officials Tacked integrity or were incompetent, and can neither prevent 
disasters nor take care of them after they have happened 5^11,
W JtA 'tu f# )n ).’150 With regard to fiscal matters, Wade argued 
that there was ‘a shortage in all aspects of the central government’s income. Despite 
some measures implemented to ease the financial shortages of the provinces, because of 
financial constraints only short-term measures are possible (^ W A IIIA tn*
Hart had more detailed proposals, and his proposals for reform pointed to greater 
centralisation. Like Wade, he also pointed out that the lack of funds was impeding 
domestic reforms. He advocated the introduction of a more progressive land tax. He 
also called for the reform of the salt tax and the domestic transit tax, pointing out that 
the system was vulnerable to embezzlement by the officials, which implied tighter 
central control by the imperial government.152 The bureaucracy and military were also in 
urgent need of reform. Provincial civil and military officials needed to be allowed to 
reside in their native provinces, where they had and could develop greater local 
knowledge that would allow for more effective government.153 The military needed to be 
reduced in size and trained more effectively. They were also to be ‘prevented] from 
engaging in business activities outside their normal jobs ( A H ith ^b ll^ L )’, 154 which, 
(when we take the low wages of the military into account) presumably meant that the
149 Paul Cohen, has argued that ‘Modem Westerners...have generally insisted on the need for a proper 
institutional and legal setting if society is to function effectively. When society fails to function 
effectively in a given area, the critic may call for new men. But he is just as likely to diagnose the 
failure as systemic and to prescribe institutional modifications.’ While Cohen’s argument may have a 
grain of truth to it, it may be somewhat questionable to ascribe a tendency to advocate institutional 
change as a ‘Western’ phenomenon. Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, pp. 160-161
150 Cited in Zeng Guofan, Zeng Guofan quanji: zougao (vol. 9). (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 1991), p. 
5243
151 Cited in ibid.
152 This point was also made in Wade’s memorandum.
153 In Qing China, under the ‘principle of avoidance’, a bureaucrat was forbidden to take up 
appointments in his native provinces or in an area within 160 miles (500 li) of his hometown, in order 
to prevent the rise of nepotism and other abuses of local connections. Under a similar rationale, 
officials were also rotated to different posts at regular intervals.
154 Cited in Zeng Guofan, Zeng Guofan quanji: zougao (vol. 9). (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 1991), p. 
5240
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military needed to be provided with better pay. Provincial officials also needed to be 
paid adequate salaries to prevent them from overtaxing the people. Hart proposed that 
one way to achieve this was for ‘the central government to perhaps consult with the 
provinces and decide on a budget ft > ) ’ . 155
Several Chinese officials who had the opportunity to witness the political systems 
of the European powers came to a similar point of view. Guo Songtao, for instance, was 
deeply impressed by the centralised nature of the British budgetary system. 156 The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Stafford Northcote told Guo that the British financial 
system relied on a central budget that would predetermine government spending. This 
was a very different system from the decentralised Qing system, where ‘neither the 
concept of budgets and accounts settlements existed, let alone a centralised fiscal system 
where the central government was responsible for funding various financial needs. ’ 157 
Moreover, this process was debated in parliament and widely disseminated to the people 
via the popular press. This resulted, according to Guo, in ‘the government and people 
uniting as one, governing and protecting their country. This is the reason that this 
country [Britain] continues to prosper, several thousand years after its founding. ’ 158
Attempting to strengthen state centralisation in China
Despite these social pressures and increased information of the centralised systems of 
governance in the European states, the Qing leadership ultimately failed to implement 
political reforms needed to centralise China along Western lines. The reasons for this 
can, to a certain extent, be located in the fact that the Chinese elite had not decided to 
adopt the identity of a ‘Westernised’ state and be assessed by the social standards of 
European International Society. This meant that the political will to implement any
155 Cited in ibid., p. 5239
156 Sasaki Yö cites an interesting anecdote where the Japanese junior finance minister Inoue Kaoru 
erroneously explained to Guo that the British government financed their budget primarily from land 
taxes. Guo was deeply impressed that the mercantile activity was hardly taxed. However, this could 
hardly be further from the truth, as Guo himself subsequently found out when he visited the British 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stafford Northcote: the British government’s income was derived 
primarily from indirect taxation. See Sasaki Yö, Shin matsu chügoku ni okeru nihon kan to seiyö 
kan. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2000), pp. 131-132. Thanks are also due to Leonard 
Seabrooke for providing information on British taxation.
I5' Sasaki Yö, Shin matsu chügoku ni okeru nihon kan to seiyö kan, p. 132. A useful discussion of the 
Qing taxation system can be found in Albert Feuerwerker, ‘State and Society in Eighteenth-Century 
China: The Ch’ing Empire in its Glory’, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies (no. 27). (Ann Arbor: 
Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976), pp. 88-94 and Banno Masataka, Kindai 
chügoku seiji gaikö shi. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2001), pp. 41-46
158 Cited in Sasaki Yö, Shin matsu chügoku ni okeru nihon kan to seiyö kan, p. 133
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institutional reforms that would further centralise the Chinese state along 
‘Europeanised’ lines was lacking.
There were certain points of agreement between Wade, Hart and the Chinese 
political elite. It is worth noting that the reforming of the tax system, bureaucracy and 
army did receive some support. 159 However, it would be somewhat misleading to equate 
this with a positive response to socialisation pressures from the European states. Most 
agreements that the Chinese political elite had with Hart or Wade were already being 
seriously discussed as pertinent issues. Zeng Guofan, for instance, predated Hart’s 
advice for a better paid military by offering high salaries for his Xiang Army, which 
played an important role in suppressing the Taiping Rebellion. 160 The corruption of local 
officials and the downgrading of the quality of officials caused by the sale of official 
rank was well known, and seen as an issue that merited serious attention. The response, 
however, was not one of transforming China into a ‘Europeanised’ state. Rather, it was 
a matter of recruiting men of talent, and weeding out corrupt practices and the officials 
who carried them out. The Chinese elite on the whole did not, at least at this stage, 
consider it necessary to abolish the existing political institutions. 161 Consequently, while 
reforms were undertaken, they tended to be limited in scope. While reforms on the tax 
system was undertaken in the form of tax reductions, limited legal reforms, and anti­
corruption campaigns, Hart’s proposals for a national land survey and progressive 
taxation system was ignored. While the reformist officials did attempt to appoint 
honourable individuals as tax collectors, this merely constituted a modification of the 
traditional tax system. A new government institution to collect taxes was not created. 
As regards bureaucratic reforms, many of the reformist officials made considerable 
efforts to recruit men of talent as their advisers or recommend them to official positions, 
but the traditional examination system was not abolished, and neither was the ‘principle 
of avoidance’ abolished, although some officials were sympathetic to the idea.
While many reformist officials have often been accused of focusing solely on the 
superficial aspects of Western strength (such as steamships) out of ignorance, this was, 
to a certain degree, also a result of their awareness of the political infeasibility of
159 For a detailed discussion of this aspect of reforms, see Johathan K. Ocko, Bureaucratic Reform in 
Provincial China: Ting Jih-ch'ang in Restoration Kiangsu, 1867-1870. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1983), chapters 5 and 6.
160 However, Zeng’s organisation of his military was based primarily on Qi Jiguang, a Ming strategist. 
For this point, see Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization 
and Social Structure, 1796-1864. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 
147
161 These issues included tackling corruption and limiting the sale of rank.
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introducing sweeping reforms. 162 The degree to which Chinese reformers could 
implement any meaningful changes was severely circumscribed by sociopolitcal 
obstacles within Qing China at this time.
One problem was that state centralisation along Western lines was most likely to 
harm the vested interests of the local elite (the gentry). As Paul Cohen states, ‘because 
the [local officials and gentry] had a vested interest in precisely those aspects of the 
system that were most cumbersome and irrational, it formed a powerful check on 
reform. ’ 163 When we analyse Wade and Hart’s proposals, it is possible to see that their 
suggestions called for the further centralisation of government power. The fact that their 
proposals were based on European experiences would most likely have meant that they 
envisaged these reforms to maximise the state’s capacity to efficiently extract resources 
needed to ‘modernise’. For instance, with respect to bureaucratic reforms, Hart had 
suggested that the local clerks’ power needed to be curbed, a point echoed by reformists 
such as Wang Tao. Such measures meant further central governmental control of the 
clerks ‘by giving them status in the Confucian hierarchy, thus making them subject to its 
indoctrination and controls’ . 164 Similarly, we may recall that Hart’s proposals included a 
plan for a more efficient taxation system aimed at correcting abuses by officials, and 
entailed greater central control of China’s tax collection. Had the adoption of a 
Western-styled budgetary system, which so impressed Guo Songtao, taken place, 
outright centralisation of fiscal resources would have also occurred.
This was a radical departure from conventional practice. Compared to European 
states, the Chinese state had experienced far less substantial and frequent threats to its 
survival. Even when a particular dynasty was overthrown, the political structures 
themselves survived. As R. Bin Wong observes, ‘the common observation that China 
could be conquered but its system remained intact is important for us in a comparative 
context, since China was not threatened with the frequent possibilities of 
dismemberment or absorption faced by smaller European political units’ . 165 Faced with 
fewer rival groups (both internal and external), the Chinese state faced less pressing 
needs to extract resources. Taxation subsequently remained relatively light, and local 
control was delegated to local officials. It was precisely this system of governance
162 For a discussion of this dilemma between reformist programmes and the practical political problems 
of implementing them, see Kwang-ching Liu, ‘The Confucian as Patriot and Pragmatist: Li Hung- 
chang’s Formative Years, 1823-1866’, Harvard Journal o f Asiatic Studies (vol. 30, 1970, pp. 5-45)
163 Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity, pp. 213-214. Around the Tongzhi period, the number of 
clerks was said to be over one million.
164 Wright, The Last Stand o f Chinese Conservatism, p. 94
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which made any attempts to further centralise state powers (had they been carried out) 
difficult.
Although the long-standing existence of a centralised bureaucracy has often given 
the impression of strong central control within China, in reality the power of the state 
was quite weak at the local level. 166 The rule of avoidance meant that the local 
magistrate (who was a bureaucrat sent by the central government) was often ignorant of 
local conditions. Furthermore, the Confucian ideal of omnicompetence did not fit 
realities: the magistrate was in fact ‘dependent both on the day-to-day functioning of 
numerous clerks, messengers, guards, doormen, police, and servants and on the 
goodwill and cooperation of the local elite’ for him ‘to do his job well’ . 167 Under the 
Qing system, local officials charged with the task of taxation were paid low wages, 
supplemented by some nominal stipends and a small office stipend. This income was 
not enough to meet the expenses of the local government, 168 and the local governments 
were expected to finance themselves. Subsequently, local governments were allowed to 
charge ‘customary fees’, which were ‘irregular levies, in the sense that they were neither 
specifically authorized by imperial edict nor uniform from locality to locality. ’ 169
This traditional system of local governance made any attempts to increase the 
power of the central government extremely difficult. Further state centralisation 
inevitably entailed the loss of power on the part of the local elite, who were bound to 
offer the stiffest resistance and ultimately attempt to quash the reforms. Any attempts to 
further the state’s ability to extract fiscal resources would deprive many officials of 
opportunities of ‘squeeze’, and were difficult to implement. 170 Furthermore, Albert 
Feuerwerker argues, ‘the commonality of values and interests between those gentry 
members who directly served the state (the official elite) and their more numerous kin 
and friends of the same class who held no office’ meant that most of the elite ‘accepted
165 Wong, China Transformed, p. 90
166 See Kuhn, Origins o f the Modern Chinese State, pp. 21-23
167 Feuerwerker, ‘State and Society in Eighteenth-Century China’, p. 66. The local magistrates tasks 
included tax collection, maintenance of order, arbitrate civil and criminal legal matters and deal with 
the paper work required by the central government.
168 The expenses of local government in Qing China were wide-ranging. It included salaries for the 
administrative staff, gifts to the superior offices, and contributions to the regional treasurer.
169 Feuerwerker, ‘State and Society in Eighteenth-Century China’, p. 65. While it is tempting to label 
such forms o f ‘taxation’ as corruption (and indeed the Chinese mandarins were often notorious among 
Westerners for their ‘squeeze’), we must keep in mind that these practices were sanctioned by the 
imperial government, and cannot be called ‘corruption’ in the strictest sense. While corruption 
certainly did exist, Feuerwerker states that the phenomenon could ‘be found in discernible quantities 
in Ch’ing China, that occasionally it occurred on a grand scale, but that it was not more prevalent than 
in earlier dynasties.’ See Feuerwerker, ‘State and Society in Eighteenth-Century China’, p. 74
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in practice the apparent anomaly that the local gentry both supported the imperial state 
and prevented its penetration and reorganization of local society in the interests of the 
whole nation rather than merely the gentry who actually ruled it.’171 These problems 
were not missed by the British Minister to China, Rutherford Alcock, who pointed out 
to this problem as early as 1876 in his despatch to Foreign Secretary Lord Stanley. 
‘Dislike to innovation, as such, coupled with the fear of its possible but unknown 
sequences’, he wrote, were nowhere
...so strongly marked as with the ‘literati and gentry’ of whom so much is heard in 
China. They represent the educated and official classes throughout the Empire.
All the expectants and aspirants who have taken their first literary degree...; all 
who have retired from the public service, dwelling for the most part in their native 
places, where their influence is always considerable, enter into the same 
combinations....The Central Government in Peking is well nigh powerless in any 
matters opposed to the prejudices of these classes, when united, and animated by 
an esprit de corps, which is in itself a great element of strength. They mutually 
support and shield each other in all conflicts with the Government where foreign 
interests are in question; and the struggle will necessarily be long, because the 
governing classes and the whole public opinion of a nation cannot be either put 
aside as a thing of no account, or their actual services dispensed with.172
Rich country, strong army: technology and industry
The desire for technological change was a key characteristic of both the Self­
strengthening movement and the Meiji reforms. There was a heavy bias towards heavy 
industry. As discussed above, Western weapons (and with it, technology) were one of 
the most conspicuous aspects of the Western states’ superiority over China and Japan. It 
is perhaps for this reason that the adoption of these weapons and the attempts to 
establish heavy industry capable of producing European weaponry and machines were 
one of the earliest and most important aspects of reforms in both states. Within Japan, 
industrialisation and the adoption of technology served a dual purpose of demonstrating 
Japan’s ‘civilised’ status, as well as ensuring Japan had the means to protect itself from 
the dangerous European powers. For the Chinese elite, industrialisation merely served 
as a means to protect China, and did not serve to highlight China’s commitment to 
reinvent itself along European lines. Rather, the slogan of ‘Chinese learning for essence,
170 This point is made in Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and 
Peasant in the Making o f the Modern World. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 182
171 Feuerwerker, ‘State and Society in Eighteenth-Century China’, pp. 114-115.
172 Ian Nish (ed), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office 
Confidential Print (Part 1, Series E, Vol. 20: China’s Rehabilitation and Treaty Revision, 1866- 
1869)., pp. 117-118
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Western learning for practical use’ was stressed, as this was less likely to be seen as 
constituting a threat to the identity of the Chinese state. 173
Industrialisation in Japan: intellectual origins and motivations
Although the slogan of ‘rich country, strong army’ became an explicit policy in the 
Meiji period, it is possible to trace its emergence prior to Japan’s full encounter with 
European International Society. This was partly in response to domestic economic 
failures and partly as a result of a growing awareness of the expansion of the European 
powers. Japanese intellectual Kudo Heisuke, who was influenced by students of ‘Dutch 
studies’, argued before the arrival of Perry expedition that ‘it was in Japan’s national 
interest to promote foreign trade if the realm was to survive and overcome chronic 
domestic difficulties. ’ 174 Japanese with some knowledge of the West also began to note 
the yawning gap between Japan and European states in terms of technological and 
scientific development. Individuals such as Sakuma Shözan had earlier ‘argued that 
modem artillery was essential to protect Japan, and so international trade must be 
promoted to generate the wealth necessary for arms manufacture and national 
defense. ’ 175 The fact that after Perry’s arrival there was no concerted resistance to this is 
reflective of the ‘relatively advanced state [of] Western studies, and particularly the 
applied sciences’ within Japan, 376 where Western weapons and writings on military 
science had always attracted keen interest. 177
The Meiji leadership carried over this intellectual inheritance, and industrialisation 
was envisaged as playing a number of additional roles. One was to reverse the 
substantial balance of payments deficit Japan faced by increasing the output of industry. 
The drainage of specie reserves meant that the Meiji government was increasingly 
forced to issue inconvertible paper currency to meet its spending, ultimately leading to a
173 Of course, the assertion that industrialisation was least likely to threaten the Chinese ideological 
framework is a relative one, and does not suggest that Western technology was never seen as a threat 
to Chinese identity and society: railroads, for instance, were often opposed on the grounds that they 
disturbed the geomancy of the particular area.
174 Harootunian, ‘Late Tokugawa culture and thought’, p. 117
175 Richard J. Samuels, ‘Rich Nation, Strong Army’: National Security and the Technological 
Transformation o f Japan. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 36. Sakuma Shözan (1811 - 
1864) was a rangaku student who specialised in military science. He advocated that Japan repudiate 
its sakoku policy, and served as an adviser to the Tokugawa shogunate. He was later assassinated.
176 Thomas C. Smith, ‘The Introduction of Western Industry to Japan during the Last Years of the 
Tokugawa Period’, Harvard Journal o f Asiatic Studies (vol. 11, no. 1/2, June 1948, pp. 130-152), p. 
130
177 For a brief survey of Japanese adoption of Western military science, see Seiho Arima, ‘The Western 
Influence on Japanese Military Science, Shipbuilding and Navigation’, Monumenta Nipponica (vol. 
19, no. 3/4, 1964, pp. 352-379)
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depreciation of its currency. This, Thomas C. Smith, argues, led to three further 
problems. First, as the government relied heavily on land tax (which was fixed), ‘any 
depreciation in the value of money meant a corresponding loss of revenue to the 
government.’. 178 This in turn increased the spending power of the rural population, 
increasing the consumption of foreign imports, often to the detriment of the rural 
industry. Finally, the inflation caused by the excessive issuing of paper currency hurt 
the samurai, who relied on fixed stipends paid by the government (their stipends were 
only abolished in 1876 in the form of compulsory commutation). They remained a 
powerful, potentially destabilising force to be reckoned with, and the fledgling Meiji 
government could not afford to risk antagonising them. It was hoped that 
industrialisation could ‘absorb the unemployed former warriors and make them a 
constructive element in Japanese society.’179
There were international concerns as well. First, many of the Meiji elite believed 
that industrialisation would enable Japan to protect itself from European International 
Society’s coercive mode of interaction. Second, it would play a crucial role in 
facilitating Japan’s entry into European International Society as a ‘civilised’ member of 
European International Society. As discussed previously, a highly industrialised 
economy was seen as an integral part of the identity of ‘civilised’ members of late- 
nineteenth century European International Society. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
foreign diplomats reinforced this point. British Minister Sir Harry Parkes, while just as 
keen to see that Britain would benefit from trading with an industrialised Japan, 
believed that ‘good government was but one mark of a civilized country, which ought 
also to enjoy the social and material advantages to be derived from economic growth’,180 
and had impressed upon the Japanese leadership the need to industrialise and engage in 
free trade. The Meiji leadership and leading intellectuals of the time were certainly not 
ignorant of this fact, and any references to the ‘civilised’ states of European 
International Society frequently contained references to their industrial and 
technological prowess.181 Fukuzawa Yukichi’s oft-cited Bunmeiron no gairyaku argued 
that within ‘civilised states’, ‘industry and commerce were experiencing increasing
178 See Thomas C. Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government 
Enterprise, 1868-1880. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 25 
1/9 Masakazu Iwata, Ökubo Toshimichi: The Bismarck of Japan. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1964), p. 242. This point is also visible in Iwakura Tomomi, ‘Tomomi zaisei ni kansuru yöken 
o shoshi kakugi ni fusuru koto’ in Iwakurakö jikki (Tada Kömon, ed) (vol. 3). (Tokyo: Hara shobö, 
1968), pp. 640-641
180 Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, p. 197
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growth, and deepening the happiness of the people (Ij§j6D ||(T0 
£•$!< L)’.182 Kume Kunitake, the secretary for the Iwakura mission, also came to a 
similar view. As Marlene J. Mayo states, Kume noted that highly commercialised and 
industrialised states were all ‘civilised’ states.183 As the Japanese elite were committed 
to reinventing Japan as a ‘civilised’ power, the identification of the intertwined nature 
industry, technology, and ‘civilisation’ would give additional impetus to 
industrialisation efforts, and consequently assist Japan’s quest to become a member of 
the ‘civilised’ states.
Industrialisation in Japan: the implementation of ideas
The Meiji government’s drive to industrialise was characterised by a high level of state 
involvement in promoting industry, and, as will be discussed below, constituted the 
most important difference between the Chinese and Japanese cases of industrialisation. 
Chinese efforts to attain ‘wealth and strength’ by industrialisation were primarily the 
product of local or individual initiatives. By contrast, the Japanese attempts were 
characterised by a high level of state involvement. As Chuhei Sugiyama has shown, in 
the early Meiji period, British intellectual influences was most strong in the realm of 
economics.184 As Western works which advocated protectionism (such as H. C. Carey or 
Friedrich List) began to be introduced, there emerged calls for a more protectionist 
policy. Writing in 1871, Wakayama Norikazu claimed that ‘[f]ree trade...was good 
enough in theory but...it was not practical to adopt the principle in such a country as 
Japan where the majority of people were still poor, unfamiliar with manufacturing and 
commerce’.185 Interestingly, Ökubo Toshimichi appears to have come to a similar point 
of view.186 In his memorial to Sanjö Sanetomi in 1874, Ökubo argued that Britain had
181 Byron K. Marshall, Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar Japan: The Ideology o f the Business 
Elite, 1868-1941. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 14-15, endorses this assertion.
182 Fukuzawa Yukichi, Bunmeiron no gairyaku, p. 27
183 Marlene J. Mayo, ‘The Western Education of Kume Kunitake, 1871-6’, Monumenta Nipponica (vol. 
28, no. 1, Spring 1973, pp. 3-67), p. 42. Also see pp. 39-40. It is interesting to compare Fukuzawa 
Yukichi and Kume Kunitake here. As Marlene J. Mayo argues, Kume’s work is ‘quite different from 
[Fukuzawa’s] polemical and philosophical works both in character and intent’. Unlike Fukuzawa, 
who was a civilian (albeit a highly influential one), Kume’s views expressed in the Beiö kairan jikki 
give us ‘clues to officialdom’s interpretation of progress.’ See Mayo, ‘The Western Education of 
Kume Kunitake, 1871-6’, p. 14.
184 See Chuhei Sugiyama, ‘The Development of Economic Thought in Meiji Japan’, Modern Asian 
Studies (vol. 2, no. 4, Meiji Centenary Number, 1968, pp. 325-341), especially pp. 326-329.
185 ibid., p. 331.
186 Byron K. Marshall has also suggested that there is a strong possibility that Ökubo Toshimichi was 
exposed to the intellectual influence of Friedrich List during his visit in Germany. Note, however, 
that List’s work was not widely disseminated until the 1880s, after Ökubo’s assassination. See 
Marshall, Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar Japan, p. 17, fn.
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only committed itself to free trade policies after it had achieved wealth and strength 
based on protectionist, mercantilist policies. He believed that Japan should follow a 
similar path of development, 187 and argued as follows:
As far as encouraging industry is concerned, we have yet to reap any-benefits from 
this, and domestic production and the consumption of domestic produce is 
decreasing day by day. Although we can say that this is because the people have 
yet to be completely enlightened and are unable to take advantage o f the changing 
times to engage in successful commerce, we must also admit that we have up to 
now paid scant attention to this aspect of policy and have lacked the will to 
provide leadership....Those who are responsible for the people should provide 
thoughtful policies not only for industry, but also transportation and any other 
matters that require the immediate protection of the government. Moreover, such 
policies should take account of the characteristics of the land and the intelligence 
of the people....188
In his memorial, Ökubo primarily considered Britain as a worthy model of 
emulation. England was ‘a small island country comparable to Japan, which had taken 
advantage of its ports and mineral resources to establish itself as an outstanding 
nation. ’ 189 However, he had no intention of following the British policy of free trade, 
preferring to follow a mercantilist programme that would aim, first and foremost, to 
promote Japanese industry. Meiji officials such as Iwakura Tomomi echoed Ökubo’s 
views. 190 To a certain extent, the decision to embark on a protectionist policy was 
connected to Japan’s socialisation, into European International Society. As we have 
seen, the Meiji leadership had witnessed the coercion exercised by the ‘civilised’ states 
of the Society, and continued to harbour deep suspicions towards them. This, in return, 
fostered a thinking that ‘posit[ed] Japan in a hostile, Hobbesian world in which 
interdependence inevitably leads to dependence, and dependence eventually results in 
domination. ’ 191
Heavy industry was particularly promoted. Richard Samuels identifies four pillars 
to this policy, namely ‘protection of industries, provision of subsidies, leasing and
187 See Ökubo Toshimichi, ‘Ökubo Toshimichi no shokusan kögyö ni kansuru ikensho’ in Nakamura 
Masanori, Ishii Kanji and Kasuga Yutaka (eds), Nihon kindai shisö taikei (vol. 8): keizai kösö. 
(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1988), pp. 17-18.
188 ibid., p. 17
189 Iwata, Ökubo Toshimichi, p. 237
190 See for example, Iwakura Tomomi, ‘Tomomi zaisei ni kansuru yöken o shoshi kakugi ni fusuru koto’, 
written in 1879. In Iwakurakö jikki (Tada Kömon, ed) (vol. 3). (Tokyo: Hara shobö, 1968), pp. 632- 
642
191 Samuels, ‘Rich Nation, Strong Army’, p. 43. Indeed, Nakamura Masanori and Ishii Kanji argue that 
Japan’s determination to minimise foreign capital is ‘in contrast to Italy and Russia, which achieved 
capitalist industrialisation through seeking foreign capital and funds’. Consequently, the Meiji 
leadership frequently displayed a strong sense of fear towards accepting foreign investment to 
achieving industrialisation. Nakamura Masanori and Ishii Kanji, ‘Meiji zenki ni okeru shihonshugi
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transferring of new machinery, and establishing and ultimately transferring ownership of 
“exemplary” factories.’192 The first step was to establish government enterprises to 
nurture industry. By the beginning of the 1880s the Meiji government had substantially 
expanded its involvement in industry193, to the extent that the vast majority of modem 
industrial enterprises established before 1880 were state-owned.
Increasing pressures on government finances resulted in the sale of most 
government enterprises in the mid-1880s.194 However, as Tessa Morris-Suzuki points 
out, ‘many scholars argue that the central government continued to play a vital role in 
the promotion of technological change’ and industrialisation,195 primarily through a 
programme of military spending.196 As diplomatic tensions with Korea rose (an anti- 
Japanese riot had broken out in Korea in 1882), ‘the [Meiji] government took advantage
taisei no koso’ in Nakamura Masanori, Ishii Kanji and Kasuga Yutaka (eds),Nihon kindai shiso taikei 
(vol. 8): keizai kösö. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1988), p. 420
192 Samuels, ‘Rich Nation Strong Army’: National Security and the Technological Transformation o f  
Japan. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 37. See also E. H. Norman, ‘Japan’s Emergence 
as a Modem State’, in John W. Dower (ed), Origins o f the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings 
o f E. H. Norman. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), pp. 224-242
193 The Meiji government’s portfolio of industries included three shipyards (Nagasaki, Yokosuka and 
Hyögo). It had also set up other enterprises such as the Akabane machinery works (1871), the 
Tomioka silk-reeling works (1872), the Fukagawa cement factory (1875), the Shinagawa glass factory 
(1876), as well as the Fukagawa white brick factory (1878).
194 A brief note on the sale of government enterprises is necessary here. The origins of the Meiji 
Restoration are subject to some debate, and scholars such as Thomas C. Smith have viewed it in terms 
of an alliance between the samurai and the rich peasants, which constituted a embryonic capitalist 
class. See Smith, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 
1868-1880. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 13-22. The sale of the government 
enterprises were sold at extremely low prices, and heavily favoured entrepreneurs with close 
connections to the government. It is possible for such sales to be seen as a product of this 
samurai/govemment nascent capitalist alliance. However, this view overestimates the degree to 
which samurai/govemment class interests converged with those of the rich peasant/nascent capitalist 
class, and subsequently has difficulty in explaining why on some occasions, class interests (to the 
degree to which they can be called as such) were made subordinate to the interests of the leadership 
(for instance, the Meiji government pressed ahead with its nationalisation of railways despite 
opposition by the entrepreneurial class). Indeed, as W. G. Beasley argues, in many aspects of the 
Meiji Restoration and the subsequent policy adopted by the leadership, ‘it is difficult to see class 
interest of either samurai or landlord as a direct and decisive influence’. See Beasley, The Meiji 
Restoration, p. 400.
195 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Technological Transformation o f Japan: From the Seventeenth to the 
Twenty-first Century. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 78-79. It must be noted 
that the effects of this policy became noticeable in the latter half of the Meiji period. In the first half, 
improvements upon preexisting industry was primarily responsible for industrial growth in Japan, and 
the Meiji government also took steps to encourage this. See Seki Junya, Meiji ishin to chiso kasei, 
pp. 133-140
196 This does not imply that the Meiji leadership and entrepreneurs were united in their acceptance of a 
large government role in industry, although Byron K. Marshall does claim that liberal economic 
policies had little appeal...for the majority of private entrepreneurs’ (Marshall, Capitalism and 
Nationalism in Prewar Japan, p. 28). A particularly heated debate took place when the government 
announced its intention to nationalise the railways in 1892. Prominent businessmen such as 
Shibusawa Eiichi and the Mitsubishi Company vigorously opposed the policy. Ökuma Shigenobu 
also opposed nationalisation, claiming his adherence to laissez-faire economic policy in 1897. See 
Marshall, Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar Japan, p. 23. We should, however exercise some 
caution in taking Ökuma’s statements at face value, as he was in political opposition at the time, and 
also served as a political ally of the Mitsubishi Company.
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of this situation to forward a eight-year plan for expanding the military.’197 Furthermore, 
Japan’s coercive diplomacy in East Asia and the subsequent deterioration of relations 
with China only fuelled calls for further military spending. Japan’s military spending 
subsequently soared. In 1882, military spending was only 16 percent of total military 
spending; by 1889, it had risen to 29 percent.198 This military spending and expansion of 
military industries, claims Kozo Yamamura, ‘acted as highly effective centers for the 
absorption and dissemination of Western technologies and skills’, and also created ‘the 
demand necessary for assuring the survival and for aiding the growth of often financially 
and technologically struggling private firms in shipbuilding, machinery, and machine- 
tool industries.’199 The Meiji government’s assistance to Japanese military industry 
enabled the firms to diversify their production and, Richard J. Samuels argues, 
‘provided markets as well as necessary manufacturing technologies for the young 
Japanese electric and machinery industries.’200
Chart 5-1: Japanese military spending as percentage of budget
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Source: Okurasho hyakunenshi henshushitsu (ed), Okurasho hyakunen shi (bekkm). (Tokyo: Okura zaimu 
kyökai, 1969), p. 137. The calculations are based on the general account expenditures.
197 Nakamura Masanori and Ishii Kanji, ‘Meiji zenki ni okeru shihonshugi taisei no köso’, p. 443
198 These figures are based on Ökurashö hyakunenshi henshüshitsu (ed), Okurasho hyakunen shi 
(bekkan). (Tokyo: Okura zaimu kyökai, 1969), p. 137. The calculations are based on the general 
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199 Kozo Yamamura, ‘Success Illgotten? The Role of Meiji Militarism in Japan’s Technological 
Progress’, Journal o f Economic History (vol. 37, no. 1, The Tasks of Economic History, March 1977, 
pp. 113-135), p. 113. Samuels, ‘Rich Nation, Strong Army’, p. 60 also supports this point.
200 Samuels, ‘Rich Nation, Strong Army’, p. 49
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The Japanese elites’ appreciation of the interconnected nature of industry, technology 
and ‘civilisation’ (as defined by European International Society) also resulted in a 
recognition that the advantages of industry and technology would have to be 
disseminated to a wider audience to fundamentally reinvent Japan’s identity. Conscious 
efforts were made to promote industry and science. Compulsory education (which was 
introduced in 1872) served to teach Japanese citizens in science, and Japanese 
universities provided advanced training to equip the Japanese with the technical 
expertise to replace foreign advisers. Another favourite method was industrial 
exhibitions. International exhibitions ‘were both a forceful reminder of 
[Japan’s]...industrial backwardness, and an excellent opportunity to study the best in 
foreign technology’. 201 They were also an excellent forum to showcase Japan’s 
attainment of industry, science and technology, projecting the image of a state that had 
begun to attain the skills and knowledge of becoming a ‘civilised’ state. The Japanese 
sent carefully selected products to such exhibitions; within its own domestic society, the 
Ministry of the Interior also organised exhibitions in Japan to promote industry.
These efforts also generated, Tessa Morris-Suzuki argues, ‘the creation of a mass 
of local institutions and projects designed to ensure that, whatever the intentions of the 
central government, “our” region should not miss out on the fruits of modernisation’.202 
Some members of the elite called for the government to provide greater assistance to the 
private and rural economy. In 1885, for instance, Maeda Masana (tuffllE^i), the first 
secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, called for a programme of 
industrialisation led by the rural industry. Maeda ‘argued that a capital-poor Japan 
should first nurture an export sector to generate capital for later heavy industrial 
development,’203 These calls for rural-led industrial development ‘reflected a growing 
acceptance of the fact that Japan’s industrial future’ depended on rural industry, which 
was still ‘responsible by far the largest share of Japan’s industrial development and 
output.’204 There were calls within rural society that were similar to Maeda’s proposed 
programme of industrialisation.
Assistance to rural industry was given an additional boost when the Meiji 
Constitution of 1889 expanded the franchise to male citizens over the age of 25 who had
201 Morris-Suzuki, The Technological Transformation o f Japan, pp. 82-83
202 ibid., p. 89
203 Samuels, ‘Rich Nation, Strong Army’, p. 39 
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LEARNING THE COMPETENCE AND SKILL TO BE A ‘CIVILISED’ STATE 205
paid more than 15 Yen in taxes. 205 This had the effect -  albeit a limited one -  of 
increasing the political voice of the rural elite, leading to ‘a closer relationship between 
central government and groups of dominant local industrialists, accompanied by an 
increasing official interest in the initiatives of the regions.’ 206 Some governmental 
assistance was made available for local industrial initiatives, which also resulted in the 
mushrooming of trade associations that ‘provided a forum for the exchange of technical 
ideas and experience, as well as acting as an entry point for the inflow of technological 
information from “above”.’207
The industrialisation o f Japan was to a large extent made possible because of the 
high level of motivation the Meiji government had in its desire to become a ‘civilised’ 
power within European International Society. The Meiji government as a whole was, 
with ‘a fine bureaucratic disregard for commercial considerations’, 208 prepared to 
provide leadership to facilitate industrialisation, which they identified as a key 
component of the identity of a ‘civilised’ member of the Society. Not all programmes 
were unqualified successes. Government enterprises were often commercial failures, 
and the sacrifices by the rural populace, who had to finance Japan’s industrialisation, 
were often substantial. Nevertheless, it is difficult to deny that the central leadership 
provided by' the Meiji government was crucial for Japan’s industrialisation. 209 
Furthermore, government leadership, particularly in its nurturing of capital-intensive 
industry, contributed substantially to fostering industry which most private Japanese 
entrepreneurs could not yet enter. Furthermore, they ‘provided an all-important 
demonstration effect, familiarising Japanese entrepreneurs and workers with the 
concepts of modem western technology.’210 This resulted in, Morris-Suzuki argues:
...a system in which new and imported ideas were not simply concentrated in a 
few elite institutions run by the state or large private enterprises, but rather 
dispersed throughout a wide range of bodies, varying in size, structure and 
geographical location, but all involved to some extent in the process of importing, 
modifying or developing new technologies.211
205 In the Meiji Constitution, males aged over 25 who had paid more than 15 Yen in tax were given the 
right to vote.
206 Morris-Suzuki, The Technological Transformation o f Japan, p. 99
207 ibid., p. 104
208 ibid., p. 80
209 Samuels argues that active government intervention provided the foundation for many industries, 
‘especially those that applied modem science and technologies’. Samuels, 'Rich Nation, Strong 
Army', p. 87
210 Morris-Suzuki, The Technological Transformation o f Japan, p. 77. Also see Smith, ‘Reflections on 
the Comparative Study of Modernization in China and Japan’, p. 18
211 Morris-Suzuki, The Technological Transformation o f Japan, p. 104
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Industrialisation in China: the motivations and intellectual influences 
The importance of introducing heavy industry and European technology was quickly 
recognised by a wide spectrum of the Chinese elite, but there were also pressures from 
European nationals urging them to ‘industrialise’ and attain ‘civilisation’. Robert Hart, 
the British Inspector General of the Chinese Customs, wrote in a letter to his agent 
James Duncan Campbell in London that he saw it as his goal to introduce European- 
originated technology to China. 212 While their main goal remained that of spreading 
Christianity, missionaries such as William A. P. Martin were, Jonathan Spence argues, 
often convinced that ‘Christianity and the scientific “progress” of the West were 
inextricably linked’, and ‘it was logical...to conclude that Westernization must precede, 
and would inevitably lead to, Christian conversion. ’ 213
The Chinese saw things differently. For them, industrialisation was only linked to 
strengthening China. Many of the Chinese elite, in Philip A. Kuhn’s words, ‘explicitly 
proclaimed the cultural neutrality of modem technology’ , 214 indicating that European 
industry and technology were merely seen as a means of strengthening China and 
connected to the need to survive what was perceived to be a competitive international 
realm -  the ‘civilising’ face of the Society. It served no value as a marker of ‘civilised’ 
identity, as it did for the members of the Society.
While earlier proposals had called mainly for the introduction of Western 
weaponry, attempts to leam the secrets behind the Westerners’ weapons soon led to the 
realisation that superior weapons alone was insufficient to match the power of the 
European states. There was an increasing awareness that industry and commerce played 
a crucial role in the production of advanced weapons. The self-strengthening
212 Written on 29th May 1873. See John King Fairbank, Katherine Frost Bruner, and Elizabeth MacLeod 
Matheson (eds), The LG. in Peking: Letters o f Robert Hart Chinese Maritime Customs 1868-1907. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1975), p. 111. Hart regarded Campbell as a loyal 
and reliable aide. His letters are characterised by ‘their complete candor. Hart commented without 
constraint on people and events, knowing that what he wrote was for Campbells’ eye alone’, and these 
letters can be seen to be of a reliable nature. See L. K. Little, ‘Introduction’ in John King Fairbank, 
Katherine Frost Bruner, and Elizabeth MacLeod Matheson (eds), The I.G. in Peking: Letters o f 
Robert Hart Chinese Maritime Customs 1868-1907. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 
1975), p. 3. The biographies of such Western advisers can be found in Jonathan Spence, To Change 
China: Western Advisers in China 1620-1960. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969)
213 Spence, To Change China, p. 133. Emphasis added. Lloyd E. Eastman also notes that journals by 
missionary organisations, such as the Wangguo gongbao (The Review of the Times), published by 
The Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge, also ‘contained many articles 
designed to convince Chinese literati of the need for reform.’ They heavily influenced non-official 
reformist writers such as Zheng Guanying, who drew heavily from these articles. Eastman, ‘Political 
Reformism in China before the Sino-Japanese War’, p. 708.
214 China’s ‘self-strengthening’, the intention was, in Philip A. Kuhn’s words, ‘to graft Western industrial 
technology onto a Confucian cultural base’, and ‘explicitly proclaimed the cultural neutrality of 
modem technology.’ Kuhn, Origins o f  the Modern Chinese State, p. 52
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programmes consequently began to expand in scope. David Pong claims that Chinese 
reformers reasoned that such undertakings would ‘not only supply government needs but 
also.. .increase revenue and improve the people’s livelihood...which was both a self­
strengthening and traditional goal. ’ 2 ' 5 Li Hongzhang argued:
W estern machinery can produce farming, weaving, printing and pottery-making 
equipment for the daily use o f the people. It is not solely for the purpose o f 
making weapons. W hat is wondrous is that it utilizes the power o f water and fire 
to save labour and material resources....Several decades hence, among the rich 
peasants and prosperous merchants o f China, there will inevitably be rich peasants 
and merchants who copy W estern machines and pursue their own profits
Li’s statement was in itself a significant departure from the traditional Confucian 
attitudes towards the merchants, 217 and reflected the influence of the School of Practical 
Statecraft, which stressed the importance of studying how Confucianism could 
contribute to the solving of practical socio-political issues. 218 The leading exponents of 
the School of Practical Statecraft had argued that the pursuit of wealth and power was 
justifiable. According to Peter M. Mitchell, scholars of the School such as Wei Yuan
...steadfastly  repudiated the orthodox Confucian interpretation o f pursuit of li 
[profit] in any form as a low passion devoid o f  ethical worth. Instead it became the 
sole determinant o f right and wrong so long as it had a collective socio-political 
interpretation. From such a position it was possible for him  to hold wealth (fu g§) 
and power (ch’iang UM) as not only inevitable but also desirable and wholly valid 
ideals for government. Since the aim o f scholarship was service to society, 
concern for provisions (shih f£ )  and weapons (ping fF ) were as appropriate for
215 David Pong, ‘The Vocabulary of Change: Reformist Ideas of the 1860s and 1870s’, in Ideal and 
Reality: Social and Political Change in Modern China 1860-1949. (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1985), p. 42
216 Li Hongzhang, ‘Zhiban waiguo tiechang jiqi zhe’, Li Hongzhang quanji: zougao. (Changchun: Shidai 
wenyi chubanshe, 1998), p. 426
217 Traditionally, high officials were forbidden to conduct commercial activities. Although this rule was 
by no means adhered to rigidly, many lower officials would enter business. However, they used 
various excuses as to avoid being reproached by their peers. The very fact that leading officials such 
as Zeng Guofan or Li Hongzhang were prepared to engage in some business activities indicates an 
important shift in this attitude. For a discussion of late Qing perceptions on commerce, see 
Wellington K. K. Chan, Merchants, Mandarins, and Modern Enterprise in Late Ch’ing China. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1977)
218 Li Hongzhang and Zeng Guofan were influenced by the Statecraft School to varying degrees. In his 
article ‘The Confucian as Patriot and Pragmatist: Li Hung-chang’s Formative Years, 1823-1866’, 
Harvard Journal o f Asiatic Studies (vol. 30, 1970, pp. 5-45), Kwang-ching Liu states that there is ‘no 
trace in Li’s early writings of any interest in administrative statecraft..., to which Tseng [Zeng 
Guofan] was also devoted’ (p. 8). However, one of Li Hongzhang’s advisors was Feng Guifen, who 
was one of the leading exponents of the Statecraft School at the time, and Li’s ‘proposals to enhance 
the state’s “wealth and strength” (fu-ch’iang [fuqiang] g ^ ) . . .w e re  influenced by Feng Kuei-fen 
[Feng Guifen]...the eminent statecraft scholar whom Li brought into his mu-fu' (p. 26). For an 
examination of Zeng Guofan and the statecraft school, see Han-Yin Chen Shen, ‘Tseng Kuo-fan in 
Peking, 1840-1852: His Ideas on Statecraft and Reform’, Journal o f Asian Studies (vol. 27, no. 1, 
November 1967, pp. 61-80).
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scholars as for rulers. Wealth defined as social production and Power in blunt 
terms o f military effectiveness were legitimate sage-sanctioned concerns of 
government and scholarship.219
Furthermore, such undertakings also indicated a greater awareness for the need to 
protect Chinese political and economic interests. Li Hongzhang’s letter of 1863 seems 
to confirm this. Li wrote: ‘Ever since the Yangtze River was opened up to trade, 
Chinese economic interests have been under the foreigners’ control. This has caused us 
much problems, but we have been unable to stop them 41
3Ü, LtL ^ h j^ p j .) .’220 The reformist elite were on the whole united in their
distaste of foreign encroachment and wished to protect Chinese economic interests from 
foreign hands. Zuo Zongtang asserted that ‘ “The method of self-strengthening should 
be to seek from among ourselves, not seek from among others. He who seeks the help 
of others will be controlled by others, and he who relies upon himself will have the 
situation under his own control.’”221 This emergent nationalist sentiment was also a 
product of China’s exposure to European International Society, and indicated, in 
Kwang-ching Liu’s words, a growing awareness ‘of the fact that the world was made up 
of contending states of varying strength and that the West was superior to China in 
power and technology.’222 It corresponds closely to what E. J. Hobsbawm has called 
‘proto-nationalism’; a nationalism based on ‘supra-local forms of popular identification 
which go beyond those circumscribing the actual spaces in which people passed most of 
their lives’ and/or ‘the political bonds and vocabularies of select groups more directly 
linked to states and institutions, and which are capable of eventual generalization, 
extension and popularization.’223
219 Peter M. Mitchell, ‘The Limits of Reformism’, pp. 179-180
220 Li Hongzhang, ‘Fu Luo Jiaosheng shangshu’, Li Hongzhang quanji: zougao, pengliao hangao (vol. 
5). (Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 1998), p. 3138. Similar sentiments can be found in Wang 
Tao, Taoyuan wenlu waibian. (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2002), pp. 36-38
221 Cited in Teng and Fairbank, China 's Response to the West, p. 80.
222 Kwang-ching Liu, ‘The Confucian as Patriot and Pragmatist’, p. 18. In the same article, Liu refers to 
Li’s ‘concern for China -  his Chung-kuo or Chung-t’u -  as “Confucian patriotism’” (p. 43). David 
Pong has also forwarded a similar form of ‘Confucian patriotism’, albeit with reference to the Sino- 
British dispute over the Wusong railway in 1877. According to Pong’s definition, this nationalism is 
defined as ‘first, a strong reaction against foreign encroachment on Chinese territorial and 
administrative integrity; second, a strong distaste for the corrupting elements, both at the official and 
the popular levels, brought about by the introduction and the presence of the railway; third, a genuine 
concern for the well-being of the poorer sections of the Chinese society; and lastly, a concern for the 
development and independence of Chinese economic interests.’ David Pong, ‘Confucian Patriotism 
and the Destruction of the Woosung Railway, 1877’, Modern Asian Studies (vol. 7, no. 4, 1973, pp. 
647-676), p. 675.
223 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 46-47
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Despite the enthusiasm of some officials, the drive to introduce European heavy 
industry and technology by no means received unqualified support. Fujita Yüji cites one 
argument by the official Fang Xunyi (Jj'MWi), who questioned the costs that such 
projects would entail, and argued that this would place an unnecessary financial burden 
on the people, and go against the Confucian ideal of benevolent government:
The people are the base of the country, but for many years they have been 
suffering from the hardships caused by war and corvee labour...we have been 
using the peoples money and strength for too long. Yet, the government is still 
trying to charge travel taxes and transit taxes to pay for schools, military schools, 
army and navy, and militia....If we want to rest, nourish, guide and protect our 
people, we had better rethink our policy again.224
A second argument pointed to the incompatibility of European methods with 
China, which shows some interesting parallels with contemporary resistance to foreign- 
influenced/imposed reforms. For instance, the building of railroads was opposed on the 
grounds of ‘excessive concentration of the population in urban areas, as well as the 
decline of the countryside’.225 An official named Zhang Xihong (‘Mtlgfti) also argued:
Nowadays, robbery is rife in China, and anything of slight value simply cannot be 
left in the streets [without it getting stolen]. Now, if we lay a railroad which runs 
for several thousands of miles, there is simply no way we can guard it properly, 
and it is obvious that the rails will be stolen.226
Fujita states that Zhang’s argument goes beyond the rejection of railroads. His 
criticism of the inability for officials to adequately protect the railroad implicitly point 
out to corruption of Chinese officialdom. This in turn pointed to the inability of 
‘Westernisation’ to put a stop to immoral governance, and critiqued its advocates of 
their misplaced priorities to eradicate the root causes of China’s weakness. What was 
needed was to improve the current system of governance, not introduce European 
industry and technology.227
Industrialisation in China: the implementation o f ideas
Despite such opposition, Western-styled forms of industry, industrial plants and 
enterprises began to be established under official patronage, as can be seen by Zeng 
Guofan’s establishing of the Jiangnan Arsenal in 1855, Zuo Zongtang’s Fuzhou Naval
224 Cited in Fujita Yüji, Ajia ni okeru bunmei no taikö, pp. 279-280
225 Cited in ibid., p. 280
226 Cited in ibid., pp. 281-282.
227 Fujita Yüji, Ajia ni okeru bunmei no taikö: jöiron to shukyü ron ni kansuru nippon, chösen, chügoku 
no hikaku kenkyü. (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobö, 2001), pp. 282-238
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Dockyard in 1866, and Li Hongzhang’s China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company 
in 1870.
Many of the enterprises remained the initiatives of reformist local officials and 
were under their patronage, as epitomised by the guandu shangban companies (It’If it] 
meaning ‘official supervision and merchant management’). They were modelled, 
Wellington K. K. Chan, states, on the Qing salt monopoly (which utilised merchants but 
remained under government control), the European firm which ‘required modem 
technology and some measure of Western-style management’, and the traditional 
partnership enterprises characterised by the ‘hiring [of] a manager who was then given 
almost absolute control.’228
From the point of making China rich and powerful, the reforms were successful to 
a certain degree. First, the Chinese firms did, in some instances, successfully compete 
with Western firms. Li Hongzhang’s China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company, 
for instance, successfully competed with the Western steamship companies. Second, it 
cannot be denied that many of the industrial enterprises set up by the reformist elite 
played an important role in providing weapons necessary to make China a ‘rich and 
powerful’ state. Zeng Guofan’s Jiangnan Arsenal manufactured guns and ships, ‘the last 
in 1872 with 400 horsepower and carrying 26 guns’,229 while Zuo Zongtang’s Fuzhou 
Shipyard produced forty ships. Third, the industrial enterprises established by the 
reformist elite also served as centres of Western learning. Although limited primarily to 
science and technological studies, the schools attached to the enterprises taught foreign 
languages and produced a number of translations of Western works.230
However, success was limited, at least during the period covered in this study. 
There were numerous problems that hindered the diffusion of European industry. Most 
important were financial constraints, which meant that efforts to industrialise suffered 
from a lack of coordination and inadequate funding.231 To this we must also add the 
effects of imperialism. The Qing’s financial difficulties were exacerbated by the
228 Wellington K. K. Chan, ‘Government, merchants and industry to 1911’ in Denis Twitchett and John 
K. Fairbank (eds) The Cambridge History o f China (vol. 11: Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, part 2). 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 422-423
229 Hsii, The Rise o f Modern China, p. 279
230 These Chinese translations of Western works were frequently imported by the Japanese, and served 
an important role in facilitating the dissemination of Western ideas in Japan.
231 The politics of military reform of this period serves as a good example and is ably captured in David 
Pong, ‘China’s Defense Modernization and the Revenue of the Maritime Customs Service, 1875- 
1879’ in Tradition and Metamorphosis in Modern Chinese History: Essays in Honor o f Professor 
Kwang-Ching L iu’s Seventy-fifth Birthday (vol 2). (Taibei: Institute of Modern History, Academia 
Sinica, 1998), pp. 979-1006
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unequal treaties imposed upon China b y  the Western powers. Stephen C. Thomas notes 
that between 1870-1897 China lost 817 million taels of purchasing power to opium 
trade and 200 million taels because of foreign control of tariffs and smuggling from 
Hong Kong.232 This had serious ramifications for the Chinese elite, as this made it 
seemingly difficult to fund projects to achieve the ‘wealth and strength’ they so 
desperately wanted. Furthermore, conservative opposition to excessive spending on 
industry made the imperial government increasingly wary of dispensing funds, and 
resulted in a lack of investment.
Another problem was that the enterprises established to undertake ‘self- 
strengthening’ were mostly run as a joint venture between merchants and officials, with 
the official retaining control. This meant that the merchants, who were responsible for 
the day-to-day running of the enterprises, were ‘always liable to official exactions on his 
personal wealth or the assets of his enterprises’, 233 and official interference and 
corruption often took place. In this sense, the conservative factions who had argued for 
the need to stamp out dishonest practices had a valid point, and this added weight to 
their objections to handing out further funding for the fledging new enterprises. The 
merchants were often dissatisfied with the officials, but they did not have much choice 
but to collaborate with them. Their dilemma was that they recognised the necessity for 
official assistance. Chan notes that Zheng Guanying himself ‘conceded that the 
merchants needed official protection because there was no commercial law or 
constitutional guarantee to safeguard their rights and properties.’234 However, their sense 
of vulnerability made them reluctant to invest heavily in the newly established 
enterprises.
There were other problems which were connected to weaknesses in the Chinese 
governmental institutions. One problem was the system of rotating officials, which 
meant, according to Chan, that ‘[t]he efforts of industrial promoters were often 
repudiated by those who succeeded them.’ 235 Another problem was the lack of 
coordination from the central government. The threat from the European states meant 
that Qing attention was diverted to coastal areas, resulting in a weakened grip on inland
232 See Stephen C. Thomas, Foreign Intervention and China’s Industrial Development, 1870-1911. 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 62-70.
233 Albert Feuerwerker, China’s Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844-1916) and Mandarin 
Enterprise. (New York: Atheneum, 1970), p. 244
234 Chan, ‘Government, merchants and industry to 1911’ pp. 435-436 
ibid., p. 448235
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China. 236 Consequently, China was ‘deprived any movement for modernization of a 
central focus and direction’ , 237 and unable to finance its own efforts at reform. 238 The 
lack of a centralised budget, for instance, meant that
...the actual disbursements [of funds] and all the patronage that went with them 
were arranged under the provincial leaders’ authorisation. This diffused the 
authority between the central and provincial governments and made it impossible 
to follow priorities on the national level so that industries could develop in an 
orderly manner.239
For an agrarian state such as China to industrialise, this was a most unfortunate situation. 
As R. Bin Wong demonstrates, ‘the expansion of rural industry’ in China was supported 
by a growing populace engaged in agriculture, and ‘did not contain any stimuli for major 
capitalization or technological changes. ’ 240 For China to achieve industrialisation, active 
governmental involvement was necessary; but this was not forthcoming.
This point was not lost on Zheng Guanying, who had worked at Li Hongzhang’s 
Shanghai Cotton Cloth mill. He noted the intimate relationship between commerce and 
industry, and pointed out that within the West, merchants were treated well. ‘Wealth’, 
he stated, ‘comes from merchants, and commerce originates from a collaboration 
between soldier, peasant and artisan. Because they know this, the countries in the West 
use soldiers to protect merchants, and fight wars not only with their armies but also 
through trade. ’ 241 In his mind, the imperial government was not paying enough attention 
to promote commerce and industry. Zheng was also aware that the Japanese 
government was taking an active role in promoting industry, and saw this in contrast to 
the realities in China. This gave his sense of urgency additional impetus. ‘Since the 
Meiji Restoration’, Zheng wrote, ‘Japanese ministers have been touring the world and 
have a very good understanding of the benefits and detriments of trade....They have
236 Wong, China Transformed, p. 157
237 Feuerwerker, China ’s Early Industrialization, p. 13
238 This point has been made by David Pong through his case study of the politics of financing the 
Fuzhou Naval Dockyard. See ‘Keeping the Foochow Navy Yard Afloat: Government Finance and 
China’s Early Modem Defence Industry, 1866-75’, Modern Asian Studies (vol. 21, no. 1, 1987, pp. 
121-152). See also Dwight H. Perkins, ‘Government as an Obstacle of Industrialization: The Case of 
Nineteenth-Century China’, The Journal o f Economic History (vol. 27, no. 4, The Tasks of Economic 
History, December 1967, pp. 478-492).
239 Chan, ‘Government, merchants and industry to 1911’, p. 448. See also Banno Masataka, Kindai 
chügoku seiji gaikö shi, pp. 41-46.
240 Wong, China Transformed, p. 41. This process by which an expanding rural economy actually 
hinders industrialisation has been labelled ‘involution’.
241 Zheng Guanying, Shengshi xveiyan. (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1998), p. 297
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implemented Western laws, established a Ministry of Trade, and ordered the 
establishment of Trade Bureaus all across the country’ .242
One reason for this difference between China and Japan can be traced to the 
different historical experiences between the two states. China had a vast territory, and a 
history of being a great power, both militarily and culturally. Many conservatives 
pointed out that in a country as large as China, there would surely be a man of learning 
who was well versed in technological expertise (including mathematics and astronomy); 
there was no need to insist on learning ‘Western’ ways.243 They claimed that alternative 
methods of strengthening the country were available, and since the Chinese elite on the 
whole deemed it unnecessary to reinvent China as a ‘civilised state’ of European 
International Society, these arguments proved persuasive and reduced the possibility of 
strong central government involvement in introducing European technology and 
industry. For Japan, the introduction of Western technology was crucial in displaying 
their ‘civilised’ identity, and the need to introduce European technology was felt much 
more strongly. While the direction the Japanese government took was sometimes 
questioned, this opposition did not constitute a force as significant as in China.
Mass mobilisation
China and Japan’s encounter with European International Society was also to have 
important ramifications on both states’ attempts to become rich and powerful. As both 
states’ elites began to further their knowledge of the European powers, it came to their 
attention that a powerful state within the Society was one which possessed the ability to 
mobilise its citizens. For this, a state needed to command some form of popular support. 
While the notion of ‘popular sovereignty’ had yet to gain full acceptance as a 
benchmark for ‘legitimate’ statehood in the nineteenth century, China and Japan’s 
interactions with European International Society resulted in the transmission of the ideas 
of popular sovereignty and power. Furthermore, Chinese and Japanese elites travelled 
to Europe and observed the political institutions there. They perceived a link between 
the political institutions of the European states and the patriotic sentiments. Some 
believed that this was the source of the European states’ power.
242 ibid., p.305
243 This was a point made by the Grand Secretary Woren. See Fujita Yüji, Ajia ni okeru bunmei no 
taikö, pp. 288-289
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Mass mobilisation in Japan: intellectual origins and motivations
As the Japanese elite were more interested in adopting a ‘civilised’ identity on European 
International Society’s terms, they were obviously eager to adopt the political 
institutions of the member states of the Society. Also, as one of their goals was to 
become a rich and powerful country, they were interested in emulating European 
political institutions that would serve to maximise their military power. They were 
much more likely to look beyond ‘Western’ weapons and drill. The Japanese elites thus 
sought to locate and emulate sources of power that could be found within the political 
institutions of the ‘civilised’ states of European International Society. In the course of 
their intellectual searching, some of them were to locate this in patriotism and popular 
sovereignty.244
Patriotism was one of the prominent features of European states’ power that 
caught the Japanese elites’ attention. The influential intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi had 
introduced Japanese readers to this particular source of European power as early as 
1866. In his best-seller Seiyö jijö, Fukuzawa introduced the French experience with 
mass armies. He wrote that in France,
Napoleon used all the people in war, and set up laws which stipulated that the 
people fight for their country; he loved the soldiers and officers, and generously 
rewarded them. The people hereby began to harbour feelings of loyalty towards 
the country and did not care about death in battle....This was the reason for 
Napoleon’s success; and all Western states are now said to base their army laws on 
those of Napoleon.245
Similar observations were made several years later when the Iwakura mission 
visited Europe. While the members of the delegation were impressed by the 
technological advances made by the European states, they also noted that these states 
not only relied on their superior arms for their strength. They relied on the patriotic 
sentiment of their citizens. Referring to Britain, the secretary of the Iwakura mission 
Kume Kunitake wrote that the source of its strength lay in the fact that ‘its people are 
united as one and work hard to produce. They have strong patriotic sentiment (H[U J M 
— ), and find it shameful to be subservient to other countries.’246 Education seemed
244 There is also evidence that Western influences played a role. Umetani Nobum notes that Guido F. 
Verbeck told the Meiji leaders that a Western-styled mass army needed ‘patriotism and loyalty to the 
emperor’, and also impressed upon them that a mass army could help destroy the remaining vestiges 
of feudalism and unify Japan. See Umetani Noboru, Oyatoi gaikokujin (vol. 11): seiji, hösei. (Tokyo: 
Kajima shuppankai, 1971), p. 36.
245 Cited in Hirata Toshiharu, ‘Meiji guntai ni okeru “chükun aikoku” no seishin no seiritsu’, Gunji 
shigaku (vol. 13, no. 2, September 1977, pp. 2-20), p. 7
240 Kume Kunitake, Beiö kairan jikki (vol. 2). (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978), p. 99. A similar point is 
made in Kume Kunitake, Beiö kairan jikki (vol. 3), p. 331
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to be an important way in which to instil love for one’s country. The Swiss education 
system was praised by the Iwakura mission for cultivating nationalism, 247 as were 
education systems in other European states.248
The Japanese elite also observed that within Europe, these patriotic sentiments 
derived from their political institutions. There were vague observations on the 
connection between state power and popular sovereignty. As early as 1861, the 
prominent Meiji intellectual Katö Hiroyuki (IlüM'jhZ.) noted in his Tonarigusa (THIr) 
that when ‘parliamentary democracy is carried out and public opinion is taken into 
account, national opinion is united and a “martial spirit” takes root among citizens.’249 A 
decade later the Iwakura mission also noted that the greater the political freedom in one 
particular state, the more prosperous the people seemed to be. The United States was 
the epitome of this, while Russia was perceived to be ‘merely in the first stages of 
progress. The czar and Russian aristocracy grasped all the wealth and monopolized the 
higher culture. The czar was a despot; the ordinary people did not accumulate capital or 
engage in enterprise’.250 It also appeared that the greater political stake the people had in 
the country, the more they were likely to be united in patriotism. Referring to the 
British political system, Kume Kunitake claimed:
It is common practice throughout Europe for the people to elect their members of 
Parliam ent...nowadays, when ships travel around the world and trade and 
interaction take place, in order to protect national rights and interests, the people  
must be united as one (tUKJiT—fP v 'T ’) and respect property and become rich 
and strong. The right o f legislation derives from this necessity.251
However, when it came to applying the principles of popular sovereignty to Japan, 
the Meiji leaders were somewhat ambivalent. Ökubo Toshimichi, Kido Takayoshi, and 
Itö Hirobumi were certain that Japan needed to adopt a constitutional government. An
247 See Marlene J. Mayo, ‘The Western Education of Kume Kunitake, 1871-6’, Monumenta Nipponica 
(vol. 28, no. 1, Spring 1973, pp. 3-67), p. 21
248 See Joseph Pittau, ‘Inoue Kowashi, 1843-1895 and the Formation of Modem Japan’, Monumenta 
Nipponica (vol. 20, no. 3/4, 1965, pp. 253-282), p. 273
249 Hirata Toshiharu, ‘Meiji guntai ni okeru “ChQkun aikoku” no seishin no seiritsu’, Gunji shigaku (vol. 
13, no. 2, September 1977, pp. 2-20), p. 6. Katö Hiroyuki was associated with one of the first 
intellectual societies in Japan, the Meirokusha (S ^A ft), established in 1873. Although in his earlier 
writings (such as the passage cited above) he did propagate liberalism, he later turned to Social 
Darwinism and espoused a particular brand of Social Darwinism which called for the subjugation of 
individual interests to the state. In 1881, he requested that all his works calling for liberal ideas be 
banned, thus making a conscious departure from liberal ideas. The passage cited above is made with 
reference to the Qing dynasty, but it is actually a covert critique of Tokugawa shogunate policies. 
While this is not directly related to Meiji mass mobilisation, it does demonstrate the existence of 
ideas inspired by popular sovereignty. For a brief discussion of the evolution of Katö’s thoughts, see 
Mikiso Hane, ‘Early Meiji Liberalism: An Assessment’, Monumenta Nipponica (vol. 24, no. 4, 1969, 
pp. 353-371), pp. 364-365
250 Mayo, ‘The Western Education of Kume Kunitake, 1871-6’, p. 36
251 Kume Kunitake, Beiö kairan jikki (vol. 2), pp. 82-83. Emphasis added.
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acceptance of the Society’s ‘standards of success’ meant that they had to adopt 
European-styled political institutions, and they often did view European political 
institutions as superior. As George Akita argues, ‘[t]o assert...that the [Meiji] leaders 
limited their motives [to establish a constitutional government] to the demands of 
Realpolitik would be a misinterpretation. They are indications that they were convinced 
of the intrinsic superiority of the constitutional government.’252 Ökubo was convinced 
‘that a constitutional system insured that all officials would be provided with a fixed and 
consistent guide for official conduct. This in turn would lead to unity between the 
people and the government, and then modernization would be possible.’253 Furthermore, 
the Meiji leaders were conscious of the social standards of European International 
Society. An acceptance of these social standards would facilitate Japan’s acceptance as 
a ‘civilised’ power by the member states. Inoue Kaoru expressed this succinctly when 
he stated:
Constitutional government was not created simply to satisfy the desires of the 
people. Those in the government also believed that it was imperative to create a 
constitutional regime to expedite the revision of treaties and the restoration of 
equal rights.254
However, the Meiji leaders were unsure about the efficacy of popular sovereignty 
in mobilising the masses. Yamagata Aritomo, who consistently remained suspicious of 
popular political representation,255 claimed that popular sovereignty would lead to self- 
centred policies. ‘In observing the various assemblies and election methods during my 
travels in Europe,’ he reported, T find that calm, mature discussion generally arouses 
little response while the reputation and influence of those advocating the empty theories 
of extremism gradually increases’.256 To be sure, the Meiji leaders did not necessarily 
advocate a highly despotic monarchical state. Ökubo Toshimichi claimed that such a 
system of government could bring disaster upon a country if the ruler was 
unenlightened. However, at the same time, he was equally uneasy about popular 
sovereignty. Democracy (K3£/I$C minshu no sei), for sure, was a system that ‘fully 
comprehends the laws of heaven ( H— he said.257 However, 
at the same time, it was only suited to young, Protestant countries, and ‘if applied to
252 George Akita, Foundations o f Constitutional Government in Modern Japan 1868-1900. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 12
253 ibid., p. 12. See also Nakamura Naoyoshi, Meiji kokka no keisei to ajia. (Tokyo: Ryükei shosha, 
1991), p. 18
~54 Cited in Akita, Foundations o f Constitutional Government in Modern Japan 1868-1900, p. 12 
255 This assertion is supported by Roger F. Hackett, ‘The Meiji Leaders and Modernization’.
Cited in ibid.,, p. 266256
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“peoples who are used to old habits and stick to old ways”, it could display great cruelty, 
even worse than that of a despotic monarchy, just as in the French Revolution.’258 Kido 
Takayoshi appears to have harboured similar thoughts. In a conversation in 1873 on the 
constitution of Japan with ltd Hirobumi, Kido argued that the ‘fundamental law of the 
state has to be “despotic.”’259 In an entry in his diary dated 22nd November 1873, Kido 
appears to justify this stance as follows:
Even if  we imitate the magnificent form of European and American governments 
in the externals o f ours, while public understanding trails far behind, and the 
system is removed from the actual conditions o f our country and unrealistic, it can 
only bring unhappiness to our people and cause damage to the nation, and so will 
be o f no use.260
The belief among the Meiji leadership that the Japanese populace were not yet 
ready to participate in politics was a fairly widespread one. Amidst growing calls for 
the establishment of a parliamentary system, Meiji official Inoue Kowashi (#_Lt&) 
argued in 1881 that Japan needed a Prussian-style parliamentary system where the 
executive had greater power and was less vulnerable to the whims of the parliament. 
Inoue Kowashi, who played a key role alongside Itö Hirobumi in drafting the Meiji 
Constitution, claimed that Japanese civilisation was not yet ready for a British-styled 
parliamentary system.261 Inoue Kowashi had noted in the early 1870s that ‘Prussia.. .was 
peaceful and the relations between monarch and people were well defined and stable. 
The Prussian Constitution was not derived from a social contract, but it had been 
granted by the monarch.’262 A stronger monarch meant a greater limit on the powers of 
the legislature, and the political leaders were not vulnerable to the whims of the 
legislative. The masses did not trust intellectuals, he said, and were vulnerable to falling 
prey to selfish interests at the expense of national interests. A more authoritarian system 
would insulate Japan from the whims of the masses, and was far more suited to the
257 Cited in Nakamura Naoyoshi, Meiji kokka no keisei to ajia. (Tokyo: Ryukei shosha, 1991), p. 17
238 ibid. See also Joseph Pittau, Political Thought in Early Meiji Japan 1868-1889. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 48-49
259 See Kido Takayoshi’s diary entry dated 20th November 1873, in Kido Takayoshi, The Diary o f  Kido 
Takayoshi (vol. 2) (Sidney Devere Brown and Akiko Hirota, trans). (Tokyo: University of Tokyo 
Press, 1985), p. 398. Umetani Noboru suggests that Kido may have been influenced by the liberal 
jurist Rudolf von Gneist, who he met in Berlin. See Umetani Noboru, Oyatoi gaikokujin (vol. 11): 
seiji, hösei. (Tokyo: Kajima shuppankai, 1971), p. 156
260 Kido Takayoshi, The Diary o f Kido Takayoshi (vol. 2) (Sidney Devere Brown and Akiko Hirota, 
trans), p. 398. See also Pittau, Political Thought in Early Meiji Japan 1868-1889, pp. 43-44
261 During the drafting of the constitution, foreign advice (including Prussian and British) was actively 
sought. For a detailed discussion of the role played by the foreign advisers, see Umetani Noboru, 
Oyatoi gaikokujin (vol. 11): seiji, hösei.
262 Joseph Pittau, ‘Inoue Kowashi, 1843-1895 and the Formation of Modem Japan’, Monumenta 
Nipponica (vol. 20, no. 3/4, 1965, pp. 253-282), p. 256
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gradualist approach favoured by the Meiji leadership. Accordingly, Inoue Kowashi 
stressed the stability the Prussian-styled constitutional government could bring. ‘In 
Prussia’, he wrote to Itö Hirobumi in June 1881, ‘according to the constitution, the 
emperor has the right to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, whose tenure of office 
is determined by the emperor’s will not by the votes of parliament. So also the prime 
minister cannot quit without an imperial order. I think this is desirable for our 
country.’263 The British system, on the other hand, worked only because its populace 
and its representatives were politically mature. Japan needed to consolidate its newly 
established political system, and needed stability.264
George Akita attributes this somewhat paternalistic thinking to Confucian 
intellectual influences among the Meiji leaders, which stipulated that educated men of 
moral learning had the duty to lead the people. The Meiji leaders, he argues, ‘believed 
first of all in a benevolent elitism which stemmed from their acceptance of a natural 
hierarchy based on ability.’265 There are parallels with the thinking of the Chinese elite 
here, as we will see later. However, to what extent such attitudes stem from 
Confucianism is debatable. It is worth noting that even Meiji liberals such as Fukuzawa 
Yukichi regarded that a large number of the Japanese populace were not sufficiently 
enlightened to participate in politics. It is equally arguable that many leaders and 
intellectuals of this time were unable ‘to overcome their class prejudices’. 266 
Furthermore, there were even international influences which cautioned the Japanese 
leaders against granting full political rights to their citizens. Ökubo Toshimichi, for 
instance, witnessed the aftermath of the battles during the political turmoil surrounding 
the Paris Commune. It had the effect of heightening his suspicion of awakening the 
political consciousness of the masses. 267 Furthermore, in what is indicative of the 
limited degree to which popular sovereignty had become a legitimate form of statehood, 
the Iwakura Mission’s European hosts ‘did little to introduce them to truly radical 
political theories and spoke less of social responsibility and individual freedom.’268
263 ibid., p. 262. Inoue also mentioned that in Prussia the previous year’s budget could be carried over 
into the new financial year if the legislature and executive did not agree, providing further stable 
governance.
264 See Inoue Kowashi’s letter to Itö Hirobumi cited in ibid., p. 261-263.
265 Akita, Foundations o f Constitutional Government in Modern Japan 1868-1900, p. 162
266 Hane, ‘Early Meiji Liberalism: An Assessment’, p. 371
267 See Akita, Foundations o f Constitutional Government in Modern Japan 1868-1900, pp. 28-29; 
Mayo, ‘The Western Education of Kume Kunitake, 1871-6’, pp. 35-36 and Tanaka Akira, Meiji ishin 
to tennö sei. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa köbunkan, 1992), p. 126
268 Mayo, ‘The Western Education of Kume Kunitake, 1871-6’, p. 37. Another example of this can be 
found in the written works of General Charles William Le Gendre, who served as an advisor to the 
Japanese government. Writing on popular sovereignty, he states: ‘It is not by transferring the
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Implementing mass mobilisation in Japan
As regards the implementation of mass mobilisation, conscription was an institution that 
was introduced at a relatively early stage. The introduction of this particular form of 
military, however, was by no means automatic in Japan. There were political 
considerations which put the introduction of mass conscription into question. As 
Westney argues, European states needed mass armies to staff their ever-expanding 
military. However, in Japan ‘[ejven if fewer than half of the estimated 450,000 
unemployed samurai were incorporated into a new army and navy based on Western 
methods, their numbers would have exceeded the actual military strength mustered by 
Japan through the 1880s.’269 Doubts were expressed as to whether an army comprising 
of non-samurai could constitute an efficacious fighting force.270 There was also the 
danger of robbing the traditional role of the feudal warrior class and inflaming the 
resentment of unemployed former samurai.271
Despite these objections, the imperial edict pfffu chöhei kokuyu) that
announced conscription in 1872 (this was followed by the Conscription Edict 
chöhei rei) of 1873) claimed that Japan was reverting to ‘ancient practices’, but also 
revealed European intellectual influences. It stated that ‘the four classes [samurai, 
peasant, artisans and merchants] have finally been given their freedom S J
~'y J  'y h ^ ) . This is a way of abolishing hierarchies and equalising human 
rights’.272 In similar fashion to the European states, it was argued that Japanese citizens 
owed a duty to the state (rather than their feudal lord) in return for their rights. All the 
people were now ‘nationals of the imperial land’ and were all required to serve the state;
governing power from the Dai Jo Kuwan [Dajökan] to the people, or vice versa, but by defining the 
functions of each in the body politic and keeping the one distinct from the other, that the problem of 
political reconstruction in Japan can be solved. For, while by the latter process, we may succeed in 
having the central power and the people work in harmony and to mutual advantage, by the former we 
make sure to place them in opposition to each other, and, thereby, lead them into a struggle for 
supremacy in which history teaches us, freedom must sooner or later, find its grave...So we see all 
uncontrolled powers are ban in this that they equally paralyse one of the two vital forces of the body 
politic. The uncontrolled power of the prince paralyses freedom , and that of the people, authority. 
But let me say, in passing, if I had to select between the prince-tyrant and the people-despot, I would 
decide for the first. There is nothing more cruel and difficult to restrain than a popular despotism.’ 
General Charles William Le Gendre, Progressive Japan, a Study o f the Political and Social Needs o f 
the Empire. (New York: C. Levy, 1878), pp. 113-114
269 D. Eleanor Westney, ‘The Military’ in Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman (eds), Japan in 
Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 179
270 Katö Yöko, Chöheisei to kindai Nippon. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa köbunkan, 1996), p. 45
271 The assassination of one of the early advocates of universal conscription, Ömura Masujirö 
demonstrated this danger.
272 This document is found in Rekishigaku kenkyükai (ed), Nihonshi shiryö: kindai (vol. 4). (Tokyo: 
Iwanami shoten, 1997), p. 99
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the passage that ‘there should be no differences in [all classes’] duties to serve the state ( 
HfU—'WtS K — '>7 % n  3 ]) f l /V ^ 'y y  indicated this.273
The introduction of mass conscription benefited the Meiji government in a number 
of ways. The adoption of the European-styled military served to protect Japan from the 
caprice of the European powers; when we consider the dualistic way in which the 
Japanese viewed the European states, this is understandable. But viewing such reforms 
simply as a response to an anarchical, dangerous international realm misses another 
crucial dimension: the introduction of a mass army was also intrinsically connected to 
demonstrating Japan’s ‘Europeanised’ identity. As Hackett argues, one rationale for 
adopting a mass army along European models ‘was that almost all European nations 
built their armies on the foundation of a universal conscription system.’274 An army, 
Hackett states, ‘is by its very nature a comparative institution’.275 Furthermore, Hans J. 
Morgenthau claims, military power and the display of it has been used been used in the 
‘policy of prestige’ (and this practice continues to this very day); ‘[s]ince military 
strength is the obvious measure of a nation’s power, its demonstration serves to impress 
the others with that nation’s power.’276 Such prestige, however, can only be meaningful 
when the notions of ‘prestige’ are shared by an actor and her peers.277 While Japan’s 
army had some way to go before it could match those of the ‘civilised’ European states, 
in the context of the nineteenth century, the adoption of a ‘Europeanised’ army also 
entailed equipping it with advanced industrial and military technology, and this served 
as a visible sign of ‘civilised’ identity and military power. The Chinese were often 
ridiculed by the Europeans for their military ‘backwardness’; one author wrote as early 
as 1836:
...there is, probably, at the present no more infallible a criterion of the civilisation 
and advancement of societies than the proficiency which each has attained in “the 
murderous art,” the perfection and variety of their implements for mutual 
destruction, and the skill with which they have learned to use them.278
In such an intellectual climate, Japan’s willingness to adopt a European-styled 
military institution would create a favourable impression on the ‘civilised’ powers of 
Japan’s commitment to be judged by the Society’s values. The fact that the Japanese
273 ibid. Also see Hirata Toshiharu, ‘Meiji guntai ni okeru “chükun aikoku” no seishin noseiritsu’, Gunji 
shigaku (vol. 13, no. 2 ,, September 1977, pp. 2-20), p. 14
274 Hackett, ‘The Meiji Leaders and Modernization, p. 255
275 ibid.
276 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 79
277 ibid., p. 74
278 Cited in Adas, Machines as the Measure o f Men, p. 185
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elite had connected European military power and weapons with ‘civilisation’ meant that 
they understood this well.
The 1872 Education Act gakusei) that introduced compulsory education also
served to foster a sentiment of loyalty towards the state. The system of mass education 
in the Western states made a favourable impression on the Japanese. Japan had a long 
tradition of providing education (though not compulsory) to its populace, and the 
educational benefits of mass schooling were certainly recognised. The Act ‘openly 
urged the universal development of character, mind, and talent for the sake of rising and 
prospering in the world’, 279 and also demonstrated the appreciation for compulsory 
education as a social good. At the same time, the Meiji leadership linked education to 
strengthening the Japanese state, and the result of this was ‘an educational policy 
devoted to “civilization and enlightenment” for the sake of strengthening the nation.’280 
The textbooks of European origin, such as the Taisei kanzen kunmö Ijilll), one
of the most popular textbooks of the Meiji period, also introduced the concept of 
patriotic duty to one’s state.281
However, the Meiji leaders were less successful in preventing the increase of 
politically-minded citizens.282 As discussed above, the Meiji leadership was reluctant to 
give the Japanese populace a greater stake in politics, even if it meant sacrificing a 
greater ability to mobilise their citizens. But mass conscription had the effect of 
politicising the Japanese populace. The new recruits were not only given physical 
training; often illiterate, they were taught to read and write, and many of them 
subsequently gained access to newspapers and radical magazines. 283 Furthermore, 
Japan’s conscious decision to enter European International Society entailed an exposure
279 Gluck, Japan ’s Modem Myths, p. 104
280 ibid.
281 The Taisei kanzen kunmö was written by Frenchman Charles Louis Bonne. The works cited here is: 
Charles Louis Bonne, Taisei kanzen kunmö (Mitsukuri Rinshö, trans). (Nagoya: Nagoya gakkö, 
1871), p. 51
282 However, we must be careful not to overstate the degree to which the Japanese populace had become 
politicises. By 1890, Carol Gluck notes, the ‘electorate of 450,000 comprised only 1.1 percent of the 
population’, with ‘urban dwellers of every economic stratum dramatically underrepresented.’ While 
this can be attributed to the limited franchise of the time, Gluck also notes: ‘[t]he circle of newspaper 
readers who kept abreast of political activities was wider, though not by much....Although many 
copies passed through the hands of several readers, the social distribution during this period remained 
limited to the high elite and more recently added lower officials, elementary schoolteachers, 
merchants, and others of “middle class society. (chüryü shakai)’” Gluck, Japan 's Modem Myths, pp. 
67-68.
283 See Nobutaka Ike, ‘War and Modernization’ in Robert E. Ward (ed), Political Development in 
Modem Japan. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968); David B. Ralston, Importing the 
European Army: The Introduction o f European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra- 
European World, 1600-1914. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 165-166; and
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to ‘foreign’ material and intellectual influences, including those of popular sovereignty. 
A consequence of this was a mutiny of the imperial guard in the 1878 Takebashi 
Mutiny. The cause was located, amongst others, in the ‘support to representative 
government, as part of a growing political agitation directed against the [Meiji] 
oligarchy.’284
Similarly, education was not quite having the intended effect of producing 
patriotic citizens. The education system was not always conducive towards producing a 
unified, patriotic sentiment that could be utilised by the government in its quest to 
become ‘rich and strong’. The government had yet to establish a tight control over the 
educational system. The curriculum had undergone a bewildering series of changes,285 
and ‘the elementary curriculum had...shifted from Anglo-American egalitarian 
emphasis on the individual intellect, ...to a mixture of Confucian and European elitism 
and moral emphasis’.286 Moreover, as a relatively well-educated group, teachers were 
easily influenced by other far more radical (at least in the eyes of the Meiji leadership) 
intellectual influences from the West; their commitment to the state was often wanting.
The government’s response to its increasingly politicised citizens reflected its 
ambivalence. On the one hand, it offered them some concessions by forming prefectural 
assemblies in 1878.287 In 1881, an imperial edict also declared that a national assembly 
was to be established by 1890.288 Suffrage was increased (albeit to a limited number of 
Japanese citizens) in the 1889 Meiji Constitution. At the same time, however, the 
emperor was given sovereign authority and prerogative of supreme command, and
Richard J. Smith, ‘Reflections on the Comparative Study of Modernization in China and Japan’, pp. 
16-18
284 Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise o f Modern Japan, 1838-1922. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 84. The most direct cause of the mutiny was 
dissatisfaction over salaries and rewards.
285 Between 1872-1886, the schools were administrated along French, American, and Prussian-inspired 
models.
286 Gluck, Japan ’s Modern Myths, p. 19. Also see E. Patricia Tsurumi, ‘Meiji Primary School Language 
and Ethics Textbooks: Old Values for a New Society?’, Modern Asian Studies (vol. 8, no. 2, 1974, 
pp. 247-261)
287 However, we must not overstate the influence of popular opinion behind the establishment of 
representative assemblies: while popular opinion did matter, the Meiji leaders were not necessarily 
against these measures per se. They knew from their observation of European states that 
constitutional government and some form of legislative assembly was necessary. The 1878 decision 
to set up prefectural assemblies had, for instance, already been suggested as early as 1870. George 
Akita seems correct in asserting that ‘Meiji political history cannot be seen simply as a struggle 
between “liberal” opposition demanding political rights and a “conservative” regime bent on 
maintaining the status quo and acquiescing to change only when faced with opposition pressure.’ 
Akita, Foundations o f Constitutional Government in Modern Japan 1868-1900, p. 23
288 The edict was issued in the wake of a public uproar surrounding the sale of the Hokkaido 
Colonization Commission properties to a member of the Meiji leadership, Kuroda Kiyotaka, at a 
highly advantageous price. Anti-government rallies became linked to calls for representative
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popular representation was limited. A brief examination of the drafting process shows 
that the leadership were determined to protect the power of the executive. An earlier 
draft constitution prepared by the Senate (tü^Ptc Genröin), which ‘made important 
concessions to the democratic ideal’ with ‘clear checks and balances...established to 
limit the powers of the emperor and of the central government’, was rejected.289 The 
British parliamentary system was also rejected in favour of a Prussian-styled 
constitutional government.290
The Meiji leadership also sought to suppress political dissent both through 
repressive legislation and a heavy dose of indoctrination in patriotism. One obvious 
target was the military. A politically active army was perceived as extremely dangerous, 
and the Takebashi Mutiny aroused much shock among the leadership.291 The 
government moved to issue stem instructions to the military (the 1878 Admonition to 
Soldiers or SAPlJS Gunjin kunkai),292 warning them not to meddle with politics, and 
this was reinforced by the 1880 Regulations for Public Meetings, where soldiers were 
forbidden to attend political meetings.293 Soldiers were admonished by the emperor to 
refrain from political activities in the 1882 Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors 
Gunjin chokuyu). State and emperor were conflated, and soldiers were told to focus 
their loyalty on the emperor alone. Intellectual influences from European sources, 
which advocated loyalty to the state in return for the guarantee of certain rights, were 
less emphasised. In their place, Japanese notions of loyalty, which focussed on 
absolutely loyalty towards the ruler, was reintroduced.294 Politics was deemed to be ‘in 
and of itself undesirable, even noxious.’295
government, and the government leaders were also accused of selfish, nepotistic practices. See 
Haraguchi Kiyoshi, Nihon kindai kokka no keisei, pp. 272-279
289 Pittau, ‘Inoue Kowashi, 1843-1895 and the Formation of Modem Japan’, p. 259. For further 
information on the Genröin draft (the Kokken söan), see also Akita, Foundations o f Constitutional 
Government in Modern Japan 1868-1900, pp. 11-12
290 Umetani Noboru states that interest in the Prussian system of governance were increasingly visible 
from the late 1870s, and by 1879 or 1880, the core leaders involved in drafting the constitution 
(Iwakura Tomomi, ltd Hirobumi and Inoue Kowashi) were united in their preference for this 
particular model. See Umetani Noboru, Oyatoi gaikokujin (vol. 11): seiji, hösei, pp. 156-157
291 The mutiny was described as ‘the most conspicuous blemish in the history of the Imperial army, the 
most disgraceful event to scar the glorious Meiji era’. See Roger F. Flackert, Yamagata Aritomo in 
the Rise o f Modern Japan, 1838-1922. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 
p. 84
292 These instructions were written by Nishi Amane, and announced by Yamagata Aritomo. The 
document is found in Yamagata Aritomo, Yamagata Aritomo ikensho, pp. 75-83
293 Other groups included were police officers, teachers, students, and agricultural and technical trainees. 
In July 1890, a new legislation, the Public Meetings and Political Associations Law expanded this 
group to include minors and women.
294 Hirata Toshiharu, ‘Meiji guntai ni okeru “chükun aikoku”no seishin no seiritsu’, p. 18
295 Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, p. 53
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The education system was reconfigured to ensure that loyalty to the state was 
fostered. While reconfiguring the Japanese state along Europeanised lines had furthered 
Japan’s acceptance by European International Society, the members of the Meiji 
leadership were all concerned by the increasing negative social problems that 
accompanied these reforms. The list was certainly a long one, as Carol Gluck states:
Society, they said, was in disarray, afflicted by ills, beset by economic difficulties, 
roiled by the struggle for survival, upset by labor problems, exposed to dangerous 
thought, threatened by socialist destruction, rent by gulfs between rich and poor, 
city and country, worker and capitalist.296
While the leaders agreed that some form of ideological education was needed, 
they disagreed over its implementation. Some individuals (such as the imperial tutor 
Motoda Eifu advocated a return to more Confucian values. While they did
not reject Confucian intellectual influences per se, other officials (such as Mori Arinori 
who became minister of education in 1885) stressed ‘patriotic service to the 
state on the Western model rather than to the morai obligation between a Confucian 
ruler and his subjects’.297 Greater efforts were taken to gain control over schools (by 
1902, the government had decided to replace privately published textbooks with 
national textbooks), and a policy of patriotic education which utilised the symbolic 
value of the emperor, as epitomised by the Rescript on Education (ifcW M u kyöiku 
chokugo), was introduced.298 Inoue Kowashi, who played a key role in drafting the 
Rescript, believed that the most effective way by which to inculcate the masses in 
patriotism was by stressing loyalty towards the emperor.299 Eventually, Carol Gluck 
states, the Rescript
...was raised to the status of a civic creed. What began as an assertion of native 
values and social ethics became a civil morality: an index of loyalty and patriotism
296 ibid., p. 28
297 ibid., p. 109
298 The Rescript was drafted by Inoue Kowashi and Motoda Eifu. While Inoue was a constitutional 
specialist deeply influenced by Prussian political theory and Motoda a Confucian, they were able to 
come up with a draft, partly due to their mutual interest (albeit with different interpretations) in 
Confucian thought. Details of the drafting of the Rescript is told in ibid., pp. 120-123.
299 Pittau, ‘Inoue Kowashi, 1843-1895 and the Formation of Modem Japan’, p. 272. Also see Gluck, 
Japan ’s Modern Myths, p. 85 for Mori Arinori’s views. The kokutai is a somewhat vague concept. It 
often refers to the unbroken Japanese imperial line, while Mitogaku scholars such as Aizawa Seishisai 
interpreted it as a form of moral culture which included ‘the moral values of trust, loyalty, filial piety, 
peace, and well-being among the people...all were part of that national essence that was transferred as 
a mandate from Heaven to the divine line of archaic kings through the son goddess Amaterasu.’ See 
Tetsuo Najita, ‘History and nature in eighteenth-century Tokugawa thought’ in John Whitney Hall 
(ed), The Cambridge History o f Japan (vol. 4): Early Modern Japan. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) ,p. 640.
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(chukun aikoku) not only for the schools, but for wherever allegiance to the state 
was at ideological issue.300
Mass mobilisation in China: intellectual influences and motivations 
Wei Yuan was one of the earliest Chinese intellectuals to explore European government 
institutions and their connections with greater mass mobilisation, even though the link 
with popular sovereignty and nationalism had yet to be made. Wei’s starting point was 
what he considered to be the abysmal state of the Qing. Witnessing the corruption, 
rebellion, and China’s inability to effectively counter foreign encroachment, Philip A. 
Kuhn notes, Wei Yuan’s thoughts centred around the question of whether or not ‘the 
state could be invigorated by more fervent commitment and broader political 
participation among the literati elite, and at the same time be strengthened in the 
exercise of its authoritarian rule . ’ 301 Wei also noted in his Haiguo tuzhi that in the 
United States, the people’s participation in politics meant that popular opinion was 
reflected in politics. This made people work hard, and made the country strong . 302 Wei 
Yuan’s proposal was to allow broader political participation by the members of the elite. 
He argued that the literary inquisitions during the Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors 
had led to a stifling of expressing opinions. By encouraging the educated elite to 
express their opinions more freely, Wei hoped for the articulation of a better policy that 
could serve China well.
Wei’s contemporary Feng Guifen went further. Like Wei Yuan, Feng also 
believed that ‘broader literati participation was to be the source of the heightened 
national energy needed to resist the West. ’ 303 To this end, he suggested two important 
points. First, Feng argued that officials be appointed to higher positions based on 
nominations from other members of the elite. Second, Feng suggested that in order to 
eliminate the corruption and social unrest prevalent within the countryside, the growing 
powers of the middlemen and runners had to be curbed. The solution was the 
appointment of a new, different kind of middleman, voted by villagers. Unlike Wei 
Yuan, Feng owed his ideas to Western thought which advocated popular political 
participation, despite the fact that he did not explicitly discuss the concept of popular 
sovereignty. Philip A. Kuhn argues that the very notion of an equal vote bears the 
hallmarks of ‘the idea of popular sovereignty -  of the rights of man, liberty, equality,
300 Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, p. 127
301 Kuhn, The Origins o f the Modern Chinese State, p. 32
302 Wei Yuan, Haiguo tuzhi (abridged edition), p. 402
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and the rule of reason’, 304 which is an anathema ‘to the Chinese governmental 
system...for the simple reason that one man’s opinion is assuredly not equivalent to the 
opinion of any other; men are, after all, differentiated by both virtue and education.’305
As China’s interaction with European International Society increased, the ideas of 
popular sovereignty began to trickle into China. In their search for ‘wealth and strength’, 
the concept appears to have also caught the attention of the Chinese reformists. Writing 
to Li Hongzhang from France in 1878, Ma Jianzhong noted the seemingly close 
relationship between rulers and their subjects as well as the strong support the former 
seemed to enjoy. Furthermore, Ma noted that this seemed to generate patriotism, which 
further strengthened the state. He then went on to argue that the European powers 
derived this power from their responsiveness to the popular will.
When recalling the year or so since I came to Europe I remember that originally I 
assumed Europe’s wealth and strength solely lay in its highly developed 
manufacturing industry and in its strict military discipline. When I delved further 
into its laws and examined its arts of government I realized that Europe’s search 
for wealth had as its basis the protection of commercial organizations and that its 
quest for strength had as its guiding principle the gaining of popular support. By 
protecting commercial organizations taxes can be increased, thereby ensuring state 
revenues are sufficient; by gaining popular support loyalty and devotion are 
increased manifold, thereby ensuring shared hatred of external enemies.306
Outside officialdom, reformists such as Zheng Guanying and Wang Tao also came to 
similar conclusions. Zheng maintained that the close relationship between the people 
and the government meant that ‘the country’s minds are as one ( II ̂ L ' l F -)’, 
making it difficult for despotic government to take root. The result was a stable, strong 
government.307 Wang Tao also argued that ‘England’s resource is the fact that there is a 
sympathetic government understanding between the governing and the governed, and a 
close relationship between the ruler and the people. The foundations of the country will 
be strong and stable
).’308 In so doing, Zheng and Wang had located popular sovereignty as one of the key 
powers of the Western system.
303 Kuhn, The Origins o f the Modern Chinese State, p. 57
304 Bukovansky, ‘The altered state and the state of nature’, p. 200
305 Kuhn, The Origins o f the Modern Chinese State, p. 61
306 Ma Jianzhong, ‘A Letter to Li Hongzhang on Overseas Study’, in Strengthen the Country and Enrich 
the People: The Reform Writings of Ma Jianzhong (1845-1900), p. 44
307 Zheng Guanying, ‘Yiyuan (part 1)’, Shengshi xveiyan, p. 96
308 See Wang Tao, ‘Ji yingguo zhengzhi’, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, p. 89. The translation is rendered 
from Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T ’ao and Reform in Late Ch 'ing China, p. 225
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Many Chinese reformists also identified the parliamentary system and direct 
elections as the key institutions that linked the people and goverment.309 Recording a 
conversation by a member of the Chinese diplomatic mission, Xue Fucheng argued that 
the secret of Western strength was seen in the closeness between the rulers and their 
subjects, and direct elections were one important aspect of this source of power. The 
Western powers
...carry  out direct township elections and establish parliaments, and whenever 
trouble occurs, the people are allowed to say whatever they want to say. If there is 
anything that harms the benefits o f the people, [the W estern powers] enact new 
laws to improve the situation. Detailed censors are taken, everything is recorded, 
and not one person is missed. So, this enables all the wishes o f the people at the 
bottom to reach the top JTTHMIft
a#,
MÜ±T^ttü^ ) . 310
Meanwhile, Guo Songtao actively sought to enrich his understanding of European 
political systems during his tenure as Chinese Minister in Britain through his reading 
and interactions with the British. His time in Britain appears to have confirmed his 
earlier conviction that the strength of the European powers lay in their political 
institutions. With reference to the British system, Guo wrote in his diary: ‘The reason 
Britain is becoming increasingly prosperous is because Parliament is charged with 
protecting the national policy. Meanwhile, Britain has also established mayors ( I P ^ J l )  
so it can rule the people and remain responsive to the popular will.’311 Guo believed that 
the parliamentary system and mayoral system fostered strong ties between the ruler and 
his/her subjects. Herein lay the secret of British strength.
These statements also indicate that some of the reformists were beginning to show 
an increasing openness to institutional reforms based on European models. Writing in 
1892 while serving as Chinese Minister to Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, Xue 
Fucheng appears to suggest that a Western-styled monarchical system could indeed be 
adopted by the Chinese system. While he identified democratic states as being able to 
widely recruit talent and able to limit abuses by officials, Xue was also concerned that it 
could lead to ‘the establishment of cliques and increasing rivalry between them. Each
309 This was one of the earliest serious debates about parliaments among the reformists. However, the 
notion of introducing a parliamentary system were not seriously discussed until after the Qing had 
been defeated by Japan in 1894. Zheng Guanying’s 1884 proposal to establish a parliament was 
rejected as ‘mad and absurd’. See Eastman, ‘Political Reformism in China before the Sino-Japanese 
War’, p. 700. Debates on direct elections go back further, however:
310 Xue Fucheng, ‘Chu shi riji’, Chouyang chuyi, p. 147
311 Cited in Sasaki Yö, Shin matsu chügoku ni okeru nihon kan to seiyö kan, p. 127.
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would try and advance their own interests at the expense of others and the state’ . 312 On 
the other hand, a monarchical state junzhu zhi guo) was less vulnerable to
disruptions and could prosper at times of wise rulers. However, Xue claimed that its 
weaknesses included ‘an excessive concentration of power at the top and the possibility 
that the people are exploited like cattle. i K ^ ^ ^ n ^ H ) . ’ 313 Xue used
Russia as an example of a ‘monarchical government’ where the people were vulnerable 
to harsh exploitation by the monarch. Following from this, he wrote in his diary:
Before the time o f king Yu, a democratic system was prevalent in China
The sage king Shun, gathered a group o f his followers at his 
homestead during the first year of his reign....A t that time, it was an established 
rule that the people had the right to elect a man o f integrity as their lord, and 
among the lords, the most virtuous would be selected as the Son o f Heaven. This 
is the primary model o f the democratic system in the early centuries o f China (jib
Many centuries later, Qin Shi Huang introduced 
totalitarianism into C hina....The first two dynasties o f  Qm and Han maintained 
this pattem , and thus the monarchy became the one and only government system in 
China.314
Xue’s suggestions are significant in that he advocated the reforms of political 
institutions as a necessity. While Guo Songtao himself did not advocate introducing 
Western domestic political institutions, Xue Fucheng invoked Chinese history to justify 
domestic political reform. By referring to the time of the sage kings -  a period 
eulogised in Confucianism as the time in which perfect government was carried out — 
Xue implicitly argues that ‘Western political systems match those of the “era of the sage 
kings” and should therefore be introduced’ , 315 rather than be rejected as something 
fundamentally alien to Chinese political traditions.
312 Xue Fucheng, ‘Chu shi riji’, Chouyang chuyi, p. 123
313 ibid.
314 ibid., pp. 123-124. The translation of this passage is based on Helen Hsieh Chien. See Xue Fucheng, 
The European Diary o f Hsieh Fucheng: Envoy Extraordinary o f  Imperial China (Helen Hsieh Chien, 
trans.). (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 114. However, the translator erroneously translates 
the passage ‘Before the time of king Yu (4*111 lit Jit W ItT) as ‘Before the time of the legendary Yao’. 
King Yu was in fact the successor to both kings Yao and Shun. Therefore, these passages have been 
corrected accordingly. Qin Shi Huang, also known as the First Emperor, was the first ruler to unify 
China. He is renowned for his brutal, despotic rule and often served as a negative example for 
successive rulers of China.
315 Satö Shin’ichi, Kindai chügoku no chishikijin to bunmei, p. 93. Invoking pre-Qin times to justify 
reform was common among reformists at this time, and can also be seen in the writings of Wang Tao. 
Paul A. Cohen states that in the case of Wang Tao, such reasoning demonstrated a ‘willingness...to 
acknowledge fulfilment in contemporary Western society of the most cherished Chinese political 
ideals.’ Similarly to Satö, Cohen also states that ‘[t)o call for a revival of pre-Ch’in [Qin] political 
behavior therefore, was not necessarily to countenance reaction; it could just as well signify a 
commitment to sweeping reform.’ See Between Tradition and Modernity, p. 210. Also see. Eastman, 
‘Political Reformism in China before the Sino-Japanese War’, p. 698
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Discussions of mass mobilisation in China
However, such ideas were never implemented or received widespread and serious 
attention by the top elite during the Tongzhi Restoration. This does not mean that the 
Chinese elites did little to tap into the latent power of the populace to enhance the power 
of the Chinese state. Anti-foreign riots impressed many Chinese officials on the 
potential power of the masses. Fujita Yüji notes two points in particular. First, they 
believed that the masses would be more attached to their land than Qing soldiers, and 
fight to defend it from foreign encroachment. Second, they were convinced the 
Europeans feared that the Chinese people could rally around the Qing and become a 
powerful force that could drive them out of China.316 In this context, an official named 
Yuan Baoheng argued during the diplomatic dispute surrounding the anti-
Christian riots and the Tianjin massacre of 1870 that the incident ‘was caused by the 
rightful indignation of the masses, and demonstrated that they had the “qualities to 
control the barbarians”
To an extent, Yuan Baoheng had identified that the latent power of mass 
mobilisation could potentially be unified and channelled to produce a sentiment of 
collective loyalty towards the state. His ideas were not inherently implausible either. 
We will recall the fact that at the elite level there was already an increasing nationalist 
sentiment, as well as an increasing consciousness of ‘Chinese’ identity that prompted 
officials such as Li Hongzhang to attempt to protect and promote Chinese economic 
interests. Furthermore, similar developments were taking place among Chinese of 
various social backgrounds. Increasing numbers of Chinese were coming into contact 
with Western ideologies through treaty ports or emigration to European colonies. Here, 
argues Henrietta Harrison, they encountered ‘the racist attitudes of the colonisers, which 
were gradually being institutionalised during this period’, often becoming ‘aware of 
their Chineseness in a new context of nation and race’ as a consequence.318 It was 
possible that this latent nationalism could be united as one.
Despite these developments, little efforts were undertaken towards mass 
mobilisation through popular sovereignty or the utilisation of nationalism. While some
316 Fujita Yüji, Ajia ni okeru bunmei no taikö, pp. 261-262
317 ibid., p.262
318 Henrietta Harrison, Inventing the Nation: China. (London: Arnold, 2001), p. 71. While the primary 
focus is on political elites here, this does not deny the existence of nationalist sentiment among non­
elites. As Harrison further argues, ‘[pjopular proto-nationalism of the late nineteenth century...was 
strongly opposed to foreign interference in China’ -  such as proselytising by Christian missionaries 
which disturbed local social order -  ‘which was relatively well known and understood.’ (Harrison, 
Inventing the Nation, p. 86)
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officials did forward positive assessments of European political institutions, many were 
hostile. Wei Yuan’s Haiguo tuzhi was one of the earliest works to introduce Chinese 
readers to popular representation, but relied on Protestant missionary accounts of the 
European system of states. These ‘accounts of a world order based on the equality of 
nations and depending largely on international trade were intended to encourage China’s 
entrance into the Western-conceived Family of Nations’, 319 and violated traditional 
notions of Sinocentric superiority. Furthermore, hostility towards missionaries 
remained strong, and Wei’s views did not fall on sympathetic ears during his time. 
Furthermore, China’s refusal to transform itself into a ‘Westernised state’ meant that it 
did not introduce any European-styled institutions with popular representation, which 
may have led to the growth of a patriotic sentiment that the Chinese state could tap into. 
Philip A. Kuhn argues that as far as the political elites were concerned, ‘their social 
position[s] rested upon no inherited system, [and] their elite identity and their local 
interests could, ultimately be protected by no power but that of the [traditional Chinese] 
state. ’ 320
There were other ideological problems as well. Enlightenment thought that 
assumed humankind’s capacity for reason influenced popular sovereignty. Confucian 
thought, however, stipulated that only those of higher learning possessed the ‘virtue’ to 
rule a state. Ideas of popular sovereignty thus elicited hostile responses. Any form of 
representative government would give political power to the immoral, and allow for 
selfish government: the result, one Chinese official wrote in response to Feng Guifen’s 
suggestions, would be that ‘ “crafty officials” will all “flip the dust off their caps 
[preparatory to assuming their new posts] and congratulate one another,” and the sincere, 
unassuming aspirant, whatever his merit, will have no chance at all. ’ 321 Li Hongzhang 
was equally harsh in his criticisms of Feng’s ideas. Feng’s suggestion for official 
appointments based on votes, he claimed,
...was modeled on the system by which the American Congress selects officials, 
without understanding their evils. [In that system], those below seek their private 
advantage, those above protect their clients. At its worst, the system amounts to 
seeking office through bribery. Perceptive people in that country are well aware of 
this. 322
319 Suzanne Wilson Barnett, ‘Protestant Expansion and Chinese Views of the West’, Modern Asian 
Studies (vol. 6, no. 2, 1972, pp. 129-149), p. 146
320 Kuhn, Origins o f the Modern Chinese State, p. 47
321 ibid., p. 62
3z2 Cited in ibid., p. 63
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To a certain extent, individuals such as Guo Songtao and Ma Jianzhong shared this view 
as well. Guo’s praise of the British parliamentary system was based on his belief that 
the superior nature of the British political system had resulted in ‘producing men of 
talent and the flourishing of scholarship, bringing wealth and strength ’ . 323 However, his 
thinking remained heavily influenced by the Confucian notion that men of talent, rather 
than institutions themselves, could bring about national wealth and strength. Similarly, 
Zheng Guanying, while advocating the introduction of direct elections, placed relative 
emphasis on the system’s ability to recruit men of talent. 324 Ma Jianzhong, for his part, 
questioned the American political system by claiming that during elections ‘bribery is 
openly practiced. With a change of president there is a change of governing personnel; 
incoming officials are all members of the new president’s clique. How can such people 
be trusted to govern the country! ’ 325
For similar reasons, no systematic attempts were made to introduce mass 
education and indoctrinate the masses in nationalism. In Japan, mass conscription 
contributed greatly to enhance national consciousness and maintain morale. In China, 
Richard J. Smith notes, ‘[e]ven in the new-style armies of Li Hung-chang [Li 
Hongzhang] and others, personal ties of blood, friendship or local affinity often counted 
for more than expertise’ , 326 and mass conscription was not implemented. Traditionally, 
the ruling Chinese elites had harboured strong antipathy towards mass conscription. Not 
only were they expensive to run, they lacked the skills and experience necessary to fight 
China’s traditional enemies, the Northern nomads. Another important reason relevant to 
our discussion here is that the Chinese rulers were deeply suspicious of the loyalty of 
mass armies, and this stemmed from their fundamental ambivalence towards the people. 
While the Chinese elite were aware of the potential power of a mobilised populace to 
ward off the troublesome European powers, they knew well that mass mobilisation was 
a double-edged sword: the people could easily turn against them. As Mark Edward 
Lewis points out, ‘[t]he danger to the government posed by an armed peasantry’ was
323 Sasaki Yo, Shin matsu chügoku ni okeru nihon kan to seiyo kan, p. 128
324 Zheng Guanying, , ‘Yiyuan (part 1)’, Shengshi weiyan. (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 
1998), p. 97. Wang Tao also proposed introducing ‘Western elective procedures’ which Paul A. 
Cohen claims ‘was suggestive of -  and very possibly influenced by -  Western elective procedures.’ 
Between Tradition and Modernity, p. 219. However, it should be noted that direct elections -  a 
radical concept within China, for sure -  were already being discussed, and could be found in the 
writings of Feng Guifen’s Jiaobinlu kangyi. See Feng Guifen, ‘Gong chuzhiyi’, Jiaobinlu kangyi. 
(Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2002), pp. 1-2. Also see Philip A. Kuhn, ‘Ideas behind 
China’s Modem State’
325 Ma Jianzhong, ‘A Letter to Li Hongzhang on Overseas Study’, Strengthen the Country and Enrich 
the People, p. 45
326 Smith, ‘Reflections on the Comparative Study of Modernization in China and Japan’, p. 19
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evident to most Chinese rulers. 327 Dynasties had fallen after mass revolts (usually 
described in terms of a loss of the ‘mandate of heaven’), and the Chinese elite was not 
about to endanger their survival by arming the ‘foolish’ masses.
As far as the Chinese troops during this period were concerned, they continued to 
be ‘[l]ocally raised, armed, and trained...[and] had little sense of national 
identification. ’ 328 Western-style education, which played a crucial role in disseminating 
nationalist sentiment, remained in small pockets, such as the Fuzhou Dockyard or 
missionary schools. They tended to teach technical subjects (such as mathematics), and 
‘in a world that placed a very high value on knowledge of the classics, they would be 
unable to converse as equals with members of the bureaucratic elite. ’ 329 Consequently, 
very few members of the political elite sent their sons to these schools. The European- 
styled education system thus also failed to attract a sufficient number of students that 
could be mobilised for the Chinese state. 330
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the stage of socialisation where China and Japan attempted 
to acquire the ‘competence and skill’ to become a power worthy of the protection of 
European International Society’s institutions. The analytical framework adopted in this 
thesis allows us to forward a number of findings and interpretations that differ from 
conventional studies, and it is worth summing them up here.
Conceptualising China and Japan’s socialisation as an engagement with two 
different modes of interaction allows us to identify a number of less documented 
characteristics in Chinese and Japanese elites’ attempts to reform. While both the 
Chinese and Japanese elites ultimately sought to attain the identity of a ‘Europeanised’ 
state by the twentieth century, their witnessing of the Society’s coercive face meant that 
suspicions towards the European powers remained. This resulted in an almost obsessive 
emphasis on enhancing state power. This, combined with the nineteenth-century
327 Mark Edward Lewis, ‘The Han Abolition of Universal Military Service’ in Hans Van de Ven (ed), 
Warfare in Chinese History. (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 41
328 Richard J. Smith, ‘Reflections on the Comparative Study of Modernization in China and Japan’, p. 
19. Also see Allen Fung, ‘Testing the Self-Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the sino-Japanese 
War of 1894-1895’, Modern Asian Studies (vol. 30, no. 4, Special Issue: War in Modem China, 
October 1996, pp. 1007-1031), pp. 1022-1026.
329 Henrietta Harrison, Inventing the Nation: China. (London: Arnold, 2001), p. 85. It is interesting to 
note that the Chinese leadership only introduced mathematics as a subject in the imperial 
examinations in 1898, after the shock of being defeated by Japan. This move proved extremely 
unpopular with the candidates.
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intellectual climate that equated machinery and the existence of heavy industry with 
‘civilisation’, meant that the fields of industry and military received disproportionate 
attention from the leaders.
Within the time scope of this study, this resulted in unbalanced industrial 
development, and caused considerable distress in rural Japan. Strong emphasis was 
placed on developing heavy industry, while small, rural industries remained, according 
to E. H. Norman, ‘dominated by the capital of small traders and usurers, 
and ...compelled to remain at a primitive stage technically’ . 331 Apart from heavy 
taxation, women in rural families were also sent to work in rural industries to 
supplement the family income. They provided readily available, cheap labour which 
assisted the development of the Japanese rural economy, but worked in appalling 
conditions. 332 The crucial role played (and indeed the sacrifices made) by the rural 
populace and women in the process of Japan’s quest for equal status within ‘civilised’ 
European International Society should be readily acknowledged. 333
This biased path of adaptation was also partly motivated by the Chinese and 
Japanese elites’ observations that European states shared a common characteristic of 
being military powers. While the attainment of ‘civilised’ identity did ultimately 
become important for both states’ elites, their institutional reforms would continue to be 
coloured by an overriding goal: making the country ‘rich and powerful’. This aspect has 
been surprisingly downplayed in conventional English School works. The Meiji leaders, 
for instance, adopted constitutional government and introduced limited suffrage, but 
democratic ideals played a secondary role. Similar tenets can be found in the Chinese 
case, although this took place in the twentieth century. Michael M. Hunt has argued that 
one important characteristic of China’s national identity ‘has been a preoccupation with
330 However, this is not to suggest that the Chinese elite and intellectuals failed to appreciate the potential 
utility of a Western-style education. For a positive account of schooling in Europe, see Zheng 
Guanying, Shengshi weiyan, pp. 66-68
331 E. H. Norman, ‘Japan’s Emergence as a Modem State’, in John W. Dower (ed), Origins o f the 
Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings o f E. H. Norman. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), p. 
242
332 It is worth noting that the English School approach has been criticised for its neglect of domestic 
politics and women’s perspective because of its state-centric bias. Jacqui Tme, argues that gender is 
‘obscured within domestic politics by a naturalized public-private division that has historically 
relegated women to the private sphere and considered private sphere matters inherently non-political’; 
given the crucial role that women played in Japan’s quest to attain ‘civilised’ identity, this seems a 
valid point. See True, ‘Feminism’ in Alex J. Bellamy (ed), International Society and its Critics. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 156
333 In his essay ‘E. H. Norman, Japan, and the Uses of History’, John Dower notes with reference to 
works on Japanese history inspired by modernisation theory: ‘If one really steps back and appraises 
current scholarship on modem Japan, or “modernization,” it must be concluded that there is 
something constricted and bloodless, something truly mechanistic’ in their depictions of the reforms 
that took place in the Meiji era. See Dower, ‘E. H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History’, p. 69
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creating and maintaining a strong centralized state. During the crisis of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this preoccupation reached proportions that an 
outside observer might characterize as obsessive.’ 334 Hans van de Ven argues that 
‘[s]elf-strengtheners like Li Hongzhang believed that a modem, industrial and 
prosperous China would come about in a process of gradual construction. This view 
continued to shape the minds of late Qing and early Republican leaders’ .335 Unlike the 
Tongzhi Restoration, there were greater calls for the adoption of European institutions, 
but, in similar fashion in Japan, these refonns were inextricably linked with the aim of 
making China powerful. The reformist/intellectual Liang Qichao a), for instance, 
‘treated modem education, the fostering of a spirit of nationalism, political reform and 
the revival of martial attitudes as part of the same package’ . 336 Chinese preoccupation 
with becoming ‘rich and strong’ continues to this day, 337 and it remains to be explored to 
what extent China’s experience of engaging with the coercive face of European 
International Society influences this behaviour.
The utilisation of a more agent-centric, process-oriented analytical framework has 
also uncovered the multifaceted Chinese and Japanese engagements with the Society. 
This goes beyond the linear, Eurocentric depictions forwarded in accounts by English 
School scholars. While China’s initial lack of conformity with the Society’s norms has 
been described as resulting from ‘inertia’ , 338 the empirical examinations here suggest the 
contrary. First, even though their views may have been a minority, we see that many 
Chinese elites were intellectually engaging with European institutions. Their 
observations went beyond the simple rejection of European influence on the basis 
Chinese superiority. Second, while cultural barriers certainly existed and played a part, 
there was nothing inherently ‘ignorant’ about the Chinese elites’ refusal to be judged by 
the Society’s normative standards or their rejection of emulating the European states. 
The conservatives were correct in their criticism of corruption among the reformist 
elites. Furthermore, they did not necessarily oppose ‘all attempts to modernize’, as
334 Michael H. Hunt, ‘Chinese National Identity and the Strong State: The Late Qing-Republican Crisis’ 
in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (eds) China ’s Quest for National Identity. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1993), p. 62
335 Hans van de Ven, ‘The Military in the Republic’, China Quarterly (no. 150, Special Issue: 
Reappraising Republic China, June 1997, pp. 352-374), p. 357
336 ibid.
337 Alastair Iain Johnston argues, for instance that ‘China’s concept of major powerhood has changed 
little since 1949: The model is of a maximally sovereign and autonomous political state that is both 
rich and strong.’ See Johnston, ‘International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy’ in Kim, Samuel 
S. (ed) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium. (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1998), p. 74
338 Gong, The Standard o f ‘Civilization' in International Society, p. 146
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Gong simplistically portrays. 339 Their questioning of the suitability of adopting 
European-styled institutions in China was a perfectly valid one, as there was (and is) no 
reason to presume that the Western-styled state was inherently ‘progressive’. These 
debates continue to this very day, in the form of resistance to the imposition of political 
institutions of Western origin.340
It is difficult to accurately categorise the stage of China’s socialisation into 
European International Society; as discussed in the previous chapter, the Qing elites had 
begun to introduce some reforms in their diplomatic institutions. Furthermore, they 
sought to establish heavy industry under the rubric of ‘rich country, strong army’, and 
this was partly based on their ‘knowledge’ that the European states -  all powerful, 
military states -  were generally accorded some protection from invasion and 
intervention. They were in a sense trying to acquire what they thought to be the 
‘competence and skill’ to become a state that would be accorded the protection of 
European International Society. This makes it tempting to label the series of domestic 
reforms undertaken between the 1860s and the 1890s as a result of the Chinese elites 
entering the ‘strategic learning’ stage of socialisation.
However, at this period, it would be more correct to interpret China as between 
the stage of ‘adaptation’ and ‘strategic learning’. The Chinese elite had indeed 
recognised that a commonality between the European states facilitated a less coercive 
international environment, but they failed to recognise the importance and need to attain 
a ‘civilised’ identity to qualify for the protection of the Society. Neither did the Chinese 
elite necessarily perceive the ‘modem state’ as a social good that was promoted by 
European International Society. Consequently, while the attempts to become ‘rich and 
strong’ did superficially resemble adherence to the ‘standard of civilisation’, the Chinese 
elite did not perceive it as such. China was the hegemon within this order, and the fact 
that it had been able to dominate and decide the social norms of the East Asian 
international system undoubtedly made it more difficult for the Chinese to accept this 
new international order. The member states of European International Society classified 
China as a ‘semi-civilised’ state; something its elites, with knowledge of China’s proud 
history and legacy of being the most ‘civilised’ state within its region, found difficult to 
acknowledge. Furthermore, the member states of European International Society were, 
in many Chinese elites’ eyes, immoral countries that had the effrontery to called
339 ibid., p. 150
340 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The West: Unique, not Universal’, Foreign Affairs (vol. 75, no. 6,
November/December 1996, pp. 28-46), especially pp. 37-41
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themselves ‘civilised’, while at the same time encroaching on China’s territory. This 
reduced the European powers’ moral standing and capacity to serve as models of 
emulation, and in light of the atrocities the European states committed in the course of 
their imperial expansions, it is difficult to blame the Chinese elite for thinking in this 
way.
The Meiji elite, on the other hand, embraced -  albeit reluctantly -  the social 
standards of European International Society and followed the path of reinventing their 
state along the lines of a ‘civilised’ member of the Society. The Japanese leadership 
appear to have had a better understanding of the dual modes of interaction in the Society. 
They understood that in order to escape the coercion that emanated from the Society’s 
forced introduction of ‘civilisation’, they needed to fulfil the social criteria set by its 
members. The evidence forwarded in this chapter thus suggests that Japan was engaged 
in a process of ‘emulative learning’, which, we will recall, is defined as taking ‘the 
[society’s] members’ social world as the definitive guideline for action’, ‘faithfully 
orient[ing] personal action to conform to its principles and to achieve its reproduction’ 
and being prepared to ‘be held accountable to its requirements should something go 
awry. ’ 341 While simultaneously attempting to attain military and economic strength, 
Japan was already beginning to demonstrate its ability to abide by the social standards of 
European International Society not only by following the legalistic stipulations of the 
‘standard of civilisation’, but also the ‘hidden’ standard of introducing ‘Europeanised’ 
systems of governance.
The reason why Japan managed to grasp these realities quicker than the Chinese is 
an oft-discussed topic. 342 One reason was Japan’s smaller size meant that reforms were a 
lot easier to implement. The Chinese elite had the burden of having to govern a large 
country. Reforms could not easily be carried out, and this had the effect of increasing 
the number of ‘violations’ of the norms of European International Society, which only 
invited further intervention by the European powers.
Second, to a certain extent, Japan had the benefit of observing the mistakes of 
China. The defeats suffered by China were a shock to the Japanese, who had 
traditionally viewed the Chinese state as the regional hegemon and often a source of
341 Long and Hadden, ‘A Reconception of Socialization’, pp. 43-44
Examples include William W. Lockwood, ‘Japan’s Response to the West: The Contrast with China’, 
World Politics (vol. 9, no. 1, October 1956, pp. 37-54) and Suganami, ‘Japan’s Entry into 
International Society’, pp. 196-199
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emulation. Now China served as a negative example. If Japan wanted to avoid the fate 
of semi-colonisation, it obviously had to follow a different path from the Chinese.
Third, Japan was fortunate in having a leadership that could forcefully implement 
the reforms necessary to facilitate its entry as a ‘civilised’ member of European 
International Society. While the Meiji leadership came from various segments of the 
traditional elite, they had come to power by overthrowing the feudal order. Unlike their 
Chinese counterparts, who were working within the institutional constraints of the 
traditional Chinese state, they were relatively insulated from feudal vested interests, and 
were in a far better position to implement the necessary reforms.
Lastly, there were ideological reasons. As Yamamuro Shin’ichi argues, while 
European International Society in the nineteenth century was just as (if not more) 
hierarchical as the traditional East Asian international order, ‘unlike the Sinocentric 
order which promoted harmony under only one [usually Chinese] ruler’, thereby 
denying any possibility of Japan achieving equality with the ‘most civilised state’, the 
new European dominated order ‘gave the Japanese an opportunity to climb up the 
hierarchical ladder by attaining civilisation, thus facilitating its acceptance by the 
Japanese.’ 343 By accepting this point, I depart from Gerrit W. Gong’s assertion that 
‘Japan experienced difficulty in perceiving and executing the Western concept of 
international equality’ because it had ‘projected its hierarchical social patterns into the 
realm of international relations’ . 344 Sovereign equality only operated within Europe, and 
European International Society in the nineteenth century was hierarchical vis-ä-vis the 
‘uncivilised’ entities. A long-time member of the hierarchical East Asian international 
order, Japan and its elite were already sensitised to the importance of social standings 
within an order; this, to a certain degree, facilitated Japanese elites’ understanding and 
acceptance of the social structures of the Society.
Demonstrating ‘civilised’ status within nineteenth-century European International 
Society, however, was not only confined to domestic aspects. Internationally, Japan 
would also engage in demonstrating its ‘civilised’ statehood. This would involve 
behaving like a European Great Power and destroying of the traditional East Asian 
international order. This remains to be explored in detail, and it is to this aspect the 
empirical investigations will now turn.
343
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Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Shisö kadai to shite no ajia, p. 42.
Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation ' in International Society, p. 166
DEMONSTRATING CIVILISED’ IDENTITY: THE 
DISMANTLING OF THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM
In the days when Japan was engaging in peaceful arts, the Westerners used to think 
of it as an uncivilised country. Since Japan started massacring thousands of people 
in the battlefields of Manchuria, the Westerners have called it a civilised country. 
(Okakura Tenshin, Cha no hon [The Book of Tea], 1906)
Introduction
This chapter investigates the ways in which the socialisation of China and Japan into 
European International Society affected their international behaviour. As argued 
previously, in order to gain recognition as a ‘civilised’ member of the Society, non- 
European states were frequently required to demonstrate themselves worthy of being 
collectively judged as such by the ‘civilised’ members. The previous chapter has argued 
that one aspect of this process entailed certain domestic reforms that would transform an 
‘uncivilised’ state into a ‘civilised’, Western-styled state. However, in order to display 
‘civilised’ identity, an aspirant entrant not only had to possess ‘legitimate’ domestic 
attributes; it had to exhibit its ‘civilised’ identity in its international relations as well. 
This process went hand-in-hand with aspirant members’ domestic reforms.
As the state that was more interested in attaining legitimate membership of 
‘civilised’ European International Society, it is not surprising that it was Japan that took 
the lead in this, and the chapter’s focus is consequently more on Japan’s new foreign 
policy vis-a-vis its neighbours, while China takes a more reactive role of responding to 
the changes brought about by Japan in the Tributary System.
The process by which Japan put the norms of European International Society into 
practice and demonstrated its ‘civilised’ identity in the international social sphere led to 
the coercive subjugation of other polities or peoples and the invasion of their land. 
Japan’s Asian neighbours naturally reacted negatively to these actions, and viewed 
Japan with the utmost suspicion. Japan consequently lost its status as a legitimate 
member of the East Asian international order, but how Asian polities and peoples 
viewed Japan was not of primary importance at this time. This issue would come to the 
forefront later when Japan acquired its colonies, and the necessity to impress Japan’s 
identity as a ‘civiliser’ upon the ‘uncivilised’ peoples in its colonies arose. However, 
during 1870-1890s, Japan had yet to acquire colonies, and while it still languished in 
‘semi-civilised’ status and was subject to unequal treaties, its primary goal was to gain
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entry into ‘civilised’ European International Society. To this end, it needed to be 
collectively judged as such by the members of the Society. Consequently the audience 
for Japan’s demonstration of ‘civilised’ status was primarily the European powers, while 
the Asian states were often props on the stage which the Japanese utilised to show this 
status.1
The results of Japan’s attempts to demonstrate its ‘civilised’ identity in the 
international arena were far from the English School ideal of enhanced order. The 
eventual result was a military clash between China and Japan over their influence in 
Korea -  the first since the end of the sixteenth century. The Sino-Japanese war 
represented a clash between two different international orders, and was more than just 
than simple Sino-Japanese rivalry. It was fought between two states with different 
identities. Japan attempted to become a member of European International Society and 
adhere to its social expectations, while China sought to maintain its ‘Middle Kingdom’ 
status and remain a member of the East Asian international order. In order to become a 
member of the Society, Japan rejected the existence of ‘Tributary States’, based on 
ritualistic, hierarchical Confucian social norms. Tributary states either needed to be 
incorporated into the father/elder brother state or be treated as ‘independent’ sovereign 
entities. Ritualistic procedural norms were now replaced by legal procedural norms of 
the Society, international law. Hierarchies remained, but were now reconfigured in 
accordance with the level of ‘civilisation’ attained by European standards. As the 
Europeanised, ‘civilised’ state of East Asia, Japan now assumed the ‘civilised’ states’ 
prerogative to introduce the trappings of ‘European civilisation’ by force.
Japan’s dismantling of the Tribute System stripped the Qing of its prestige and 
identity as the ‘centre of civilisation’ and alarmed the Chinese, who had yet to fully 
socialise into the Society. It appears that they had difficulty in comprehending Japan’s 
actions in terms of its socialisation into European International Society, and saw them as 
nothing more than an assault on the Sino-centric Tributary System to the Chinese. They 
subsequently began to develop a fear and suspicion of Japan’s intentions. The coupling 
of Japanese aggression and Chinese suspicion eventually became the spark that started 
the War in 1894.
Before we undertake the empirical investigations, it is worth making a number of 
qualifications explicit from the outset. This is particularly so as Japan’s demonstration
i For this point, I am indebted to Joel Quirk and C. W. Braddick.
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of ‘civilised’ identity has often been labelled as ‘Japanese imperialism’. However, 
imperialism is subject to numerous competing explanations and interpretations, and is at 
best a contentious, divisive issue. Japanese imperialism and its origins are no 
exception.2 It must be made clear that this chapter does not attempt to resolve the 
various controversies surrounding the origins of Japanese imperialism, which in any 
case is beyond the scope of this study. Rather, its purpose (among others) is to explore 
one facet of late-nineteenth century Japanese imperialism and its connection with 
Japan’s entry into European International Society, thus acknowledging the multi­
causality of imperialism.
The chapter is divided broadly into four parts. The first section presents a brief 
theoretical discussion. The second section examines the invasion of Taiwan in 1874. 
The third will examine how the Japanese attempts to implement the norms of European 
International Society resulted in the subjugation of the Ryükyü Kingdom. Finally, the 
Japanese penetration of Korea is examined.
Some theoretical considerations
At this point, it is worth reiterating what a ‘civilised’ state’s identity consisted of in the 
context of the late nineteenth century. With regard to international conduct, a ‘civilised’ 
state’s identity comprised two broad characteristics. One was respect for ‘generally 
accepted international law, including the laws of war’ and fulfilling ‘the obligations of 
the international system by maintaining adequate and permanent avenues for diplomatic 
interchange and communication’, as stipulated in the ‘standard of civilisation’.3 This 
was an important component of a ‘civilised’ state’s identity, as the ‘standard of 
civilisation’ not only served as a criterion for admitting new entrants into ‘civilised’ 
European International Society, but also as a crucial means by which the European 
states could differentiate themselves from other ‘barbarous’ polities.
Another important, yet relatively underexplored identity was that of a ‘civiliser’. 
As argued earlier, nineteenth-century European International Society was a dualistic one 
in which the ‘civilised’ members applied different modes of interaction depending on
2 See, for example, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, (eds) The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895- 
1945. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984; W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894- 
1945. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); Inoue Kiyoshi, Nihon teikokushugi no keisei. (Tokyo: 
Iwanami shoten, 2001); and Andre Schmid, ‘Colonialism and the “Korea Problem” in the 
Historiography of Modem Japan: A Review Article’, Journal o f Asian Studies (vol. 59, no.4, 2000, 
pp. 951-976)
3 Gong, The Standard o f ‘Civilization ’ in International Society, p. 15
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the level of ‘civilisation’ a particular state had attained. 4 A ‘civilised’ state was entitled 
to introduce the trappings of ‘civilisation’ into ‘backward’ states (by force if necessary); 
and in this context, imperialism was an integral component of the Society. While some 
European states were constrained by their material capabilities from engaging in 
‘civilising missions’, in the case of the European great powers, their moral authority to 
do so was seldom questioned, and an integral part of their identity. Even for the less 
powerful European states, their superiority -  particularly vis-ä-vis Asian and African 
states -  was taken for granted. Many of the smaller European states thus happily joined 
in signing unequal treaties with non-European states, which symbolised the former’s 
‘civilised’ status and the latter’s inferiority.
This particular nature of European International Society was to have important 
implications for China and Japan’s socialisation. As we have seen, while both China and 
Japan viewed European International Society as coercive and saw the need to become 
‘rich and strong’, they each followed a divergent path. While China’s response entailed 
limited incorporation of Western technology and political institutions, Japan 
consciously, if reluctantly, accepted its ‘semi-civilised’ status actively sought higher 
social status in accordance with the social standards of the Society. The reconfiguration 
of external relations was thus an especially pertinent issue for Japan.
Japan’s attempts to demonstrate its ‘civilised’ identity in its international relations 
entailed at least two actions. First, clearly demarcated territorial boundaries were 
established, and any vestiges of the institutions of the Tributary System were abolished. 
Specifically, this meant the demise of a political entity: Japan incorporated the Ryükyü 
Kingdom, which had traditionally presented tribute to both China and Japan and 
remained a ‘vassal state ryözoku no kuniy to both countries.
Second, the Japanese faithfully replicated what they interpreted to be a great 
power’s identity: to ‘civilise’ ‘barbarous’ states and peoples. The Japanese elite 
subsequently began to attempt to demonstrate their own ‘civilised’ identity by sending 
military expeditions and forcing Western-styled diplomacy and statehood on their Asian 
neighbours which they now labelled ‘uncivilised’. Of course, while Japan’s entry into 
European International Society clearly had a role to play in the emergence of Meiji 
Japanese imperialism, 5 this is not to say that it was Japan’s entry into European 
International Society alone which instigated Japan’s imperialism in the Meiji era, and
4 See Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society.
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neither do I wish to portray Japan as a victim of Western imperialism and ignore the fact 
that it was also a perpetrator of imperialism. However, it is equally impossible to 
dismiss the role of European International Society and its connections outright, and this 
point can be justified on the following grounds.
For a start, it is necessary to consider the historical context under which Japan and 
China encountered European International Society. As scholars such as Michael Adas 
have ably demonstrated,5 6 the late nineteenth century was a time when there existed a 
genuine belief that the ‘civilised’ states had a normative mission to introduce the 
trappings of civilisation into ‘barbarous’ states. This was the social environment in 
which the Chinese and Japanese leaders found themselves, and this particular feature of 
nineteenth-century European International Society must be taken seriously. The Meiji 
leaders were, to use a colloquial term, ‘creatures of their time’. It would be mistaken to 
somehow assume that the proclamations of Japan’s ‘civilising’ role within Asia was 
merely rhetoric, thus implying that the Japanese leaders were able to rationally detach 
themselves from their particular social world and cynically use the ‘civilising mission’ 
to justify imperialist ideas that had somehow always been latent.7
It is also important to acknowledge that from the standpoint of the socialisation 
process, it is extremely difficult to discount the effects of the Janus-faced nature of the 
Society, particularly towards aspirant members. The Chinese and Japanese elites 
noticed that the ‘civilised’ European states were subject to norms which protected their 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, while they were victims of European ‘gunboat 
diplomacy’ and subject to unequal treaties. Furthermore, both states’ primary contact 
with European International Society was through the great powers of the Society, such 
as France, Britain, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, the United States. With the possible 
exception of the United States (which, in any event, joined the club of imperial powers 
by colonising the Philippines in 1898), all these powers were imperial powers. They 
were allowed to intervene in ‘uncivilised’ lands, and this fact did not escape the 
attention of the Chinese and Japanese elites either.8
5 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, pp. 11-15
6 See Adas, Machines as the Measure o f Men.
7 This is not to deny any possibility that latent imperialist thoughts did exist: but it is important 
nevertheless not to see imperialist motives before and after the expansion of European International 
Society in the same context
8 Alexis Dudden Eastwood, International Terms: Japan's Engagement in Colonial Control. (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1998), p. 99; Nishikawa Nagao, Chikyü jidai no minzoku, bunka 
riron: datsu ‘kokumin bunka ’ no tame ni. (Tokyo: Shin’yosha, 1995), pp. 86-87
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In the case of Japan’s socialisation, the effects exerted by the dualistic European 
International Society can be discerned from several points. First,, from a social 
theoretical point of view, an aspirant member would be expected to emulate the role of 
the Society’s members to some extent. As Michael L. Schwalbe notes, ‘[r]ole taking is 
essential to establishing stable patterns of action and interaction. It is necessary to 
coordinate joint action and to sustain community life. The very existence of social 
structure is thus premised on role taking. ’ 9 Furthermore, the more powerful the actors’ 
significant others are, the greater the possibility that the pressures for emulation are high. 
Schwalbe again notes: ‘Interacting with powerful others whose worldviews and inner 
states must be accurately surmised to obtain desired rewards might therefore encourage 
the development of role-taking accuracy. ’ 10 In the case of socialisation into late- 
nineteenth century European International Society, then, we would expect some form of 
emulation of this dualistic feature by an aspirant member, particularly if it has observed 
both the modes of interaction which applied to ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ states.
It is thus hardly surprising that it was the Japanese, who were far more interested 
in being judged by the social standards of the Society, who emulated this particular 
characteristic of the Society in the process of their socialisation. They carefully used the 
‘civilised’ language of diplomacy (by referring to international law, for example) in their 
intercourse with both the European and Asian states. For the former, this served to 
demonstrate their civilised identity; for the latter, it served to demarcate Japan from the 
‘uncivilised’ diplomatic practices of the Tributary System. Furthermore, the Japanese 
also engaged in imperialistic practices aimed at introducing the trappings of 
‘civilisation’ to their ‘backward’ Asian neighbours.
There is of course a difference between mere mimicry and actual empathy, and we 
will recall that a state in the ‘strategic learning’ stage of socialisation is more likely to 
resort to limited, ad hoc adoption of some roles of its new social environment, while a 
state in the ‘emulative learning’ stage is more likely to empathise with them. * 11 With 
regard to a ‘civilised’ power’s prerogative of intervening in ‘barbaric’ states, an
9 Michael L. Schwalbe, ‘Role Taking Reconsidered: Linking Competence and Performance to Social 
Structure’, Journal for the Theory o f Social Behaviour (vol. 18, no. 4, December 1988, pp. 411-436), 
p. 426. Cf. Wendt, Social Theoty o f International Politics, pp. 329-330.
10 ibid., pp. 420-421
11 This, Michael L. Schwalbe states, has three dimensions, which is ‘a general disposition to enter the 
perspectives of others...a disposition to strive for accuracy, range, and/or depth...[and] a disposition 
to seek to reconstruct the other’s world-constitutive imagery, or to identify with the responses it 
evokes, or to do both.’ Ibid., p. 419
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examination of Japanese sources gives some indication that this ‘empathy’ or 
internalisation had taken place among-the Japanese elite in the late nineteenth century.
First, as Japan’s process of socialisation and its consequent Europeanisation took 
place, there emerged an increasing disposition among Japanese elites to adopt the 
viewpoint of the ‘civilised’ member states of European International Society and see 
their Asian neighbours as ‘uncivilised’ . 12 The flip-side of Japanese elites’ acceptance of 
their ‘semi-civilised’ status, as well as the desire to be seen as a ‘civilised’ power by the 
members of European International Society, was a concurrence with the view that other 
Asian and African polities were (also) ‘semi-civilised’ or ‘savage’. Fukuzawa Yukichi, 
one of the leading Japanese liberals of the time, wrote in his highly influential 
Bunmeiron no gairyaku (An Outline of the Theory o f Civilization) as follows:
Today, when we discuss world civilisation, the European states and the United 
States are regarded as the most civilised states (saijö no bunmeikoku H  
H U ) .  Turkey, China, Japan and other Asian states are considered to be half- 
civilised (hankai no kuni ^U SO H ]), while Africa and Australia are held to be 
savage countries {ya^an no kuni S f^ tD lU ). This view is widely held throughout 
the world, and the Westerners are extremely proud of their civilizational 
attainment. Even among those half-civilised and savage states, there is not a single 
one which accepts the stigma of being half-civilised or savage, makes no attempt 
to change this status, or dares to boast of itself and claim equality with the 
Occidental states.13
Furthermore, Fukuzawa claimed that this hierarchy was widely accepted throughout this 
world: ‘Why is it that this is so? It is because this [hierarchy] is based on irrefutable 
reality. ’ 14
This intellectual development was one consequence of Japan’s attempts to attain a 
‘civilised’ identity in European International Society. Drawing on the sociological 
insights of Emile Dürkheim, Iver B. Neumann has argued that the creation of a 
collective identity, or ‘an “in-group” must necessarily entail its demarcation from a 
number of “out-groups,” and that demarcation is an active and ongoing part of identity 
formation. ’ 15 In case of early Meiji Japan, the fact that the creation of a collective 
identity as a ‘civilised’ state took the form of selecting Japan’s ‘backward’ Asian
12 This intellectual climate is well expressed in the memoirs of Mutsu Munemitsu, the Japanese foreign 
minister at the time of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1894, although we must bear in mind that he 
was writing, in part, to defend and justify the Meiji government’s policies, and he may have 
accentuated the differences between the two countries. See Mutsu Munemitsu, Kenkenroku (Gordon 
Mark Berger, trans.). (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1982), pp. 27-28. See also Yamamuro 
Shin’ichi Shisö kadai to shite no ajia: kijiku, rensa, töki. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001), pp. 44-46
13 Fukuzawa Yukichi, Bunmeiron no gairyaku, pp. 25-26 
ibid., p. 2614
DEMONSTRATING ‘CIVILISED’ IDENTITY 245
neighbours as the ‘uncivilised’ ‘other’ can be seen both as evidence and result of an 
active process to carve out a ‘civilised’ identity for Japan based on the social criteria of 
European International Society.
Second, as the distinction between a now ‘civilised’ Japan and an ‘uncivilised’ 
Asian state became starker in Japanese minds, there were increased calls from the 
Japanese elite to introduce ‘civilisation’ into these places. Best known is Fukuzawa 
Yukichi, whose Bunmei ron no gairyaku (published 1875), he had already argued that 
the world was divided in accordance with the level of ‘civilisation’, and had categorised 
China as ‘semi-civilised’.16 Ten years later, exasperated with Korea’s slowness in 
reforms, Fukuzawa now wrote that it was necessary for Japan to ‘leave Asia’. Japan’s 
‘backward’ Asian neighbours were becoming an embarrassment, and it was necessary 
‘to leave the ranks of Asia and join Western civilisation. There is no need to treat China 
and Korea differently because they are our neighbours; we should deal with them just 
like Western nations deal with them,’17 This, Nishikawa Nagao argues, is an expression 
that ‘[led] to an acceptance of conquest and intervention towards semi-civilised or 
barbarous states... and is an expression of the colonial theory of exporting civilisation’.18 
It also provides evidence of the internalisation of the Janus-faced normative structures 
of European International Society and of the increasing recognition and acceptance of 
the ‘civilised’ states’ prerogative to do so.19
There is also evidence that this view existed among political elites as well. For 
instance, in 1884 the then Japanese Minister to Russia Hanabusa Yoshimoto (7FÜÜ1C) 
questioned in a memorandum to foreign minister Inoue Kaoru whether or not ‘the most 
civilised Asians should join the Europeans in developing barbarous lands and guiding 
the savages to enlightenment.’20 Hanabusa’s document vividly illustrates the choice 
Japan was facing at the time.21 As Tsuda Takako argues, the choice was about
15 Iver B. Neumann, Uses o f the Other, p. 4
16 Fukuzawa Yukichi, Bunmei ron no gairyaku. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001), p. 25
17 Fukuzawa Yukichi, ‘Datsua ron’, collected in Rekishigaku kenkyükai (eds), Nihonshi shiryö (vol. 4): 
kindai. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1997), p. 187. Emphasis added.
18 Nishikawa Nagao, Chikyü jidai no minzoku, bunka riron, p. 94. Note, however, that while 
Fukuzawa’s views were similar to those of Western colonists, he was not always consistent as regards 
the efficacy of force in introducing ‘civilisation’. See Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea 1868- 
1910: A Study o f Realism and Idealism in International Relations, pp. 138-139. Also see Hatuse 
Ryühei, ‘ “Datsua ron” saikö’, pp. 19-44.
19 Fukuzawa’s evolving thoughts on the dualistic European International Society are ably discussed by 
Hatuse Ryühei, ‘ “Datsua ron” saikö’, pp. 19-44.
20 Itö Hirobumi (ed), Hisho ruisan: gaikö hen (vol. 2). (Tokyo: Hisho ruisan kankö kai, 1936), p. 186.
21 Hanabusa was writing in the context of the ongoing Sino-French war over Vietnam and calling for the 
occupation of Taiwan to prevent France’s occupation of the island. However, there are some points
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...whether Japan would attempt to face the invading West as a member of Asia, or 
assume the identity of a Western power and ‘enlighten’ and ‘develop’ backward 
Asia....It is significant that this statement comes from Hanabusa, who was 
Japanese Minister to Korea charged with carrying out Japan’s Korea policy during 
1877-1882. Judging from his background, it would be difficult to deny that his 
statements were close to the understandings of the Japanese government at the 
time.22
Such acceptance of ‘civilising’ prerogatives did not occur wholesale, however. As 
noted previously, there were many who were suspicious of blindly accepting ‘Western’ 
values, viewing traditional civilisation as something worth maintaining. Consequently, 
Japan’s identity as a ‘civiliser’ was sometimes discussed in a different form, ‘not only as 
a disseminator of occidental values towards the orient and a representative of the orient 
towards the Occident, but [as] the creator of a new civilisation which emerged from a 
harmony of Eastern and Western civilisations’. 23 As Yamamuro Shin’ichi notes, 
however, the very fact that Japan was assumed to have attained the best of both cultures 
of the Orient and Occident ‘had to be based on the assumption that Japan had become 
civilised by undergoing a process of Westernisation’24 and attained the highest level of 
European ‘civilisation’, and the intellectual influences of European International Society 
continued to lurk behind Japan’s ideology of ‘civilising’ its ‘backward’ Asian 
neighbours.
Punishing ‘savages’ in the name of ‘civilisation’: the 1874 Japanese expedition to 
Taiwan
While the annexation of the Ryükyü Kingdom was a part of Japan’s attempt to show its 
ability to adhere to the more legal requirements of European International Society, the 
Japanese expedition to Taiwan in 1874 merits our attention as a more explicit
which indicate that this statement can be seen as evidence of Japan’s socialisation into the Janus-faced 
European International Society. First, Hanabusa makes clear that the choice over whether Japan 
should ‘civilise’ its Asian neighbours or not is an overarching choice that must be made before any 
strategic concern is met. The other grand strategy for Japan is to defend itself against the encroaching 
West without joining the ranks of the ‘civilised’ powers that interfere in ‘barbarous’ states. In this 
statement, we see the transitionary nature of Japan’s identity of the time. Second, we must take note 
of the nature of the document and its author. The document was written as a policy recommendation 
for foreign minister Inoue Kaoru, and reached the highest levels of political decision-makers in Japan. 
Hanabusa had previously been the Minister to Korea, and judging that he was given positions in 
Russia and Korea, both important states to Japan’s strategic and economic interest, seems to indicate 
that he was trusted by his immediate superiors and his views were treated seriously by the ministry.
22 Tsuda Takako, ‘Sen happyaku hachijü nendai ni okeru nippon seifu no higashi ajia seisaku tenkai to 
rekkyö’, Shigaku zasshi (vol. 91, no. 12, December 1982, pp. 1-33), p. 20
23 Yamamuro Shin’ichi Shisö kadai to shite no ajia, p. 46 
ibid.24
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manifestation of the dualistic nature of the Society and its effects on the entry of non- 
European states.
The Japanese expedition to Taiwan has been subject to various interpretations by 
historians. Leonard Gordon argues that the Taiwan expedition constituted an ‘abortive 
colonial venture’. He points to the careful military and colonisation planning which 
took place as early as 1872, well before the actual sending of the troops. This, 
combined with ‘the anxiety for a favourable settlement of the Ryükyü question.. .and the 
impact of a growing national consciousness in Japan lend credence to the contention 
that the expedition was a serious colonization effort.’25
Another view is to analyse the incident primarily through the lens of domestic 
politics.26 Marlene J. Mayo argues that in 1874 Japan was experiencing unprecedented 
domestic unrest. A row over sending an expedition to Korea had split the Meiji 
government, resulting in the resignation of leading figures such as Saigö Takamori 
1^®), Soejima Taneomi ( I 'J ^ f lE ) , and Etö Shinpei (Teller TP). To make matters 
worse for the remaining Meiji leaders, samurai resentment (exacerbated by government 
attempts to reduce their stipends) resulted in an assassination attempt on Iwakura on 
14th January 1874. On 3ld February, a samurai rebellion broke out in Saga (fell). The 
Meiji leaders, Mayo argues, needed some form of means by which to divert simmering 
(predominantly samurai) resentment away from government policies. ‘The Taiwan 
affair’, she argues, ‘should not be treated as an “abortive colonial venture,” though that 
element was certainly not lacking, but rather as older arguments would have it: a safety 
valve.’27
Möri Toshihiko, meanwhile, takes a view which brings together the two strands. 
He is critical of Mayo’s arguments, claiming that the detailed planning which went into 
the expedition suggests that venture was more than just a ‘passive, ad hoc action they 
[the Meiji leadership] were forced to adopt’ in light of domestic unrests.28 He notes that 
while the Japanese government was at pains to claim that the ‘object in sending officers 
to Formosa [was] to inquire into the fact that our people met with cruel treatment from
25 Leonard Gordon, ‘Japan’s Abortive Colonial Venture in Taiwan, 1874’, Journal o f Modern History 
(vol. 37, no. 2, June 1965, pp. 171-185), p. 185
26 This view is expressed in Hilary Conroy, ‘Japanese Nationalism and Expansionism’, The American 
Historical Review (vol. 60, no. 4, July 1955, pp. 818-829); Marlene J. Mayo, ‘The Korean Crisis of 
1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy’, Journal o f Asian Studies (vol. 31, no. 4, August 1972, pp. 793- 
819); Iriye, ‘Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status’, pp. 289-290; and Iwata, Ökubo Toshimichi.
27 Mayo, ‘The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy’, p. 818
28 Möri Toshihiko, Taiwan shuppei. (Tokyo: Chüö köronsha, 1996), p. iv
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savages and stop recurrence’,29 Japanese aspirations to assuming the role of a colonial 
power were visible in a number of aspects.30 For a start, the office that was specially 
established to oversee the expedition was given the official English title of 
‘Colonization Office’, while Ökuma Shigenobu, its head, was designated as ‘Minister of 
Colonization’. Furthermore, there existed detailed plans for the colonisation, which 
serves to refute the aforementioned arguments that the Taiwan expedition was merely a 
‘safety valve’ for domestic discontent. There is also evidence that Ökuma had ordered 
the recruitment of personnel to assist the colonisation effort, and there existed plans 
which ‘called for stationing military colonists at several points along the east coast, and 
it laid out a plan for troops to establish small branch camps that would form the basis of 
a permanent presence in the aboriginal territory.’31 However, while he does pay greater 
attention to the colonial desires towards Taiwan which existed well before 1874, Möri 
also places heavy emphasis on the domestic political scene. He points towards the 
leadership crisis of the end of 1873, and states that one reason for the Taiwan expedition 
was the Meiji leadership’s ‘ pressing need for a visible performance’ that would shore 
up their domestic legitimacy.32
29 Japanese foreign minister Terashima Munenori’s telegram to Shinagawa, Japanese Consul in 
Shanghai, 14th April 1874, in Ian Nish (ed), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and 
Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print (part I, series E, vol. 21: Treaty Revision and 
Sino-Japanese Dispute over Taiwan, 1868, 1876). (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of 
America, 1994), p. 231. The telegram instructs Shinagawa to ‘contradict’ any ‘false rumour’ that 
would not correspond with the official explanation. In any event, there is a strong possibility that this 
telegram was a smokescreen, as LeGendre’s memorandum had made clear that ‘in order not to 
provoke unnecessary foreign opposition, the “ostensible object” of the expedition would be to punish 
the aborigines who had murdered the Ryükyüans in 1871, while “its real object will be the annexation 
of Aboriginal Formosa.’” See Robert Eskildsen, ‘Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic 
Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan’, The American Historical Review (vol. 107, no. 
2, April 2002, pp. 388-418), pp. 396-397.
30 It appears that the Western powers were not ignorant of this either: Robert Eskildsen notes that 
‘[ljeaks about the expedition plagued the government in April, and the expedition’s colonial purpose 
seems to have been an open secret among the foreign community throughout the treaty ports of East 
Asia’. Eskildsen, ‘Of Civilization and Savages’, pp. 397-398. British Minister to Japan, Sir Harry 
Parkes, seems to confirm Eskildsen’s point in his despatch to Thomas Wade on 4th April 1874, where 
he noted: T believe that if the present expedition succeeds in securing a footing, it will be followed by 
a large force of the unemployed samurai, and that the occupation of so much of Formosa as they can 
take will follow.’ Parkes was quite critical of the Japanese efforts (this could have been connected to 
his interest in safeguarding British commercial interests in East Asia), stating in the same despatch: 
‘To my mind, the Japanese are making a false step; in order to gratify national conceit they are 
incurring unnecessary expense, and are risking collision with the Chinese’. See Ian Nish (ed), British 
Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print (Part 
I, Series E, Vol. 21: Treaty Revision and Sino-Japanese Dispute over Taiwan, 1868, 1876). 
(Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1994), p. 234
31 Robert Eskildsen, ‘Of Civilization and Savages’, p. 397. The author of this memorandum is 
unknown.
32 Möri Toshihiko, Taiwan shuppei, p. 123
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These studies have added much to our understanding of the political processes 
leading up to the Taiwan incident, but they have deficiencies, The most conspicuous 
shortcoming is that these accounts give an incomplete picture: they decouple Japan’s 
domestic politics from the international context in which the decision to send the 
expedition took place. Political decision-making takes place as a result of an interaction 
between domestic and international political spheres;33 a consideration of international 
factors is necessary in discussing the Taiwan expedition of 1874. Domestic-centred 
arguments presented above ignore how the imperialist intellectual climate of the late- 
nineteenth century affected Japan’s decision to send troops to Taiwan.34
This approach consequently portrays a leadership somehow able to instrumentally 
use ‘foreign expansion’ as a means to protect its interests. In this sense, the Meiji 
leaders are seen as totally detached from the international normative context of the time. 
While Gordon and Möri do mention that colonial desires towards Taiwan certainly did 
seem to pervade the Japanese leaders’ minds, they do not explain ‘why colonial desires 
[towards Taiwan] remained so deep-rooted among the Japanese leaders’.35 This point 
becomes more salient when we consider the fact that there were moves among the Meiji 
leadership to send a military force to Taiwan before one of the first large-scale samurai 
rebellions, the Saga rebellion, broke out in February 1874.36
The argument presented here is that as an aspirant member of the Society, Japan 
also sought to adopt an identity of a ‘civilised’ Great Power. While the expedition to 
Taiwan did indeed have its uses within Japanese domestic politics, internationally, it 
also constituted a move to reinvent Japan’s identity within European International 
Society. In this sense, the expedition was not only a matter of the Meiji government 
shoring up its domestic legitimacy as Möri argues; it was also an attempt to secure 
international legitimacy as a ‘civilised’ member of the Society. In adopting this 
particular interpretation, this study aligns itself with the argument forwarded by Robert 
Eskildsen that ‘Japanese colonialism happened concurrently with and contributed much
33 The domestic-international divide and the need for an integration of the two levels of analysis are, for 
example, discussed in Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations, pp. 29-36 and C. W. 
Braddick, Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1964: In the Shadow o f the Monolith. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), pp. 3-6.
34 This point is also made by Robert Eskildsen, ‘Meiji nana nen taiwan shuppei no shokuminchiteki 
sokumen’ in Meiji ishinshi gakkai (eds), Meiji ishin to ajia. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa köbunkan, 2001), p. 
62
35 ibid.
36 Sophia Su-fei Yen, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations 1836-1874. (Hamden: The Shoe String 
Press, 1965), p. 210
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to Japan’s modernizing process’,37 and attempts to place early Japanese imperialism in 
its proper international historical context.
The Taiwanese question: the early diplomatic phase
The origins of the expedition to Taiwan can be traced back to 1871, when a group of 
Ryükyüans encountered a severe storm while on sea. They eventually reached Taiwan, 
where the native tribes ($±LH± known in Japanese as Botansha, or Mudanshe in 
Chinese) murdered 54 out of 66 of them. The survivors were eventually rescued by the 
Qing authorities and handed over to the Ryükyüan trading house in Fuzhou in July 
1872. The incident first came to the attention of the Japanese government around May 
1872, after Japanese diplomat Yanagiwara Sakimitsu ( bii also known as 
Yanagiwara Zenkö) discovered a report of the incident in the official Beijing Gazetteer ( 
jingbao) and forwarded it to the foreign minister Soejima Taneomi back in Tokyo. 
While Yanagiwara himself does not appear to have regarded the incident as particularly 
important at the time,38 the incident was soon taken up by a number of politicians and 
military personnel,39 who demanded that Japan send a punitive expedition to the islands 
to punish the Taiwanese ‘savages’. These demands were based on the assumption that 
the Ryükyü Kingdom and its people were Japanese citizens.
Japanese colonial intentions became increasingly evident with the arrival of 
American Charles W. LeGendre to Japan. LeGendre, who had served as U.S. consul in 
Amoy between 1866 and 1872,40 had experience of seeking compensation from the Qing 
for the murder of U.S. citizens on Taiwan, where he had argued ‘from international law 
that, unless China sustained the exercise of its jurisdiction over the aboriginal territory, 
in other words unless China civilized the savages who lived there, it could not claim 
sovereignty over the territory.’41 Although he failed in his objectives, he gained 
considerable knowledge of Taiwan in the process. In October 1872, en route to 
Washington, LeGendre stopped over in Japan, where American Minister Charles
37 Eskildsen, ‘Of Civilization and Savages’, p. 389
38 See Möri Toshihiko, Taiwan shuppei, pp. 3-4.
39 This included Ijichi Sadaka, Kabayama Sukenori, a military officer of Kagoshima who later became 
Taiwan’s first Japanese governor, and Saigö Tsugumichi, the brother of Saigö Takamori.
40 Present day Xiamen (jjtH ).
41 Eskildsen, ‘Of Civilization and Savages’, p. 395. Eskildsen has also gives a detailed overview of 
LeGendre’s negotiations with the Chinese during his tenure as consul of Amoy. See Eskildsen, ‘Meiji 
nana nen taiwan shuppei no shokuminchiteki sokumen’, pp. 63-66.
DEMONSTRATING ‘CIVILISED’ IDENTITY 251
DeLong introduced him to foreign minister Soejima.42 Here, DeLong pointed out 
Taiwan’s good climate and abundant natural resources, and claimed: ‘because of 
geographical advantage, many foreigners have their eye on the island. Even though 
China does claim it as hers, if its orders cannot be carried out in the island, it is 
unoccupied, and is there for the taking.’43 While it is difficult to assess the true 
intentions behind DeLong’s statement,44 Soejima’s interest in colonising the island was 
ignited. He declared that ‘Japan would also desire the island ($HCT 
f^)’, to which the U.S. Minister replied rather vaguely that although the ‘U.S. did not 
occupy foreign lands it was quite happy to see states friendly to [the U.S.] occupy 
others’ lands and develop them.’45 Japan’s colonial ambitions began to take a more 
concrete form once they decided to employ LeGendre as a foreign policy advisor. 
LeGendre subsequently submitted a series of memorandums for Soejima. His 
memorandums written in late 1872 gave detailed plans for the colonisation of the east 
coast of Taiwan. LeGendre’s colonisation proposals referred to the necessity to 
‘civilise’ the ‘savage’ lands. It justified Japan’s sending of troops by claiming that ‘in 
accordance with international law, a Great Power could take over the sovereignty of 
“savage lands”, provided it introduced the trappings of “civilisation”’.45
LeGendre’s arguments mirrored the norms of the ‘civilising’ mode of interaction 
in European International Society, which allowed for ‘uncivilised’ entities’ sovereignty 
to be divided. In utilising these arguments for the Taiwanese case, ‘LeGendre 
introduced into Japanese government discourse the idea, derived from international law, 
that bringing civilization to the “savages” of Taiwan justified colonizing the territory.’47 
LeGendre’s memorandum assumed (regardless of the actual collective judgement by the 
members of the Society) that Japan had a level of ‘civilisation’ on par with those of the 
European powers, while it denigrated the Taiwanese natives to ‘barbaric’ status. It was 
this elevated social status which allowed the Japanese the prerogative of sending troops 
in the name of ‘civilisation’ and justifying their entitlement to sovereignty over Taiwan.
42 DeLong appears to have done this to curry favour with the Japanese government and increase his and 
American influence over Japan. See Yen, Taiwan in China 's Foreign Relations 1836-1874, p. 160
43 Gaimushö chösabu, Dainippon gaikö monjo (vol. 7). (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai kyökai, 1939), p. 5
44 Möri Toshihiko, for instance, claims that DeLong did not intend to encourage Japanese colonial 
ambitions on Taiwan. Such a move, he contends, could potentially upset the balance of power in East 
Asia, and cause considerable jealousy.
45 Gaimushö chösabu, Dainippon gaikö monjo (vol. 7). (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai kyökai, 1939), p. 6
46 Eskildsen, ‘Meiji nana nen taiwan shuppei no shokuminchiteki sokumen’, p. 71. Also see Yen, 
Taiwan in China 's Foreign Relations 1836-1874, p. 179
47 Eskildsen, ‘Of Civilization and Savages’, p. 396
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The Meiji leaders, for their part, ‘accepted the link [proposed above by LeGendre] 
between sovereignty, effective governance and civilisation, and their policies towards 
Taiwan did not alternate from this fundamental principle.’ 48 The utilisation of 
LeGendre’s arguments would bring them two advantages. First, the invoking of the 
normative principles of European International Society could help demonstrate Japan’s 
‘civilised’ status to the Society’s members. Second, the Japanese would also be able to 
shore up their claims to ‘civilised’ status by legally occupying Taiwan and obtaining a 
colony, a hallmark of a ‘civilised’ state.
Demonstrating ‘civilised’ identity in China: Sino-Japanese talks over Taiwan and the 
military expedition
Before the military expedition could be sent, however, it was necessary for the Japanese 
government to lay the diplomatic groundwork. As any military adventure overseas 
would be subject to close scrutiny by the Western powers, if Japan was to be deemed a 
‘civilised’ state, it was necessary for the Japanese elite to couch their reasons for their 
invasion of Taiwan in terms of international law. The Japanese government’s claims to 
legitimacy in sending a military mission to Taiwan (and even colonising the island) was 
based primarily on LeGendre’s suggestions, which were based on the stipulations of 
effective sovereignty. The Japanese leaders needed to demonstrate that Taiwan was 
indeed not ‘effectively’ governed by the Chinese authorities, and to this end, ‘it was 
thought best to seek a clarification from the Chinese government about its position 
regarding aboriginal Formosa’.49
The Japanese diplomatic mission to China, which was despatched in March 1873, 
was led personally by the foreign minister Soejima Taneomi. Soejima’s ostensive 
objective was to congratulate the Tongzhi emperor on reaching maturity and ratify the 
Sino-Japanese treaty of friendship, concluded on September 1871. However, the 
mission had other objectives, many of them with direct implications on the Tributary 
System. Apart from clarifying the Qing’s relationship with Taiwan, Soejima also 
intended to assert Japanese claims to the Ryükyü islands and question Korea’s relations 
with the Chinese empire (to be discussed later).
48
49
Eskildsen, ‘Meiji nana nen taiwan shuppei no shokuminchiteki sokumen’, p. 66 
Wayne C. McWilliams, ‘East Meets East’, p. 242
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Soejima also used his trip to China as a stage to demonstrate Japan’s new status as 
a ‘civilised’ power to its Asian neighbour, as well as the Western powers. Soejima’s 
foreign policy has conventionally been known as ‘kokken gaikö (lU ttl^f^ national 
rights diplomacy)’. This has generally been understood as a nationalistic policy aimed 
at redressing Japan’s national humiliations and restoring Japan’s sovereign rights and 
international ‘prestige’ in order to allow her to stand on an equal footing with the 
Western powers. 50 What is noteworthy here is that this was done by referring to the 
social standards of European International Society. While Soejima had a Confucian 
intellectual background and was famous for his loyalty towards the imperial throne, this 
did not mean that he was bent on reasserting Japan’s honour on the terms of Japan’s 
traditional foreign relations. Indeed, despite his intellectual upbringing, he was by no 
means a die-hard traditionalist. He had received instruction from the missionary Guido 
F. Verbeck and was not adverse to Western intellectual influences; he favoured 
modernisation and admitted to the superiority of certain Western institutions. More 
importantly for our discussion, Soejima appears to have wanted to restore Japanese 
prestige on the terms of the social norms of European International Society. He was 
‘committed to conducting Japanese diplomacy according to international law, and made 
great efforts to become more thoroughly acquainted with these standards of diplomacy 
which were essentially western. ’ 51
Soejima’s agenda of demonstrating Japan’s newly-acquired ‘civilised’ identity 
was clear from the outset. He set sail to China (accompanied by LeGendre) in Western- 
style gunboats manned entirely by a Japanese crew. Upon arrival in Tianjin, Soejima 
and his entourage even opted for Western-style accommodation (much to Li 
Hongzhang’s disgust) , 52 a move calculated ‘to accentuate the modernity of [Japan] and 
draw a contrast between Japan’s progress and China’s stolid traditionalism. ’ 53 Once in 
Beijing, Soejima became involved in a diplomatic wrangle over the etiquette for the 
audience with the emperor. While the Chinese insisted Soejima perform the kowtow, 
the latter refused resolutely, claiming that it was far too humiliating for a representative
50 This is based on the discussions of Soejima’s ‘kokken gaikö' in Mayo, ‘The Korean Crisis of 1873 
and Early Meiji Foreign Policy’, p. 804, and McWilliams, Soejima Taneomi: Statesman o f Early 
Meiji Japan, 1868-1874. (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 1973), pp. 139-140
51 Wayne C. McWilliams, Soejima Taneomi, p. 142
52 Li Hongzhang was then serving as viceroy of Zhili province, and resided in Tianjin. As he was one of 
the most powerful and diplomatically experienced high officials, foreign dignitaries made a point of 
making a call upon Li at his headquarters. In this particular instance, Soejima did the same.
53 McWilliams, ‘East Meets East, p. 248
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of a sovereign state to show symbolic subservience to the Chinese emperor.54 Here we 
see Japan’s attempts to incorporate the organising principle of sovereignty of European- 
International Society, which was based on ‘sovereign equality’; it was imperative that 
Japan be seen as either superior or ‘equal’ with the Qing. Soejima also argued that, as 
ambassador, he outranked all the Western diplomats based in Beijing, and was entitled 
to an imperial audience first. Soejima liberally cited international law to bolster his 
arguments, and lectured the Chinese on their conservatism and lack of knowledge of 
Western diplomacy. The Chinese eventually gave way, and Soejima was eventually to 
meet the Tongzhi emperor ahead of the Western ministers.
While much of his time in Beijing with the zongli yamen ministers was taken up 
with arguments over the audience question, Soejima had not lost sight of his earlier 
mission of clarifying the Taiwan issue with the Chinese. This took place at the same 
meeting on 21sl June 1873 where the Ryükyü issue was also discussed between zongli 
yamen ministers Mao Changxi and Dong Xun ( lltf r l)55 and Japanese diplomat
Yanagiwara Sakimitsu.56 Yanagiwara demanded to know how the Qing intended to deal 
with the Taiwanese aborigines, to which the Chinese replied: ‘There are two kinds of 
savages on this island. One type has come under our rule, which we call “ripe savages”, 
and the other is beyond our influence, and we have no means of controlling them (jttln
) ).’57 Yanagiwara replied that since the Qing had failed to 
punish the savages, ‘Taiwan was in danger of being occupied by foreign powers wanting 
to punish the savages...posing a threat to our southern waters and islands. For this 
reason, we are preparing to send an expedition [to Taiwan] immediately’.58 He left the
54 This was somewhat hypocritical of Soejima, for he himself had rejected an objection from a British 
charge R. G. Watson in Japan that the Meiji emperor remained seated when the foreign diplomats 
presented their credentials. This, the latter argued in similar vein to Soejima in China, was against 
Western protocol and insulting. Soejima had rebuffed these requests: citing international law, he told 
Watson that a sovereign state was perfectly entitled to decide its own diplomatic protocol without 
interference from foreign states.
55 It will be recalled that Dong Xun was the minister of the Zongli yamen that had written the preface for 
the Wanguo gongfa, a Chinese translation of Henry Wheaton’s Elements o f International Law.
56 Soejima himself did not attend. He was still embroiled in a dispute with the Chinese over the 
appropriate etiquette needed for an audience with the Tongzhi emperor. In order to pressure the 
Chinese into accepting his demands, Soejima had decided to inform the Chinese of his imminent 
departure from China. He therefore needed to maintain his tactical withdrawal in order to maintain 
the impression that he was busy preparing for his journey back to Japan, although with such important 
agendas such as Taiwan and Ryükyü to discuss, it is unlikely that he had not given detailed 
instructions to his juniors.
57 ‘Soejima taishi tekishin gairyaku’ in Meiji bunka kenkyükai (eds), Meiji bunka zenshü (vol. 11): 
gaikö hen. (Tokyo: Nippon hyöronsha, 1978), p. 71 
ibid., p. 7158
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meeting soon afterwards without reaching an agreement with his Chinese counterparts. 
This was the last time the Taiwan and Ryükyii issue was discussed during the Soejima 
mission. 59 Despite the fact that both sides had failed to reach some form of agreement to 
deal with the aboriginals in Taiwan, Soejima’s mission was hailed as a great success. 
For a start, he was successful in resolving the imperial audience question in Japan’s 
favour. In so doing, he demonstrated to China and the Western powers that Japan 
shared their concern of impressing upon the Chinese ‘that the fiction of Chinese 
universal sovereignty was untenable...and establish once and for all the fact that the 
Chinese Emperor was but one sovereign among many. ’ 60 This was, Wayne C. 
McWilliams argues:
...in  effect declaring Japan’s new identity; no longer was Japan to be identified 
together with China as a tradition-bound, exclusive and isolationist Asian country 
beyond the pale of international intercourse. Instead, Japan would line up with the 
nations of the modem West and challenge its reluctant Asian neighbors to abandon 
the closed world of the past for the brave new world.61
From the point of paving the way for a military expedition to Taiwan, Soejima 
was, in the eyes of the Japanese, equally successful. He had managed to get the Qing 
officials to admit that some areas of Taiwan were beyond their control. The tactics he 
used can, at the very least, be described as dubious: by threatening a diplomatic rupture 
over the imperial audience issue, he diverted the attention of the zongli yamen officials 
away from Taiwan (as well as Ryükyü). Furthermore, the sudden manner in which 
Yanagiwara had enquired about the two islands caught the officials by surprise, and they 
were unable to give measured answers. Soejima of course exploited these Chinese slips 
to his full advantage. Despite the Chinese had not in fact given their consent to sending 
a military mission to Taiwan, he reported to Tokyo that ‘the Qing ministers have 
answered that the savages and their land [Taiwan] was an area beyond China’s 
influence. They did not have any more to add, and things have gone smoothly for us. ’ 62 
Soejima never got to implement his plans for sending an expedition to Taiwan, for 
he became involved in the controversy over sending troops to Korea (the seikanron
59 Soejima avoided the topic of Taiwan and Ryükyü with his conversations with Li Hongzhang, which 
took place en route back to Japan. Although Li had already been informed of the conversations with 
Yanagiwara from the zongli yamen officials, he thought that the issue had been handled satisfactorily; 
furthermore, he appears to have been more concerned with Japanese designs on Korea, and does not 
appear to have seen the necessity for further discussion. McWilliams, ‘East Meets East’, p. 273
60 ibid., p. 252.
61 ibid., p. 275. Also see Möri Toshihiko, Taiwan shuppei, pp. 56-57
62 Möri Toshihiko, Taiwan shuppei, p. 57. Also see Yen, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations 1836- 
1874, p. 189.
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controversy), which resulted his resignation from office. The new leadership, led by 
Iwakura Tomomi and Ökubo Toshimichi, was dominated by those who had opposed 
sending the Japanese military to Korea. Nevertheless, the Taiwan expedition itself 
remained on the leadership’s agenda, suggesting that their policy regarding Taiwan 
would closely follow that of Soejima’s. The new leadership continued to solicit the 
advice of individuals such as LeGendre, Japanese diplomats Yanagiwara Sakimitsu and 
Tei Einei, American legal advisor to the Foreign Ministry (gaimushö) Erasmus Peshine 
Smith, and Fukushima Tadashige, all of whom, to different degrees, suggested 
colonisation of the island.63 Indeed, the advice forwarded by these individuals 
continued in very much the same vein as before. LeGendre, who had stayed on as 
advisor to the government, continued to argue that £[u]nder international law a civilized 
country is permitted to bring the uncivilized aboriginies up to a civilized level.. ..Japan, 
is a civilized country, and now is taking over the task which had been neglected by the 
Chinese Government’;64 Smith echoed his sentiments.
Interestingly, Yanagiwara and Tei also noted that Japan’s expedition was about 
introducing ‘civilisation’ into Taiwan. Their proposals included that Japanese consuls 
should be sent to the island, where they ‘were to undertake “public education” by telling 
the Chinese in these places the sincere desire of Japan to open up the aboriginal territory 
and civilize the tribes.’65 It was upon these suggestions that the despatching of the 
troops to Taiwan became policy, following a cabinet meeting on 6th February 1874.66 
While there were some complications arising from protests by the Western diplomatic
63 See Yen, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations 1836-1874, pp. 194-203 and Eskildsen, ‘Meiji nana 
nen taiwan shuppei no shokuminchiteki sokumen’, pp. 77-88.
64 Cited in Yen, Taiwan in China ’s Foreign Relations 1836-1874, p. 196
65 ibid., p. 202
66 Kido Takayoshi was the main dissenter in this meeting. He argued that the costs of expedition would 
be prohibitively high and should be postponed, although his protests ultimately fell on deaf ears. See 
Kido’s diary entries of 2nd November 1874 (p. 93); 21st November 1874 (p. 100); 6th December 1874 
(p. 107) in Kido Takayoshi The Diary o f Kido Takayoshi (vol. 3) (Sidney Devere Brown and Akiko 
Hirota, trans). (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1986). See also Kurihara Jun, ‘Taiwan jiken 
(1871-1874): ryükyü seisaku no tenki to shite no taiwan shuppei’, Shigaku zasshi (vol. 87, no. 9, 
September 1978, pp. 60-85), pp. 66-67. Masakazu Iwata also argues that it ‘is possible that Kido may 
have agreed to the general principle of the policy, but could not force himself to agree to its 
implementation...inherent han jealousies among Meiji leaders had not abated, and the fact that the 
Formosa project was essentially Satsuma-inspired was distasteful to a Chöshü man’ See Iwata, Ökubo 
Toshimichi, p. 196. Möri Toshihiko has also submitted that the seikanron controversy was more a 
factional power struggle rather than a disagreement over policy (Möri Toshihiko, Taiwan shuppei, pp. 
106-121), and this seems to lend some support to Iwata’s thesis. However, it should also be 
mentioned that recent scholarship has noted that ‘no records exist that suggest that anybody in the 
government opposed colonization [of Taiwan] per se.’ Eskildsen, ‘Of Civilization and Savages’, p. 
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corps,67 the chastising of the ‘savages’ took place as planned. The Japanese troops 
landed on Taiwan on May 1874, capturing and executing the aboriginal chieftain, 
eventually securing the surrender of the aboriginal tribe by July.
As in the political elites’ pronouncements of Japan’s ‘civilising’ mission towards 
the Taiwanese aborigines, Japanese newspaper reports of military activities also 
reflected the demonstrative purpose of the Taiwan expedition.68 Woodblock prints 
portrayed Japanese troops in a ‘progressive’ light: the soldiers were often depicted in 
Western clothing and hairstyle, which were ‘Eurocentric symbols of power 
characteristic of the bunmei kaikaf69 The Taiwanese aborigines, on the other hand, were 
frequently shown as cannibals, even though there was scant evidence of this.70 This 
exaggerated depiction of their ‘savagery’ again served to draw a stark contrast between 
the Taiwanese natives and the Japanese, further enhancing the latter’s ‘civilised’ status. 
As Robert Eskildsen argues:
The way that commercial sources accentuated the savagery of the aborigines 
stands out as striking...The systematic and persistent nature of the references to 
aboriginal savagery show...that the exaggeration could not have been an accident 
or anomaly...The fact that Japanese commercial sources remain silent about why 
they exaggerated the aborigines’ savagery makes it difficult to draw hard and fast 
conclusions, but one effect of the exaggeration is clear: it increased the perceived 
cultural distance that separated the Japanese from the aborigines. In the context of 
the 1870s, a larger cultural distance helped both to validate Japanese claims for 
higher status in the Western-dominated international order and to eliminate a 
middle ground between civilization and savagery that might trap the Japanese in a 
less than salutary solidarity with other East Asian peoples.71
Analytical remarks
Japan’s early colonial adventure in Taiwan offers a stark example of the effects of 
socialisation into a dual European International Society. As discussed previously.
67 The Western diplomats were concerned that an invasion of Taiwan would precipitate a war between 
China and Japan and dismpt their commercial interests in East Asia. To this end, they sought to 
maintain neutrality demanded that any foreign advisers and ships registered in their respective states 
be withdrawn from use in the expedition. See British Minister to China Thomas Wade’s despatch on 
30th April 1874, in Ian Nish (ed), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the 
Foreign Office Confidential Print (part I, series E, vol. 21: Treaty Revision and Sino-Japanese 
Dispute over Taiwan, 1868, 1876). (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1994), 
p. 227.
68 The following section draws heavily on Eskildsen, ‘Of Civilization and Savages’.
69 Robert Eskildsen, ‘Of Civilization and Savages’, pp. 406-407. While the domestic contests over 
Japanese identity is largely beyond the scope of this study, it must be noted that these prints also 
carried images of symbols which were associated with the traditional samurai, reflecting the often 
contested, transitional nature of Japanese identity in the 1870s.
70 ibid., p. 400 
ibid., p. 40271
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Japan’s decision to seek full membership into the Society entailed seeking the identity 
of a Europeanised, ‘civilised’ state. This drive, which reached a peak in the 1870s, took 
the form of ‘civilisation and enlightenment’, or bunmei kaika. One of the international 
manifestations of this drive was the adoption of the prerogatives of a ‘civilised’ power 
in the late-nineteenth century: the right to enlighten ‘uncivilised’ polities and peoples.
The invasion of Taiwan in 1874 also symbolised a new development in Japan’s 
engagement with its East Asian neighbours; namely the emergence of China and Korea 
as Japan’s ‘uncivilised’ other.72 By contrasting the Japanese as ‘civilisers’ with the 
‘savages’, the Japanese accentuated their different status in the hierarchical Society. In 
doing so, they ‘eliminated the middle ground between civilization and savagery that 
might trap Japan in an inferior status to the West.’73 This took place in the context of an 
increasing sense of superiority over China and Korea in the 1870s, both among the 
political elite and Japan’s civil society.74
The invasion of Taiwan can also be seen as a Japanese challenge to the East Asian 
international order. It will be recalled that prior to the expansion of European 
International Society, Japan, while challenging China’s prestige within the Tributary 
System, sought to do so within the normative structure of the system. It sought to place 
itself on a higher position within the hierarchy of states by appropriating China’s 
position as the ‘middle kingdom’ or ‘centre of the universe’ and seeking tributary 
relations from its neighbours, the Ryükyü Kingdom and Korea. While the maintenance 
of large numbers of tributary states and the observance of elaborate, hierarchical rituals 
were markers of prestige within the East Asian order, colonial possessions 
(characterised by outright direct rule) were not. However, by the 1870s, Japan was
72 While we must caution against historical essentialism, this particular view of Asia as an ‘uncivilised’ 
area which needed to be ‘civilised’ under Japanese tutelage was one which was to persist into the 
twentieth century.
73 ibid., p. 393
74 According to Itö Yukio, there was an increasing confidence in Japan’s ability to ‘modernise’ and 
concurrent disdain towards the Chinese and Koreans as ‘stubborn’ or ‘backward’. Itö Yukio, ‘Nisshin 
senzen no chügoku, chosen ninshiki no keisei to gaiköron’ in Furuya Tetsuo (ed), Kindai nihon no 
ajia ninshiki. (Kyoto: Kyoto daigakujinbun kagaku kenkyüjo, 1994), pp. 111-119. This by no means 
implies that the Japanese continued to hold these views throughout the Meiji period: while views 
towards Korea did indeed tend to be condescending, Qing military build-up in the 1880s increased 
Japan’s fear towards China, and resulted in more positive appraisals of China’s capacity for 
modernisation. It is interesting to note that fear for China’s embryonic power persists to this very day 
in the form of the ‘China threat’ thesis, and continues to be debated among the Japanese today. See 
for example, Amako Satoshi (ed), Chügoku wa kyöi ka. (Tokyo: Keisö shobö, 1997).
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seeking prestige within a fundamentally different international order, where colonies 
were an integral part of a ‘civilised’ states’ prestige. 75
Not surprisingly, Japan’s Taiwan expedition was seen as a great threat to China,76 
and intensified Chinese efforts to ‘self-strengthen’ and build up the country’s military 
capability.77 Two further changes in the East Asian international order also began to 
take place. First, the Qing altered its governance of Taiwan, which had previously been 
characterised by relatively weak rule. Theoretically, Motegi Toshio argues, ‘Chinese 
attitudes towards “barbarians” that came under their rule but were beyond the pale of 
Chinese civilisation was a passive one. They were “placed beyond the pale (fk^T 
huawai) and not governed” and left alone.’78 While the extent to which this theory was 
practiced is debatable, Japan’s actions certainly had the effect of making this traditional, 
indirect form of rule both legally and practically impossible. Motegi Toshio argues, 
‘traditional, indirect rule in the Chinese periphery was not suited for confronting the 
modem international order and its “power”, “international law” and modem territorial 
sovereignty.’79 In recognition of this fact, the Qing strengthened its mle, and took steps 
to establish a form of a more visible, ‘direct governance’ on the island. Shen Baozhen 
suggested that the Fujian governor spend time in Taiwan and ‘improve administrative 
organisations by creating additional prefectures in the north of the island, thereby 
increasing the penetration of Qing rule throughout Taiwan.’80 Mining projects and the 
laying of telegraphic lines were carried out by Ding Richang between 1876-1877, and 
migrants from the mainland were invited to settle on the island. In October 1885, 
Taiwan became a province, and the ‘Sinification’ of the aboriginals was encouraged.81
75 The emergent differences in both states’ identities were increasingly obvious in the Sino-Japanese 
talks following the invasion of Taiwan. While the Japanese envoy Ökubo Toshimichi referred to 
international law in his arguments, the Chinese Grand Secretary Wenxiang proposed not to solve the 
dispute in accordance with international law, for this was a ‘Western concept.’ Ökubo Toshimichi 
ignored this suggestion. See Gaimushö chösabu, Dai nippon gaikö monjo (vol. 7). (Tokyo: Nihon 
kokusai kyökai, 1939), p. 230
76 Li Hongzhang described Ökubo Toshimichi, who arrived inChina to seek a diplomatic solution to the 
issue, as ‘extremely cunning’. See Li Hongzhang, ‘Fu Song Xuefan shi lang’, Li Hongzhang quanji 
(vol. 6): pengliao hangao. (Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 1998), p. 3593.
11 This can also be seen by Li Hongzhang’s calls for greater ‘self-strengthening’ following Japan’s 
invasion of Taiwan. See ‘Fu Guo Zimei junmen’, Li Hongzhang quanji (vol. 6): pengliao hangao., 
pp. 3592-3593.
78 Motegi Toshio ‘Chüka sekai no “kindai” teki saihen to nippon’ in Öe Shinobu, Asada Kyöji, Mitani 
Ta’ichirö, Goto Ken’ichi, Kobayashi Hideo, Takasaki Söji, Wakabayashi Masatake and Kawamura 
Minato (eds) Kindai Nippon to shokuminchi (vol. 1): shokuminchi teikoku nippon. (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shoten, 1992), p. 70
79 ibid., p. 72
80 ibid., p. 70
81 An interesting discussion of the changing symbols of power and prestige in Taiwan following the 
strengthening of Qing rule and Sinification in Taiwan can be found in Henrietta Harrison, ‘Clothing
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Second, apart from bringing about important changes in the East Asian 
international order, the Taiwan incident (coupled with the Japanese annexation of the 
Ryükyü Kingdom which took placer later) served to further strain Sino-Japanese 
relations. The incident increased Chinese suspicions over Japanese designs towards its 
most important tributary state, Korea. It was here where the key actor of the East Asian 
international order, China, and the new Asian member of European International 
Society, would finally come to blows for the first time since the sixteenth century.
Dismantling the vestiges of the Tributary System: abolishing the Ryükyü Kingdom
As Japan’s socialisation into European International Society took place, the Ryükyü 
Kingdom’s position as a tributary state to both China and Japan also began to be 
questioned. The Ryükyü Kingdom was experiencing increasing numbers of encounters 
with European naval vessels in the 1840s. Furthermore, the strategic position of the 
kingdom was beginning to attract the interest of European diplomats. The turning point 
for the kingdom’s fortunes came with the advent of the Meiji era. The Meiji leadership 
not only aimed to strengthen Japanese control over the island kingdom; they eventually 
sought to incorporate it completely into the Japanese sovereign state.82 First, the islands’ 
ambiguous status as a ‘double-tributary state’ (pEjUd® ryözoku no kuni) was altered. 
The kingdom was forbidden to engage in diplomacy with the Qing, and exclusive 
Japanese jurisdiction was emphasised. Next, Japan’s claims to the islands were 
consolidated in 1879 by extinguishing the kingdom’s separate identity and transforming 
it into a prefecture of Japan. The islanders were systematically indoctrinated to become 
loyal citizens of the Japanese state.83
Why did the Ryükyü Kingdom, which had previously existed with its ambiguous 
status intact, have to be abolished in the Meiji era? Why did this particular form of 
‘organised hypocrisy’ became increasingly problematic for Japan? One reason that has 
been forwarded by conventional historical studies is that territorial ambiguities could
and Power on the Periphery of Empire: The Costumes of the Indigenous People of Taiwan’, 
Positions: East Asian Cultural Critique (vol. 11, no. 2, 2003, pp. 331-360)
82 This is not to say that the process of incorporating the Ryükyü Kingdom was a linear process: Oguma 
Eiji states that Meiji leaders such as Ökuma Shigenobu or Kido Takayoshi did not consider the 
Ryükyüansto be ‘Japanese’, and ltd Hirobumi was of the thought that ‘it would be better for Ryükyü 
to be incorporated into Japan as a [separate] kingdom.’ See Oguma Eiji, ‘Nihonjin’ no kyökai. 
(Tokyo: Shin’yö sha, 1998), p. 21
83 While an analysis of the process of indoctrinating the Ryükyüans is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
a detailed analysis of this process can be found in Oguma Eiji, ‘Nihonjin’ no kyökai. (Tokyo: Shin’yö 
sha, 1998).
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lead to loss of what the Japanese considered to be their territory or spheres of 
influence. 84 As the notion of ambiguous borders did not (at least in principle) exist 
within nineteenth-century European International Society, international law stipulated 
that such areas could be claimed by another state.85 Emmerich de Vattel stipulated in his 
treatise that ‘[w]hen...a nation finds a country uninhabited, and without an owner, it 
may lawfully take possession of it: and after it has sufficiently made known its will in 
this respect, it cannot be deprived of it by another nation. ’ 86 What was meant by 
‘inhabited’ was naturally decided by the Europeans, and ‘meant settled and cultivated in 
the European manner’ . 87 Neither Japan nor China were in a position to effectively 
oppose the Society in its imposition of this criterion. If they did not satisfy European 
standards for ‘effective governance’, they were in danger of losing their claims over 
what it considered to be its territory or spheres of influence. Under the stipulations of 
international law, the ambiguous status of the Ryükyü Kingdom signified Japan had 
failed to establish effective sovereignty over the islands. This meant that the Chinese -  
or even worse, the Western powers -  could equally lay claims to the islands, thus 
reducing Japan’s line of security against the ‘rapacious’ European powers. 88
This fear of ‘losing’ Japan’s periphery was connected to perceptions of the Society 
held by many of the Japanese elite at this time. Even in the late Tokugawa period,
84 Maehira Fusaaki, ‘Jükyü seiki no higashi ajia kokusai kankei to ryükyü mondai’ in Mizoguchi Yüzö, 
Hamashita Takeshi, Hiraishi Naoaki and Miyajima Hiroshi (eds), Ajia kara kangaeru (vol. 3): shüen 
kam no rekishi. (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1994), p. 260
85 An excellent discussion on the legal aspects of European conquest can be found in Keal, European 
Conquest and the Rights o f Indigenous Peoples.
86 Cited in Keal, European Conquest and the Rights o f Indigenous Peoples, p. 101
87 ibid.
88 Indeed, the Japanese had earlier experienced challenges to their claims to the northern island of Ezo (
present day Hokkaido Jfc#liü) by the Russians on the grounds that they had not established 
effective governance over the area. Similarly, the Japanese political leaders had found that the Bonin 
Islands (rî ZLiiJĵ Ila Is  Ogasawara shotö in Japanese) surrounding Japan were equally vulnerable to 
being claimed by the European states on the grounds that they were ‘uninhabited’. Indeed, the Bonin 
Islands were claimed as British territory by explorer Frederick William Beechey in 1827, and British 
Minister to Japan Sir Rutherford Alcock had pointed out in 1862 that ‘the islands had been formally 
declared the property of the British Crown’ and ‘[ijnasmuch as the islands had been uninhabited at 
that time...whatever rights Japan might have had to them were considered to have been forfeited.’ 
See Hyman Kublin, ‘The Ogasawara Venture (1861-1863)’, Harvard Journal o f Asiatic Studies (vol. 
14, no. 1/2, June 1951, pp. 261-284), p. 277. In a dispute with Japanese officials over ownership 
over the Bonin Islands, British Minister Harry Parkes stated that geographical proximity did not 
constitute a legitimate claim if the territory was not effectively governed. Moreover, Parkes added 
that ‘if geographical proximity were to be the deciding factor for territorial claims, it could be argued 
that Ryükyü belonged to China’. Cited in Maehira Fusaaki, ‘Jükyü seiki no higashi ajia kokusai 
kankei to ryükyü mondai’, p. 262. A detailed discussion of the negotiations surrounding Japan’s 
‘sovereignty’ over Ezo/Hokkaidö can be found in Uemura Hideaki, ‘ “Hokkaido”, “Okinawa” no 
shokuminchika to sono kokusaihö no ronri’, PRIME (no. 12, March 2000, pp. 55-82) and Taijudö 
Kanae, ‘Meiji shonen ni okeru nippon ryödo no kakutei to kokusaihö’, Högaku ronsö (vol. 100, no. 
5/6, March 1977, pp. 184-211).
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rumours were circulating about an impending occupation of the Ryükyü islands by the 
Western powers. The members of the Meiji leadership often saw the Western powers 
and European International Society in threatening terms. Since Japan could not (as yet) 
match the military prowess of the ‘civilised’ states, there was a strategic ‘need to draw 
national boundaries as far away from the mainland as possible, and secure a base for 
national defence’ . 89 Regardless of the Ryükyü Kingdom’s separate identity, the 
Japanese considered the island kingdom as its sphere of influence that it could little 
afford to lose to any foreign power.
This chapter, however, introduces a second reason. While not denying that the 
factors discussed above were important, its main contention is that the continued 
existence of the Ryükyü Kingdom, and by extension the vestiges of the Tributary 
System were becoming increasingly incompatible with the new identity Japan was in the 
process of adopting. This point has been touched upon to a certain extent by historical 
studies. Akira Iriye, for instance, notes the importance of state identity, albeit at the 
domestic level. He defines a ‘modem state’ as ‘a territorial entity in which center and 
periphery are united in a conception of national unity and defense. ’ 90 According to this 
perspective, it was/is necessary for a government to have clearly defined territorial 
borders because ‘[nationalistic sentiment could easily be mobilized through propaganda 
and the press whenever it ŵ as felt that a country’s justifiable territorial claim was being 
violated; on the other hand, the government would be held accountable.. .and its 
authority.. .seriously undermined’ in the case of failure.91
While this is true, the case of the Ryükyü Kingdom highlights some limitations to 
this perspective. First, while Iriye’s argument assumes an a priori understanding of 
what Japan’s territorial borders were, in the early days of the Meiji era the Japanese 
leadership themselves were not united in the belief that the Kingdom was exclusively an 
integral part of Japan; the East Asian international order did not necessarily stipulate the 
need of exclusive jurisdiction. Consequently, while they did believe that the island 
kingdom belonged to Japan, some members also considered China to have claims over
89 Oguma Eiji, ‘Nihonjin’ no kyökai, p. 21. Also see Mark R. Peattie, ‘Introduction’ in Ramon H. 
Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds), The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), pp. 8-9, for a brief point about Japan’s desire to acquire and maintain certain 
territorial spheres to ensure the security of the Japanese mainland proper. One of the most famous 
political statements of this line of thinking was made by Yamagata Aritomo in the context of the fear 
of a Russian advance and increasing Sino-Japanese rivalry over Korea. See Yamagata Aritomo’s 
statement, ‘Gaikö köryaku ron’ in Yamagata Aritomo ikensho, pp. 196-201.
90 Akira Iriye, ‘Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status’, p. 286 
ibid.91
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the islands as well. Second, the Meiji leaders did not necessarily consider the 
Ryükyüans to be ‘Japanese’. If this was the case even for the leading political elites, it 
is difficult to imagine, at least in the early Meiji period, the emergence or existence of 
popular nationalistic sentiment that would compel the Meiji government to secure the 
Ryükyü borders in order to shore up their domestic legitimacy.
The abolition of the Ryükyü Kingdom may again be conceptualised as an exercise 
in securing international legitimacy and demonstrating Japan’s ‘civilised’ status to both 
domestic and international audiences. As discussed previously, the Meiji leadership’s 
goals were to ‘accept “the laws of the universe [i.e. international law] and enter the 
modem world where “all countries stood equally amongst each other” and “enhance 
national prestige’” .92 If Japan were to be recognised as a legitimate power that 
confomied to the norms of European International Society, the uncertain status of the 
Ryükyü Kingdom could potentially pose problems. The Kingdom’s continuation of 
tributary relations with China signified its persistent participation in the East Asian 
international system. This relation was characterised by the systemic procedural norms 
of ritual justice, as opposed to the legislative procedural norms of European 
International Society. The Ryükyü Kingdom’s participation in the tribute system could 
potentially highlight Japan’s inability to conform with international law, and 
consequently its lack of commitment to fully join the international order as defined by 
the Society. This would, in turn, jeopardise Japan’s quest to attain the status of a 
‘civilised’ power as defined by the members of European International Society. The 
abolition of the Ryükyü Kingdom thus was not only a process of securing Japan’s 
periphery. It was also a political process of strengthening Japan’s commitment to 
attaining recognition as a ‘civilised’ member of European International Society.
The first phase o f extinguishing the Ryükyü Kingdom
The ‘ambiguous’ status of the Ryükyü Kingdom came under increasing scrutiny 
following the expansion of European International Society to the Japanese archipelago 
and its surrounding islands. The Ryükyü Kingdom’s full encounter with European 
International Society took place in 1854, when the kingdom established Treaty Relations 
with the United States in June. The Dutch quickly followed suit, signing a trade treaty 
in 1859. It is significant that the United States treated the kingdom as capable of
92 Motegi Toshio, ‘Chuka sekai no “kindai” teki saihen to nippon’,p. 63
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entering diplomatic agreements on its own accord; in this sense the Ryükyü government 
was treated as an independent, sovereign entity.
This, however, does not mean that the European powers were unaware of the 
ambiguous (at least by the norms of European International Society) status of Ryükyü. 
In his report to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Matthew C. Perry claimed that while the 
Japanese insisted that the Ryükyü Kingdom was a vassal of Japan, ‘its actual 
sovereignty was disputed by China.’93 This confusion was evident on the Japanese side 
as well. When queried on the status of the islands by the British in 1860, the Tokugawa 
shogunate officials’ replies were evasive. In response to further enquiries by British 
diplomats, the shogunate claimed that the kingdom ‘has belonged to Japan for many 
years’, but also stated that Ryükyü had ‘ties with China for many years. Because of this, 
some of its institutions were based on those of China, but we allow them to follow their 
customs’. This constituted ‘Japan’s desire to claim the Ryükyüs, while at the same time 
officially admitting to the kingdom’s continued Tributary ties with China.’94
This confusion continued even after the Tokugawa shogunate was overthrown. 
While the Meiji government, like the Tokugawa leaders, regarded the Ryükyü Kingdom 
as a part of Japan’s sphere of influence, the incorporation of the kingdom did not take 
place immediately. Indeed, Gabe Masao states that the government’s earliest 
indications to ‘assume a larger role in Ryükyüan affairs’ came only in April 1871,95 
when Inoue Kaoru submitted a memorial claiming that the ambiguous status of the 
kingdom needed to be amended and fully brought under Japanese control. However, 
even at this point, it was obvious that some confusion remained, for a legislative organ 
of the Meiji government, the sain {&%) submitted a response to Inoue’s arguments, 
stating that ‘the Ryükyü king was a Ryükyüan, and should not be confused as a person 
of Japan’,96 and that the kingdom should be allowed to come under both Chinese and 
Japanese sovereign authority.
The Meiji leaders, however, were certainly not prepared to ‘lose’ the kingdom. 
They proceeded to take steps to ensure the lingering features of the East Asian 
international system were eliminated in the Ryükyü Kingdom’s relations with China and 
Japan. The first step came in 1872, when the Ryükyüan envoys arrived in Tokyo to
93 Maehira Fusaaki, ‘Jükyü seiki no higashi ajia kokusai kankei to ryükyü mondai’, p. 252
94 ibid., p. 259
95 Gabe Masao, ‘Nippon no kindaika to Okinawa’, in Öe Shinobu et al (eds), Kindai Nippon to 
shokuminchi (vol. 1): shokuminchi teikoku nippon. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), p. 104 
Cited in Oguma Eiji, ‘Nihonjin' no kyökai, p. 20.96
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congratulate the Meiji emperor on his accession. The Japanese leaders used this 
occasion-to appoint the Ryükyü king Shö Tai (fnj^) as a member of the Japanese 
nobility (MM kazoku) and give investiture to him as ‘lord of the Ryükyü fief (5it£k^i 
Ryükyü han). The kingdom’s autonomy was also gradually taken over by Japan. In 
October the same year, the foreign minister Soejima Taneomi presented a memorial 
calling for greater Japanese control over the island kingdom. The memorial, amongst 
others, called for establishing Japanese bureaucratic control over the diplomatic mission 
the Ryükyüans maintained in Fuzhou ( 'J'l'l ) and the ‘gradual promulgation of 
[Japanese] political institutions’ that would lead to the ‘integration of tax, local 
government’ with the rest of Japan.97 Within a matter of thirteen days, the Japanese 
government unilaterally declared that all ‘treaty and diplomatic matters concerning the 
Ryükyü fief were hereafter to be handled by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’.98
The second phase o f extinguishing the Ryükyü Kingdom: from ‘domestic ’ issue to a 
Sino-Japanese diplomatic dispute
Despite these efforts, the legacies from the Tributary System were difficult to eradicate, 
and the Ryükyü Kingdom continued its tributary relations with the Qing, sending 
missions both in 1872 and 1874. One reason for this is that the Ryükyü leaders may 
have been reluctant to abolish a political system that had served their interests well. But 
while it is tempting to reduce all reasons to the leaders’ self-interest, it is equally 
important to take into account Ryükyü state identity, to which its interests were 
inextricably linked. The kingdom’s identity was strongly tied to its tributary relations 
with the Qing; unlike Japan, the Ryükyü elites were not interested in entering European 
International Society and cutting traditional ties with China, to which it felt a 
considerable sense of loyalty. A second reason stems from Japan’s own transitionary 
identity at this time, manifest in its policies towards the Ryükyü Kingdom. While the 
Japanese moved towards consolidating its control over the territory and monopolising 
diplomatic prerogatives, they attempted to do so by invoking the traditions of the 
Tributary System and giving the Ryükyü king ‘investiture’. Furthermore, it is worth 
noting that the Meiji government dispatched officials from the Foreign Ministry and
97 Gaimusho chösabu, ‘Ryukyu han ni taishi waga hanzoku taisei no tettei o kisubeku shochi aritaku 
mune negaide no ken’, Dai nippon gaikö monjo (vol. 5). (Tokyo: Nippon kokusai kyökai, 1939), p. 
385
ibid., p. 39298
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Finance Ministry to oversee the administration of the islands," which, as British 
diplomat Ernest Satow perceptively observed at the time, £indicate[d] that the islands 
were not yet regarded as an integral part of the Japanese Empire.’100
Such behaviour -  which seemed to contradict Japan’s claims to the Ryükyü 
islands -  came in the wake of Japan’s ongoing dispute with the Qing over the murder of 
Ryükyü fishermen in Taiwan in 1871. The fate of the Ryükyü Kingdom became 
intertwined with the Sino-Japanese diplomatic row inasmuch as the Japanese 
leadership’s justification for sending troops to Taiwan were based on their claims that 
they were punishing the Taiwanese ‘savages’ for the murder of Japanese citizens. This 
of course implied that the Ryükyüans were actually Japanese. For the Meiji leaders this 
was a crucial issue that they could not choose to ignore. As Akira Iriye points out, if the 
murdered Ryükyüans
...were to be considered Japanese citizens, it would be incumbent upon the 
government to seek satisfaction for their tragedy from the Chinese government, 
which had control over Taiw an...If they were not viewed as Japanese citizens, 
Japan’s claim to the Ryükyüs would, of course, be destroyed.101
Sino-Japanese negotiations on this matter took place during the Soejima mission’s 
visit to China in 1873. Soejima’s mission, amongst others, was to make the Chinese 
recognise Japan’s claims to Ryükyü, thus laying the foundations for sending troops to 
Taiwan in the future. The discussions took place on 21st June 1873, between Japanese 
diplomat Yanagiwara Sakimitsu and Mao Changxi and Dong Xun, ministers of the 
zongli yamen. The talk was ‘extremely significant for it was on this basis of this 
discussion alone that Soejima’ -  and the Japanese government -  ‘would later claim that 
the Chinese government recognized Japan’s intention to send an expeditionary force to 
Formosa’.102 Here, Yanagiwara berated the Chinese for their inability to control the 
‘barbarians ( ± # ) ’, who ‘operated more or less independently and killed our citizens 
who had been shipwrecked there last winter #  A S ‘ji U 9  /UA N —
FfeÜl/ ' y J  \ 103 The zongli yamen ministers, for their part,
99 ibid.
100 Memorandum by Ernest M. Satow, 6th July 1879. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports 
and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print (series E, vol. 2: Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, 
and North-East Asia, 1875-1888). (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1989), 
p. 63
101 Iriye, ‘Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status’, pp. 288-289
102 McWilliams, ‘East Meets East’, pp. 263-264
103 The minutes from this meeting are recorded in ‘Soejima taishi tekishin gairyaku’ in Meiji bunka 
kenkyükai (eds), Meiji bunka zenshü (vol. 11): gaikö hen., p. 70.
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replied that while they had heard that Ryükyüans had been murdered by the Taiwanese 
‘barbarians’, they ‘did not know that this was connected to Japan. Furthermore, as 
Liuqiu (Ryükyü) was a tributary state of China, Chinese officials saved those who had 
escaped, and sent them back to their country.’104 Yahagiwara countered this point by 
asserting Japanese (Satsuma) control of Ryükyü, which could be dated to the middle 
ages.
While both states’ competing claims to the Ryükyü Kingdom were revealed in the 
1873 talks, this did not immediately become a diplomatic dispute between the two 
states.105 The issue resurfaced the following year in 1874, after the Japanese had sent the 
punitive expedition to Taiwan. In an effort to bring an end to the standoff between 
China and Japan, the two states signed a treaty in which the Chinese accepted that the 
Japanese had conducted a punitive expedition to redress the murdering of its own 
citizens. In the bilateral negotiations that followed, Japan succeeded in getting the 
Chinese to pay an indemnity for the murder of the Ryükyüans.106 Moreover, the 
agreement included a text which stated that the ‘Taiwanese savages had wantonly 
harmed Japanese citizens By implying that
the Ryükyüans were Japanese, the Japanese leaders strengthened their claims over the 
islands.
However, this did not significantly alter Sino-Ryükyü relations, despite French 
legal advisor Gustave Emile Boissonade de Fontarabie’s assessment that the agreement 
would mark a significant step in making the Chinese accept Japanese claims to the 
islands.108 Although the Chinese did admit that Ryükyü belonged to Japan, this did not
104 ‘Soejima taishi tekishin gairyaku’ in Meiji bunka kenkyukai (eds), Meiji bunka zenshu (vol. 11): 
gaikö hen. (Tokyo: Nippon hyöronsha, 1978), p. 70
105 From the benefit of hindsight in the twenty-first century, it seems quite astonishing that the Chinese 
failed to press the issue further; historians have forwarded several possible reasons for this. Wayne 
C. McWilliams argues that Soejima’s somewhat deceitful (if not cleverly executed) diplomacy may 
have blinded them to the pitfalls that lay behind Yanagiwara’s questions. Furthermore, the Chinese 
were preoccupied with dispute over Soejima’s imperial audience. See Wayne C. McWilliams, ‘East 
Meets East: The Soejima Mission to China, 1873’, Monumenta Nipponica (vol. 30, no. 3, Autumn 
1975, pp. 237-275), pp. 268-269. Marlene J. Mayo claims that while the Chinese could well have 
been aware of the potential dangers Japan’s claims presented to the East Asian international order in 
1873, there were more pressing domestic and international concerns that rendered it unable to deal 
with it adequately. See Mayo, ‘The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign Policy’, Journal 
o f Asian Studies (vol. 31, no. 4, August 1972, pp. 793-819), p. 810
106 This took place on 3 1st October.
107 Gaimushö chösabu, ‘Nisshin ryökokukan gokan jökan’, Dai nippon gaikö monjo (vol. 7). (Tokyo: 
Nihon kokusai kyökai, 1939), p. 317
108 Note, however, that Boissonade himself also advocated the Japanese government to leave the political 
institutions of the Ryükyü Kingdom intact, while controlling Ryükyü diplomatic prerogatives. This, 
Oguma Eiji, argues, should be seen as a form of ‘indirect rule’ based on European colonial 
experiences. See Oguma Eiji, ‘Nihonjin’ no kyökai, p. 25
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necessarily mean that they had renounced their claims to Ryükyü, because within the 
normative framework of the tribute system, a state/polity could ‘belong’ to another on 
the basis of tributary hierarchies, regardless of whether or not effective governance had 
been established.109
Sino-Japanese tensions regarding the Ryükyü Kingdom came increasingly to the 
forefront following the Meiji government’s moves to increase its claims over the 
kingdom by transferring the administration of the area to the Home Ministry 
naimusho). As mentioned above, the kingdom continued sending tributary missions, 
embarrassing the Japanese government.110 It was in this context that Ökubo Toshimichi 
submitted a memorial calling for further Japanese control of the area. Noting that the 
Ryükyü elite had still not
...escaped the jurisdiction of the Qing. This is indeed ambiguous, confused, and 
harms our reputation. However, these [i.e. tributary relations] are customs dating 
back several hundreds of years, and they [the Ryükyüans] cling on to them 
obstinately...At a time when all countries stand alongside each other equally (7711! 
y ^ 0 ) , i f  the situation is left as it is, difficulties could arise in the future.* 111
The Japanese moved swiftly to put an end to the island kingdom’s ambiguous 
position. In 1875, a Home Ministry administrator, Matsuda Michiyuki was
sent to the kingdom, and wasted no time in issuing a senes of orders (14ln July).112 
While some orders were directed at reforming the domestic institutions of the kingdom, 
most relevant for our discussion here are the orders that compelled King Shö Tai to 
terminate Ryükyü’s ties with China. These orders consisted of three parts. First, the 
kingdom was to terminate its sending of tributary missions to China altogether; second, 
the king was forbidden to seek investiture from China; lastly, the trading mission the 
kingdom maintained in Fuzhou was to be abolished. Of particular importance is the fact 
that these orders were justified in terms of international law,113 which is indicative of two 
points. First, it suggests that the Japanese leadership had already begun to consider
109 Kobayashi Takao, ‘Taiwan jiken to ryükyü shobun (2): rujandoru no yakuwari saikö’, Seiji keizai 
shigaku (no. 341, November 1994, pp. 13-32), p. 28 and Motegi Toshio, ‘Chüka sekai no “kindai” 
teki saihen to nippon’, p. 68
110 On one occasion, Tei Einei (Nagayasu), acting Japanese Minister in China, demanded to meet and 
chastise the Ryükyü representatives, but was rebuffed by the Chinese.
111 Cited in Öyama Azusa, ‘Ryükyü kizoku to nisshin fungi’, Seikei ronsö (vol. 38, no. 1-2, May 1970, 
pp. 76-126), p. 83
112 See Inoue Kaoru kö denki hensan kai (eds) Segai inoue kö den (vol. 3). (Tokyo: Naigai shoseki, 
1934), pp. 398-399, for a full description of the demands.
113 ‘Ryükyü han ni tsütatsu seraretaru shokajö ni kanshi setsumei narabini migi shokajö sumiyaka ni 
junpö seraru beki mune yöbö no ken’, Dai nippon gaikö monjo (vol. 8). (Tokyo: Nippon kokusai 
kyökai, 1939), p. 328
DEMONSTjRAUNG ‘QVIUSED’ IDENTITY 269
international law to have some moral legitimacy that could induce some form of 
compliance from other states. However, the Ryükyü king was unlikely to see the law as 
morally binding, and the abolition of tributary relations could plausibly be ordered (and 
carried out) without invoking international law. This leads to a second, more salient 
point: the use of international law was also intended to highlight Japan’s ‘civilised’ 
identity. Ryükyü adherence to international law would be limited while its rulers 
continued to regard the law as illegitimate. However, as far as securing the Ryükyü 
Kingdom’s compliance with Matsuda’s orders was concerned, Ryükyüan disregard for 
international law did not necessary matter, as there were other means (such as military 
options) that could bring this about. Rather, the references to international law were 
intended to demonstrate Japan’s acceptance of international law, and facilitate its 
recognition by the member states of European International Society as a candidate 
worthy of joining the Society as a ‘civilised’ member.
These series of actions by Japan, however, were viewed by the Chinese with 
alarm. The Chinese were already beginning to see Japan as a threat following the 
latter’s expedition to Taiwan,114 and Japanese designs towards the Ryükyü Kingdom 
seemed to confirm their fears.115 The Ryükyü elites also sent a secret mission to the 
Qing in 1877, begging for their help. The Chinese Minister to Japan, He Ruzhang (fJ&P 
J$), who received a petition from the Ryükyüans,116 reported in a letter to Li Hongzhang:
The Japanese have neither mercy nor reason. They are like crazy dogs, bullying 
others as they please. We could rely on the Sino-Japanese peace; not only will 
they prevent Liuqiu [Ryükyü] from sending tribute, they will certainly try to 
eliminate the kingdom. Furthermore, they will attempt to cause trouble in Korea,
114 See, for instance, Wen Xiang and Li Hongzhang’s memorials submitted in 1874 and collected in Ssu- 
Yü Teng and John King Fairbank, China ’s Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 90, 119, respectively.
115 This sentiment was quite possibly strengthened by Ryükyüan resistance towards the Japanese 
government’s policies. They pleaded with the Japanese authorities to allow them to maintain 
relations with both their ‘mother and father countries’. The fact that their pleas were couched in 
terms of filial piety is also characteristic of the East Asian international order, where ‘the moral 
purpose of the state, and indeed of all political and social communities from family, tribe to empire’ 
was, in Confucian fashion, ‘to promote social and cosmic order and harmony.’ Yongjin Zhang, 
‘System, empire and state in Chinese international relations’, Review o f International Studies (vol. 27, 
special issue, 2001, pp. 43-63), p. 56. A useful summary of the contents of Ryükyüan pleas can be 
found in Nish, Ian (ed) British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign 
Office Confidential Print (series E, vol. 2: Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, and North-East Asia, 1875- 
1888). (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1989), pp. 63-64; Öyama Azusa, 
‘Ryükyü kizoku to nisshin fungi’, Seikei ronsö (vol. 38, no. 1-2, May 1970, pp. 76-126). See also He 
Ruzhang’s letter, ‘He Zie lai han’ in Li Hongzhang, Li Hongzhang quanji (vol. 1): penglisao hangao, 
jiaotang hangao, haijun hangao, yishu hangao. (Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 1998), pp. 
4368-4370
116 These meetings between the Chinese Minister and the Ryükyüan officials took place in February 
1878.
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and if they do not do so, they will ask us unreasonable demands. If we listen to 
them, we will lose our dignity; if we refuse them, war will be unavoidable.117
Li Hongzhang agreed, stating that the Japanese were being ‘unreasonable in the extreme 
( H I B ® ’. However, he was pessimistic about the prospects of Japan reversing its 
policy. Ryükyü was too far away for China to realistically protect it; even if China 
‘relied on our brushes and tongues to reason with Japan, the recent actions by the 
Japanese are, as you [He Ruzhang] mentioned, bullying others freely and are like mad 
dogs. I fear that they will not listen to us.’118
Li Hongzhang’s fears proved correct. Despite Chinese protests, the Japanese were 
in no mood to renounce their claims to the islands. He Ruzhang’s protests to the 
Japanese in 1878 were rebuffed by the Japanese foreign minister Terashima Munenori, 
who told He that Chinese investiture was no different from papal recognition of 
European kings; it was merely ceremonial, and did not constitute effective governance 
of the area.119 Terashima Munenori's denial of the significance of Ryükyü-Qing 
tributary relations and Chinese investiture was a rejection of the tribute system’s 
‘systemic norms of procedural justice’, in which ritualistic tributary missions signified a 
states ‘vassal’ status vis-a-vis the Chinese empire. Rather, Terashima was now basing 
Japan’s claim over the islands on effective governance over the islands -  a claim based 
on the stipulations of international law, a hallmark of European International Society 
and its systemic norm of legislative justice.
Japanese resolve was strengthened further by Ryükyü attempts to appeal to the 
legations of the United States, France, and the Netherlands, with whom they had earlier 
entered treaty relations.120 The Meiji government discovered the plot,121 and promptly
117 Cited in Li Hongzhang, ‘He Zie lai han’ in Li Hongzhang quanji (vol. 7): penglisao hangao, jiaotang 
hangao, haijun hangao, yishu hangao. (Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 1998), p. 4369
118 ‘Fu He Zie’, in ibid., p. 4370
119 Öyama Azusa, ‘Ryükyü kizoku to nisshin fungi’, Seikei ronsö (vol. 38, no. 1-2, May 1970, pp. 76- 
126), p. 98. It is also worth noting that the Chinese Minister He Ruzhang wrote a strongly-worded 
letter accusing the Japanese of reneging on the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty of 1871 and 
‘suppressing small countries’, greatly offending the Japanese side and causing a considerable cooling 
of relations between China and Japan. See Öyama Azusa, ‘Ryükyü kizoku to nisshin fungi’, Seikei 
ronsö (vol. 38, no. 1-2, May 1970, pp. 76-126), pp. 98-100 and Inoue Kaoru kö denki hensan kai 
(eds) Segai inoue kö den (vol. 3). (Tokyo: Naigai shoseki, 1934), pp. 401-402.
120 According to Hanabusa Nagamichi, the petitions thanked the powers for entering treaty relations with 
Ryükyü, and asked for their help in persuading the Japanese government to allow the Ryükyü 
Kingdom to follow their traditional customs. See Hanabusa Nagamichi, ‘Okinawa kizoku no 
enkaku’, Kokusaihö gaikö zasshi (vol. 54, no. 1-3, April 1955, pp. 3-40), p . 25
121 While Gabe Masao claims that this move was based on advice from He Ruzhang, Uemura Hideaki 
argues it is more likely that the idea to appeal to the Western diplomatic representatives originated 
from the Ryükyüans themselves. See Gabe Masao, ‘Nippon no kindaika to Okinawa’ in Öe Shinobu, 
Asada Kyöji, Mitani Ta’ichirö, Goto Ken’ichi, Kobayashi Hideo, Takasaki Söji, Wakabayashi
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ordered the Ryükyüan officials to close down their official residence and leave Tokyo. 
The Ryükyü request for the Western powers’ help proved to be an incident that hastened 
the abolition of the kingdom.122 The Meiji government decided they, could not afford to 
allow such independent initiatives by the Ryükyüans to undermine Japanese claims to 
the islands. On 11th March 1879, Matsuda Michiyuki was despatched to Ryükyü for the 
third time, this time with orders to abolish the kingdom. Sixteen days later, under the 
threat of military force, the Ryükyü king was forced to vacate his palace and reside in 
Tokyo. On 4th April, a brief edict announced that the Ryükyü ‘fief had been abolished 
and would henceforth be governed directly by the central government in Tokyo as 
Okinawa prefecture, thus ending the existence of an important member of the East 
Asian international order.
Analytical observations
In some senses, the abolition of the Ryükyü Kingdom and the subsequent Sino-Japanese 
dispute constituted an early clash between two different international systems. It is true 
that the Chinese elite were beginning to incorporate some institutional features from 
European International Society, as its invoking of international law around this period 
demonstrates. However, in their dealings with Asian states, the Chinese continued to 
operate predominantly within the social structures of the tribute system.'23 The Japanese 
elite, who were more interested in establishing Japan as a ‘civilised’ power within 
European International Society, refused to do so. Despite the still transitionary nature of 
its identity, it strove to apply the norms of the Society in its dealings with its Asian 
neighbours.
Although it is impossible for us to know how accurately they grasped this, it 
seems that some members of the Chinese elite were also beginning to appreciate this 
fact. When discussing the demise of the Ryükyü Kingdom, Li Hongzhang commented 
perceptively: ‘Japan is adopting many features from Western law, and is now ruling 
[Ryükyü] on Western legal lines...there are no rituals based on those between lord and
Masatake and Kawamura Minato (eds), Kindai Nippon to shokuminchi (vol. 1): shokuminchi teikoku 
nippon. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), p. 107, and Uemura Hideaki, ‘ “Hokkaido”, “Okinawa” no 
shokuminchika to sono kokusaihö no ronri’, p. 77
122 Uemura Hideaki, ‘ “Hokkaido”, “Okinawa” no shokuminchika to sono kokusaihö no ronri’, p. 77. Li 
Hongzhang also comes up with a similar analysis in his conversation with former U.S. president 
Ulysses S. Grant, whose good offices the Chinese attempted to use to resolve the Ryükyü issue. See 
Li Hongzhang, ‘Yu meiguo ge qian zongtong wutan jie lüe’, Li Hongzhang quanji (vol. 7): pengliao 
hangao, jiaotang hangao, haijun hangao, yishu hangao, p. 4405
123 Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order, p. 142
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vassal. Ryükyü is not permitted to send tribute to either China nor Japan.’ 124 
Furthermore, he suggested separately that China should invoke international law to 
criticise Japan’s actions towards Ryükyü. Li reasoned that this was because ‘Japan 
follows the Western states’ -  a statement indicative of his recognition that Japan, as the 
state that was actively striving for membership in European International Society, was 
far more likely to be receptive to the normative constraints of the Society than those of 
the Tributary System.125
It was because of these different identities of China and Japan that the abolition of 
the Ryükyü Kingdom had significant ramifications on Sino-Japanese relations. As 
stated above, the Chinese still regarded the Ryükyü Kingdom as its tributary vassal, and 
the Toss’ of the island kingdom in 1879 was a substantial shock to many quarters of the 
Chinese elite.126 While the island kingdom itself was of little economic significance to 
the Qing, its political importance as a member of the East Asian international order was 
considerable. As Möri Toshihiko argues, tributary missions to China signified ‘the 
virtue of the Chinese emperor’ and served to strengthen China’s central position in the 
East Asian international order, as well as its domestic legitimacy.127 The relations 
between China and Japan were already tense following the dispute surrounding Japan’s 
expedition to Taiwan. The Ryükyü incident constituted a fundamental assault on the 
East Asian international order, as it stripped China of its vassals and threatened China’s 
legitimacy. In this sense, it paved the way for the eventual clash between China and 
Japan over their respective influence in the Korean Peninsula.
The clash of international systems: Sino-Japanese politics over Korea
As Japan increasingly sought to identify itself as a ‘civilised’ member of European 
International Society, its relations with Korea, which were conducted in terms of the 
tribute system, also came to the attention of its leaders. In the aftermath of the collapse 
of the shogunate, the Tsushima fiefdom, which was heavily dependent on trade with 
Korea, petitioned the new Meiji government to restart diplomatic relations with the
124 Li Hongzhang, ‘Lun riben fei liuqiu’, Li Hongzhang quanji (vol. 7): pengliao hangao, jiaotang 
hangao, haijun hangao, yishu hangao, p. 4390
125 Li Hongzhang, ‘Mi yi riben zheng liuqiu shi’, Li Hongzhang quanji (vol. 7): pengliao hangao, 
jiaotang hangao, haijun hangao, yishu hangao, p. 4367
126 See for instance Wang Tao, Taoyuan wenlu waibian, pp. 127-130; Xue Fucheng, Chouyang chuyi., 
pp. 66-70. Cf. Frederick Foo Chien, The Opening o f Korea: A Study o f Chinese Diplomacy 1876- 
1885. (Hamden: The Shoe String Press, 1967), p. 132
127 Möri Toshihiko, Taiwan shuppei, p. 182
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kingdom.128 The Meiji government’s initial response was a cautious one, perhaps due to 
the Tsushima fiefs warning that ‘[traditionally the Korean dynasty has always been 
extremely stubborn’.129 For the time being, the Meiji leaders decided to utilise the 
institutions of the traditional international order to communicate with Korea, and in late 
1868 sent a message via a Tsushima official, informing the Koreans of the change in 
government and the Japanese emperor’s assumption of political power.
However, these Japanese initiatives were rebuffed by the Koreans. For a start, the 
Japanese had failed to use the seal issued to the Tsushima fiefdom by the Yi dynasty, 
which indicated a disregard for the ritual etiquette needed for Japanese-Korean 
interaction. Another bone of contention (at least in Korean eyes) was Japan’s affrontery 
in using the Chinese character ‘huang’ (Ik), for their emperor (written as köjö lk_h), 
which was reserved for use only by the Chinese emperor (huangdi Ü ^ ) .130 To the Yi 
dynasty, which continued to fully operate within the normative framework of the 
traditional East Asian international system, Japan’s actions constituted an assault on its 
international order. The ‘equating [of] the position of the Japanese ruler with that of the 
Chinese sovereign would mean an act of high treason’,131 and simply could not be 
tolerated. Furthermore, the Japanese use of this character implied that the Meiji 
emperor was superior to the Korean king; ‘it would mark the Korean monarch as the 
vassal or subject of the Japanese ruler’,132 and was another reason the Koreans rejected 
the Japanese letter.
Korea’s rebuff - which took the form of refusing to accept the letter and 
demanding the Japanese envoys leave Korea -  drew strong responses from the Japanese. 
It is difficult to ascertain whether Japanese reactions in the 1860s was a result of their 
increasing association with the social structures of European International Society or 
sentiments for imperial restoration, prominent among anti-Tokugawa samurai. Key- 
Hiuk Kim, for example, claims that Japan’s attempts to repudiate traditional Japanese-
128 Möri Toshihiko, Taiwan shuppei, p. 67; Ben Quincy Limb, Sei-Kan Ron: A Study in the Evolution o f 
Expansionism in Modern Japan, 1868-1873. (Ph.D. dissertation, St. John’s University, 1979), p. 77
129 Cited in Limb, Sei-Kan Ron, p. 79. Möri Toshihiko believes that this warning was intended to protect 
the vested interests the Tsushima fiefdom had in maintaining their monopoly over Japanese-Korean 
relations. The warning was included in a memorial prepared by Tsushima lord So Yoshisato (later 
Shigemasa) and Tsushima official Öshima Masatomo, and was intended to unsettle the Meiji 
leadership’s confidence in their ability to successfully conduct diplomacy with the Koreans, thus 
strengthening Tsushima’s role as mediator. See Möri Toshihiko, Taiwan shuppei, pp. 67-68.
130 Fujimura Michio, Nisshin sensö zengo no ajia seisaku. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995), p. 23; Duus, 
The Abacus and the Sword, pp. 30-31. The message to the Korean king can be found in Iwakura kö 
jikki (Tada Kömon, ed) (vol. 3). (Tokyo: Hara shobö, 1968), p. 16
131 Limb, Sei-Kan Ron, pp. 83-84
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Korean relations -  as seen in the use of linguistic terms which so offended the Koreans 
-  was connected to late-Tokugawa imperial restoration ideology. This line of thinking- 
asserted that Japanese-Korean relations ‘should no longer be conducted on the basis of 
the equality of the two countries; they should be “restored” to their “proper” form, 
which the loyalists believed existed in ancient times when Korea had been a “tributary” 
of Japan.’133 It is on this basis, Key-Hiuk Kim argues, that Japan sought new diplomatic 
relations with the Koreans.
By the latter half of the 1870s, however, Japan’s increasing exposure and 
engagement with the social structures of European International Society meant that the 
normative backdrop of its Korea policy would be less dominated by the ideology of 
imperial restoration, although the transition was by no means a linear, clear-cut one. By 
this time, ‘Japanese policy towards Korea...was inspired by a chauvinistic desire for 
aggrandizement abroad and growing zeal to enhance Japan’s prestige by emulating the 
West in international diplomacy.’134 Their objectives vis-ä-vis Korea had expanded from 
mere ‘punishment of insults’ to two other ones: the introduction of political reforms into 
Korea, and the severing of Korea’s tributary relations with China. There appear to be at 
least two motivations for this policy. Firstly, as Japan increasingly sought to be 
accepted as a member of ‘civilised’ European International Society, the necessity to 
demonstrate Japan’s ‘civilised’ status became greater. A ‘civilised’ state needed 
diplomatic relations established on the basis of treaties. As Alexis Dudden Eastwood 
argues:
...the Korean court’s rebuff [of Japan’s attempts to enter treaty relations based on 
the norms of European International Society] raised the question of how the Meiji 
regime would define its Korean policy. As this question arose during discussions 
of how to create a wholly new foreign policy, the drafters of Japan’s Korean 
relations...wrote and articulated policies towards Korea that were fluent with the 
policies they created to engage in Japan with the international arena.135
Secondly, there were geostrategic considerations. Although the European powers 
themselves on the whole not particularly interested in colonising the Korean peninsula,
132 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 31
133 Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order, p. 115. Tabohashi Kiyoshi also asserts that 
earlier calls for Japan to establish -  by force if necessary -  its dominance over Korea ‘have some 
connections with restorationist thought and were often abstract ideas...it would be mistaken to claim 
such debates as an early manifestation of Japan’s near-modem Asian Continental policy.’ Tabohashi 
Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1). Keijö (Seoul): Chosen sötokufu chüsüin, 1940), p. 
298
134 Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order, p. 254
135 Eastwood, International Terms, p. 39
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the Japanese saw matters differently. Their experience of ‘gunboat’ diplomacy had 
amply demonstrated the violent, ‘civilising’ mode of interaction which existed within 
the Society. Regardless of actual intentions, the Meiji leaders were sensitive to the 
possibility of a Western power (particularly Russia) keen to introduce the trappings of 
civilisation establishing and a foothold in Korea,136 which was described by a German 
military adviser to Japan as ‘a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan’.137 In order to 
prevent such an occurrence, it was important to get the Koreans to enter into ‘modem’ 
treaty relations and begin following the path to ‘civilisation’. It was also necessary to 
demonstrate that the Korean kingdom had begun to repudiate ‘semi-civilised’ ways by 
ridding itself of any practices associated with the East Asian international order. This 
meant that Korea would have to renounce its ‘tributary’ status vis-ä-vis China and be 
treated as an ‘independent’ entity. This also overlapped with Japan’s need to 
‘[designate] Korea an “independent nation” because the Meiji regime was committed to 
writing all its foreign relations according to international law and only independent 
entities could contract legally.’138 Furthermore, this would theoretically provide Korea 
with sovereign independence, and provide legal means by which to it could ‘protect’ 
itself from any potential attempts by China to obstruct the process of dismantling the 
normative order of the Tributary System.
Japan ’s ‘Broken Door’policy towards Korea
For the reasons discussed above, the Japanese remained determined to dismantle the 
vestiges of the Tributary System, despite continuous Korean rejections. A turning point 
in Japan’s policy vis-ä-vis Korea took place in the 1870s, when the Meiji leaders 
unilaterally abolished the Tsushima fiefdom’s role in Japanese-Korean relations. This 
action coincided with Japan’s policy of pursuing legitimate membership of European 
International Society, as well as an increased capacity for dealing directly with the Yi 
dynasty. It appears that ‘the Meiji government realized that Tsushima’s retention of any 
role whatever was not only impracticable but incompatible with the new form of
136 See Martina Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys: The Opening o f Korea, 1875- 
1885. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), p. 110 and Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 
p. 49.
137 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 49; Tsuda Takako, ‘Sen happyaku hachijü nendai ni okeru 
nippon seifu no higashi ajia seisaku tenkai to rekkyö’
138 Eastwood, International Terms: Japan ’s Engagement in Colonial Control, p. 49
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relations Japan wished to establish with Korea.’ 139 Japan’s foreign policy was 
henceforth to be conducted in a ‘civilised’ manner as dictated by the procedural norms 
of European International Society. To this end, the Japanese government now 
centralised diplomatic prerogatives in their own hands, and dispatched Foreign Ministry 
officials to Korea. Furthermore, they abolished the Tsushima trading house, 
establishing a Japanese legation in its place.140 As Alexis Dudden Eastwood states: ‘A 
trade house which had existed for centuries far removed from the islands now being 
articulated as “Great Japan” was newly claimed as a manifestation of “sovereignty 
rights.’” 141 The ‘waegwan had become a foothold for the new “civilized” set of 
institutions through which the Japanese intended to conduct their formal relations with 
Korea.’142
But Japan’s continued attempts to enter more ‘modem’ diplomatic relations with 
Korea were no more successful.143 Within Korea, the retirement of the conservative 
regent (the Taewon’gun and the rule of King Kojong (BUtk) was beginning to
result in a gradual shift in Korean foreign policy. The Koreans were aware of China and 
Japan’s interactions with European International Society through reports from their 
envoys in China,144 and had received warnings of a possible Japanese invasion by the 
Zongli yamen following Japan’s expedition to Taiwan in 1874. However, despite King 
Kojong’s attempts to reopen talks with Japan, progress was hampered by continuous
139 Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order, p. 165. See also Conroy, The Japanese Seizure 
o f Korea, pp. 109-110.
140 Interestingly in 1874, Ökubo Toshimichi and Ökuma Shigenobu utilised the language of European 
International Society to explain the Waegwan's new role in Japanese diplomacy. The Trading house, 
now renamed the Söryökan, ‘was “associated with our (Japan’s) sovereignty rights (kokken). It 
occupies land for one office, it protects (hogo) the officials and secures trade routes.’” See Eastwood, 
International Terms, p. 41
141 ibid.
142 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 37. Also see Kim, The Last Phase o f  the East Asian World 
Order, p. 166.
143 Continuous Korean rebuffs famously gave pretext to the famous debate of invading Korea 
(seikanron) in 1873, which resulted in a split within the Meiji leadership. However, it is important to 
keep in mind that while the political repercussions within the leadership were significant, the 
seikanron debate of 1873 ‘was neither a defining crisis nor a commitment to annexation’, and Japan’s 
Korean policy did not change per se. See Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 43. The motives 
behind Saigö Takamori, the chief proponent of the seikanron in 1873 has been subject to much 
debate, indicating a substantial difference of opinion among historians. While this is not the place to 
discuss the politics surrounding the 1873 political crisis of the seikanron debate, a summary of the 
crisis can be found, among others, in Mayo, ‘The Korean Crisis of 1873 and Early Meiji Foreign 
Policy’, Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order, Limb, Sei-Kan Rom, Möri Toshihiko, 
Taiwan shuppev, and Duus, The Abacus and the Sword.
144 Martina Deuchler reports that the Korean king ‘was startled to learn that the Japanese envoy was 
received in audience by the Chinese emperor on the same footing as his Western colleagues and that 
the Japanese were even opening a legation in the Chinese capital.’ See Deuchler, Confucian 
Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, pp. 14-15.
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wrangling over diplomatic protocol and conservative opposition within the Korean 
government.145
The diplomatic standstill tested the Meiji leadership’s patience to the limit. In 
September 1875, the Japanese warship Un'yö (HfH) entered Korean waters near the 
strategic location of Kanghwa island, ostensibly to conduct surveys, but in fact almost 
certainly to provoke the Koreans.146 As expected, the Koreans attacked the ship with 
cannon.147 The Japanese seized this opportunity to take a more assertive stance towards 
Korea: since attempts to open Korea’s door to European International Society had 
failed, the Japanese would now attempt to break the door open by imposing new 
diplomatic relations based on treaties, a hallmark of the Society. The Japanese envoys, 
Kuroda Kiyotaka and Inoue Kaoru arrived in Korea on late January 1876, and used this 
opportunity to impress upon the Koreans Japan’s ‘civilised’ identity. Like the 1873 
Soejima mission to China, they arrived in warships. This point was not lost on a 
Japanese newspaper, the Chöya shinbun, which noted that this had some resemblance to 
the Perry expedition of 1853.148
While the analogy with Perry should not be stretched too far, the Japanese envoys 
also assumed a ‘civilised’ power’s role in introducing an ‘uncivilised’ state into 
European International Society. Inoue told the Koreans that a treaty with Japan ‘treats 
your country as independent as well. It relies on the precedent of customary exchange
145 The differences between the Koreans and the Japanese included issues such as Western clothing, use 
of Chinese characters in diplomatic correspondence and so on. Although a detailed discussion of 
Korean domestic policy of this time is beyond the scope of this study, a concise account is given in 
Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, pp. 15-23 and Chien, The Opening o f Korea, 
pp. 22-23.
146 The Japanese were well aware of the possibility of being fired upon, and it is significant that the ship 
‘had been ordered to sea on its survey mission several days after Moriyama Shigeru, who had been 
carrying on negotiations with the Koreans at Pusan since early 1875, was ordered to break them off 
and come home.’ Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 44. Kim argues that the incident was ‘part of 
a scheme by the Ökubo faction to create a situation to be used to its own political advantage at home 
and to diplomatic advantage in Korea’ (Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order, p. 232). 
The island lies off the coast close to Seoul, and was seen as a gateway to the Korean capital. 
Moreover, it was used by Korean kings as a refuge at times of national crises.
147 It is interesting to note that in 1876, officials at the zongli yamen responded to Japanese claims that 
their ship had been fired upon by the Koreans by stating: ‘If you look at the Wanguo gongfa (the 
Chinese translation of Wheaton’s Elements o f International Law), shores within 10 li are classified as 
territorial waters...you should not have carried out surveys [so close to Korea’s shores], that is why 
the Koreans fired upon you.’ To this, the Japanese envoy Mori Arinori merely responded that since 
Korea had not entered treaty relations, it was beyond the pale of international law. See Li 
Hongzhang, ‘Riben shichen sen youli shushi zheng yongning laishu wutan jieltle’, Li Hongzhang 
quanji (vol. If.pengliao hangao, jiaotang hangao, haijun hangao, yishu hangao, pp. 4228-4229
148 Duus, The Abacus and the, p. 47
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among nations and is the just way of the world (Tcifl/ tenchi no ködö).,XA9 To the 
Korean envoys who then asked ‘what a treaty was’, Kuroda answered that entering a 
‘treaty [relation with Japan] means opening up your ports and engaging in trade with 
us.’150 The Korean envoy pressed further that this had been done for the past 300 years 
without a treaty, and Kuroda replied: ‘Nowadays, there are no countries in the world that 
do not enter treaty relations if they wish to trade. We [Japan] have signed treaties with 
many countries and are beginning to engage in trade.’151 The arena of diplomatic 
negotiation was thus used as a stage to demonstrate Japan’s new ‘civilised’ status. 
Kuroda and Inoue’s continuous references to the norms of the Society in their talks with 
the Koreans ‘offer[ed] an indication that the Meiji diplomats had located a new way to 
order their world which allowed them to define what they were doing as a departure 
from past practices.’152
The talks resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Kanghwa of 27th February 1876. 
‘It was’, Key-Hiuk Kim argues, ‘Western in concept and form, based essentially on the 
principle of the equal sovereignty of all states.’153 Indeed, article 1 stipulated ‘Korea is 
an independent state and has equal rights with Japan; in future friendly relations both 
sides shall treat each other as equals (ff]!¥[II S 0 PitJcM
The treaty thus fundamentally challenged 
the hierarchical principle of organising sovereignty in the East Asian international 
order.155 However, the Treaty also imposed extraterritorial jurisdiction (article 10) 
which was ‘similar in nature to the provisions of the “unequal” treaties which the 
Western powers had extracted from Japan only a dozen or more years before.’156 The 
Koreans did not necessarily see this as a problem, as Japanese had traditionally been 
tried by their own people under the tribute system. However, under the social structures
149 Gaimushö chösabu Dai Nippon gaikö monjo (vol. 9). (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai kyökai, 1940), p. 89. 
Also see Eastwood, International Terms, p. 48 and Inoue Kaoru kö denki hensankai (ed), Segai inoue 
kö den (vol. 2). (Tokyo: Naigai shoseki, 1933), pp. 705-706.
150 Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1), p. 464
151 ibid., p. 464. Also see Gaimushö shösabu, Dai Nippon gaikö monjo (vol. 9). (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai 
kyökai, 1940), p. 90
152 Eastwood, International Terms, p. 48
153 Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order, p. 253
154 The full text of the treaty is available in Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1), 
pp. 504-507 and Gaimushö chösabu, Dai Nippon gaikö monjo (vol. 9), pp. 114-119.
155 T. C. Lin, ‘Li Hung-Chang: His Korea Policies, 1870-1885’, The Chinese Social and Political 
Science Review (vol. 19, 1935-36, pp. 202-233), p. 217
156 C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics o f Imperialism 1876-1910. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967), p. 17. Details of the talks between the Korean envoys and the
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of the Society, ‘these obligations took on...the ominous characteristics of the 
stipulations embodied in the “unequal treaties.’” 157 The Japanese, for their part, were 
fully aware of the symbolic meanings behind such unequal treaties. Here, we can 
observe again the use of Japan’s Asian neighbours as the ‘uncivilised other’ in order to 
demarcate Japan and enhance its ‘civilised’ qualities. In Key-Hiuk Kim’s words, 
‘[although it...was making little headway in its efforts to revise unequal treaties with 
Western powers, Japan succeeded in imposing upon Korea an “unequal” treaty.. ..This 
meant that Japan established the same privileged position in Korea as that held by the 
Western treaty powers in China and Japan’.158
Chinese reactions: early Chinese policies to protect the Tributary System in Korea
While committed to opening Korea, the Meiji leadership nevertheless proceeded to do 
so with caution. In particular, they were concerned with how the Chinese would react to 
direct Japanese action on the Korean Peninsula. While the Japanese could not accept 
China’s claim to suzerainty over Korea, they knew of the close relationship enjoyed 
between the two states, and needed to ensure that the Qing would not intervene.159
To this end, Mori Arinori was despatched to China to explain Japan’s intentions to 
send a mission to seek redress for the incident at Kanghwa Island and to probe the 
Qing’s intentions. In his negotiations with the zongli yamen ministers, Mori 
immediately demanded to know the precise nature of the tributary relations between 
Korea and China. The zongli yamen ministers sent a reply to Mori explaining: ‘Korea 
has always protected itself. China leaves Korea to govern itself, and we do not let 
Chinese interfere in their affairs
k m ß f f i y  However, the Chinese also warned that ‘ in their dealings with Korea, 
they could not but worry for Korea’s security, even though it has never interfered in its 
internal politics ( 't1 They also
reminded Japan that Article one in the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1871 (ratified in 1873)
Japanese envoys can be found in Inoue Kaoru ko denki hensankai (ed), Segai inoue ko den (vol. 2), 
pp. 704-712 and Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1), pp. 433-515.
157 Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, p. 49
158 Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order, p. 253
159 Chien, The Opening o f Korea, pp. 25-27
160 Memorandum by the Zongli yamen to Mori Arinori, 14th January 1876, in Jiang Tingfii (ed), Jindai 
zhongguo waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao (vol. 2). (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1978), p. 368
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had stipulated that both countries would not infringe on each other’s territory.16' Mori 
flatly rejected these claims. He replied:
According to what Prince Gong said, ‘although Korea is a tributary state o f China, 
its land does not belong to China and we have never interfered with its internal 
affairs. And therefore in Korea’s relations with other countries, we listen to their 
wishes and do not force them to do things against their will.’ From this, it seems 
that Korea is an independent state, and your claims to Korea as a vassal state are 
nothing but empty words.162
In stating that Korea was an independent state, Mori was of course referring to an 
independent sovereign state as defined by the terms of European International Society. 
According to this logic, China would legally have no right to interfere with Korean 
internal affairs; this, in turn, would mean that Japan could freely force open the 
kingdom’s doors without consulting the Chinese. ‘Since Korea has in fact the substance 
of an independent state and has autonomy in its internal and external affairs’, Mori 
consequently announced to the zongli yamen, ‘we [Japan] will deal with Korea as 
such. ’ 163
This, of course, was precisely what the Japanese proceeded to do (at least on 
paper) at the Treaty of Kanghwa. Although T. C. Lin argues that the inclusion of the 
‘independence’ clause of the Treaty was interpreted by the Chinese ‘as implying no 
departure from the long established situation or modification of Korea’s status as 
China’s vassal’ , 164 Japanese actions, closely following its earlier expedition to Taiwan, 
caused considerable concern among the Chinese. 165 The Treaty of Kanghwa
...represented a repudiation of the traditional East Asian concept of hierarchical 
interstate relations. It drove a major institutional wedge into the surviving
161 The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1871 was a reciprocal treaty which allowed for equal and limited 
extraterritoriality between both countries. There was no Most Favoured Nation clause. Article two 
proved to be the most contentious, as it stipulated that both sides would help each other in the event 
that they were ‘treated unfairly or without respect’: this was taken to imply a Sino-Japanese military 
alliance by the European powers. See, for example American Chage d’ Affaires Charles O. Shepard’s 
letter to Soejima Taneomi and Terashima Munenori in Gaimushö chösabu, Dai nippon gaikö monjo 
(vol. 5). (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai kyökai, 1939), pp. 246-247. The full text of the 1871 Sino-Japanese 
Treaty can be found in Gaimushö chösabu, Dai nippon gaikö monjo (vol. 4). (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai 
kyökai, 1938), pp. 203-210.
162 Memorandum by Mori Arinori to the Zongli yamen, 15th January 1876, in Jiang Tingfu (ed), Jindai 
zhongguo waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao (vol. 2), p. 369. Emphasis added.
163 Memorandum by Mori Arinori to the Zongli yamen, presumed date 14th February 1876, in ibid., p. 
373
164 T. C. Lin, ‘Li Hung-Chang: His Korea Policies’, p. 217
165 In fact, some quarters in the Chinese political elite were already expressing concern of a possible 
attack on Korea by Japan before the latter occupied Taiwan. Following his talks over Taiwan with 
Soejima Taneomi in 1873, Li Hongzhang was already expressing his fear of Japanese ambitions 
towards Korea. See Li Hongzhang, ‘Lun riben yu Taiwan chaoxian bilu jiaoshe’, Li Hongzhang 
quanji{\o\. 1): pengliao hangao, jiaotang hangao, haijun hangao, yishu hangao, p. 4087
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traditional world order in East Asia and challenged, if  it did not openly reject,
C hina’s suzerainty over the peninsular kingdom .166
The Chinese themselves had been attempting to change the Koreans’ foreign policy for 
some time.167 The Chinese recognised that any problems between Korea, the European 
powers and Japan could have grave implications. The Yi dynasty’s refusal to open its 
doors to the expanding European International Society could possibly bring reprisals 
against China: if China was assumed to have suzerainty over Korea by the Western 
powers, it could be held responsible for Korean conduct. On the other hand, even if 
Korea was recognised as an independent power by the members of the Society, under 
the stipulations of a tributary relationship Korea could legitimately ask China for help, 
possibly dragging her into an unnecessary war.168 If the Qing was to avoid these two 
rather unpalatable possibilities, it had two stark options to choose from: it could ‘assume 
the role of an active suzerain and direct the external policy of Korea’,169 or it could do 
nothing and risk losing its vassal state outright.
The Chinese chose the former approach, as was increasingly visible by 1879 
following the annexation of the Ryükyü Kingdom and growing concern over ‘the steady 
growth of Japanese influence in Korea’.170 One Chinese tactic was to strongly encourage 
the Koreans to enter treaty relations with the Western powers. It was hoped, as the 
zongli yamen memorial of 21st August 1879 stated, that once Korea had entered treaty 
relations, ‘if Japan and Korea began fighting in the future, [the other treaty states] could
166 Kim, The Last Phase o f the East Asian World Order, p. 253. Also see Deuchler, Confucian 
Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, p. 127. It should be noted, however, that this was not necessarily 
the case from the Korean point of view. As Tabohashi Kiyoshi states: ‘Japan, of course, interpreted 
“independent state” as a state with absolute sovereignty within its own territory. Korea, on the other 
hand, was a vassal of China and not strictly a sovereign state. However, the Qing recognised Korea’s 
domestic sovereignty and had declared so to other states. Therefore, it would be unfair to berate the 
Koreans for agreeing to the “independence” clause in the Treaty of Kanghwa.’ Tabohashi Kiyoshi, 
Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1), p. 482. A similar point is made in Eastwood, International 
Terms: Japan ’s Engagement in Colonial Control. (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1998), 
p. 49
167 Earlier Chinese attempts to persuade Korea to enter diplomatic relations with the European powers is 
documented by Mary C. Wright, ‘The Adaptability of Ch’ing Diplomacy: The Case of Korea’, 
Journal o f  Asian Studies (vol. 17, no. 3, May 1958, pp. 363-381)
168 Li Hongzhang aptly pointed out this dilemma in his memorial to the zongli yamen, where he wrote: 
‘Korea is poor and weak and it has no chance of holding its own against Japan in a war. If, based on 
the precedents set by the Ming dynasty, Korea asks us for help [to fight the Japanese], how would we 
respond to this?’ See Jiang Tingfu (ed), Jindai zhongguo waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao (vol. 2). (Taipei: 
Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1978), p. 370
169 Lin, ‘Li Hung-Chang: His Korea Policies’, p. 213
170 C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics o f Imperialism 1876-1910, p. 18. For 
the influence of the annexation of the Ryükyü Kingdom, see Chien, The Opening o f Korea, p. 63 and 
Lin, ‘Li Hung-Chang: His Korea Policies’, p. 219
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all stand up and admonish the wrong > Wi&JZLllb IU #^M piM ^).’171
It was a policy which resembled the tried and tested tactic of ‘playing barbarians off one 
another (yi yi zhi yi)d
The Chinese got the chance to apply this policy in 1880, when the United States 
attempted to enter treaty relations with Korea. Despite the fact that the American envoy 
Commodore Robert Wilson Shufeldt had received some help from the rather reluctant 
Japanese (who were fearful of damaging both Japanese-Korean and U.S.-Japanese 
relations should Shufeldt fail to obtain results from Korea he desired),172 his diplomatic 
overtures had been met by rejections from the Koreans. While careful not to take an 
overtly interventionist stance, Li Hongzhang stepped in to play a vital role in securing a 
treaty for Shufeldt. 173 He persuaded the Korean envoys that a treaty would be 
advantageous to protecting Korea, while his political aides Ma Jianzhong and Zheng 
Caoru helped write a draft treaty.174 One important clause from the Chinese
point of view was article 1, which stated that ‘Korea is a vassal state of China, but has 
always enjoyed autonomy in both its internal and external affairs.’175 While Shufeldt 
rejected this and the clause had to be dropped from the final draft of the treaty, he did 
agree to a ‘compromise that the Korean king would, after signing the treaty, send a 
communication to the president of the United States declaring Korea’s dependency on 
China.’176
171 This memorial was based on a memorial submitted by Ding Richang. Jiang Tingfu (ed), Jindai 
zhongguo waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao (vol. 2). (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1978), p. 375. Also 
see Li Hongzhang’s letter to Korean official Yi Yu-won, where he claims that Japan fears the West, 
and in order to protect itself from Japan, Korea should sign treaties with the Western powers, as if it 
were to ‘use poison to neutralise another poison, using an enemy to attack another enemy’. The letter 
is collected in Jiang Tingfu (ed), Jindai zhongguo waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao (vol. 2). (Taipei: Taiwan 
shangwu yinshuguan, 1978), pp. 376-378
172 However, it should be noted that in his careful study of Japanese policy towards Korea, Hilary 
Conroy states ‘the Japanese acted in good faith’ and sought to encourage Korea to establish treaty 
relations with the United States, and any reluctance on the Japanese part was not an attempt to keep 
other nations out of Korea. An additional factor for Japan’s lack of enthusiasm to act as a mediator 
could be because of its promise with Korea ‘not to transmit letters of other nations to her officials.’ 
Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea, p. 100
173 It should be noted that the Koreans themselves had requested Chinese help in establishing treaty 
relations with the United States. They contended that an imperial edict from China would facilitate 
the acceptance of treaty relations with a foreign power.
174 The eventual Korean-American Treaty that was signed on 7th May 1882 was a fairer one than the 
Treaty of Kanghwa. It allowed the Koreans to determine their customs rates. Furthermore, while 
allowing the U.S. extraterritoriality, it stipulated that the right ‘would be relinquished after the 
modification of the Korean legal system.’ Chien, The Opening o f Korea, p. 88
175 Cited in Lin, ‘Li Hung-Chang: His Korea Policies’, p. 223
176 Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, p. 119. This precedent was followed when 
Korea signed treaties with Britain and Germany in 1882.
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It can be said that the Chinese elites’ attempts to confirm Korea’s status as a 
Tributary state were ultimately unsuccessful, as they failed to give this relationship legal 
status within European International Society. On the other hand, from the point of 
checking Japan’s attempts to dismantle the last vestiges of the East Asian international 
order, the Chinese initiatives did work to some extent. The Japanese recognised this 
themselves, and were somewhat peeved that China had usurped the emerging ‘civilised’ 
power, Japan, and demonstrate their superior position over Korea by bringing about 
diplomatic reform in Korea. Furthermore, the Japanese ‘considered that such a 
declaration of dependency...would obviously strengthen China’s claims to Liuchiu 
[Ryükyü].’177
Sino-Japanese rivalry in Korea: the sending o f troops
But while the opening of Korea did serve the interests of the Chinese and the Japanese 
in some ways, it also brought about unexpected consequences. Many of the ruling 
Korean elite ‘interpreted the [Korean] government’s actions as a betrayal of the order 
and, more directly, attributed the plight of their daily lives to the government’s 
unorthodox policies’,178 and such simmering discontent became increasingly intertwined 
with power struggles within the Korean court. Foreigners also become targets for such 
dissent.
One of the first of such incidents was the Soldiers’ Mutiny of July 1882 (Im-o 
gunlan zE^IFil). The direct cause was resentment arising from the unequal treatment 
and pay between regular soldiers and the modernised, Japanese-trained corps. The 
Taewön ’gun, who sought to re-establish conservative dominance in the court, fanned the 
flames by exhorting the soldiers to attack the reformers and the Japanese. The riot 
quickly escalated into an attack on the dominant Min clan, the royal palace, and the 
Japanese legation. Japanese Minister Hanabusa Yoshimoto barely escaped with his life.
Both the Chinese and Japanese reacted swiftly. Back in Tokyo, the Japanese 
government decided to send Hanabusa back to Korea to demand an indemnity from the 
Korean government ‘within the boundaries permissible under international law.’ 179
177 Chien, The Opening of Korea, p.90
178 Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, p. 130. It is believed that the Taewön'gun 
was behind these anti-Western movements. C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the 
Politics o f Imperialism 1876-1910, p. 20
179 Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1). Keijö (Seoul): Chosen sötokufu chüsüin, 
1940), p. 788. Also see Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea: 1868-1910. (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), pp. 102-103. Hardliners such as Soejima Taneomi and
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While the Japanese did dispatch a military force to accompany Hanabusa’s mission, this 
was only to protect the mission and other Japanese nationals, and the Japanese foreign 
minister Inoue Kaoru ‘took pains to disavow any aggressive intent on the part of 
Japan’.180 The Chinese saw matters differently. They feared that the Japanese would 
take advantage of the situation to further their ambitions towards Korea.181 In his 
memorial to the viceroy of Zhili, Zhang Shusheng (Jlltfll),182 Xue Fucheng warned that 
Japanese ambitions on Korea were nothing new, and there was the possibility that Inoue, 
‘using crafty, poisonous tricks )’, would invade the capital and collaborate
with the Taewon ’gun and try either to force the Korean king to abdicate or take away the 
Taewön’gun to Tokyo.183 China, he argued, needed to send troops to Korea to prevent 
the Japanese from carrying out their plans. The zongli yamen was of a similar opinion, 
arguing that a more assertive policy stand towards Korea was urgently needed, both to 
strengthen Sino-Korean Tributary ties and ward off Japan.184 In the event, both countries 
sent their militaries to Korea, and took measures to ensure their power on the peninsula 
was preserved. The Chinese detained the Taewön’gun and hauled him off to Tianjin. 
The Japanese leaders, for their part, presented the Koreans with additional demands to 
redress the damage inflicted by the mutiny. The result was the Treaty of Chemulp’o and 
its Additional Convention, where Japan successfully extracted indemnities and further 
trading and travelling concessions from Korea.
While the 1882 mutiny may have been quelled, it certainly did not put an end to 
simmering Sino-Japanese rivalry over the Korean peninsula. The mutiny had resulted in 
a somewhat uneasy coexistence of Japan and China on the peninsula: while both sides 
were anxious to avoid a war,185 both continued their attempts to strengthen their power
Kuroda Kiyotaka demanded for more forceful measures against Korea, but were ultimately overruled 
by the moderates such as Inoue Kaoru, the foreign minister.
180 C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics o f Imperialism 1876-1910, p. 36
181 Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, p. 132
182 Li Hongzhang, who was the viceroy of Zhili, was at this time mourning the death of his mother, 
although he continued to exert influence over policy. Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no 
kenkyü (vol. 1), p. 861.
183 Letter from Xue Fucheng to Zhang Shusheng, 12th August 1882, collected in Jiang Tingfu (ed), Jindai 
zhongguo waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao (vol. 2), p. 390.
184 See Jiang Tingfu (ed), Jindai zhongguo waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao (vol. 2). (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu 
yinshuguan, 1978), pp. 387-388. Cf. C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics o f 
Imperialism 1876-1910, p. 36 and Motegi Toshio ‘Chüka sekai no “kindai” teki saihen to nippon’, 
pp. 78-79.
IS5 In the early 1880s, Qing officials such as Zhang Peilun argued for a much more assertive Korea 
policy by China. However, top officials such as Li Hongzhang were much more cautious of 
implementing an overly assertive policy that would arouse the suspicions of Japan and the Western 
powers. See Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1), pp. 861-867 for a detailed 
discussion of Qing Korean policy around this time.
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over the area. It was the Chinese who were initially more successful. In the wake of the 
1882 mutiny, they had asserted their tributary rights to justify their intervention, and had 
amply demonstrated their ability to do so.186 Now they moved to further consolidate this 
success, helped by the support of the dominant Min clan within the Korean ruling elite.
Under Chinese encouragement, some measures towards domestic ‘strengthening’ 
were undertaken,187 and loans were provided by China for this purpose. China 
recommended a foreign advisor (the German Paul George von Möllendorf), who took 
up his post in 1882. The Chinese also continued their policy of persuading Korea to 
enter relations with other members of European International Society with the hope of 
checking Japanese ambitions. During 1883, they played a part in Korea’s signing of 
treaties with the British and Germans, further facilitating the kingdom’s entry into 
European International Society. They also signed trade a trade agreement with Korea in 
late 1882, in which China’s superior status over the former was reasserted. 188 
Consequently, the agreement was framed as an ‘imperial favour’ to allow Koreans to 
trade,189 and the Chinese enjoyed decided advantages over their Korean counterparts, 
including extraterritoriality and freedom to travel in the interior.
The Meiji leadership continued their policy of keeping a low profile after the 1882 
mutiny. As itö Yukio notes, the 1880s were marked by some guardedness towards the 
Qing’s ‘self-strengthening’ and its subsequent military build-up,190 and the Meiji 
leadership was in no mood to challenge China at this particular stage.191 But this does
186 This was further demonstrated by the fact that it was the Chinese official Ma Jianzhong who had 
played an important role in mediating the Treaty of Chemulp’o. However, to Western diplomats, the 
logic which undergirded Sino-Japanese interactions was somewhat incomprehensible: American 
diplomats observed that ‘in the past, the Chinese had repeatedly disavowed any suzerain relations 
with Korea, yet...the Imperial edict indicting the Tai-wön-kun [sic],..showed that China had asserted 
“sovereignty over Korea”; and the Japanese, who should either have sought compensation from the 
Chinese Government or refuted China’s pretension to Korea, did neither.’ See Chien, The Opening o f  
Korea, p. 104.
187 For details of these reforms, see ibid., pp. 130-146and Deuchler,, pp. 149-171
188 This, of course, was criticised by the member states of European International Society -  but the 
loudest complaints were heard from the Japanese and American diplomats.
189 Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, pp. 140-143; Chien, The Opening o f Korea,
p. 121-122
190 See Itö Yukio, ‘Nisshin senzen no chügoku, chosen ninshiki no keisei to gaiköron’ and Peter Duus, 
The Abacus and the Sword, pp. 60-61. In 1882, we also see Iwakura Tomomi calling for a rise in 
Japan’s naval spending with reference caution to China’s military expansion. Iwakura notes China’s 
recent military build-up, as well as its ill-feelings towards Japan stemming from Sino-Japanese 
disputes over Taiwan and the Ryükyü Kingdom. See Iwakura Tomomi, ‘Tomomi sozei zöchö ni 
kansuru ikensho o naikaku ni teishutsu suru koto’, Iwakura kö jikki (Tada Kömon, ed) (vol. 3), p. 
940.
191 Iwakura’s views, which are said to closely reflect those of the Japanese foreign ministry, is available 
in Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1), pp. 902-903. For a detailed account 
of the interaction between the cautious line of the government and the reformist groups within Japan, 
see Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea, pp. 125-168.
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not mean that Japanese attempts to ‘civilise’ Korea had been abandoned. The Japanese 
leadership was not particularly thrilled to see Korea entering treaty relations and 
reforming under Chinese guidance. However, their Korea policy involved seeking ‘the 
further development of [Korea’s] opening process, not in Japanese unilateral action, nor 
in support of Korean progressives, but in collective pressure to be exerted by Japan and 
other treaty powers’. 192 In this sense, Korea’s exposure to ‘civilised’ European 
International Society could lead to greater pressures exerted upon her to undergo a 
‘civilisation’ process. As one of Korea’s closest neighbours, this could potentially allow 
Japan to play a role in this process, allowing itself to stand as an equal among the 
‘civilised’ powers. 193
Furthermore, during this period we see leading Japanese politicians and 
intellectuals engaged in more private attempts to introduce the Koreans to ‘civilisation 
and enlightenment’, which again demonstrates the degree to which the ‘civilising’ mode 
of interaction within European International Society had become internalised among the 
Japanese elite. The Meiji leaders exercised caution in assisting these private ventures, 194 
but Korean reformists found welcome supporters such as Fukuzawa Yukichi or his 
disciple Inoue Kakugorö (# _ h ^  who believed that ‘since Japan was the first state 
to recognise Korean independence, it had the responsibility to support it and its 
enlightenment and civilisation (bunmei kaika), and Qing interference under the auspices 
of its suzerain relationship, was a political crime. ’ 195
This in itself symbolises the rejection of the Sinocentric ideology of the East 
Asian international order, where the ‘Middle Kingdom’ had the duty to show 
‘compassion’, ‘encouragement’ and ‘nourish’ those at a lower social status. 196 Now that
192 ibid., p. 117
193 ibid., p. 135. This makes sense when we consider the historical contest of this time, where attempts 
to reform the unequal treaties were on the top political agenda of the Meiji leadership.
194 For instance, Kim Ok-kyun’s attempts to raise Japanese for Korean reforms were met with very little 
success, much to the disappointment of Kim and Japanese progressives. Inoue Kakugorö, a student 
of Fukuzawa Yukichi, complained that he ‘was disappointed to find that the Japanese government, 
having changed its policy frequently, had no definite policy on Korea.’ Cited in ibid., p. 139.
195 Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1), p. 908. Also see C. I. Eugene Kim and 
Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics o f Imperialism 1876-1910, pp. 42-43. The movements were 
also intertwined with Liberal movements (jiyü minken undo) in Japan to the extent that ‘if reform 
could be achieved on the continent (Korea, China) the reform of Japan would be “automatic.”’ 
(Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea, p. 133) However, Conroy is not of the opinion that such 
individuals used the movement to ‘civilise’ Korea and Korean reformists ‘as pawns in a Japanese 
nationalist scheme to gobble up Korea.’ (Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea, p. 129). It is worth 
noting that some of the leading ‘liberals’ such as Itagaki Taisuke were former proponents of 
seikanron. Although they had such intellectual heritage it was by no means clear that they would 
advocate overseas expansion in the 1880s.
196 Mancall, China at the Centre, p. 23
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both China and Korea were beginning to be seen as ‘backward’ nations by many 
Japanese around this time, the degree to which China was ‘civilised’ was debatable, and 
brought the legitimacy of Qing prerogatives over Korea into question. On this basis, it 
was concluded that it was not the ‘Middle Kingdom’ China that had the duty to 
‘nourish’ Korea; that task fell to ‘civilised’ Japan. In what may seem as a somewhat 
paternalistic attitude today, Fukuzawa Yukichi ‘noted the similarity between the 
opening of Japan by the United States and that of Korea by Japan. This gave Japan a 
rank of “first friendly nation” to Korea and a special concern for the progress of her 
civilisation. ’ 197 Japanese progressives thus took it upon themselves to ‘enlighten’ the 
Koreans and their country, and came into contact with a number of Korean reformists. 
Fukuzawa in particular seems to have exerted considerable influence. He was in contact 
with individuals such as Kim Ok-kyun Pak Yöng-hyo and Ö Yun-
jung (F^ftd3 ) , 198 and gave advice on implementing a number of cultural policies. 199 The 
Koreans also received ‘lessons in theoretical politics’ that all ‘civilised nations’ were 
sovereign, independent states. 200
Abortive Japanese attempts at ‘civilising’ Korea: the 1884 incident
However, Japanese progressives’ attempts to ‘civilise’ Korea were unsuccessful. While 
they were happy to extend their support to the Korean reformists, the latter often 
encountered strong resistance back home. As noted above, the powerful Min clan 
within the Korean court were more inclined to support the more gradual, Chinese-led 
reforms rather than the Japanese-influenced reformists. 201
197 Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea, p. 138
198 Ö Yun-jung had visited Japan in 1881 as a member of the secret Korean inspection tour (sinsa 
yuamdan) dispatched to leam about political and economic reform abroad. It was during this visit 
that he met Fukuzawa. Kim Ok-kyun had also visited Japan in summer 1881 and had been introduced 
to Fukuzawa by Ö Yun-jung. Both Kim and Pak Yöng-hyo visited Japan in 1882 as members of the 
apology mission sent to Japan following the 1882 mutiny.
199 One policy was the establishment of a newspaper, which was duly carried out by hiring Fukuzawa’s 
students.
200 See Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1), p. 909; Conroy, The Japanese 
Seizure o f  Korea, p. 138; and Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys, pp. 200-201.
201 See Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1), p. 900. Martina Deuchler takes a 
dimmer view of the Min clan’s motives: for the Min, she argues, ‘strengthening themselves was first; 
strengthening the country was second....The Min’s concept of modernization was narrow and self- 
serving; their concept of foreign relations was traditional.’ Deuchler, Confucian Gentlemen and 
Barbarian Envoys, pp. 204-205.
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The Korean reformists grew increasingly impatient of the slowness of reforms. 202 
They began to consider utilising force to implement their ideas; in this, Japanese 
sympathetic to their cause supported them to varying degrees. Kim Ok-kyun and Inoue 
Kakugorö began seeking help from the French legation in Japan to back the progressives 
in Korea. 203 Meanwhile in Korea, Inoue Kakugorö established contact with the Japanese 
Minister to Korea, Takezoe Shin’ichirö and his deputy Shimamura Hisashi
Initial contact began during Takezoe’s leave of absence, when the reformists 
managed to get a sympathetic audience from Shimamura. Takezoe himself was far 
more cautious -  he knew that his superior in Tokyo, Inoue Kaoru, was dubious of the 
reformists and was keen to avoid a conflict with China over Korea. 204
Takezoe, however, eventually became more willing to extend his help towards the 
coup d’etat plans by the reformists, asking Kim Ok-kyun ‘whether or not the 
Independence Party had the will to undertake domestic reforms with Japanese help. ’ 205 It 
appears that Takezoe had decided that he could safely support the reformists without 
provoking the Chinese. 206 China was embroiled in a war with France over Vietnam at 
the time, causing the withdrawal of some Chinese troops from Korea. This ‘apparent 
weakness of China made some anti-Chinese Koreans all the more restive and aggrieved 
at the continual Chinese domination’ .202 Furthermore, the key Qing officials in charge of 
foreign policy, Prince Gong and Li Hongzhang had either been dismissed and/or were
202 American diplomat Ensign George C. Foulk reported: Tn October one of the progressive party 
leaders told me that unless foreign intervention prevented, Corea would soon be irreclaimably in the 
hands of the Chinese, and with great bittemess went on to say that his small party had not only lost 
power to proceed further...but they were in actual danger of execution’. Cited in Conroy, The 
Japanese Seizure o f Korea, p. 146. This statement may be exaggerated, as execution of the 
progressives could potentially invite intervention from Japan, and was politically too risky. However, 
judging from the fact that the attempted coup happened two months later, it does give us a sense of 
the desperation felt by the reformists.
203 This took place in the context of increasing hostility between China and France over Annam 
(Vietnam). It appears that Kim Ok-kyun and Inoue Kakugorö believed that the French would be 
sympathetic to a cause that would weaken Chinese influence in the Korean peninsula.
204 Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea, p. 144
205 Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1), p. 928. This interview took place on 1st 
November 1884, and is the first instance where Takezoe indicated extending Japanese help to the 
progressives’ cause. Note that the progressives were also known as the ‘independence party (tongnip 
tang)' or the ‘party of civilisation (kaehwa tang)'.
206 There is some disagreement among historians about the extent to which Takezoe involved himself in 
the plot. Tabohashi Kiyoshi argues that the possibility of a clash between the progressives and the 
Min was low prior to Takezoe’s return. The plot only began moving after the Minister had returned 
to Korea from his leave of absence, thus implying that Takezoe had played a decisive role in inciting 
the coup d’etat. Hilary Conroy, on his part, points out to simmering discontent and plans of a revolt 
before Takezoe’s return, and reduces Takezoe’s responsibility to a certain extent.
207 C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics o f  Imperialism 1876-1910, p. 44
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under severe domestic attack by qingyi officials for ‘appeasing’ the French,208 and it is 
possible that Takezoe thought that the possibility of Chinese intervention was low.209
The coup, which took place on 4th December 1884, was a dismal failure. 
Although Japanese troops were supplied by Takezoe to assist the reformists, they were 
eventually overwhelmed by Chinese troops, and got involved in a brief skirmish in the 
royal palace. The Japanese legation in Seoul was burnt and Japanese residents in Seoul 
were killed by angry mobs. Like his predecessor Hanabusa, Takezoe was forced to flee 
the capital.
The incident highlighted the fundamentally contradictory nature of Japan’s policy 
towards Korea. On the one hand, the Meiji leaders were keen to avoid military conflict 
with China. However, on the other hand, Japanese policy vis-ä-vis Korea also reflected 
the ‘civilising’ mode of interaction within European International Society, and also 
included a policy of promoting Korean ‘independence’ and ‘civilisation’. As Tabohashi 
points out, this goal was completely at odds with the Qing’s policy of maintaining its 
tributary ties with Korea, and ‘[t]hose in charge of [this Japanese] policy needed 
considerable diplomatic and political skills’ to avoid a clash with China.210
Following the failure of the coup, the Japanese sought redress for the damage 
caused by the riots, ignoring their Minister’s interference in Korean domestic politics.2" 
Diplomacy was of course to be conducted in a ‘civilised’ manner as dictated by the 
norms of European International' Society. Korea was to be treated as an independent 
state in its own right, and the Japanese representative Inoue Kaoru was insistent on this 
point. The Japanese government was again demonstrating their determination to 
separate Korea from its suzerain, despite their continued determination not to get 
involved in a war with China. The Chinese, for their part, felt entitled to be involved in 
Korean-Japanese negotiations. For one thing, Korea was their tributary state; 
furthermore, Chinese troops had been involved in a gunfight with the Japanese. 
However, the Japanese remained firm. When a Chinese official joined the negotiating 
table, Inoue Kaoru
208 For a brief summary of the Sino-French war of 1884-1885, see Immanuel Hsii, The Rise o f Modern 
China, pp. 325-330.
209 C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics o f Imperialism 1876-1910, p. 48
210 Tabohashi Kiyoshi, Kindai nissen kankei no kenkyü (vol. 1), p. 907
211 The Meiji leaders were indeed aware of Takezoe’s involvement and did consider whether or not he 
should have been punished. However, Inoue Kaoru maintained that Takezoe ‘had not been well 
versed in the situation in Korea and had been taken advantage of by the Independence party, other 
Japanese, and his own subordinates who were in sympathy with the Independence party.’ Conroy, 
The Japanese Seizure o f Korea, pp. 158-159
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...stood up, shook hands, and said: ‘Today 1 am negotiating with a Korean official.
It is not convenient for you to be present today.’...These episodes...indicate rather 
neatly the Japanese government’s emphasis on conducting diplomacy in the 
Western-style modem way, on standing with progressive nations in a ‘wise, 
prudent, and liberal policy.’ Shaking hands with a fellow oriental, ...the emphasis 
on international law....built into the conferences the same air of firm yet patient 
teaching of backward people which had characterized the Japanese handling of 
Korea since 1876.212
However, diplomatic difficulties with China remained. The incident had brought 
about the clash of Chinese and Japanese troops, and had amply proved that the 
continued presence of the two armies could easily result in another conflict. Neither 
side wished war, and a diplomatic solution was sought. In March 1885, ltd Hirobumi 
was sent to China to thrash out an agreement with his Chinese counterpart, Li 
Hongzhang. After some bickering over the where the responsibility lay for the Sino- 
Japanese clash, both leaders agreed to the Convention of Tianjin, signed on 18th April 
1885. The convention consisted of three points. First, it stipulated that both Chinese 
and Japanese troops would be withdrawn from Korea. Second, a Korean peace-keeping 
force was to be established, and the training undertaken by foreigners apart from 
Chinese and Japanese. Third, it was agreed that if either China or Japan wished to send 
troops in the future, it was to give notice to the other party.
The negotiations were not only about raw power politics. Following Japan’s 
policy to carve itself a place among the ‘civilised’ members of European International 
Society, Japan again took this opportunity to demonstrate its ‘civilised’ identity to the 
Chinese. Itö spoke to Li Hongzhang in English, and peppered his arguments with 
references to international law. Avoiding the use of Chinese characters for explaining 
‘independence ( S i jishu/zizhuy or ‘sovereignty ( iH i  shuken/zhuquan)\ he precluded 
arguments over the meaning of the terms, which ‘allowed the terms of international law 
to retain their authority.’213 By using the language of a ‘civilised’ state whose language 
left less room for reinterpretation of the terms of international law, Itö enhanced the 
moral authority of his statements, as well Japan’s civilised identity and legitimacy in 
terms of the rules of European International Society; it was another display of ‘the 
Japanese government’s desire to transform how power was defined in Asia’214
212 ibid., pp. 160-161
“l3 Eastwood, International Terms, p. 51
214 ibid.
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Analytical observations: the road to the Sino-Japanese war 1894-1895
Korea was arguably China’s most important Tributary state, and was the closest to its 
strategic borders. It is perhaps no surprise that Japanese attempts to alter the status quo 
there encountered the stiffest resistance from the Qing. Although the Convention of 
Tianjin did succeed in bringing about a temporary peace, Sino-Japanese rivalry over 
Korea continued. Japan was not about to give up its quest to ‘civilise’ Korea and 
enhance its legitimacy within the Society, and China was equally unwilling to give up its 
last remaining Tributary state.
Following the signing of the Convention, Qing interference in Korea increased 
markedly. Yuan Shikai (^ tä f l) ,  the new Chinese ‘Resident’ of Korea, aggressively 
asserted Chinese control over the peninsula, demanding that all matters of Korean 
diplomacy be sent to China for approval.215 These actions significantly overstepped the 
traditional boundaries of authority China exercised under the Tributary System, and led 
to considerable resentment among the Koreans. Ironically, the more the Chinese ‘tried 
to maintain their traditional suzerain ties, the more they came closer to modem [Western] 
forms of domination.’216 Chinese economic penetration also increased. The Chinese 
gained a monopoly over laying telegraphic lines, and dominated the shipping lines 
between China and Korea.
The Japanese leadership continued their policy of avoiding conflict with China as 
much as possible. While there were a number of minor disputes between Korea and 
Japan,217 they continued to adopt a conciliatory tone. They refused to engage in forcible 
attempts to ‘civilise’ Korea and to reconstruct her as an ‘independent’ state for fear of 
provoking the Chinese unnecessarily. Their policy operated on
...the presumption that the chief ingredient of a realistic policy on Korea was 
caution, that ‘a good outcome’ could be achieved in a ‘conciliatory manner.’ In 
terms of goals they continued to define a good outcome as Korean reform and 
independence....There was no great hurry....Japanese policy makers had learned 
by 1885 that they had to take into consideration not only Korean 
intransigence.. .but Chinese intransigence as well.218
Yet the peace that had been achieved through the Convention of Tianjin was a 
delicate one. By this time, Japan’s quest for ‘civilised’ identity had posed such a
215 C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics o f  Imperialism 1876-1910, pp. 65-66; 
Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 58
216 Motegi Toshio ‘Chuka sekai no “kindai” teki saihen to nippon’, pp. 81-82,
217 See Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea, pp. 188-198 for details.
218 ibid., pp. 200-201
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challenge to the Qing that any further moves by either power in Korea could easily 
result in a war between the two. The Chinese, having already lost one tributary state and 
seen its territory invaded, were deeply suspicious of Japan. Japan remained equally 
apprehensive of the Chinese. China had re-established its power over the Korean 
peninsula, and was building an impressive military force through its own ‘self 
strengthening’. By the later half of the 1880s, ‘the army leadership regarded the Ch’ing 
[Qing] empire as the chief hypothetical enemy and assumed that any major external war 
would be fought there.’219 Loans were raised to expand the navy; the Meiji leadership 
even relied on public donations and an imperial donation to fund maritime defences.220 
Sino-Japanese relations now resembled that of a classic security dilemma.
In the end, there were several sparks that ignited the fire and disturbed the 
precarious peace between China and Japan. First, Japan’s Korean policy became 
tangled up in Japanese domestic political divisions over popular representation. The 
opposition frequently heaped criticism on the Meiji leaders’ foreign policy. Although 
the government did have the means to silence them by force (censorship and arrests), the 
opposition was a powerful force that could not be ignored lightly, and could have well 
prodded the government to consider a more aggressive policy. Second, continuous 
Chinese domination over Korea convinced the Japanese that a moderate policy was 
futile to ‘civilise’ Korea. By the early 1890s, coupled with their increasing confidence 
in their military power following increased military spending,221 ‘the question which had 
been answered affirmatively in the 1870’s posed itself again. Was caution really 
realistic?’222
This factor increased in importance when power struggles among the great powers 
of European International Society extended to East Asia. In the wake of increasing 
Anglo-Russian rivalry over Afghanistan, the British occupied the small island of 
Komun-do (or Port Hamilton) on 15lh April 1885, fearing that the Russians would 
attempt to use the Sino-Japanese standoff to extend its power over Korea. While the 
incident had less to do with Japan, Tsuda Takako argues that the incident prompted fear
219 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 61. See also Yamagata Aritomo’s warning of the Qing military 
build-up (which came as early as November 1880), ‘Shin rinpö heibe ryakuhyö’ in Yamagata Aritomo 
ikensho (Öyama Azusa, ed), pp. 91-99 and Itö Yukio, ‘Nisshin senzen no chügoku, chösen ninshiki 
no keisei to gaiköron’, p. 110-111.
220 Tsuda Takako, ‘Sen happyaku hachiju nendai ni okeru nippon seifu no higashi ajia seisaku tenkai to 
rekkyö’, pp. 28-29; Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, pp. 62-63
221 Itö Yukio, ‘Nisshin senzen no chügoku, chösen ninshiki no keisei to gaiköron’, p. 157; Duus, The 
Abacus and the Sword, pp. 63-64
222 Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea, p. 207
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among the Meiji leaders that any manifestations of European great power politics could 
easily disturb the peace within the region. 223 Furthermore, the construction of the 
Siberian Railway would mean that the Russians could potentially enjoy greater access to 
East Asia. Thus, ‘the pursuit of a good outcome was becoming a more urgent matter 
than it had been in 1885; something more than caution might be needed if Korea policy 
were to remain realistic.’ 224 It was argued that ‘China was likely to strengthen its 
military and naval position in Korea, perhaps even forming alliances with a Western 
power’,225 significantly weakening Japan’s own security as well. Japan needed to re­
establish its dominance over the Korean peninsula, even if it meant ousting China.
It was in this context that the 1894 Tonghak Rebellion took place in Korea. China 
asserted its rights as suzerain state, and following requests from the Korean government 
to help crush the rebellion, despatched troops. Japan immediately followed suit after 
receiving notification from the Chinese in accordance with the Convention of Tianjin. 
Foreign minister Mutsu Mumemitsu claimed that this was to preserve the power balance 
within the peninsula.226 The mistrust of the two powers was such that even when it 
transpired that the rebellion was already put down, both Japanese and Chinese troops 
continue to operate in the region. Hostilities finally began on 25tn July 1894. The Sino- 
Japanese war, the first full-scale military conflict between the two countries since the 
sixteenth century, had begun.
Conclusion
The rivalry and eventual military clash which took place between China and Japan in 
1894 was in many ways a culmination of the clash of international orders, although it is 
somewhat ironic that it took place between two states that had both, at some stage, been 
members of the same international order.
223 Tsuda Takako, ‘Sen happyaku hachijü nendai ni okeru nippon seifu no higashi ajia seisaku tenkai to 
rekkyö’, pp. 24-25. Conroy takes a more sanguine view, claiming that ‘this...affair did not unduly 
excite Japanese fear of Russia for it was more an expression of the Asia wide Anglo-Russian rivalry 
than a specific design on Korean territorial integrity’. See Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea: 
1868-1910, p. 210
224 Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea, p. 212. This point was perhaps most eloquently expressed 
by Yamagata Aritomo in 1890, who called for the need to secure the ‘cordon of sovereignty (shuken 
sen)' by establishing and defending the outer ‘cordon of interest (rieki sen)'. Yamagata states the 
dangers Russia will pose to Korea when the Trans-Siberian railway is completed. Russia, he argues, 
would threaten Korea, which is Japan’s ‘cordon of interest’ which protects Japan, particularly 
Tsushima. See Yamagata Aritomo, ‘Gaikö köryaku ron’ in Yamagata Aritomo ikensho (Öyama 
Azusa, ed), pp. 196-201.
2"5 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 64
226 See Mutsu Munemitsu, Kenkenroku, p. 7 and Conroy, The Japanese Seizure o f Korea, p. 241.
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This chapter has argued that Japan’s imperialism in the 1870s and 1880s can be 
interpreted as a component of Japan’s socialisation into European International Society 
and its effort to demonstrate its ‘civilised’ identity. Nineteenth-century European 
International Society was a Society for empires, and imperialism was an inherent 
component of the Society. As well as being a perpetrator of imperialism in Asia, Japan 
was, to a certain degree, also a victim of European imperialism. In order to escape the 
threat (whether perceived or real) of European imperialism, the Japanese had decided to 
engage with the social requirements of the Society, rather than reject it. In the process, 
they sought to appropriate ‘Western civilization in order to challenge Western 
imperialism and improve Japan’s status in the world’.227 Of course, this ‘status’ would 
have to be attained in accordance with the social standards of the Society, provided 
Japan sought membership of it. Prestige is a deeply social phenomenon which can only 
be conferred by a social actor’s peers. Therefore, if an actor wishes to attain prestige in 
her environment, she must be seen to be conforming to the norms of the particular social 
environment she inhabits.
Japan’s behaviour during the 1870s and 1880s was therefore aimed precisely at 
attaining prestige within the dualistic European International Society. For instance, 
Japan’s attempts to punish the Taiwanese ‘savages’ and even possibly establish a colony 
were aimed at attaining the prerogatives of a ‘civilised’ state, and in this sense this form 
of imperialism ‘did not result from Japan’s engaging Western civilization; rather, it 
constituted part of the process of Japan’s engaging it’.228 It will be recalled that the 
mode of action towards ‘uncivilised’ states in the Society allowed the European states to 
divide the sovereignty of ‘savage’ polities and rule such lands on behalf of the local 
rulers in order to introduce the trappings of ‘civilisation’. In European International 
Society of the late-nineteenth century, the hallmarks of ‘civilised’ great powers -  those 
states with ‘prestige’ -  had the right to ‘civilise’ the ‘savages’ and, concurrently, 
colonial possessions. It was precisely these features that Japan tried to attain, and early 
Meiji imperialism should be seen as an early attempt by the Japanese to do so. Of 
course, Japan could not just simply invade other countries as it pleased: it had to follow 
‘civilised’, legitimate procedural norms to do so. Hence, Japan’s military adventure was 
justified on the basis of the ‘civilising role’ the great powers of European International
227
228
Robert Eskildsen, ‘Of Civilization and Savages’, p. 393 
ibid., p. 403
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Society were allowed to play, and mirrored the dual social structures of the Society in 
the late-nineteenth century.
In similar fashion to the previous chapter, we see that China was between the 
‘adaptation’ and ‘strategic learning stage’. China had still not abandoned its identity as 
a member of the East Asian international order. This manifested itself in the 
continuation of Tributary relations with its neighbours. It is for this reason that Japanese 
actions aimed at dismantling the vestiges of the Tributary System were seen as such a 
threat. Not only did they imperil what the Chinese considered to be their territory; they 
also threatened the very basis upon which China’s international prestige and identity 
was based.
It is perhaps for this reason that Korea’s position within the expanding European 
International Society and the receding Tributary System ultimately had to be resolved by 
war. By 1894, the differences between the two states had become so great that it was 
probably extremely difficult to avoid a clash. This point was also made aptly by the 
Japanese foreign minister during the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, Mutsu 
Munemitsu, who wrote perceptively in his memoirs of the war, ‘[w]hatever form the 
quarrel [between China and Japan] might take...it was patently clear to all that the real 
cause of friction would be a collision between the new civilization of the West and the 
old civilisation of East Asia.’ 229 It of course goes without saying that some were 
uncomfortable with the fact that ‘civilising’ meant military expansion, demonstrating 
again that Japan’s socialisation was by no means a linear process. Okakura Tenshin 
summed up this sentiment aptly when he observed shortly after the end of the Russo- 
Japanese war:
In the days when Japan was engaging in peaceful arts, the Westerners used to think 
of it as an uncivilised country. Since Japan started massacring thousands of people 
in the battlefields of Manchuria, the Westerners have called it a civilised 
country...if we have to rely on the odious glories of war to become a civilised 
country, we should happily remain barbarians.230
However, in the context of the late-nineteenth century and Chinese and Japanese 
experiences, failure to adhere to the social standards exerted by the ‘civilised’ members 
of European International Society could bring yet more coercion. Despite Okakura’s 
reservations, Japanese politicians such as Mutsu were ‘fully aware, as politicians, that if
229 Mutsu Munemitsu, Kenkenroku (Gordon Mark Berger, trans.), p. 28
230 Okakura Tenshin, Okakura Tenshin shü (Meiji bungaku zenshü, vol. 38). (Tokyo: Chikuma shobö,
1963), pp. 122-123
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they placed Japan’s survival at the top of their agenda they would have no choice but to 
set their foreign policy-in accordance with “European civilisation’” .231 The Sino- 
Japanese war of 1894-1895 was arguably one unfortunate by-product of the expansion 
of the Janus-faced European International Society, and resulted yet again in stark 
differences between the two states. Japan acquired its first colony, Taiwan, and began 
its first steps towards becoming a ‘civilised’ colonial power. For China, defeat by the 
new member of European International Society, Japan, signified a shock stronger than 
its initial encounter with the European powers back in the early nineteenth century. It 
was to serve as a catalyst for further social and political reforms aimed at adapting to the 
Society, ultimately bringing about the revolution and the birth of the ‘modem’ Chinese 
state in 1911.
Figure 6-1: Shooting China in the name of ‘civilisation’
This picture appeared in 1894, the year the Sino-Japanese war broke out. The Japanese soldier is shooting 
a Chinese man, and the letters ‘civilisation’ come out of the barrel of the gun. Note that the Chinese man 
is smoking opium, a symbol of backwardness, while the Japanese soldier is clothed m Western clothing, 
representing modernity. The child the Japanese soldier carries symbolises Korea. Source: Rekishigaku 
kenkyükai, Nihonshi shiryö. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1997), p. 223
231 Yamamuro Shm’ichi, Shiso kadai to shite no ajia: kijiku, rensa, toki. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2001), 
p. 47
CONCLUSION
This study has reinterpreted China and Japan’s engagement with European International 
Society. As noted earlier, conventional English School studies of the complex process 
of socialisation that China and Japan underwent have been characterised by ‘thin’ 
accounts. Furthermore, these accounts are characterised by a downplaying of the 
intricate relationship between the expansion of European International Society and 
imperialism. They thus have difficulty in explaining why Japan embarked on ‘mimetic’ 
imperialistic ventures, and how Sino-Japanese relations became increasingly 
characterised by suspicion and conflict as a result. The thesis has proposed a fresh 
examination of the expansion of European International Society by combining the 
theoretical tools of the English School and constructivist approaches and by utilising 
primary materials often neglected by scholars of International Relations. Four principal 
questions were posed at the beginning of this thesis:
1. What was the relationship between European International Society and 
imperialism in the late-nineteenth century?
2. How did this shape the relations between the Society and China and Japan?
3. Did the expansion of European International Society into China and Japan 
result in a process of socialisation and a fundamental shift in both states’ 
identities and interests?
4. What are the implications of these findings for the English School approach?
At this point, it would be appropriate to summarise the study’s findings to the first three 
empirical questions and answer the last question by discussing the implications of this 
thesis.
Summary of findings
European International Society, imperialism, and the ‘uncivilised’ outsiders 
The nineteenth century, when China and Japan encountered European International 
Society, was a period of imperialism. Riding on a wave of overwhelming material 
preponderance, the European powers sought to extend their influence and search for 
markets overseas. The nineteenth century was also a time in which European 
confidence in their cultural, industrial, political and military achievements reached a 
highpoint. The by-product of this, as the theoretical literature of the dynamic of ‘self 
and other’ distinction has shown, was that the non-European polities and peoples were
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increasingly labelled as ‘uncivilised’ to contrast and enhance European notions of 
superiority.
A concomitant development was the increasing ideational belief that the 
‘civilised’ states of Europe had the moral duty to introduce the trappings o f ‘civilisation’ 
into non-European polities. European material preponderance provided the ‘civilisers’ 
with ample evidence that non-European polities and peoples were ‘backward’. 
Furthermore, this period saw the emergence of theories which provided ‘scientific’ 
evidence that non-White races were inherently inferior. Even the non-European polities 
whose civilisation had been the subject of admiration by Europeans came to be seen as 
increasingly stagnant or backward. Such sentiments served both as a pretext and 
genuine impetus for the European states to either establish informal or complete colonial 
rule over who they considered to be ‘barbarians’. Accordingly, by the time of the late- 
nineteenth century, non-European states were much less likely to be subjected to the 
mode of interaction that applied among European states, which at least nominally aimed 
for coexistence.
This thesis does not ignore historical complexities. In the interactions between the 
European and non-European states, there were sometimes inconsistencies as to when 
some polities would feel the full force of the ‘civilising’ mode of interaction. But there 
is no denying that polities across the world were differentiated on the basis of 
‘civilisation’ and/or race and subjected to differing modes of interaction. In such a 
patently racist social context, Non-Whites were much more likely to be labelled as 
‘uncivilised’ and subjected to the ‘civilising’ mode of interaction of the Janus-faced 
European International Society.
China and Japan ’s socialisation into European International Society 
The Chinese and the Japanese were to witness this coercive side of the Society, as well 
as the more ‘cooperative’ side, which promoted ‘order and coexistence’ among 
‘civilised’ states. Through an examination of Chinese and Japanese elites’ written 
works, this study has revealed that both sides, to differing degrees, understood the 
dualism inherent within European International Society at the time. On the one hand, as 
their knowledge of the West and intra-European international relations deepened, the 
Chinese and Japanese elites began to develop an understanding of the purposes behind 
the historical evolution of the institutions of the Society. They appreciated that the
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institutions often served to maintain some form of order and protect smaller states from 
the powerful.
Both the Chinese and the Japanese had initially encountered the Society’s 
‘civilising’ mode of interaction, however, and the other mode that governed relations 
between ‘civilised’ states did not immediately become obvious to them. Their initial 
reaction was to strengthen their military power, and this was a perfectly understandable 
response. Military force was an obvious way in which to repel any aggressor. Even 
when they did become aware of the existence of some form of common identity that 
qualified a state to enjoy the protection of the Society’s institutions, many of the 
‘civilised’ states were also militarily powerful, so ‘rich country, strong army’, seemed an 
obvious starting point. Furthermore, it was perceived that powerful states were more 
able to utilise (or abuse) the Society’s institutions to protect their own interests (often at 
the detriment of weaker states), because of their sheer military preponderance. Many of 
the Society’s institutions remain vulnerable to this, and Realist perspectives still serve as 
a powerful reminder of this fact.
However, focusing our attention on attaining military power leaves us with an 
incomplete picture, because military/material power alone did not necessarily help a 
state enjoy the protection of the Society’s institutions. In the context of the late- 
nineteenth century, the Society was one which demanded homogeneity: if an 
‘uncivilised’ entity wished to enjoy the protection of its institutions, it also had to adhere 
to the ‘standard of civilisation’ and transform itself into a ‘Europeanised’ state, and the 
military preponderance the European powers enjoyed at this time meant that non- 
European polities usually had no choice but to conform to these social standards.
In the case of China and Japan, there appears to be a difference in the degree to 
which they understood the Society’s demands for homogeneity. While they both sought 
to become ‘rich and powerful’, China and Japan thus took different paths as a result. 
China sought to become a powerful state by introducing Western technology and 
industry. This was particularly prominent in heavy industry which could be utilised for 
military purposes. But China did not seek membership of European International 
Society, and neither did it perceive the need to adhere to its social norms it thus rejected 
the Society’s demands for homogeneity. Its reforms to become a powerful state were 
not intended for demonstrative purposes to impress the members of the Society. 
Consequently, very little was done to remodel the Qing political institutions along the
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lines of the ‘civilised’ European states and attain the same identity as a ‘civilised’ 
member of the Society.
A similar argument can be made with regard to China’s international behaviour. 
As previous English School scholars have documented, around this time China had 
begun to adopt some of the institutions of the Society in their international relations. 
But this in itself should not be seen as evidence of a deep level of ‘socialisation’. Most 
of these developments were mainly to govern the Qing’s relations with the European 
states, and while some institutions later gained increasing domestic legitimacy, neither 
can it be denied that China’s adoption of them was in part out of expediency. After all, 
failure to conform to the expected behaviour of European International Society could 
bring about military intervention, as the Chinese elites well knew. The superficial 
nature of China’s ‘strategic learning’ was evident in China’s continuation of its tributary 
relations with members of the East Asian international order. In the relative absence of 
coercion, the Chinese elites saw very little need to conform to the ‘social standards’ 
imposed upon them by the ‘civilised’ European powers. In a sense, then, the Chinese 
were secure in their identity: the ‘impact of the West’, for sure, did shake their belief in 
their superiority. But during the period examined in this thesis, we still observe that the 
Chinese elite considered themselves equally (if not more) ‘civilised’ as the European 
powers. Furthermore, if we consider the barbarism committed by the European powers 
under the name of ‘civilisation’ and the sacking of the Summer Palace by the British and 
the French, it does indeed seem unreasonable to expect the Chinese to accept that the 
European powers were more ‘civilised’ than themselves.
In contrast, Japan sought to transform its identity from participant in the Tributary 
System to ‘civilised’ member of European International Society. Japan was the first 
non-European state to attain great power status within the Society, and this was in large 
part a result of historical contingency. The Japanese had the advantage of being able to 
observe what the consequences would be if they resisted the expanding Society. 
Furthermore, they had leaders who understood the close connection between a state’s 
level of ‘civilisation’ and how the Society’s two modes of interaction would apply.
The task of transforming Japan’s identity was by no means an easy task. The 
Japanese had witnessed two very different faces of the Society, and their seemingly 
eager attempts to ‘Europeanise’ had partly resulted from military coercion, not 
wholesale admiration for the ‘civilised’ states of the Society. Gerrit W. Gong puts this 
nicely when he describes Japan’s position as ‘[c]aught between the Scylla of its Asian
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traditions and neighbours and the Charydbis of the European powers with their 
definitions and standards of “civilization”’.'
Consequently, the Meiji leadership’s efforts to seek membership in the Society 
were often shot with contradictions. The Meiji leaders were often genuinely impressed 
by the industrial and political developments that had taken place in the European states, 
while simultaneously remaining resentful and suspicious of them. Similar 
inconsistencies were visible within the broader spectrum of Japanese society too: 
Japanese in Western clothing lamented the loss of indigenous Japanese culture and 
ethics, while pan-Asianists called for Asians to unite, while at the same time not 
questioning Japan’s leadership role in introducing modernity into the region to counter 
the threat of the West. But the leadership was ultimately successful in transforming 
Japan’s identity. This required considerable political will, and when we consider the 
failures of other non-European states to attain ‘civilised’ status with the same speed at 
which Japan had done, it must be concluded that the Japanese case was unique.
The changes which took place within Japan consequently took on a different 
character from those of the Chinese. Japan sought to become a ‘rich and powerful 
state’, as they also knew the coercive face of the Society only too well. Their goal was 
in part to build up Japan’s military power, just like China’s. However, in contrast to 
China, Japan also sought to do so by modelling itself on the ‘civilised’ European 
powers. The central difference with China lay in the fact that the policy also was 
purposely designed to demonstrate Japan’s ability to play the role of a ‘civilised’ power.
Similar developments took place in Japan’s international behaviour. Japan fully 
incorporated the institutions of European International Society into its foreign relations. 
The degree to which Japan had become socialised into the social structures of the 
Society is discernible from their policy within East Asia. The Japanese leaders also 
sought to demonstrate their ability to conduct their diplomacy in a ‘civilised’ manner. 
They dismantled the ‘outdated’ vestiges of the East Asian international order and 
established diplomatic relations based on legalistic ‘treaty relations’ among the 
Society’s members. There was, however, another dimension of Japan’s socialisation 
that has to date been underexplored by English School scholars: that was the unexpected 
consequence of increased Sino-Japanese conflict and Japanese imperialism. As Japan’s 
‘Europeanisation’ accelerated and the European International Society’s social standards 
of ‘success’ became entrenched, the Asian states increasingly came to be seen as
i Gong, The Standard o f ‘Civdization ’ in International Society, p. 174
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‘backward’. The effects of the dual mode of interaction within European International 
Society became increasingly prominent in Japan’s diplomatic conduct towards its Asian 
neighbours. Having engaged with the notion that ‘civilised’ states had the duty to 
‘enlighten’ the ‘barbarous’ people, Japan sent military expeditions to ‘pacify’ the 
Taiwanese ‘savages’ and carve themselves a ‘civilised’ identity. They also began 
attempts to promote political reforms in Korea, precipitating increasingly hostile Sino- 
Japanese rivalry.
Implications of the study
Implications for the English School approach
The findings of this study suggest that the English School must seek a better balance 
between its devotion to providing ways of avoiding the brutish world of power politics 
and serving as an analytical tool to understanding international politics. As mentioned 
in earlier chapters, some scholars have noted that the English School approach not only 
describes what states do, it also describes what they ought to do. 2 This is not in itself 
deplorable. In a world where states still regularly violate international norms (human 
rights abuse is one that comes readily to mind), surely it is worthwhile having a 
theoretical/philosophical approach that provides prescriptions for a more ethical life in 
the international realm.
At the same time, however, this seems to come at the price of producing a 
somewhat narrow conceptualisation of International Society. The results of this, as we 
have seen, are either tensions between historical realities and normative commitments or 
narrowly-defined questions which downplay the coercive mode of interaction within 
International Society. This permits us to view only one side of the face of International 
Society, and puts blinkers on interpretive analysis conducted under the theoretical 
approach of the English School. This hardly seems to do justice to the approach’s self- 
proclaimed potential as a broader theoretical framework for understanding international 
politics. In recent years, there have been arguments that the English School approach 
was a forerunner of constructivist approaches; 3 this presumably implies that the
2 Chris Brown, ‘World Society and the English School: An “International Society” Perspective on 
World Society’, European Journal o f International Relations (vol. 7, no. 4, 2001, pp. 423-441), p. 
438
3 See Dunne, Inventing International Society, pp. 7-9, ‘The Social Construction of International 
Society’, European Journal o f International Relations (vol. 1, no. 3, 1995, pp. 367-389); Richard 
Little, ‘The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations’, European Journal
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approach can also serve as a heuristic analytical tool for deepening our understanding of 
the social context of international relations. I certainly do not intend to forward another 
dichotomy between ‘Realism" and ‘Idealism’, and neither do I believe that the English 
School should abandon their normative ideals altogether. * 4 But if we are to broaden the 
analytical scope of the English School approach, we need to escape the intellectual 
strait-jacket of conventional accounts of European International Society.
By paying attention to the fact that China and Japan first encountered the coercive, 
‘civilising’ face of the Society, it is hoped that this thesis points the way forward to 
arriving at a more complete understanding of why both the Chinese and Japanese 
framed their national interests and goals in militaristic/imperialistic terms, rather than 
cooperative terms. Furthermore, this analytical framework is able to demonstrate why 
the Japanese, who defined ‘civilised’ membership of the Society in terms of imperialist 
behaviour and used its institutions accordingly to attain this goal, were actually 
reproducing the Janus-faced nature of European International Society.
Implications for understanding Sino-Japanese relations
This thesis also advocates the need for greater contextualisation in the study of Sino- 
Japanese relations. Some studies on this topic have claimed that mutual rivalry and 
ambivalence has historically been present between the two countries. In a typical 
statement of this kind, Rex Li states in his discussion of contemporary Sino-Japanese 
relations: ‘[wjhile Japanese ambitions in the international arena have attracted much 
attention from Chinese scholars and analysts, it is Tokyo’s Asia strategy that causes the 
greatest concern in China. After all, Japan and China are historical rivals in East Asia. ’ 5 
The other argument, often espoused by the leaders of the two countries, maintains that 
relations between the two were fundamentally characterised by peace, only for it to 
become increasingly conflict-ridden in the late-nineteenth century, after China and 
Japan’s encounter with European International Society, thereby polarising the historical 
evolution of the bilateral relationship.
o f International Relations (vol. 6, no. 3, 2000, pp. 395-422); Barry Buzan, ‘The English School: an
underexploited resource in IR’ Review o f International Studies (vol. 27, no. 3, July 2001, pp. 471 -
488)
4 In this vein, it is worth noting that constructivists have also had normative arguments that prescribe 
appropriate behaviour for states. However, they have tended to do so implicitly, and this has also 
come under some criticism. See Reus-Smit, ‘Imagining society: constructivism and the English 
School’, British Journal o f Politics and International Relations (vol. 4, no. 3, October 2002, pp. 487- 
509), pp. 499-502.
5 Rex Li, ‘Partners or Rivals? Chinese Perceptions of Japan’s Security Strategy in the Asia-Pacific 
Region’ The Journal o f Strategic Studies (vol. 22, no. 4, December 1999, pp. 1-25), p. 6
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Both sides are correct, but only to a certain extent. This study has demonstrated 
that Japan’s views vis-ä-vis China were both characterised by admiration and an attempt 
to usurp China’s position at the apex of the social hierarchy in the East Asian 
international order: in this sense we can see both states as ‘historic rivals’. The Sino- 
Japanese war of 1894-1895 was, however, a turning point in that it took place under 
very different circumstances. It was not a clash between two states belonging to the 
same international order, but one which took place between members of two different 
orders. It was arguably more strongly connected with increasing insecurities created by 
Japan’s quest for a ‘civilised’ identity within European International Society and its 
subsequent attempts to dismantle the vestiges of the East Asian international order. 
This seems less connected to ‘historic’ rivalry, which had previously taken place within 
the same international order. Such arguments give the ‘historic’ character of Sino- 
Japanese conflict a remarkably ahistorical character. While rivalries between the two 
states may have taken place throughout history, we need to further elucidate the 
different social/historical contexts in which these took place.
Implications for the study of international politics
I would like to conclude with a number of implications for the study of international 
politics in general. This is a worthwhile exercise, because the violent, coercive manner 
in which both states were introduced into European International Society had significant 
implications for the future world order.
This thesis has traced Japan’s attempts to become a ‘civilised’ member of 
European International Society in the late-nineteenth century, and Japan’s labours were 
to eventually bear fruit; in 1899, it succeeded in abolishing extraterritoriality, and was 
accorded ‘great power’ status after its victory over Russia in 1905. Despite these 
achievements, it seems that the Japanese did not always feel comfortable in the Society. 
Memories of the coercive, ‘civilised’ powers persisted, as well as the racist attitudes of 
the European powers, which continued to demarcate ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ on the 
basis of skin colour. On 6th November 1918, on the eve of the Peace Conference, 
Konoe Fumimaro future prime minister of Japan (1937-1939, 1940-1941),
wrote indignantly of the continued racial discrimination and ‘Anglo-American-led 
pacifism’:
As Japanese, it is imperative that we advocate the abolition of the yellow-skinned
races. It goes without saying that the United States and the British colonies of
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Australia and Canada open the doors of their territories to Whites, while they look 
down upon Japanese and other yellow-skinned peoples and seek to exclude them 
from their territories.. .From the point of humanity and justice, I cannot but call for 
the Anglo-Americans to deeply regret their arrogant ways in this coming Peace 
Conference and abolish not only restrictive immigration practise, towards yellow­
skinned people, but also all other discriminatory practices. I think that the coming 
Conference is a crucial test of whether or not humanity is capable of reconfiguring 
the world on the basis of humanity and justice. I hope that Japan will not pay 
credence to Anglo-American pacifism, and strive to accomplish a true sense of 
humanity and justice.6
Japan, however, saw their proposed Racial Equality Clause quashed at the 
Conference by the opposition of the White powers. In many ways, this ambivalence 
towards the guardians of International Society -  the ‘great powers’ -  led to a weakness 
of the moral fabric of the Society, at least with regard to Japan. Japanese perceptions of 
hypocrisy and continued differentiation, as well as its frustration, was partly responsible 
for the Society’s decreased legitimacy, as well as being partly responsible for Japan’s 
revolt against the Society in the 1930-1940s, when it proclaimed an alternative order 
called the ‘Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’ which it juxtaposed against the 
‘Anglo-American world order’.
This problem was to bedevil Japan in its own relations with its Asian neighbours. 
Just like the European powers had done for the Japanese, Japan played a crucial role in 
providing a ready model for its neighbours to attain ‘civilised’ status and stand on equal 
terms with the European states. Many Chinese and Korean students came to Japan to 
learn the secrets of successful ‘state reconfiguration’, and were often impressed with the 
changes that had taken place. Japan’s victory over the ‘civilised’ European state, 
Russia, was also a case for celebration for many Asians, although it should be noted that 
the Russo-Japanese war was fought over Chinese territory and came at a significant cost 
to Chinese lives, and is certainly not a case to be celebrated uncritically.
At the same time, Japan had also become a Janus-faced entity, for it was a 
‘civiliser’ that forced its Asian neighbours to ‘modernise’ and enter unequal treaties 
with it. Many Asians thus felt an equal sense of antipathy towards the Japanese, and it 
is arguable that China’s ambivalence towards Japan is less to do with its historic pride, 
but rather with its more recent memories of Japan as a ‘civilised’ member of European 
International Society. These memories have yet to be erased -  Japan continues to be an 
important power of East Asia. It is the only Asian member of the G8, and has one of the 
largest economies of the world. However, it is still viewed with suspicion from its
6 Konoe Fumimaro, ‘Eibei hon’i no heiwashugi o haisu’ in Ito Takeshi (ed), Seidanroku. (Tokyo:
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neighbours; whenever it attempts to take on the role of a ‘guardian’ International Society 
(such as participating in UN peace-keeping operations), its actions trigger an unwelcome 
response by Korea and China.
These ambivalent reactions towards the great powers of International Society are 
not limited to China or Japan. There are some similarities between the outlooks of the 
nineteenth-century Chinese, Japanese, and today’s so-called ‘Third World’ states. The 
continuous problem of so-called ‘failed states’ and states with appalling records of 
human rights abuse often call into question whether or not it is necessary for 
contemporary International Society to utilise its ‘civilising’ mode of interaction and 
intervene in such states. * 7 The ‘civilising’ face of International Society has far from left 
us, and suspicion towards contemporary International Society and its institutions are still 
visible today in the form of resistance to any perceived form of ‘cultural imperialism’ or 
‘Western intervention’. It is not particularly surprising that these voices come from so- 
called ‘Third World’ states that were most exposed to the ‘civilising’ mode of 
interaction. 8
The issue of whether or not International Society has the responsibility to extend 
its version of ‘civilisation’ is a contested topic, and usually takes the form of debates 
over ‘humanitarian intervention’. The tension over the protection of state sovereignty or 
humanity need not be resolved here. But we should be mindful of the fact that states’ 
engagement with the ‘civilising’ mode of interaction can have unintended consequences, 
as Japan’s imperialism so starkly demonstrates. A more contemporary example of this 
may be many non-European states’ suspicion of the ‘industrialised states’ -  the modem 
‘civilised’ states -  which often results in a labelling of various international norms as 
‘cultural imperialism’ and a refusal to comply with them, thus threatening the fragile 
international order. To attain a tmly universal international order -  for states and its 
peoples -  we need to accept the fact that International Society has been and still is a 
Janus-faced one, for better or for worse. The future task is to ensure that its ‘civilising’ 
face attains greater legitimacy.
Chikura shobo, 1936), pp. 240-241
7 See for example Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and 
Failing States’, International Security (vol. 29, no. 2, Fall 2004, pp. 85-120)
8 Again, although this problem need not be solved within this thesis, this legacy of imperialism is 
reflected in the fundamental tension which exists in the ‘pluralist’ and ‘solidarist’ debate. This 
debate, albeit with a greater sympathy to the ‘solidarist’ position, is discussed in Nicholas J. Wheeler, 
Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000)
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